CHAPTER LXX.

THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF LINCOLN'S ANECDOTES

--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF LINCOLN AND STANTON

--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.

Things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there would be no

more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in North Carolina and

Virginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go into

camp there until mustered out. Suitable garrisons were left at the

prominent places throughout the South to insure obedience to the laws

that might be enacted for the government of the several States, and to

insure security to the lives and property of all classes. I do not know

how far this was necessary, but I deemed it necessary, at that time,

that such a course should be pursued. I think now that these garrisons

were continued after they ceased to be absolutely required; but it is

not to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought between the

sections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many serious

apprehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done.

Sherman marched his troops from Goldsboro, up to Manchester, on the

south side of the James River, opposite Richmond, and there put them in

camp, while he went back to Savannah to see what the situation was

there.

It was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him.

Halleck had been sent to Richmond to command Virginia, and had issued

orders prohibiting even Sherman's own troops from obeying his,

Sherman's, orders. Sherman met the papers on his return, containing

this order of Halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage.

On his arrival at Fortress Monroe returning from Savannah, Sherman

received an invitation from Halleck to come to Richmond and be his

guest. This he indignantly refused, and informed Halleck, furthermore,

that he had seen his order. He also stated that he was coming up to

take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probably

be as well for Halleck not to show himself, because he (Sherman) would

not be responsible for what some rash person might do through

indignation for the treatment he had received. Very soon after that,

Sherman received orders from me to proceed to Washington City, and to go

into camp on the south side of the city pending the mustering-out of the

troops.

There was no incident worth noting in the march northward from

Goldsboro, to Richmond, or in that from Richmond to Washington City.

The army, however, commanded by Sherman, which had been engaged in all

the battles of the West and had marched from the Mississippi through the

Southern States to the sea, from there to Goldsboro, and thence to

Washington City, had passed over many of the battle-fields of the Army

of the Potomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any other

body of troops, the entire theatre of the four years' war for the

preservation of the Union.

The march of Sherman's army from Atlanta to the sea and north to

Goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was

anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally magnificent

in the way it was conducted. It had an important bearing, in various

ways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war.

All the States east of the Mississippi River up to the State of Georgia,

had felt the hardships of the war. Georgia, and South Carolina, and

almost all of North Carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from

invasion by the Northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts.

Their newspapers had given such an account of Confederate success, that

the people who remained at home had been convinced that the Yankees had

been whipped from first to last, and driven from pillar to post, and

that now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than to

find a way out of the war with honor to themselves.

Even during this march of Sherman's the newspapers in his front were

proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men who

were frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to try

to get under the cover of our navy for protection against the Southern

people. As the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, the

minds of the people became disabused and they saw the true state of

affairs. In turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to

submit without compromise.

Another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was

calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse of

Georgia was entirely cut off from the Confederate armies. As the troops

advanced north from Savannah, the destruction of the railroads in South

Carolina and the southern part of North Carolina, further cut off their

resources and left the armies still in Virginia and North Carolina

dependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already very

much exhausted of food and forage.

In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville Junction and the other

from the neighborhood of Raleigh, North Carolina, arrived and went into

camp near the Capital, as directed. The troops were hardy, being inured

to fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready and fit

for duty as they had ever been in their lives. I doubt whether an equal

body of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer,

was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great

battle.

The armies of Europe are machines; the men are brave and the officers

capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of the nations of

Europe are taken from a class of people who are not very intelligent and

who have very little interest in the contest in which they are called

upon to take part. Our armies were composed of men who were able to

read, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be induced

to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the

nation was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal

to men who fought merely because they were brave and because they were

thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships.

There was nothing of particular importance occurred during the time

these troops were in camp before starting North.

I remember one little incident which I will relate as an anecdote

characteristic of Mr. Lincoln. It occurred a day after I reached

Washington, and about the time General Meade reached Burkesville with

the army. Governor Smith of Virginia had left Richmond with the

Confederate States government, and had gone to Danville. Supposing I

was necessarily with the army at Burkesville, he addressed a letter to

me there informing me that, as governor of the Commonwealth of the State

of Virginia, he had temporarily removed the State capital from Richmond

to Danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the

functions of his office there without molestation by the Federal

authorities. I give this letter only in substance. He also inquired of

me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of his

office, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the country

and go abroad without interference. General Meade being informed that a

flag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sent

out and had the letter brought in without informing the officer who

brought it that I was not present. He read the letter and telegraphed

me its contents. Meeting Mr. Lincoln shortly after receiving this

dispatch, I repeated its contents to him. Mr. Lincoln, supposing I was

asking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of Governor Smith's

letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would be permitted

to leave the country unmolested, that his position was like that of a

certain Irishman (giving the name) he knew in Springfield who was very

popular with the people, a man of considerable promise, and very much

liked. Unfortunately he had acquired the habit of drinking, and his

friends could see that the habit was growing on him. These friends

determined to make an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a

pledge to abstain from all alcoholic drinks. They asked Pat to join

them in signing the pledge, and he consented. He had been so long out

of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he resorted to

soda-water as a substitute. After a few days this began to grow

distasteful to him. So holding the glass behind him, he said: "Doctor,

couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbeknownst to myself."

I do not remember what the instructions were the President gave me, but

I know that Governor Smith was not permitted to perform the duties of

his office. I also know that if Mr. Lincoln had been spared, there

would have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving the

country who desired to do so. He would have been equally willing to

permit the return of the same expatriated citizens after they had time

to repent of their choice.

