OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE--COMMISSIONED
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES--FIRST
INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.
Soon after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to distribute his
forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville; Sherman
suggested that he be permitted to go back to Mississippi, to the limits
of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the
purpose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on the
east bank of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our
boats. He expected also to have the co-operation of Banks to do the
same thing on the west shore. Of course I approved heartily.
About the 10th of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where Hurlbut
commanded, and got together his Memphis men, or ordered them collected
and sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg and out to where
McPherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so as
to give him about 20,000 men in all.
Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was occupying Meridian with his
headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable
force of cavalry scattered west of him. He determined, therefore, to
move directly upon Meridian.
I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General Sooy Smith to Sherman's
department, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman got to Memphis.
Hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and Sherman ordered him to reinforce Smith so
as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against
Forrest, who was then known to be south-east from Memphis. Smith was
ordered to move about the 1st of February.
While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of Hurlbut with
his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and
strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could
gather. When these scouts returned it was through them that he got the
information of General Polk's being at Meridian, and of the strength and
disposition of his command.
Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly
well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective.
Smith's command was nearly double that of Forrest, but not equal, man to
man, for the lack of a successful experience such as Forrest's men had
had. The fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and
followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an
extent that can hardly be counted by percentage. The difference in
result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. This
same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and
for the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had carried on neither
army could present a more effective officer than he was.
Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his expedition,
meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the Big Black, and
with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached Jackson,
Mississippi. This latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on
the 8th, and Morton on the 9th. Up to this time he moved in two columns
to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the
march. Here, however, there were indications of the concentration of
Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close
together. He had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy
who destroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur, Mississippi, where, by
the way, Sherman himself came near being picked up.
He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated
toward Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in Meridian in
thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for
the purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who he supposed had met Forrest
before this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of a
superiority of numbers. Hearing nothing of him, however, he started on
his return trip to Vicksburg. There he learned that Smith, while
waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River,
instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the
11th. Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in Forrest's
favor.
Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a co-operative movement
with him against Shreveport, subject to my approval. I disapproved of
Sherman's going himself, because I had other important work for him to
do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of Banks,
though their time to remain absent must be limited. We must have them
for the spring campaign. The trans-Mississippi movement proved
abortive.
My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign and
siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until he
had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January I obtained
permission to go to St. Louis, where he was staying at the time, to see
him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. While I was
permitted to go, I was not permitted to turn over my command to any one
else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to
communicate regularly with all parts of my division and with Washington,
just as though I had remained at Nashville.
When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone there again
to make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern part
of Tennessee co-operate with Sherman's movement in Mississippi. I
directed Thomas, and Logan who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a
threatening movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had again
relieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as
possible there.
I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already sent two
divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate against
Sherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee. Seeing
that Johnston had depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to send at
least ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division which was already to
the east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in
command in East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his
department and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received. My
object was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part of the
preparations for my spring campaign.
About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the
Department of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved him
(*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep
Longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in East
Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped
army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for
their cause. I thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view,
countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet.
On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, if
possible; and I directed him to move without delay. Finding that he had
not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him how
important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with
Sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. Then again on
the 21st, he not yet having started, I asked him if he could not start
the next day. He finally got off on the 22d or 23d. The enemy fell
back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as
strong and farther to the rear. Thomas reported that he could not go
any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly
starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. He soon
fell back.
Schofield also had to return for the same reason. He could not carry
supplies with him, and Longstreet was between him and the supplies still
left in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving
towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding
from theirs. On the 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman's
success, which eased my mind very much. The next day, the 3d, I was
ordered to Washington.
The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had
passed through Congress and became a law on the 26th of February. My
nomination had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of March and confirmed
the next day (the 2d). I was ordered to Washington on the 3d to receive
my commission, and started the day following that. The commission was
handed to me on the 9th. It was delivered to me at the Executive
Mansion by President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my eldest
son, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors.
The President in presenting my commission read from a paper--stating,
however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had
drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public,
and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines of
reply. The President said:
"General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its
reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great
struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you
lieutenant-general in the Army of the United States. With this high
honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the
country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I
scarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes
my own hearty personal concurrence."
To this I replied: "Mr. President, I accept the commission, with
gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble
armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it
will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel
the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know
that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to
the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."
On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at
Brandy Station; then returned to Washington, and pushed west at once to
make my arrangements for turning over the commands there and giving
general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring
campaign.
It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even if I
was made lieutenant-general; but when I got to Washington and saw the
situation it was plain that here was the point for the commanding
general to be. No one else could, probably, resist the pressure that
would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and
pursue others. I determined, therefore, before I started back to have
Sherman advanced to my late position, McPherson to Sherman's in command
of the department, and Logan to the command of McPherson's corps. These
changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. My
commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of March,
1864. On the following day, as already stated, I visited General Meade,
commanding the Army of the Potomac, at his headquarters at Brandy
Station, north of the Rapidan. I had known General Meade slightly in
the Mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit. I was a
stranger to most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all except
the officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican war.
