This article is so manifestly contrary to the law of nations, that

nothing more would seem necessary than to observe that it is so. Reason

and usage have established that when two nations go to war, those who

choose to live in peace retain their natural right to pursue their

agriculture, manufactures, and other ordinary vocations, to carry the

produce of their industry for exchange to all nations, belligerent or

neutral, as usual, to go and come freely without injury or molestation,

and in short, that the war among others shall be, for them, as if it did

not exist. One restriction on their natural rights has been submitted

to by nations at peace, that is to say, that of not furnishing to either

party implements merely of war for the annoyance of the other, nor any

thing whatever to a place blockaded by its enemy. What these implements

of war are, has been so often agreed and is so well understood as to

leave little question about them at this day. There does not exist,

perhaps, a nation in our common hemisphere, which has not made a

particular enumeration of them in some or all of their treaties, under

the name of contraband. It suffices for the present occasion, to say,

that corn, flour, and meal are not of the class of contraband, and

consequently remain articles of free commerce. A culture which, like

that of the soil, gives employment to such a proportion of mankind,

could never be suspended by the whole earth, or interrupted for them,

whenever any two nations should think proper to go to war.

The state of war then existing between Great Britain and France,

furnishes no legitimate right either to interrupt the agriculture of

the United States, or the peaceable exchange of its produce with all

nations; and consequently, the assumption of it will be as lawful

hereafter as now, in peace as in war. No ground, acknowledged by the

common reason of mankind, authorizes this act now, and unacknowledged

ground may be taken at any time, and at all times. We see then a

practice begun, to which no time, no circumstances prescribe any

limits, and which strikes at the root of our agriculture, that branch

of industry which gives food, clothing, and comfort to the great mass of

the inhabitants of these States. If any nation whatever has a right to

shut up to our produce all the ports of the earth except her own and

those of her friends, she may shut up these also, and so confine us

within our own limits. No nation can subscribe to such pretensions; no

nation can agree, at the mere will or interest of another, to have its

peaceable industry suspended, and its citizens reduced to idleness and

Want. The loss of our produce destined for foreign markets, or that loss

which would result from an arbitrary restraint of our markets, is a tax

too serious for us to acquiesce in. It is not enough for a nation

to say, we and our friends will buy your produce. We have a right to

answer, that it suits us better to sell to their enemies as well as

their friends. Our ships do not go to France to return empty. They go to

exchange the surplus of one produce which we can spare, for surplusses

of other kinds which they can spare and we want; which they can furnish

on better terms, and more to our mind, than Great Britain or her

friends. We have a right to judge for ourselves what market best suits

us, and they have none to forbid to us the enjoyment of the necessaries

and comforts which we may obtain from any other independent country.

This act, too, tends directly to draw us from that state of peace

in which we are wishing to remain. It is an essential character of

neutrality to furnish no aids (not stipulated by treaty) to one party,

which we are not equally ready to furnish to the other. If we permit

corn to be sent to Great Britain and her friends, we are equally bound

to permit it to France. To restrain it would be a partiality which

might lead to war with France; and between restraining it ourselves, and

permitting her enemies to restrain it unrightfully, is no difference.

She would consider this as a mere pretext, of which she would not be the

dupe; and on what honorable ground could we otherwise explain it?

Thus we should see ourselves plunged by this unauthorized act of Great

Britain into a war with which we meddle not, and which we wish to avoid,

if justice to all parties and from all parties will enable us to avoid

it. In the case where we found ourselves obliged by treaty to withhold

from the enemies of France the right of arming in our ports, we thought

ourselves in justice bound to withhold the same right from France also,

and we did it. Were we to withhold from her supplies of provisions, we

should in like manner be bound to withhold them from her enemies also;

and thus shut to ourselves all the ports of Europe where corn is in

demand, or make ourselves parties in the war. This is a dilemma which

Great Britain has no right to force upon us, and for which no pretext

can be found in any part of our conduct. She may indeed feel the desire

of starving an enemy nation: but she can have no right of doing it at

our loss, nor of making us the instruments of it.