On the 18th of May orders were issued by the adjutant-general for a

grand review by the President and his cabinet of Sherman's and Meade's

armies. The review commenced on the 23d and lasted two days. Meade's

army occupied over six hours of the first day in passing the grand stand

which had been erected in front of the President's house. Sherman

witnessed this review from the grand stand which was occupied by the

President and his cabinet. Here he showed his resentment for the cruel

and harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by

the Secretary of War, by refusing to take his extended hand.

Sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the Potomac.

During the night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far from

the Capitol. Promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, his

troops commenced to pass in review. Sherman's army made a different

appearance from that of the Army of the Potomac. The latter had been

operating where they received directly from the North full supplies of

food and clothing regularly: the review of this army therefore was the

review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and orderly

soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without the

experience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy's

country, and of being ever on the watch. Sherman's army was not so

well-dressed as the Army of the Potomac, but their marching could not

be excelled; they gave the appearance of men who had been thoroughly

drilled to endure hardships, either by long and continuous marches or

through exposure to any climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp.

They exhibited also some of the order of march through Georgia where the

"sweet potatoes sprung up from the ground" as Sherman's army went

marching through. In the rear of a company there would be a captured

horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, captured chickens and

other food picked up for the use of the men. Negro families who had

followed the army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company,

with three or four children packed upon a single mule, and the mother

leading it.

The sight was varied and grand: nearly all day for two successive days,

from the Capitol to the Treasury Building, could be seen a mass of

orderly soldiers marching in columns of companies. The National flag

was flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filled

with spectators; the door-steps and side-walks were crowded with colored

people and poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters

from which to get a view of the grand armies. The city was about as

full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually is on

inauguration day when a new President takes his seat.

It may not be out of place to again allude to President Lincoln and the

Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, who were the great conspicuous figures in

the executive branch of the government. There is no great difference of

opinion now, in the public mind, as to the characteristics of the

President. With Mr. Stanton the case is different. They were the very

opposite of each other in almost every particular, except that each

possessed great ability. Mr. Lincoln gained influence over men by

making them feel that it was a pleasure to serve him. He preferred

yielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon

having his own way. It distressed him to disappoint others. In matters

of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least

offensive way. Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority to

command, unless resisted. He cared nothing for the feeling of others.

In fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify.

He felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, or in

acting without advising with him. If his act was not sustained, he

would change it--if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did

so.

It was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complement

of each other. The Secretary was required to prevent the President's

being imposed upon. The President was required in the more responsible

place of seeing that injustice was not done to others. I do not know

that this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority of

the people. It is not a correct view, however, in my estimation. Mr.

Lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a

public trust.

Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in

making and executing their plans. The Secretary was very timid, and it

was impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the

capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against

the army guarding the Confederate capital. He could see our weakness,

but he could not see that the enemy was in danger. The enemy would not

have been in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field. These

characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly after

Early came so near getting into the capital.

Among the army and corps commanders who served with me during the war

between the States, and who attracted much public attention, but of

whose ability as soldiers I have not yet given any estimate, are Meade,

Hancock, Sedgwick, Burnside, Terry and Hooker. There were others of

great merit, such as Griffin, Humphreys, Wright and Mackenzie. Of those

first named, Burnside at one time had command of the Army of the

Potomac, and later of the Army of the Ohio. Hooker also commanded the

Army of the Potomac for a short time.

General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his

usefulness that were beyond his control. He had been an officer of the

engineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served with

troops until he was over forty-six years of age. He never had, I

believe, a command of less than a brigade. He saw clearly and

distinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the country

in front of his own position. His first idea was to take advantage of

the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we

wanted to move afterwards. He was subordinate to his superiors in rank

to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans

with the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own.

He was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all who

knew him. He was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his

control, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the

most offensive manner. No one saw this fault more plainly than he

himself, and no one regretted it more. This made it unpleasant at

times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even with

information. In spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer and

deserves a high place in the annals of his country.

General Burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected.

He was not, however, fitted to command an army. No one knew this better

than himself. He always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those of

officers under him beyond what they were entitled to. It was hardly his

fault that he was ever assigned to a separate command.

Of Hooker I saw but little during the war. I had known him very well

before, however. Where I did see him, at Chattanooga, his achievement

in bringing his command around the point of Lookout Mountain and into

Chattanooga Valley was brilliant. I nevertheless regarded him as a

dangerous man. He was not subordinate to his superiors. He was

ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others. His

disposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main

body of the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his

standard all he could of his juniors.

Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general officers

who did not exercise a separate command. He commanded a corps longer

than any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committed

in battle a blunder for which he was responsible. He was a man of very

conspicuous personal appearance. Tall, well-formed and, at the time of

which I now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance

that would attract the attention of an army as he passed. His genial

disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presence

with his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidence

of troops serving under him. No matter how hard the fight, the 2d corps

always felt that their commander was looking after them.

Sedgwick was killed at Spottsylvania before I had an opportunity of

forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personal

observation. I had known him in Mexico when both of us were

lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of us

would ever be equal to the command of a brigade. He stood very high in

the army, however, as an officer and a man. He was brave and

conscientious. His ambition was not great, and he seemed to dread

responsibility. He was willing to do any amount of battling, but always

wanted some one else to direct. He declined the command of the Army of

the Potomac once, if not oftener.

General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a volunteer without a

military education. His way was won without political influence up to

an important separate command--the expedition against Fort Fisher, in

January, 1865. His success there was most brilliant, and won for him

the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of major-general

of volunteers. He is a man who makes friends of those under him by his

consideration of their wants and their dues. As a commander, he won

their confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of

perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed at any

given time.

Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie were good corps commanders, but came

into that position so near to the close of the war as not to attract

public attention. All three served as such, in the last campaign of the

armies of the Potomac and the James, which culminated at Appomattox

Court House, on the 9th of April, 1865. The sudden collapse of the

rebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everything

else. I regarded Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the

army. Graduating at West Point, as he did, during the second year of

the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its

close. This he did upon his own merit and without influence.

CONCLUSION.

The cause of the great War of the Rebellion against the United Status

will have to be attributed to slavery. For some years before the war

began it was a trite saying among some politicians that "A state half

slave and half free cannot exist." All must become slave or all free,

or the state will go down. I took no part myself in any such view of

the case at the time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole

question, I have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true.

Slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for its

security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours where the

larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent and

well-to-do population, the people would naturally have but little

sympathy with demands upon them for its protection. Hence the people of

the South were dependent upon keeping control of the general government

to secure the perpetuation of their favorite institution. They were

enabled to maintain this control long after the States where slavery

existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the assistance

they received from odd men here and there throughout the Northern

States. They saw their power waning, and this led them to encroach upon

the prerogatives and independence of the Northern States by enacting

such laws as the Fugitive Slave Law. By this law every Northern man

was obliged, when properly summoned, to turn out and help apprehend

the runaway slave of a Southern man. Northern marshals became

slave-catchers, and Northern courts had to contribute to the support

and protection of the institution.

This was a degradation which the North would not permit any longer than

until they could get the power to expunge such laws from the statute

books. Prior to the time of these encroachments the great majority of

the people of the North had no particular quarrel with slavery, so long

as they were not forced to have it themselves. But they were not

willing to play the role of police for the South in the protection of

this particular institution.

In the early days of the country, before we had railroads, telegraphs

and steamboats--in a word, rapid transit of any sort--the States were

each almost a separate nationality. At that time the subject of slavery

caused but little or no disturbance to the public mind. But the country

grew, rapid transit was established, and trade and commerce between the

States got to be so much greater than before, that the power of the

National government became more felt and recognized and, therefore, had

to be enlisted in the cause of this institution.

It is probably well that we had the war when we did. We are better off

now than we would have been without it, and have made more rapid

progress than we otherwise should have made. The civilized nations of

Europe have been stimulated into unusual activity, so that commerce,

trade, travel, and thorough acquaintance among people of different

nationalities, has become common; whereas, before, it was but the few

who had ever had the privilege of going beyond the limits of their own

country or who knew anything about other people. Then, too, our

republican institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking

out of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe generally believed that our

republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slightest

strain was brought upon it. Now it has shown itself capable of dealing

with one of the greatest wars that was ever made, and our people have

proven themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality.

But this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity of

avoiding wars in the future.

The conduct of some of the European states during our troubles shows the

lack of conscience of communities where the responsibility does not come

upon a single individual. Seeing a nation that extended from ocean to

ocean, embracing the better part of a continent, growing as we were

growing in population, wealth and intelligence, the European nations

thought it would be well to give us a check. We might, possibly, after

a while threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their

institutions. Hence, England was constantly finding fault with the

administration at Washington because we were not able to keep up an

effective blockade. She also joined, at first, with France and Spain in

setting up an Austrian prince upon the throne in Mexico, totally

disregarding any rights or claims that Mexico had of being treated as an

independent power. It is true they trumped up grievances as a pretext,

but they were only pretexts which can always be found when wanted.

Mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that

protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would have liked

to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans from

them. Under pretence of protecting their citizens, these nations seized

upon Mexico as a foothold for establishing a European monarchy upon our

continent, thus threatening our peace at home. I, myself, regarded this

as a direct act of war against the United States by the powers engaged,

and supposed as a matter of course that the United States would treat it

as such when their hands were free to strike. I often spoke of the

matter to Mr. Lincoln and the Secretary of War, but never heard any

special views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or felt

about it. I inferred that they felt a good deal as I did, but were

unwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our

hands.

All of the powers except France very soon withdrew from the armed

intervention for the establishment of an Austrian prince upon the throne

of Mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to the

close of the war to throw obstacles in our way. After the surrender of

Lee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheridan

with a corps to the Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez in

expelling the French from Mexico. These troops got off before they

could be stopped; and went to the Rio Grande, where Sheridan distributed

them up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops in

the quarter of Mexico bordering on that stream. This soon led to a

request from France that we should withdraw our troops from the Rio

Grande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs. Finally

Bazaine was withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French Government.

From that day the empire began to totter. Mexico was then able to

maintain her independence without aid from us.

France is the traditional ally and friend of the United States. I did

not blame France for her part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon the

ruins of the Mexican Republic. That was the scheme of one man, an

imitator without genius or merit. He had succeeded in stealing the

government of his country, and made a change in its form against the

wishes and instincts of his people. He tried to play the part of the

first Napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role. He sought by

new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal failure

of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own overthrow.

Like our own war between the States, the Franco-Prussian war was an

expensive one; but it was worth to France all it cost her people. It

was the completion of the downfall of Napoleon III. The beginning was

when he landed troops on this continent. Failing here, the prestige of

his name--all the prestige he ever had--was gone. He must achieve a

success or fall. He tried to strike down his neighbor, Prussia--and

fell.

I never admired the character of the first Napoleon; but I recognize his

great genius. His work, too, has left its impress for good on the face

of Europe. The third Napoleon could have no claim to having done a good

or just act.

To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war.

