AT HAVERHILL, MASS., AUGUST 26, 1902

_My Fellow-Citizens_:

Naturally at the home of Secretary Moody I should like to say a word

or two about the navy. I think that whenever we touch on the navy we

are sure of a hearty response from any American audience; we are just

as sure of such a response in the mountains and great plains of the

West as upon the Atlantic or Pacific seaboards. The entire country is

vitally interested in the navy, because an efficient navy of adequate

size is not only the best guarantee of peace, but is also the surest

means for seeing that if war does come the result shall be honorable

to our good name and favorable to our national interests.

Any really great nation must be peculiarly sensitive to two things:

Stain on the national honor at home, and disgrace to the national

arms abroad. Our honor at home, our honor in domestic and internal

affairs, is at all times in our own keeping, and depends simply upon

the possession of an awakened public conscience. But the only way to

make safe our honor, as affected not by our own deeds but by the deeds

of others, is by readiness in advance. In three great crises in our

history during the nineteenth century—in the War of 1812, in the Civil

War, and again in the Spanish War—the navy rendered to the nation

services of literally incalculable worth. In the Civil War we had to

meet antagonists even more unprepared at sea than we were. On both the

other occasions we encountered foreign foes, and the fighting was done

entirely by ships built long in advance, and by officers and crews

who had been trained during years of sea service for the supreme day

when their qualities were put to the final test. The ships which won

at Manila and Santiago under the Administration of President McKinley

had been built years before under Presidents Arthur, Cleveland, and

Harrison. The officers in those ships had been trained from their

earliest youth to their profession, and the enlisted men, in addition

to their natural aptitude, their intelligence, and their courage, had

been drilled as marksmen with the great guns and as machinists in the

engine rooms, and perfected in all the details of their work during

years of cruising on the high seas and of incessant target practice.

It was this preparedness which was the true secret of the enormous

difference in efficiency between our navy and the Spanish navy. There

was no lack of courage and self-devotion among the Spaniards, but

on our side, in addition to the courage and devotion, for the lack

of which no training could atone, there was also that training—the

training which comes only as the result of years of thorough and

painstaking practice.

Annapolis is, with the sole exception of its sister academy at West

Point, the most typically democratic and American school of learning

and preparation that there is in the entire country. Men go there

from every State, from every walk of life, professing every creed—the

chance of entry being open to all who perfect themselves in the

necessary studies and who possess the necessary moral and physical

qualities. There each man enters on his merits, stands on his merits,

and graduates into a service where only his merit will enable him to

be of value.

The enlisted men are of fine type, as they needs must be to do their

work well, whether in the gun turret or in the engine room; and out

of the fine material thus provided the finished man-of-war’s man is

evolved by years of sea service.

It is impossible after the outbreak of war to improvise either the

ships or the men of a navy. A war vessel is a bit of mechanism as

delicate and complicated as it is formidable. You might just as well

expect to turn an unskilled laborer offhand into a skilled machinist

or into the engineer of a flyer on one of our big railroad systems as

to put men aboard a battleship with the expectation that they will

do anything but discredit themselves until they have had months and

years in which thoroughly to learn their duties. Our shipbuilders

and gunmakers must keep ever on the alert so that no rivals pass

them by; and the officers and enlisted men on board the ships must

in their turn, by the exercise of unflagging and intelligent zeal,

keep themselves fit to get the best use out of the weapons of war

intrusted to their care. The instrument is always important, but the

man who uses it is more important still. We must constantly endeavor

to perfect our navy in all its duties in time of peace, and above all

in manœuvring in a seaway and in marksmanship with the great guns. In

battle the only shots that count are those that hit, and marksmanship

is a matter of long practice and of intelligent reasoning. A navy’s

efficiency in a war depends mainly upon its preparedness at the

outset of that war. We are not to be excused as a nation if there is

not such preparedness of our navy. This is especially so in view of

what we have done during the last four years. No nation has a right

to undertake a big task unless it is prepared to do it in masterful

and effective style. It would be an intolerable humiliation for us to

embark on such a course of action as followed from our declaration

of war with Spain, and not make good our words by deeds—not be ready

to prove our truth by our endeavor whenever the need calls. The

good work of building up the navy must go on without ceasing. The

modern warship can not with advantage be allowed to rust in disuse.

It must be used up in active service even in time of peace. This

means that there must be a constant replacement of the ineffective

by the effective. The work of building up and keeping up our navy is

therefore one which needs our constant and unflagging vigilance. Our

navy is now efficient; but we must be content with no ordinary degree

of efficiency. Every effort must be made to bring it ever nearer to

perfection. In making such effort the prime factor is to have at the

head of the navy such an official as your fellow-townsman, Mr. Moody;

and the next is to bring home to our people as a whole the need of

thorough and ample preparation in advance; this preparation to take

the form not only of continually building ships, but of keeping these

ships in commission under conditions which will develop the highest

degree of efficiency in the officers and enlisted men aboard them.

Presidential addresses and state papers, Volume 1 (of 7) · 第 63 / 98 题