There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army
before my promotion. One was the consolidation of five corps into
three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands.
Meade evidently thought that I might want to make still one more change
not yet ordered. He said to me that I might want an officer who had
served with me in the West, mentioning Sherman specially, to take his
place. If so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. He
urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole
nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the
way of selecting the right men for all positions. For himself, he would
serve to the best of his ability wherever placed. I assured him that I
had no thought of substituting any one for him. As to Sherman, he could
not be spared from the West.
This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade than did
his great victory at Gettysburg the July before. It is men who wait to
be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the
most efficient service.
Meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him. He
was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my taking
command of all the armies, was in supreme command of the Army of the
Potomac--except from the authorities at Washington. All other general
officers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands
so far as any one present with them was concerned. I tried to make
General Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been
if I had been in Washington or any other place away from his command. I
therefore gave all orders for the movements of the Army of the Potomac
to Meade to have them executed. To avoid the necessity of having to
give orders direct, I established my headquarters near his, unless there
were reasons for locating them elsewhere. This sometimes happened, and
I had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. On the
11th I returned to Washington and, on the day after, orders were
published by the War Department placing me in command of all the armies.
I had left Washington the night before to return to my old command in
the West and to meet Sherman whom I had telegraphed to join me in
Nashville.
Sherman assumed command of the military division of the Mississippi on
the 18th of March, and we left Nashville together for Cincinnati. I had
Sherman accompany me that far on my way back to Washington so that we
could talk over the matters about which I wanted to see him, without
losing any more time from my new command than was necessary. The first
point which I wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operation
of his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. There
were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great
importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war--the
restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important
commands, namely McClellan, Burnside and Fremont in the East, and Buell,
McCook, Negley and Crittenden in the West.
Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by the
general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign I thought advisable
for the command under me--now Sherman's. General J. E. Johnston was
defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia with an army, the largest
part of which was stationed at Dalton, about 38 miles south of
Chattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of the railroad from Cleveland
with the one from Chattanooga to Atlanta.
There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of
the armies of the military division of the Mississippi. Johnston's army
was the first objective, and that important railroad centre, Atlanta,
the second. At the time I wrote General Halleck giving my views of the
approaching campaign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it was
expected that General Banks would be through with the campaign which he
had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the
armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of the
Mississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon Mobile by land
while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its
ability. (*22) The plan therefore was for Sherman to attack Johnston and
destroy his army if possible, to capture Atlanta and hold it, and with
his troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or at
least to hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west,
and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points
on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left in
the possession of the enemy. This would cut the Confederacy in two
again, as our gaining possession of the Mississippi River had done
before. Banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, and
circumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which
was afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded
throughout all lands.
In regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from important
commands to duty again, I left Sherman to look after those who had been
removed in the West while I looked out for the rest. I directed,
however, that he should make no assignment until I could speak to the
Secretary of War about the matter. I shortly after recommended to the
Secretary the assignment of General Buell to duty. I received the
assurance that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards the
Secretary told me that he had offered Buell an assignment and that the
latter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to accept
the assignment offered. I understood afterwards that he refused to
serve under either Sherman or Canby because he had ranked them both.
Both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army. Sherman
ranked him as a brigadier-general. All of them ranked me in the old
army, and Sherman and Buell did as brigadiers. The worst excuse a
soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the
commander he is ordered to report to.
On the 23d of March I was back in Washington, and on the 26th took up my
headquarters at Culpeper Court-House, a few miles south of the
headquarters of the Army of the Potomac.
Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the President, I
never met Mr. Lincoln until called to the capital to receive my
commission as lieutenant-general. I knew him, however, very well and
favorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the West who
had known him all their lives. I had also read the remarkable series of
debates between Lincoln and Douglas a few years before, when they were
rival candidates for the United States Senate. I was then a resident of
Missouri, and by no means a "Lincoln man" in that contest; but I
recognized then his great ability.
In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me that he had
never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be
conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them: but that
procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the
people at the North and Congress, WHICH WAS ALWAYS WITH HIM, forced him
into issuing his series of "Military Orders"--one, two, three, etc. He
did not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of them
were. All he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the
responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed,
pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering
such assistance. Assuring him that I would do the best I could with the
means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the War
Department, our first interview ended.
The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I knew
him better.
While commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally held
conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being
otherwise used. He and General Halleck both cautioned me against giving
the President my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted,
so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be
sure to get from him all he knew. I should have said that in our
interview the President told me he did not want to know what I proposed
to do. But he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted
me to hear and then do as I pleased about. He brought out a map of
Virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the
Federal and Confederate armies up to that time. He pointed out on the
map two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that the
army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of these
streams. We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies, and the
tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. I listened
respectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protect
Lee's flanks while he was shutting us up.
I did not communicate my plans to the President, nor did I to the
Secretary of War or to General Halleck.
March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at Culpeper, and the
work of preparing for an early campaign commenced.