There can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the last

one, occurring among our own people again; but, growing as we are, in

population, wealth and military power, we may become the envy of nations

which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago; and unless

we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement being

some day made to crush us out. Now, scarcely twenty years after the

war, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on

as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an invasion

by the fleets of fourth-rate European powers for a time until we could

prepare for them.

We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be put in

the finest possible condition. Neither of these cost much when it is

considered where the money goes, and what we get in return. Money

expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our security and tends to

prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce with

foreign nations in the meantime. Money spent upon sea-coast defences is

spent among our own people, and all goes back again among the people.

The work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling of

security.

England's course towards the United States during the rebellion

exasperated the people of this country very much against the mother

country. I regretted it. England and the United States are natural

allies, and should be the best of friends. They speak one language, and

are related by blood and other ties. We together, or even either

separately, are better qualified than any other people to establish

commerce between all the nationalities of the world.

England governs her own colonies, and particularly those embracing

the people of different races from her own, better than any other

nation. She is just to the conquered, but rigid. She makes them

self-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the laborer. She

does not seem to look upon the colonies as outside possessions which she

is at liberty to work for the support and aggrandizement of the home

government.

The hostility of England to the United States during our rebellion was

not so much real as it was apparent. It was the hostility of the

leaders of one political party. I am told that there was no time during

the civil war when they were able to get up in England a demonstration

in favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up in

favor of the Union, or, as they called it, in favor of the North. Even

in Manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off

from her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the North

at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing.

It is possible that the question of a conflict between races may come up

in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery before. The

condition of the colored man within our borders may become a source of

anxiety, to say the least. But he was brought to our shores by

compulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right to

remain here as any other class of our citizens. It was looking to a

settlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of Santo

Domingo during the time I was President of the United States.

Santo Domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the administration,

but by all the people, almost without price. The island is upon our

shores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millions

of people. The products of the soil are so valuable that labor in her

fields would be so compensated as to enable those who wished to go there

to quickly repay the cost of their passage. I took it that the colored

people would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states

governed by their own race. They would still be States of the Union,

and under the protection of the General Government; but the citizens

would be almost wholly colored.

By the war with Mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen, territory

almost equal in extent to that we already possessed. It was seen that

the volunteers of the Mexican war largely composed the pioneers to

settle up the Pacific coast country. Their numbers, however, were

scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the important

points of the territory acquired by that war. After our rebellion, when

so many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found

they were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of

the villages, but wanted larger fields. The mines of the mountains

first attracted them; but afterwards they found that rich valleys and

productive grazing and farming lands were there. This territory, the

geography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, is

now as well mapped as any portion of our country. Railroads traverse it

in every direction, north, south, east, and west. The mines are worked.

The high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agricultural

lands are found in many of the valleys. This is the work of the

volunteer. It is probable that the Indians would have had control of

these lands for a century yet but for the war. We must conclude,

therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good.

Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were satisfied to

remain near the scenes of their birth. In fact an immense majority of

the whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should they

move among entire strangers. So much was the country divided into small

communities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almost

tell what section a person was from by hearing him speak. Before, new

territories were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact with

others; people who, when the country began to settle up around them,

would push out farther from civilization. Their guns furnished meat,

and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil, their bread

and vegetables. All the streams abounded with fish. Trapping would

furnish pelts to be brought into the States once a year, to pay for

necessary articles which they could not raise--powder, lead, whiskey,

tobacco and some store goods. Occasionally some little articles of

luxury would enter into these purchases--a quarter of a pound of tea,

two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if

anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey.

Little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlements

of these frontiersmen. This is all changed now. The war begot a spirit

of independence and enterprise. The feeling now is, that a youth must

cut loose from his old surroundings to enable him to get up in the

world. There is now such a commingling of the people that particular

idioms and pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent;

the country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea";

railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps,

nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished the

student of geography.

The war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. We have

but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity at home,

and the respect of other nations. Our experience ought to teach us the

necessity of the first; our power secures the latter.

I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be great

harmony between the Federal and Confederate. I cannot stay to be a

living witness to the correctness of this prophecy; but I feel it within

me that it is to be so. The universally kind feeling expressed for me

at a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last, seemed

to me the beginning of the answer to "Let us have peace."

The expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a section

of the country, nor to a division of the people. They came from

individual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations--the

Protestant, the Catholic, and the Jew; and from the various societies of

the land--scientific, educational, religious or otherwise. Politics did

not enter into the matter at all.

I am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should be given

because I was the object of it. But the war between the States was a

very bloody and a very costly war. One side or the other had to yield

principles they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to an

end. I commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victorious

side. I was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative

of that side of the controversy. It is a significant and gratifying

fact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous

move. I hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end.

APPENDIX.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, OF THE UNITED STATES ARMIES

1864-65.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 22,

1865.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations

of the Armies of the United States from the date of my appointment to

command the same.

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea

that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be

brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary

to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy and his

numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this,

we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to

garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to

protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert,

like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to

use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for

transporting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army most

vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of

inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of

producing, for the support of their armies. It was a question whether

our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by

these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had

that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both

North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely

broken.

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops

practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from

using the same force at different seasons against first one and then

another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and

producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to

hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his

resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be

nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of

our common country to the constitution and laws of the land.

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and

campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better

in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of

friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I

can say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the

best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests

of the whole country.

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending

forces was about as follows: The Mississippi River was strongly

garrisoned by Federal troops, from St. Louis, Missouri, to its mouth.

