_Mr. Chairman, Ladies, and Gentlemen_:
To-day I wish to speak to you, not merely about the Monroe Doctrine,
but about our entire position in the Western Hemisphere—a position
so peculiar and predominant that out of it has grown the acceptance
of the Monroe Doctrine as a cardinal feature of our foreign policy;
and in particular I wish to point out what has been done during the
lifetime of the last Congress to make good our position in accordance
with this historic policy.
Ever since the time when we definitely extended our boundaries
westward to the Pacific and southward to the Gulf, since the time
when the old Spanish and Portuguese colonies to the south of us
asserted their independence, our Nation has insisted that because of
its primacy in strength among the nations of the Western Hemisphere
it has certain duties and responsibilities which oblige it to take a
leading part thereon. We hold that our interests in this hemisphere
are greater than those of any European power possibly can be, and
that our duty to ourselves and to the weaker republics who are our
neighbors requires us to see that none of the great military powers
from across the seas shall encroach upon the territory of the American
republics or acquire control thereover.
This policy, therefore, not only forbids us to acquiesce in such
territorial acquisition, but also causes us to object to the
acquirement of a control which would in its effect be equal to
territorial aggrandizement. This is why the United States has steadily
believed that the construction of the great Isthmian Canal, the
building of which is to stand as the greatest material feat of the
twentieth century—greater than any similar feat in any preceding
century—should be done by no foreign nation but by ourselves. The
canal must of necessity go through the territory of one of our smaller
sister republics. We have been scrupulously careful to abstain from
perpetrating any wrong upon any of these republics in this matter.
We do not wish to interfere with their rights in the least, but,
while carefully safeguarding them, to build the canal ourselves under
provisions which will enable us, if necessary, to police and protect
it, and to guarantee its neutrality, we being the sole guarantor. Our
intention was steadfast; we desired action taken so that the canal
could always be used by us in time of peace and war alike, and in
time of war could never be used to our detriment by any nation which
was hostile to us. Such action, by the circumstances surrounding it,
was necessarily for the benefit and not the detriment of the adjacent
American republics.
After considerably more than half of a century these objects have
been exactly fulfilled by the legislation and treaties of the last
two years. Two years ago we were no further advanced toward the
construction of the Isthmian Canal on our terms than we had been
during the preceding eighty years. By the Hay-Pauncefote treaty,
ratified in December, 1901, an old treaty with Great Britain, which
had been held to stand in the way, was abrogated and it was agreed
that the canal should be constructed under the auspices of the
Government of the United States, and that this Government should have
the exclusive right to regulate and manage it, becoming the sole
guarantor of its neutrality.
It was expressly stipulated, furthermore, that this guaranty of
neutrality should not prevent the United States from taking any
measures which it found necessary in order to secure by its own
forces the defence of the United States and the maintenance of
public order. Immediately following this treaty Congress passed a
law under which the President was authorized to endeavor to secure
a treaty for acquiring the right to finish the construction of, and
to operate, the Panama Canal, which had already been begun in the
territory of Colombia by a French company. The rights of this company
were accordingly obtained and a treaty negotiated with the Republic
of Colombia. This treaty has just been ratified by the Senate. It
reserves all of Colombia’s rights, while guaranteeing all of our
own and those of neutral nations, and specifically permits us to
take any and all measures for the defence of the canal, and for the
preservation of our interests, whenever in our judgment an exigency
may arise which calls for action on our part. In other words, these
two treaties, and the legislation to carry them out, have resulted
in our obtaining on exactly the terms we desired the rights and
privileges which we had so long sought in vain. These treaties are
among the most important that we have ever negotiated in their effects
upon the future welfare of this country, and mark a memorable triumph
of American diplomacy—one of those fortunate triumphs, moreover, which
redound to the benefit of the entire world.
