THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN--THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.
As we have seen, Hood succeeded in crossing the Tennessee River between
Muscle Shoals and the lower shoals at the end of October, 1864. Thomas
sent Schofield with the 4th and 23d corps, together with three brigades
of Wilson's cavalry to Pulaski to watch him. On the 17th of November
Hood started and moved in such a manner as to avoid Schofield, thereby
turning his position. Hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded
respectively by Stephen D. Lee, Stewart and Cheatham. These, with his
cavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men. Schofield had, of all
arms, about thirty thousand. Thomas's orders were, therefore, for
Schofield to watch the movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battle
if he could avoid it; but to fall back in case of an advance on
Nashville, and to fight the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard the
enemy's movements until he could be reinforced by Thomas himself. As
soon as Schofield saw this movement of Hood's, he sent his trains to the
rear, but did not fall back himself until the 21st, and then only to
Columbia. At Columbia there was a slight skirmish but no battle. From
this place Schofield then retreated to Franklin. He had sent his wagons
in advance, and Stanley had gone with them with two divisions to protect
them. Cheatham's corps of Hood's army pursued the wagon train and went
into camp at Spring Hill, for the night of the 29th.
Schofield retreating from Columbia on the 29th, passed Spring Hill,
where Cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without molestation,
though within half a mile of where the Confederates were encamped. On
the morning of the 30th he had arrived at Franklin.
Hood followed closely and reached Franklin in time to make an attack the
same day. The fight was very desperate and sanguinary. The Confederate
generals led their men in the repeated charges, and the loss among them
was of unusual proportions. This fighting continued with great severity
until long after the night closed in, when the Confederates drew off.
General Stanley, who commanded two divisions of the Union troops, and
whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, but
maintained his position.
The enemy's loss at Franklin, according to Thomas's report, was 1,750
buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the hospital, and 702
prisoners besides. Schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189
killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 captured and missing.
Thomas made no effort to reinforce Schofield at Franklin, as it seemed
to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the battle there.
He simply ordered Schofield to continue his retreat to Nashville, which
the latter did during that night and the next day.
Thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive Hood.
The road to Chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons at
Murfreesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport and Chattanooga. Thomas had
previously given up Decatur and had been reinforced by A. J. Smith's two
divisions just returned from Missouri. He also had Steedman's division
and R. S. Granger's, which he had drawn from the front. His
quartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been organized
and armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, General J. L.
Donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the general
supervision of General Z. B. Tower, of the United States Engineers.
Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and to invest that place almost
without interference. Thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so
that he would have been safe against the attack of Hood. He had troops
enough even to annihilate him in the open field. To me his delay was
unaccountable--sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, so
that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemy
strongly posted behind fortifications. It is true the weather was very
bad. The rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so that the ground
was covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move.
But I was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude Thomas
and manage to get north of the Cumberland River. If he did this, I
apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the North, and was
afraid we might even have to send troops from the East to head him off
if he got there, General Thomas's movements being always so deliberate
and so slow, though effective in defence.
I consequently urged Thomas in frequent dispatches sent from City
Point(*41) to make the attack at once. The country was alarmed, the
administration was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest the very thing would
take place which I have just described that is, Hood would get north.
It was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from Thomas
saying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he
was making preparations, etc. At last I had to say to General Thomas
that I should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. He
replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could.
General Logan happening to visit City Point about that time, and knowing
him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, I gave him an order to
proceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas. I directed him, however, not to
deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if Thomas
had moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by
telegraph. After Logan started, in thinking over the situation, I
became restless, and concluded to go myself. I went as far as
Washington City, when a dispatch was received from General Thomas
announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time of
his movement. I concluded to wait until that time. He did move, and was
successful from the start. This was on the 15th of December. General
Logan was at Louisville at the time this movement was made, and
telegraphed the fact to Washington, and proceeded no farther himself.
The battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the Union
troops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat. The next
day the battle was renewed. After a successful assault upon Hood's men
in their intrenchments the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken,
leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers on
the field, besides the wounded that were captured. Our cavalry had
fought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that
they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy
retreated. They sent back, however, for their horses, and endeavored to
get to Franklin ahead of Hood's broken army by the Granny White Road,
but too much time was consumed in getting started. They had got but a
few miles beyond the scene of the battle when they found the enemy's
cavalry dismounted and behind intrenchments covering the road on which
they were advancing. Here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and
fighting on foot, in which the Confederates were again routed and driven
in great disorder. Our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed the
pursuit on the following morning. They were too late. The enemy
already had possession of Franklin, and was beyond them. It now became a
chase in which the Confederates had the lead.
Our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of Columbia,
where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad bridge as well as
all other bridges over Duck River. The heavy rains of a few days before
had swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges.
Unfortunately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order or
otherwise, the pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to
Franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone toward
Chattanooga. There was, consequently, a delay of some four days in
building bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge. Of
course Hood got such a start in this time that farther pursuit was
useless, although it was continued for some distance, but without coming
upon him again.