The President therefore desires, that you will immediately enter into

explanations on this subject with the British government. Lay before

them in friendly and temperate terms all the demonstrations of the

injury done us by this act, and endeavor to obtain a revocation of it,

and full indemnification, to any citizens of these States who may have

suffered by it in the mean time. Accompany your representations by every

assurance of our earnest desire to live on terms of the best friendship

and harmony with them, and to found our expectations of justice on their

part, on a strict observance of it on ours.

It is with concern, however, I am obliged to observe, that so marked has

been the inattention of the British court to every application which

has been made to them on any subject, by this government (not a single

answer I believe having ever been given to one of them, except in

the act of exchanging a minister), that it may become unavoidable, in

certain cases, where an answer of some sort is necessary, to consider

their silence as an answer. Perhaps this is their intention. Still,

however, desirous of furnishing no color of offence, we do not wish you

to name to them any term for giving an answer. Urge one as much as you

can without commitment, and on the first day of December be so good as

to give us information of the state in which this matter is, that it may

be received during the session of Congress.

The second article of the same instruction allows the armed vessels

of Great Britain to seize for condemnation all vessels, on their first

attempt to enter a blockaded port, except those of Denmark and Sweden,

which are to be prevented only, but not seized, on their first attempt.

Of the nations inhabiting the shores of the Atlantic ocean, and

practising its navigation, Denmark, Sweden, and the United States alone

are neutral. To declare then all neutral vessels (for as to the vessels

of the belligerent powers no order was necessary) to be legal prize,

which shall attempt to enter a blockaded port, except those of Denmark

and Sweden, is exactly to declare that the vessels of the United States

shall be lawful prize, and those of Denmark and Sweden shall not. It

is of little consequence that the article has avoided naming the United

States, since it has used a description applicable to them, and to them

alone, while it exempts the others from its operation by name. You will

be pleased to ask an explanation of this distinction: and you will be

able to say, in discussing its justice, that in every circumstance, we

treat Great Britain on the footing of the most favored nation where our

treaties do not preclude us, and that even these are just as favorable

to her, as hers are to us. Possibly she may be bound by treaty to admit

this exception in favor of Denmark and Sweden. But she cannot be bound

by treaty to withhold it from us. And if it be withheld merely because

not established with us by treaty, what might not we, on the same

ground, have withheld from Great Britain during the short course of the

present war, as well as the peace which preceded it?

Whether these explanations with the British government shall be verbal

or in writing, is left to yourself. Verbal communications are very

insecure; for it is only to deny them or to change their terms, in order

to do away their effect at any time. Those in writing have as many and

obvious advantages, and ought to be preferred, unless there be obstacles

of which we are not apprized. I have the honor to be, with great and

sincere esteem, Dear Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

Th: Jefferson.

LETTER CLXVIII.--TO MR. HAMMOND, September 9, 1793

TO MR. HAMMOND.

Philadelphia, September 9, 1793.

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your two memorials of the

4th and 6th instant, which have been duly laid before the President of

the United States.

You cannot be uninformed of the circumstances which have occasioned

the French squadron now in New York to seek asylum in the ports of

the United States. Driven from those where they were on duty, by the

superiority of the adverse party in the civil war which has so unhappily

afflicted the colonies of France, filled with the wretched fugitives

from the same scenes of distress and desolation, without water or

provisions for the shortest voyage, their vessels scarcely in a

condition to keep the sea at all, they were forced to seek the nearest

ports in which they could be received and supplied with necessaries.

That they have ever been out again to cruise, is a fact we have never

learned, and which we believe to be impossible, from the information

received of their wants and other impediments to active service. This

case has been noted specially, to show that no inconvenience can have

been produced to the trade of the other belligerent powers, by the

presence of this fleet in our harbors. I shall now proceed to more

general ground.

