SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE--VISIT TO SHERIDAN--SHERIDAN'S VICTORY IN THE
SHENANDOAH--SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER--CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE
WINTER.
We had our troops on the Weldon Railroad contending against a large
force that regarded this road of so much importance that they could
afford to expend many lives in retaking it; Sherman just getting through
to Atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges and
detachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of
him; Washington threatened but a short time before, and now Early being
strengthened in the valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt. It
kept me pretty active in looking after all these points.
On the 10th of August Sheridan had advanced on Early up the Shenandoah
Valley, Early falling back to Strasburg. On the 12th I learned that Lee
had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry and a
considerable cavalry force to strengthen Early. It was important that
Sheridan should be informed of this, so I sent the information to
Washington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to
get the message to Sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information.
The messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energy
and reached Sheridan just in time. The officer went through by way of
Snicker's Gap, escorted by some cavalry. He found Sheridan just making
his preparations to attack Early in his chosen position. Now, however,
he was thrown back on the defensive.
On the 15th of September I started to visit General Sheridan in the
Shenandoah Valley. My purpose was to have him attack Early, or drive
him out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies for Lee's
army. I knew it was impossible for me to get orders through Washington
to Sheridan to make a move, because they would be stopped there and such
orders as Halleck's caution (and that of the Secretary of War) would
suggest would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory to
mine. I therefore, without stopping at Washington, went directly
through to Charlestown, some ten miles above Harper's Ferry, and waited
there to see General Sheridan, having sent a courier in advance to
inform him where to meet me.
When Sheridan arrived I asked him if he had a map showing the positions
of his army and that of the enemy. He at once drew one out of his side
pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies.
He said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing out
how) against the Confederates, and that he could "whip them." Before
starting I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan, which I had
brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so positive in his
views and so confident of success, I said nothing about this and did not
take it out of my pocket.
Sheridan's wagon trains were kept at Harper's Ferry, where all of his
stores were. By keeping the teams at that place, their forage did not
have to be hauled to them. As supplies of ammunition, provisions and
rations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver the
stores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at Winchester.
Knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would
have to bring up wagons trains from Harper's Ferry, I asked him if he
could be ready to get off by the following Tuesday. This was on Friday.
"O Yes," he said, he "could be off before daylight on Monday." I told
him then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan;
and I immediately started to return to the army about Richmond. After
visiting Baltimore and Burlington, New Jersey, I arrived at City Point
on the 19th.
On the way out to Harper's Ferry I had met Mr. Robert Garrett, President
of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. He seemed very anxious to know when
workmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and put
it in shape for running. It was a large piece of property to have
standing idle. I told him I could not answer then positively but would
try and inform him before a great while. On my return Mr. Garrett met
me again with the same and I told him I thought that by the Wednesday he
might send his workmen out on his road. I gave him no further
information however, and he had no suspicion of how I expected to have
the road cleared for his workmen.
Sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. He met Early at the
crossing of Opequon Creek, a most decisive victory--one which the
country. Early had invited this attack himself by his bad generalship
and made the victory easy. He had sent G. T. Anderson's division east
of the Blue Ridge before I went to Harper's Ferry; and about the time I
arrived there he started other divisions (leaving but two in their
camps) to march to Martinsburg for the purpose destroying the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad at that point. Early here learned that I had been
with Sheridan and, supposing there was some movement on foot, started
back as soon as he got the information. But his forces were separated
and, as I have said, he was very badly defeated. He fell back to
Fisher's Hill, Sheridan following.
The valley is narrow at that point, and Early made another stand there,
behind works which extended across. But Sheridan turned both his flanks
and again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot pursuit.
The pursuit was continued up the valley to Mount Jackson and New Market.
Sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns. The
houses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled with
Early's wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters. Finally,
on the 25th, Early turned from the valley eastward, leaving Sheridan at
Harrisonburg in undisputed possession.
Now one of the main objects of the expedition began to be accomplished.
Sheridan went to work with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle,
and everything in the upper part of the valley required by our troops;
and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy. What he could
not take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited to
come back there. I congratulated Sheridan upon his recent great victory
and had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns being
aimed at the enemy around Petersburg. I also notified the other
commanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor of
his victory.
I had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to
have a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us and
have a bad effect on the November elections. The convention which had
met and made its nomination of the Democratic candidate for the
presidency had declared the war a failure. Treason was talked as boldly
in Chicago at that convention as ever been in Charleston. It was a
question whether the government would then have had the power to make
arrests and punish those who talked treason. But this decisive victory
was the most effective campaign argument made in the canvass.
Sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him in
Washington, and the President became very much frightened about him. He
was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of General
Cass was said to have been, in one of our Indian wars, when he was an
officer of army. Cass was pursuing the Indians so closely that the
first thing he knew he found himself in front, and the Indians pursuing
him. The President was afraid that Sheridan had got on the other side
of Early and that Early was in behind him. He was afraid that Sheridan
was getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out from
Richmond to enable Early to beat him. I replied to the President that I
had taken steps to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Early, by
attacking the former where he was.
On the 28th of September, to retain Lee in his position, I sent Ord with
the 18th corps and Birney with the 10th corps to make an advance on
Richmond, to threaten it. Ord moved with the left wing up to Chaffin's
Bluff; Birney with the 10th corps took a road farther north; while Kautz
with the cavalry took the Darby road, still farther to the north. They
got across the river by the next morning, and made an effort to surprise
the enemy. In that, however, they were unsuccessful.
The enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. Stannard's
division of the 18th corps with General Burnham's brigade leading, tried
an assault against Fort Harrison and captured it with sixteen guns and a
good many prisoners. Burnham was killed in the assault. Colonel Stevens
who succeeded him was badly wounded; and his successor also fell in the
same way. Some works to the right and left were also carried with the
guns in them--six in number--and a few more prisoners. Birney's troops
to the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but were
unsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line.
Our troops fortified their new position, bringing Fort Harrison into the
new line and extending it to the river. This brought us pretty close to
the enemy on the north side of the James, and the two opposing lines
maintained their relative positions to the close of the siege.
In the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed.
Ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolved
upon General Heckman, and later General Weitzel was assigned to the
command of the 18th corps. During the night Lee reinforced his troops
about Fort Gilmer, which was at the right of Fort Harrison, by eight
additional brigades from Petersburg, and attempted to retake the works
which we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them. All
their efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy
loss. In one of these assaults upon us General Stannard, a gallant
officer who was defending Fort Harrison, lost an arm. Our casualties
during these operations amounted to 394 killed, I,554 wounded and 324
missing.
Whilst this was going on General Meade was instructed to keep up an
appearance of moving troops to our extreme left. Parke and Warren were
kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move leaving their
enclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the other
intrenchments. The object of this was to prevent reinforcements from
going to the north side of the river. Meade was instructed to watch the
enemy closely and, if Lee weakened his lines, to make an attack.
On the 30th these troops moved out, under Warren, and captured an
advanced intrenched camp at Peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to the
main line. Our troops followed and made an attack in the hope of
carrying the enemy's main line; but in this they were unsuccessful and
lost a large number of men, mostly captured. The number of killed and
wounded was not large. The next day our troops advanced again and
established themselves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front of
the enemy. This advanced Warren's position on the Weldon Railroad very
considerably.
Sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken the
productions of the valley so that instead of going there for supplies
the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he again
entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to be
sent where it could be of more use. I approved of his suggestion, and
ordered him to send Wright's corps back to the James River. I further
directed him to repair the railroad up the Shenandoah Valley towards the
advanced position which we would hold with a small force. The troops
were to be sent to Washington by the way of Culpeper, in order to watch
the east side of the Blue Ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting into
the rear of Sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction.
The valley was so very important, however, to the Confederate army that,
contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike,
and save it if possible before the supplies should be all destroyed.
Reinforcements were sent therefore to Early, and this before any of our
troops had been withdrawn. Early prepared to strike Sheridan at
Harrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there.
On the 6th of October Sheridan commenced retiring down the valley,
taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving the cattle
before him, Early following. At Fisher's Hill Sheridan turned his
cavalry back on that of Early, which, under the lead of Rosser, was
pursuing closely, and routed it most completely, capturing eleven guns
and a large number of prisoners. Sheridan lost only about sixty men.
His cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. On the 10th
of October the march down the valley was again resumed, Early again
following.
I now ordered Sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity if
afforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move back
again and cut the James River Canal and Virginia Central Railroad. But
this order had to go through Washington where it was intercepted; and
when Sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what I wanted
him to do it was something entirely different. Halleck informed
Sheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a
base from which to act against Charlottesville and Gordonsville; that he
should fortify this position and provision it.
Sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and I was impelled to
telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows:
CITY POINT, VA., October 14, 1864.--12.30 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Cedar Creek, Va.
What I want is for you to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad and
canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself
ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces. If you make the
enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those
thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction.