The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession

of all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream. A few points in

Southern Louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together

with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande. All the

balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas was in

the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably

not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been

brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have

brought them out. The let-alone policy had demoralized this force so

that probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present in

garrison at any one time. But the one-half, or forty thousand men, with

the bands of guerillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along

the Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much of the

population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep

navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the

west of it. To the east of the Mississippi we held substantially with

the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, running eastward to

include nearly all of the State of Tennessee. South of Chattanooga, a

small foothold had been obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East

Tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia.

West Virginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia, with the

exception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area about

the mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort

Monroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the Potomac lying along

the Rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the sea-coast

footholds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington, and New Bern, in

North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Fort

Pulaski, and Port Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St.

Augustine, in Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our

possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy.

The accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman and

other commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the territory

occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of

the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was

proposed to occupy.

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a large

population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard

every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. In the South,

a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy

capable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms in

the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them.

This enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the

field.

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the

Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E.

Johnston, his ablest and best generals. The army commanded by Lee

occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Run

westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending Richmond, the

rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac. The army under Johnston

occupied a strongly intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and

defending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad

centre, against the armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman. In

addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, in

North-east Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the

Shenandoah Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extreme

eastern part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons,

and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the

main objective points of the campaign.

Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of the

Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies and

territory east of the Mississippi River to the Alleghanies and the

Department of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, had the immediate

command of the armies operating against Johnston.

Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the Army of

the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of the movements

of all our armies.

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army, to break

it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he

could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. If

the enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to

the full extent of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration

of Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to do

so. More specific written instructions were not given, for the reason

that I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was

satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest

extent possible.

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River against

Shreveport, Louisiana (which had been organized previous to my

appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of March, of the

importance it was that Shreveport should be taken at the earliest

possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy

from ten to fifteen days' more time than General Sherman had given his

troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the

time specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of

the main object of the Red River expedition, for this force was

necessary to movements east of the Mississippi; that should his

expedition prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red River

with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of

his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move for

the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then

held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the spring

campaign to move against Mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops

enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other

movements; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an

expedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real move

from Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks), instead of a

demonstration, as Steele thought advisable.

On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and

directions, he was instructed as follows:

"1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you

turn over the defence of the Red River to General Steele and the navy.

"2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold

upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if they

will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At

least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken

from the colored troops.

"3d. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force to

guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand

men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the

rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can

again be resumed west of the river. According to your last return, this

would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which

to move against Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men from

Missouri. If however, you think the force here stated too small to hold

the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say

concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command

for operations against Mobile. With these and such additions as I can

give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be

followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will be

ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval

fleet with which to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements with

the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach.

My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but,

from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about

the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative

with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All I

would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at

once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start

at the earliest possible moment.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS."

Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his

objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also. For his

movement two plans presented themselves: One to cross the Rapidan below

Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left.

Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections.

By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring

Richmond or going north on a raid. But if we took this route, all we

did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out;

besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed

how to cooperate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could be

used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York or

James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower

route.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General B. F.

Butler:

"FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864.

"GENERAL:-In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence

at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative

action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be

accomplished.

"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large

ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding

on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally

speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to

the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to

guard. By such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy

and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to

guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of

the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and

Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be

directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we

can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the Army of

the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it

impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I

propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems

practicable: The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base,

Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces

from your command that can be spared from garrison duty--I should say

not less than twenty thousand effective men--to operate on the south

side of James River, Richmond being your objective point. To the force

you already have will be added about ten thousand men from South

Carolina, under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person.

Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the

troops sent into the field from your own department.

"General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe,

with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon

thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time

to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as

you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to

be made.

"When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as

possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all

your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point

directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements.

"The fact that has already been stated--that is, that Richmond is to be

your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your

force and the Army of the Potomac--must be your guide. This indicates

the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River

as you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments

in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of

transports the two armies would become a unit.

"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your

direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry

south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford, about the time

of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.

"You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable

day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the

execution of this order.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."

On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. On the

19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of

General Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move from Fort

Monroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpeper. The exact

time I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would

not be earlier than the 27th of April; that it was my intention to fight

Lee between Culpeper and Richmond, if he would stand. Should he,

however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction

with his (General Butler's) army on the James River; that, could I be

certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as to

have his left resting on the James, above the city, I would form the

junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable

anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up

the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after

the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he

should at least detain as large a force there as possible.

In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I was

desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments

remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in

the background for the protection of our extended lines between the

loyal States and the armies operating against them.

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel, was so

held for the protection of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Maryland

and Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant

fields without exposing the North to invasion by comparatively small

bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and give

better protection than if lying idle in garrison. By such a movement

they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection

of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them.

General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force

into two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under command

of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia

Railroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own

request, General Sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to give up

the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one under General

Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the

Shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. The one on the

Shenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the

infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as

could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the

Shenandoah Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook

would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down

the Tennessee Railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the

New River Bridge and the salt-works, at Saltville, Va.

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were

delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in readiness and

the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the

armies not later than the 4th of May.

My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, and

capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that General

Butler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that would

tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee's army,

to accomplish this desired result in the East. If he failed, it was my

determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat, or to

so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and

still retain enough for the defence of Richmond. It was well

understood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on the

campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the

James River, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at Fort

Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of

getting possession of Petersburg, and destroying railroad communication

as far south as possible. Believing, however, in the practicability of

capturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that the objective

point of his operations. As the Army of the Potomac was to move

simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety,

and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of

the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James River.