France, England, and all other nations have a right to cruise on our

coasts; a right not derived from our permission, but from the law of

nature. To render this more advantageous, France has secured to herself,

by a treaty with us, (as she has done also by a treaty with Great

Britain, in the event of a war with us or any other nation) two special

rights. 1. Admission for her prizes and privateers into our ports.

This, by the seventeenth and twenty-second articles, is secured to her

exclusively of her enemies, as is done for her in the like case by

Great Britain, were her present war with us instead of Great Britain.

2. Admission for her public vessels of war into our ports, in cases

of stress of weather, pirates, enemies, or other urgent necessity, to

refresh, victual, repair, &c. This is not exclusive. As then we are

bound by treaty to receive the public armed vessels of France, and

are not bound to exclude those of her enemies, the executive has never

denied the same right of asylum in our ports to the public armed vessels

of your nation. They, as well as the French, are free to come into them

in all cases of weather, piracies, enemies, or other urgent necessity,

and to refresh, victual, repair, &c. And so many are these urgent

necessities, to vessels far from their own ports, that we have thought

inquiries into the nature as well as the degree of the necessities,

which drive them hither, as endless as they would be fruitless, and

therefore have not made them. And the rather, because there is a third

right, secured to neither by treaty, but due to both on the principles

of hospitality between friendly nations, that of coming into our ports,

not under the pressure of urgent necessity, but whenever their comfort

or convenience induces them. On this ground, also, the two nations are

on a footing.

As it has never been conceived that either would detain their ships of

war in our ports when they were in a condition for action, we have never

conceived it necessary to prescribe any limits to the time of their

stay. Nor can it be viewed as an injury to either party, to let their

enemies lie still in our ports from year’s end to year’s end, if they

choose it. Thus, then, the public ships of war of both nations enjoy

a perfect equality in our ports; first, in cases of urgent necessity;

secondly, in cases of comfort or convenience; and thirdly, in the time

they choose to continue; and all a friendly power can ask from another

is, to extend to her the same indulgences which she extends to other

friendly powers. And though the admission of the prizes and privateers

of France is exclusive, yet it is the effect of treaty made long

ago, for valuable considerations, not with a view to the present

circumstances, nor against any nation in particular, but all in general,

and may, therefore, be faithfully observed without offence to any; and

we mean faithfully to observe it. The same exclusive article has been

stipulated, as was before observed, by Great Britain in her treaty with

France, and indeed is to be found in the treaties between most nations.

With respect to the usurpation of admiralty jurisdiction by the Consuls

of France, within these States, the honor and rights of the States

themselves were sufficient motives for the executive to take measures to

prevent its continuance, as soon as they were apprized of it. They

have been led by particular considerations to await the effect of these

measures, believing they would be sufficient; but finding at length they

were not, such others have been lately taken as can no longer fail to

suppress this irregularity completely.

The President is duly sensible of the character of the act of opposition

made to the serving of legal process on the brig William Tell, and he

presumes the representations made on that subject to the Minister of

France, will have the effect of opening a free access to the officer

of justice, when he shall again present himself with the precept of his

court.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, Sir, your most obedient and

most humble servant,

Th: Jefferson.

LETTER CLXIX.--TO MR. GENET, September 9, 1793

TO MR. GENET.

Philadelphia, September 9, 1793.

Sir,

In my letter of June the 25th, on the subject of the ship William, and

generally of vessels suggested to be taken within the limits of the

protection of the United States by the armed vessels of your nation,

I undertook to assure you it would be more agreeable to the President,

that such vessels should be detained under the orders of yourself or the

Consul of France, than by a military guard, until the government of the

United States should be able to inquire into and decide on the fact. In

two separate letters of the 29th of the same month, I had the honor to

inform you of the claims lodged with the executive for the same ship

William and the brig Fanny, to enclose you the evidence on which they

were founded, and to desire that if you found it just, you would order

the vessels to be delivered to the owners; or if overweighed in your

judgment by any contradictory evidence which you might have or acquire,

you would do me the favor to communicate that evidence: and that the

Consuls of France might retain the vessels in their custody, in the

mean time, until the executive of the United States should consider and

decide finally on the subject.