If you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here
all the force you can. I deem a good cavalry force necessary for your
offensive, as well as defensive operations. You need not therefore send
here more than one division of cavalry.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
Sheridan having been summoned to Washington City, started on the 15th
leaving Wright in command. His army was then at Cedar Creek, some
twenty miles south of Winchester. The next morning while at Front
Royal, Sheridan received a dispatch from Wright, saying that a dispatch
from Longstreet to Early had been intercepted. It directed the latter
to be ready to move and to crush Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet,
arrived. On the receipt of this news Sheridan ordered the cavalry up
the valley to join Wright.
On the 18th of October Early was ready to move, and during the night
succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, which
fled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losing
eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners. The
right under General Getty maintained a firm and steady front, falling
back to Middletown where it took a position and made a stand. The
cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to Winchester and
held them for the use of our troops in falling back, General Wright
having ordered a retreat back to that place.
Sheridan having left Washington on the 18th, reached Winchester that
night. The following morning he started to join his command. He had
scarcely got out of town, when he met his men returning in panic from
the front and also heard heavy firing to the south. He immediately
ordered the cavalry at Winchester to be deployed across the valley to
stop the stragglers. Leaving members of his staff to take care of
Winchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escort
directly for the scene of battle. As he met the fugitives he ordered
them to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way.
His presence soon restored confidence. Finding themselves worse
frightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back. Many of those who
had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallant
soldiers before night.
When Sheridan got to the front he found Getty and Custer still holding
their ground firmly between the Confederates and our retreating troops.
Everything in the rear was now ordered up. Sheridan at once proceeded to
intrench his position; and he awaited an assault from the enemy. This
was made with vigor, and was directed principally against Emory's corps,
which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack. By one
o'clock the attack was repulsed. Early was so badly damaged that he
seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to work to intrench
himself with a view to holding the position he had already gained. He
thought, no doubt, that Sheridan would be glad enough to leave him
unmolested; but in this he was mistaken.
About the middle of the afternoon Sheridan advanced. He sent his
cavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy's rear. The
contest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke,
and disintegration along the whole line soon followed. Early tried to
rally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to give
way very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand. Our
cavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the Confederates,
captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been
lost in the morning. This victory pretty much closed the campaigning in
the Valley of Virginia. All the Confederate troops were sent back to
Richmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a little
cavalry. Wright's corps was ordered back to the Army of the Potomac,
and two other divisions were withdrawn from the valley. Early had lost
more men in killed, wounded and captured in the valley than Sheridan had
commanded from first to last.
On more than one occasion in these engagements General R. B. Hayes, who
succeeded me as President of the United States, bore a very honorable
part. His conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry as
well as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of mere
personal daring. This might well have been expected of one who could
write at the time he is said to have done so: "Any officer fit for duty
who at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in
Congress, ought to be scalped." Having entered the army as a Major of
Volunteers at the beginning of the war, General Hayes attained by
meritorious service the rank of Brevet Major-General before its close.
On the north side of the James River the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry
on the 7th of October, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed,
wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery. This was
followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was
repulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th a reconnoissance was sent
out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new
works he was constructing, which resulted in heavy loss to us.
On the 24th I ordered General Meade to attempt to get possession of the
South Side Railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th. The
attempt proved a failure, however, the most advanced of our troops not
getting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for. Seeing the
impossibility of its accomplishment I ordered the troops to withdraw,
and they were all back in their former positions the next day.
Butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side of
the James River in order to support this move, by detaining there the
Confederate troops who were on that side. He succeeded in this, but
failed of further results by not marching past the enemy's left before
turning in on the Darby road and by reason of simply coming up against
their lines in place.
This closed active operations around Richmond for the winter. Of course
there was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no serious battle
was fought near either Petersburg or Richmond. It would prolong this
work to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to day
around Petersburg and at other parts of my command, and it would not
interest the general reader if given. All these details can be found by
the military student in a series of books published by the Scribners,
Badeau's history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of the
War Department, including both the National and Confederate reports.
In the latter part of November General Hancock was relieved from the
command of the 2d corps by the Secretary of War and ordered to
Washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to be
designated the 1st corps. It was expected that this would give him a
large command to co-operate with in the spring. It was my expectation,
at the time, that in the final operations Hancock should move either up
the valley, or else east of the Blue Ridge to Lynchburg; the idea being
to make the spring campaign the close of the war. I expected, with
Sherman coming up from the South, Meade south of Petersburg and around
Richmond, and Thomas's command in Tennessee with depots of supplies
established in the eastern part of that State, to move from the
direction of Washington or the valley towards Lynchburg. We would then
have Lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely,
making it impossible for him to support his army.
General Humphreys, chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac, was
assigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed Hancock.