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried, as

far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the

Army of the Potomac. My instructions for that army were all through

him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the

execution to him. The campaigns that followed proved him to be the

right man in the right place. His commanding always in the presence of

an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that

public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he

would otherwise have received.

The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning

of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of

Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions. Before night, the whole

army was across the Rapidan (the fifth and sixth corps crossing at

Germania Ford, and the second corps at Ely's Ford, the cavalry, under

Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of its

trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight

opposition. The average distance travelled by the troops that day was

about twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed

from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of

crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and

ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through

a hostile country, and protected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps

(the fifth, Major-General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged the

enemy outside his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged

furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast

as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density

of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable

promptness.

General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the Army of the

Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the

Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, holding the road back to

Bull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a

crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as

such notice was received. This crossing he was apprised of on the

afternoon of the 4th. By six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was

leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of his

troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the

Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large proportion,

probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops,

unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier,

this was a remarkable march.

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the

morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set

in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on

the evening of the 5th. After dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to

turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating

considerable confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was

personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it

and restored order. On the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showed

that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to

the front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was

evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his

inability to further maintain the contest in the open field,

notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an

attack behind his works. I therefore determined to push on and put my

whole force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued for

a movement by his right flank. On the night of the 7th, the march was

commenced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the fifth corps moving on

the most direct road. But the enemy having become apprised of our

movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first.

On the 8th, General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent

out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line

taken up at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily driven back on the

main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable

fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning of the

9th, General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of

communication with Richmond. The 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in

manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results. Among the killed on

the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier Major-General John

Sedgwick, commanding the sixth army corps. Major-General H. G. Wright

succeeded him in command. Early on the morning of the 12th a general

attack was made on the enemy in position. The second corps,

Major-General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line,

capturing most of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces

of artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage

gained did not prove decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and

18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of

reinforcements from Washington. Deeming it impracticable to make any

further attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Court House, orders were

issued on the 15th with a view to a movement to the North Anna, to

commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. Late in the

afternoon of the 19th, Ewell's corps came out of its works on our

extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy

loss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the

21st, when it was commenced. But the enemy again, having the shorter

line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach

the North Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. The fifth

corps reached the North Anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely

followed by the sixth corps. The second and ninth corps got up about the

same time, the second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying

between that and Jericho Ford. General Warren effected a crossing the

same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon after

getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy

with great slaughter. On the 25th, General Sheridan rejoined the Army

of the Potomac from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania,

having destroyed the depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four

trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of

railroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to

Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at

Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around Richmond (but

finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed

to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge under heavy fire,

and moved by a detour to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where he

communicated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing

off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy

to guard our trains.

General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in pursuance of

instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having joined him with

the tenth corps. At the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight

hundred cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junction with him

wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry,

under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south of

Petersburg and Richmond. On the 5th, he occupied, without opposition,

both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete

surprise. On the 6th, he was in position with his main army, and

commenced intrenching. On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the

Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some

fighting. On the 9th he telegraphed as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BERMUDA LANDING, May 9, 1864.

"HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

"Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With one thousand

seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced the

Chickahominy, and have safely, brought them to their present position.

These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets

towards Richmond.

"General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same

day with our movement up James River, forced the Black Water, burned the

railroad bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting into

Beauregard's force at that point.

"We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of

railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold

out against the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up the supplies.

"Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the

cutting of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which reached

Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many,

and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight.

"General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to

Lee from Beauregard's force.

"BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General."

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion

of the enemy's first line of defences at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling,

with small loss. The time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the

benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg,

enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in North and

South Carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places. On the

16th, the enemy attacked General Butler in his position in front of

Drury's Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments

between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemy

intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the

city, and all that was valuable to him. His army, therefore, though in

a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further

operations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle

strongly corked. It required but a comparatively small force of the

enemy to hold it there.

On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid

against the Danville Railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan,

and Chula Stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freight

trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary

and other stores; thence, crossing to the South Side Road, struck it at

Wilson's, Wellsville, and Black's and White's Stations, destroying the

road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point, which he

reached on the 18th.

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General Butler, the

enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an iron-clad ram,

attacked Plymouth, N. C., commanded by General H. W. Wessells, and our

gunboats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by

assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured. The gunboat

Smithfield was sunk, and the Miami disabled.

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed

itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most,

if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by Beauregard

against the Army of the Potomac. In addition to this reinforcement, a

very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was

obtained by calling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge from the

western part of Virginia.

The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was

difficult to operate from against the enemy. I determined, therefore,

to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure

what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, I directed that they

be sent forward, under command of Major-General W. F. Smith, to join the

Army of the Potomac.

On the 24th of May, the 9th army corps, commanded by Major-General A. E.

Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, and from this time

forward constituted a portion of Major-General Meade's command.

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either of

his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank

of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town to turn the enemy's

position by his right.

Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan,

and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the Pamunkey River at

Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two

divisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful engagement with the

enemy at Hawes's Shop. On the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy

skirmishing, to the Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor Road, and

developed the enemy's position north of the Chickahominy. Late on the

evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but

was repulsed with very considerable loss. An attack was immediately

ordered by General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted in

driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.

On the 31st, General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad

bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the enemy's cavalry.

General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held it

until relieved by the 6th corps and General Smith's command, which had

just arrived, via White House, from General Butler's army.

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P.M. by the 6th corps

and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in

readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in our

carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the

right of the 6th corps, and in front of General Smith. During the

attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged

in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance.