About the same time trouble arose in connection with the Republic of
Venezuela because of certain wrongs alleged to have been committed,
and debts overdue, by this Republic to citizens of various foreign
powers, notably England, Germany, and Italy. After failure to reach an
agreement these powers began a blockade of the Venezuelan coast and a
condition of quasi-war ensued. The concern of our Government was of
course not to interfere needlessly in any quarrel so far as it did
not touch our interests or our honor, and not to take the attitude
of protecting from coercion any power unless we were willing to
espouse the quarrel of that power, but to keep an attitude of watchful
vigilance and see that there was no infringement of the Monroe
Doctrine—no acquirement of territorial rights by a European power at
the expense of a weak sister republic—whether this acquisition might
take the shape of an outright and avowed seizure of territory or of
the exercise of control which would in effect be equivalent to such
seizure. This attitude was expressed in the two following published
memoranda, the first being the letter addressed by the Secretary of
State to the German Ambassador, the second the conversation with the
Secretary of State reported by the British Ambassador:
“DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
“WASHINGTON, _December 16, 1901_.
“HIS EXCELLENCY DR. VON HOLLEBEN, etc.:
“_Dear Excellency_: I inclose a memorandum by way of reply to that
which you did me the honor to leave with me on Saturday, and am, as
ever,
“Faithfully yours,
“JOHN HAY.
“_Memorandum._
“The President in his message of the 3d of December, 1901, used the
following language:
“The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no
territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense
of any American power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as
hostile to any nation in the Old World.’”
“The President further said:
“‘This doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relations of
any American power, save that it in truth allows each of them to
form such as it desires.... We do not guarantee any State against
punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment
does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any
non-American power.’
“His Excellency the German Ambassador, on his recent return from
Berlin, conveyed personally to the President the assurance of the
German Emperor that His Majesty’s Government had no purpose or
intention to make even the smallest acquisition of territory on the
South American continent or the islands adjacent. This voluntary
and friendly declaration was afterward repeated to the Secretary
of State, and was received by the President and the people of the
United States in the frank and cordial spirit in which it was
offered. In the memorandum of the 11th of December, His Excellency
the German Ambassador repeats these assurances as follows: ‘We
declare especially that under no circumstances do we consider in
our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of
Venezuelan territory.’
“In the said memorandum of the 11th of December, the German
Government informs that of the United States that it has certain
just claims for money and for damages wrongfully withheld from
German subjects by the Government of Venezuela, and that it proposes
to take certain coercive measures described in the memorandum to
enforce the payment of these just claims.
“The President of the United States, appreciating the courtesy of
the German Government in making him acquainted with the state of
affairs referred to, and not regarding himself as called upon to
enter into the consideration of the claims in question, believes
that no measures will be taken in this matter by the agents of the
German Government which are not in accordance with the well-known
purpose, above set forth, of His Majesty the German Emperor.”
SIR MICHAEL HERBERT TO THE MARQUIS OF
LANSDOWNE.
“WASHINGTON, _November 13, 1902_.
“I communicated to Mr. Hay this morning the substance of Your
Lordship’s telegram of the 11th instant.
“His Excellency stated in reply, that the United States Government,
although they regretted that European powers should use force
against Central and South American countries, could not object
to their taking steps to obtain redress for injuries suffered by
their subjects, provided that no acquisition of territory was
contemplated.”
Both powers assured us in explicit terms that there was not the
slightest intention on their part to violate the principles of the
Monroe Doctrine, and this assurance was kept with an honorable good
faith which merits full acknowledgment on our part. At the same time,
the existence of hostilities in a region so near our own borders was
fraught with such possibilities of danger in the future that it was
obviously no less our duty to ourselves than our duty to humanity
to endeavor to put an end to that. Accordingly, by an offer of our
good services in a spirit of frank friendliness to all the parties
concerned, a spirit in which they quickly and cordially responded, we
secured a resumption of peace—the contending parties agreeing that
the matters which they could not settle among themselves should be
referred to The Hague Tribunal for settlement. The United States had
most fortunately already been able to set an example to other nations
by utilizing the great possibilities for good contained in The Hague
Tribunal, a question at issue between ourselves and the Republic
of Mexico being the first submitted to this international court of
arbitration.