When that mode of proceeding was consented to for your satisfaction, it

was by no means imagined it would have occasioned such delays of

justice to the individuals interested. The President is still without

information, either that the vessels are restored, or that you have any

evidence to offer as to the place of capture. I am, therefore, Sir, to

repeat the request of early information on this subject, in order

that if any injury has been done those interested, it maybe no longer

aggravated by delay.

The intention of the letter of June the 25th having been, to permit such

vessels to remain in the custody of the Consuls, instead of that of a

military guard (which in the case of the ship William appeared to have

been disagreeable to you), the indulgence was of course to be understood

as going only to cases which the executive might take, or keep

possession of, with a military guard, and not to interfere with the

authority of the courts of justice in any case wherein they should

undertake to act. My letter of June the 29th, accordingly, in the same

case of the ship William, informed you that no power in this country

could take a vessel out of the custody of the courts, and that it was

only because they decided not to take cognizance of that case, that it

resulted to the executive to interfere in it. Consequently, this alone

put it in their power to leave the vessel in the hands of the Consul.

The courts of justice exercise the sovereignty of this country in

judiciary matters; are supreme in these, and liable neither to control

nor opposition from any other branch of the government. We learn,

however, from the enclosed paper, that the Consul of New York, in the

first instance, and yourself in a subsequent one, forbid an officer of

justice to serve the process with which he was charged from his court,

on the British brig William Tell, taken by a French armed vessel within

a mile of our shores, as has been deposed on oath, and brought into New

York, and that you had even given orders to the French squadron there,

to protect the vessel against any person who should attempt to take

her from their custody. If this opposition were founded, as is there

suggested, on the indulgence of the letters before cited, it was

extending that to a case not within their purview; and even had it been

precisely the case to which they were to be applied, is it possible to

imagine you might assert it within the body of the country by force of

arms?

I forbear to make the observations which such a measure must suggest,

and cannot but believe that a moment’s reflection will evince to you

the depth of the error committed in this opposition to an officer of

justice, and in the means proposed to be resorted to in support of it.

I am therefore charged to declare to you, expressly, that the President

expects and requires that the officer of justice be not obstructed in

freely and peaceably serving the process of his court, and that in the

mean time, the vessel and her cargo be not suffered to depart till the

judiciary, if it will undertake it, or himself if not, shall decide

whether the seizure has been made within the limits of our protection.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, Sir, your most obedient and

most humble servant,

Th: Jefferson.

LETTER CLXX.--TO COLONEL HUMPHREYS, September 11, 1793

TO COLONEL HUMPHREYS.

Philadelphia, September 11, 1793.

Dear Sir,

I have to acknowledge yours of May the 19th and 29th, and July 20th;

being Nos. 72, 73, and 76. It is long since I wrote to you, because I

know you must be where you could not receive my letters: and perhaps it

may be some time before I write to you again, on account of a contagious

and mortal fever which has arisen here, and is driving us all away. It

is called a yellow fever, but is like nothing known or read of by the

physicians. The week before last the deaths were about forty; the last

week about eighty; and this week, I think they will be two hundred; and

it goes on spreading. All persons who can find asylum elsewhere, are

flying from the city: this will doubtless extend it to other towns, and

spread it through the country, unless an early winter should stop it.

Colonel Hamilton is ill of it, but is on the recovery.

The Indians have refused to meet our commissioners unless they would

agree to the Ohio as our boundary, by way of preliminary article. This

being impossible, because of the army locations and sales to individuals

beyond the Ohio, the war is to go on, and we may soon expect to hear of

General Wayne’s being in motion.

The President set out yesterday for Mount Vernon, according to

an arrangement of some time ago. General Knox is setting out for

Massachusetts, and I am thinking to go to Virginia in some days. When

and where we shall re-assemble, will depend on the course of this

malady.