That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the

day, but failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for

an attack on the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's

works, in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attempt

our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe,

was comparatively light. It was the only general attack made from the

Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to

compensate for our own losses. I would not be understood as saying that

all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished

as much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy

severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of

the rebellion.

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it was

impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the

city. I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and

invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right

flank to the south side of the James. While the former might have been

better as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground

satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and

east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long,

vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and

that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open

to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the

James. My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee's army north of

Richmond, if possible. Then, after destroying his lines of

communication north of the James River, to transfer the army to the

south side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he

should retreat. After the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that

the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the

army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks,

or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in

case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greater

sacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not be

accomplished that I had designed north of Richmond. I therefore

determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then

occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might

present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville

and Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between

Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and when the cavalry

got well off, to move the army to the south side of the James River, by

the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of

supply, except by the canal.

On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off on

the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, with instructions

to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join his

forces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was

thoroughly done, to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid down

in Sheridan's instructions.

On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry, under

General Gillmore, and of cavalry under General Kautz, to capture

Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges

across the Appomattox. The cavalry carried the works on the south side,

and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire.

General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and

deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without

attempting one.

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent back

to Bermuda Hundred and City Point, General Smith's command by water, via

the White House, to reach there in advance of the Army of the Potomac.

This was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before the

enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place.

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the

12th. One division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the 5th corps,

crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White Oak

Swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. The advance corps

reached James River, at Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Court House,

on the night of the 13th.

During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia

had been confronting each other. In that time they had fought more

desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two

armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of

either. The Southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was

displayed in the North, finding that they had failed to capture

Washington and march on to New York, as they had boasted they would do,

assumed that they only defended their Capital and Southern territory.

Hence, Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been

fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for

them. Their army believed this. It produced a morale which could only

be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of

the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna and Cold Harbor, bloody and

terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy,

and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the

offensive. His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the

fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the

attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. The

details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of

the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of

Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it.

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the James

River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by

wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack

of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge

vessels. Too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the

quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency

displayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chief

quartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to

occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and

but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General Sigel,

commenced on the 1st of May. General Crook, who had the immediate

command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns,

giving one, composed of cavalry, to General Averell. They crossed the

mountains by separate routes. Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia

Railroad, near Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River and

Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and

depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with Crook at

Union on the 15th. General Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, met

the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was

defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar Creek. Not regarding

the operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal

from command, and Major-General Hunter appointed to supersede him. His

instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to Major-General

H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army:

"NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VA. "May 20, 1864.

* * * * * * * "The enemy are

evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the

branch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I think

it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction; reach

Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too

much opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he

will be doing good service. * * *

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."

"JERICHO FORD, VA., May 25, 1864.

"If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should

do so, living on the country. The railroads and canal should be

destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, he

could find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville

join this army.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."

General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the

Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and,

after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the

field of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces of

artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. On the 8th of the

same month he formed a junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from

which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place he

reached and invested on the 16th day of June. Up to this time he was

very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him

sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile

country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important,

point. The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was

very great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee

sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached

Lynchburg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the

17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give

battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this want of

ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of

Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from

the defence of the North.

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of

Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a

position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, should

the force he met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he would

have been within easy distance of the James River Canal, on the main

line of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for its

defence. I have never taken exception to the operations of General

Hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no

doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his

instructions and the interests of the service. The promptitude of his

movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of

his country.

To return to the Army of the Potomac: The 2d corps commenced crossing

the James River on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wilcox's

Landing. The laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight

of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly

pushed forward by both bridge and ferry.

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to Bermuda

Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of

Petersburg.

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send

General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give

him without sacrificing the position he then held. I told him that I

would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing and

throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be

done, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the

enemy could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as directed,

and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight next

morning, but for some reason that I have never been able to

satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines

until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he made the

assault, and carried the lines north-east of Petersburg from the

Appomattox River, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing

fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about

seven P.M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no

other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced

Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear

the moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations. General

Hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached General Smith just

after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) might

wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed

knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. But

instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into Petersburg, he

requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured

works, which was done before midnight.

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. An attack

was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under

Smith and the 2d and 9th corps. It required until that time for the 9th

corps to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, and

the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock

the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of

the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously

captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four

hundred prisoners.

The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in

with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the

enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. The

advantages of position gained by us were very great. The army then

proceeded to envelop Petersburg towards the South Side Railroad as far

as possible without attacking fortifications.

On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a part of

his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, no doubt, to

get troops from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawn

before we could discover it. General Butler, taking advantage of this,

at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond.

As soon as I was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I

ordered two divisions of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, that

were embarking at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, to

report to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was

notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his

present line urged upon him.

About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to the

line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, with

his two divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th,

the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works.

But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold

them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of

his own line. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy

attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line.

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected

by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of

the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with Bermuda

Hundred.

On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition against

the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House just as the

enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. The

result of this expedition was, that General Sheridan met the enemy's

cavalry near Trevilian Station, on the morning of the 11th of June, whom

he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in

complete rout. He left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our

hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. On

the 12th he destroyed the railroad from Trevilian Station to Louisa

Court House. This occupied until three o'clock P.M., when he advanced

in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy reinforced by

infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the

latter place and too strong to successfully assault. On the extreme

right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and

was twice driven therefrom by infantry. Night closed the contest. Not

having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals

being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and

hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command to the

north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching

White House at the time before stated. After breaking up the depot at

that place, he moved to the James River, which he reached safely after

heavy fighting. He commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan,

without further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

On the 22d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Army

of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the Army of

the James moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond.

Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams's Station, destroying the depot

and several miles of the road, and the South Side road about fifteen

miles from Petersburg, to near Nottoway Station, where he met and

defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. He reached Burkesville Station

on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville

Railroad to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he

found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not

dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met

the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon Railroad crossing of Stony

Creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. Thence he

made a detour from his left with a view of reaching Reams's Station

(supposing it to be in our possession). At this place he was met by the

enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the

loss of his artillery and trains. In this last encounter, General

Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way

into our lines. General Wilson, with the remainder of his force,

succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming in safely on our

left and rear. The damage to the enemy in this expedition more than

compensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connection by

railroad with Richmond for several weeks.

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to the

Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the

Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of

his necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine

that had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's

lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of July the 2d corps and

two divisions of the cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to

the north bank of the James River and joined the force General Butler

had there. On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched

position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On the 28th our

lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market Road, but in getting

this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fighting

lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides.

The first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large

force thrown there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the

diversion made, by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force

back there. One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of

the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, to

relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the

assault to be made. The other two divisions of the 2d corps and

Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved

in front of Petersburg. On the morning of the 30th, between four and

five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a

regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th

corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion,

and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a

detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance

promptly to the ridge beyond. Had they done this, I have every reason

to believe that Petersburg would have fallen. Other troops were

immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up

enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete),

and get forces to this point for its defence. The captured line thus

held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were

withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster what

promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter was

retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus laying the

Shenandoah Valley open for raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he

returned northward and moved down that valley. As soon as this movement

of the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached the

Kanawha River, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river

and railroad, to Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of

navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great

delay was experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore,

to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For this

purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against

Richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning

to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf Department, under orders issued

immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red River

expedition. The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time

made up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments

from the invalid corps. One division under command of General Ricketts,

of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisions

of the 6th corps, under General Wright, were subsequently sent to

Washington. On the 3d of July the enemy approached Martinsburg.

General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across

the Potomac at Shepherdtown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper's

Ferry, crossed the occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards

Frederick City. General Wallace, with Rickett's division and his own

command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from

Baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the

Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. His force was not

sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and

although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy,

and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with two

division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, before

him. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry advance

reaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th. On the 12th a

reconnoissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain the

enemy's position and force. A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost

about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss

was probably greater. He commenced retreating during the night.

Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by

telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven P.M., on the 12th, the

assignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of all the

troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the

enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all

the force he could, and push Early to the last moment. General Wright

commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken

at Snicker's Ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred;

and on the 20th, General Averell encountered and defeated a portion of

the rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and

several hundred prisoners.

Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or Richmond,

I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies

operating against Richmond, so that they might be used in a movement

against Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley;

and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between

any force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as much

as possible. I felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the

fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave

Washington. Subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order to

return to the James.

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon

Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at Washington, was

ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. The rebel force moved

down the valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania which on the

30th burned Chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry,

towards Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley, and

with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia.

From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down

between Washington and City Point, making it necessary to transmit

messages a part of the way by boat. It took from twenty-four to

thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would be

received showing a different state of facts from those on which they

were based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that

must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and

rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise

would have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that

some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the

Department of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehanna, and the Middle

Department, and I so recommended.

On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in person to

Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington, with a view to his

assignment to the command of all the forces against Early. At this time

the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, while our

forces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the

crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemy

Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. From where I was, I

hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at

Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. Therefore, on the

4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and determine for

myself what was best to be done. On arrival there, and after

consultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the following

instructions:

"MONOCACY BRIDGE, MARYLAND, August 5, 1864--8 P.M.

"GENERAL:--Concentrate all your available force without delay in the

vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and

garrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in this

concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. From

Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the

Potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him

wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as

it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a

small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force,

detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after

the raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force,

the brigade of the cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville

may be taken into account.

"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best

cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be

instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south

side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start to-morrow. In

pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to

go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite

the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for

the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not

desirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should rather be

protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army

can subsist among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and

we are determined to stop them at all hazards.

"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this

you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the

course he takes.

"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular

vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country

through which you march.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER."

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached

Halltown that night.

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to

be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then

at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by the morning train, with orders

to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on

General Hunter at Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of

instructions. I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan arrived, on

the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to

military affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way of

Washington.

On the 7th of August, the Middle Department, and the Departments of West

Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna, were constituted into the "Middle

Military Division," and Major-General Sheridan was assigned to

temporary command of the same.

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were

sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached him at

Harper's Ferry about the 11th of August.

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September

were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many

severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were

generally successful, but no general engagement took place. The two

armies lay in such a position--the enemy on the west bank of the Opequon

Creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berryville--that

either could bring on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would lay open

to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances

before another army could be interposed to check him. Under these

circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken.

Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Chesapeake

and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so

indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving

Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion so

great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing to

telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of

General Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, I

left City Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his

headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done.

I met him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army

lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such

confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of

instructions necessary--Go in! For the conveniences of forage, the

teams for supplying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked him

if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on

the ensuing Tuesday morning. His reply was, that he could before

daylight on Monday. He was off promptly to time, and I may here add,

that the result was such that I have never since deemed it necessary to

visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.

Early on the morning of the 19th, General Sheridan attacked General

Early at the crossing on the Opequon Creek, and after a most sanguinary

and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeated

him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from Opequon Creek to

Winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of

artillery. The enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at

Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss

on the 20th [22d]. Sheridan pursued him with great energy through

Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After stripping

the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel

army, he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north side of

Cedar Creek.