The terms which we have secured as those under which the Isthmian
Canal is to be built, and the course of events in the Venezuela
matter, have shown not merely the ever growing influence of the United
States in the Western Hemisphere, but also, I think I may safely say,
have exemplified the firm purpose of the United States that its growth
and influence and power shall redound not to the harm but to the
benefit of our sister republics whose strength is less. Our growth,
therefore, is beneficial to humankind in general. We do not intend
to assume any position which can give just offence to our neighbors.
Our adherence to the rule of human right is not merely profession.
The history of our dealings with Cuba shows that we reduce it to
performance.
The Monroe Doctrine is not international law, and though I think one
day it may become such, this is not necessary as long as it remains a
cardinal feature of our foreign policy and as long as we possess both
the will and the strength to make it effective. This last point, my
fellow-citizens, is all important, and is one which as a people we
can never afford to forget. I believe in the Monroe Doctrine with all
my heart and soul; I am convinced that the immense majority of our
fellow-countrymen so believe in it; but I would infinitely prefer to
see us abandon it than to see us put it forward and bluster about it,
and yet fail to build up the efficient fighting strength which in the
last resort can alone make it respected by any strong foreign power
whose interest it may ever happen to be to violate it.
Boasting and blustering are as objectionable among nations as among
individuals, and the public men of a great nation owe it to their
sense of national self-respect to speak courteously of foreign
powers, just as a brave and self-respecting man treats all around him
courteously. But though to boast is bad, and causelessly to insult
another, worse, yet worse than all is it to be guilty of boasting,
even without insult, and when called to the proof to be unable to
make such boasting good. There is a homely old adage which runs:
“Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.” If the American
Nation will speak softly, and yet build, and keep at a pitch of the
highest training, a thoroughly efficient navy, the Monroe Doctrine
will go far. I ask you to think over this. If you do, you will come to
the conclusion that it is mere plain common-sense, so obviously sound
that only the blind can fail to see its truth and only the weakest and
most irresolute can fail to desire to put it into force.
In the last two years I am happy to say we have taken long strides
in advance as regards our navy. The last Congress, in addition to
smaller vessels, provided nine of those formidable fighting ships
upon which the real efficiency of any navy in war ultimately depends.
It provided, moreover, for the necessary addition of officers and
enlisted men to make the ships worth having. Meanwhile the Navy
Department has seen to it that our ships have been constantly
exercised at sea, with the great guns, and in manœuvres, so that
their efficiency as fighting units, both individually and when acting
together, has been steadily improved. Remember that all of this is
necessary. A warship is a huge bit of mechanism, wellnigh as delicate
and complicated as it is formidable. It takes years to build it. It
takes years to teach the officers and men how to handle it to good
advantage. It is an absolute impossibility to improvise a navy at the
outset of war. No recent war between any two nations has lasted as
long as it takes to build a battleship; and it is just as impossible
to improvise the officers or the crews as to improvise the navy.
To lay up a battleship and only send it afloat at the outset of a war,
with a raw crew and untried officers, would be not merely a folly but
a crime, for it would invite both disaster and disgrace. The navy
which so quickly decided in our favor in the war in 1898 had been
built and made efficient during the preceding fifteen years. The ships
that triumphed off Manila and Santiago had been built under previous
Administrations with money appropriated by previous Congresses. The
officers and the men did their duty so well because they had already
been trained to it by long sea service. All honor to the gallant
officers and gallant men who actually did the fighting; but remember,
too, to honor the public men, the shipwrights and steel workers, the
owners of the shipyards and armor plants, to whose united foresight
and exertion we owe it that in 1898 we had craft so good, guns so
excellent, and American seamen of so high a type in the conning
towers, in the gun-turrets, and in the engine rooms. It is too late to
prepare for war when war has come; and if we only prepare sufficiently
no war will ever come. We wish a powerful and efficient navy, not for
purposes of war, but as the surest guarantee of peace. If we have such
a navy—if we keep on building it up—we may rest assured that there is
but the smallest chance that trouble will ever come to this Nation;
and we may likewise rest assured that no foreign power will ever
quarrel with us about the Monroe Doctrine.