I have the honor to be, with great and sincere esteem and respect, Dear

Sir, your affectionate friend and servant,

Th: Jefferson.

LETTER CLXXI.--TO MR. GENET, October 3, 1793

TO MR. GENET.

Monticello, October 3, 1793.

Sir,

In a former letter which I had the honor of writing you, I mentioned

that information had been received that M. Duplaine, Vice-Consul of

France, at Boston, had been charged with an opposition to the laws of

the land, of such a character, as, if true, would render it the duty

of the President immediately to revoke the Exequatur, whereby he is

permitted to exercise the functions of Vice-Consul in these United

States. The fact has been since inquired into, and I now enclose you

copies of the evidence establishing it; whereby you will perceive how

inconsistent with peace and order it would be, to permit, any longer,

the exercise of functions in these United States by a person capable

of mistaking their legitimate extent so far, as to oppose, by force of

arms, the course of the laws within the body of the country. The

wisdom and justice of the government of France, and their sense of the

necessity in every government, of preserving the course of the laws

free and unobstructed, render us confident that they will approve this

necessary arrestation of the proceedings of one of their agents; as we

would certainly do in the like case, were any Consul or Vice-Consul

of ours to oppose with an armed force, the course of their laws within

their own limits. Still, however, indispensable as this act has been,

it is with the most lively concern, the President has seen that the evil

could not be arrested otherwise than by an appeal to the authority of

the country.

I have the honor to be, with great esteem and respect, your most

obedient and most humble servant,

Th: Jefferson,

LETTER CLXXII.--TO MR. GENET, November 8,1793

TO MR. GENET.

Germantown, November 8,1793.

Sir,

I have now to acknowledge and answer your letter of September the

13th, wherein you desire that we may define the extent of the line of

territorial protection on the coasts of the United States, observing

that governments and jurisconsults have different views on this subject.

It is certain, that heretofore, they have been much divided in opinion,

as to the distance from their sea-coast to which they might reasonably

claim a right of prohibiting the commitment of hostilities. The greatest

distance to which any respectable assent among nations has been at any

time given, has been the extent of the human sight, estimated at upwards

of twenty miles; and the smallest distance, I believe, claimed by any

nation whatever, is the utmost range of a cannon ball, usually stated at

one sea league. Some intermediate distances have also been insisted

on, and that of three sea leagues has some authority in its favor.

The character of our coast, remarkable in considerable parts of it for

admitting no vessels of size to pass the shores, would entitle us

in reason to as broad a margin of protected navigation as any nation

whatever. Not proposing, however, at this time, and without a

respectful and friendly communication with the powers interested in this

navigation, to fix on the distance to which we may ultimately insist

on the right of protection, the President gives instructions to the

officers acting under his authority, to consider those heretofore given

them as restrained, for the present, to the distance of one sea league,

or three geographical miles, from the sea-shore. This distance can admit

of no opposition, as it is recognised by treaties between some of the

powers with whom we are connected in commerce and navigation, and is as

little or less than is claimed by any of them on their own coasts.

Future occasions will be taken to enter into explanations with them,

as to the ulterior extent to which we may reasonably carry our

jurisdiction. For that of the rivers and bays of the United States, the

laws of the several States are understood to have made provision, and

they are moreover, as being land-locked, within the body of the United

States.

Examining by this rule the case of the British brig Fanny, taken on the

8th of May last, it appears from the evidence that the capture was made

four or five miles from the land; and consequently, without the line

provisionally adopted by the President, as before mentioned.

I have the honor to be, with sentiments of respect and esteem, Sir, your

most obedient and most humble servant,

Th: Jefferson.

LETTER CLXXIII.--TO MR. GENET, November 22, 1793

TO MR. GENET.

Germantown, November 22, 1793.

Sir,

Memoir, Correspondence, and Miscellanies, From the Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume 3 · 第 28 / 50 段