WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

But what avail, it may be asked, is it to dwell upon our past military

mistakes? None, certainly, unless we are capable as a people of

profiting by the school of experience. Thus far, in the matter under

discussion, our national good luck, inducing, as it has done, a quite

unwarranted feeling of security, has prevented us from doing so. That

we are permanently incapacitated from guiding our feet by the lamp of

experience, however, the writer at least does not believe. To a

limited extent, indeed, in the conduct of the present war, we have

already evinced a willingness to avoid repeating our past mistakes.

The question of preparation in advance of the conflict aside, the

preliminary stage of the current war has been waged in materially

better fashion than has that of any of our previous wars. In

particular the principle of universal liability to service has been

adopted and an earnest effort has been made to provide as officers,

men who combine with a high degree of natural capacity at least a

modicum of training for the work intrusted to their charge.

These things are well enough in their way, and encouraging as

indicative of the development of a more intelligent attitude on the

part of our people toward the conduct of the military arm of the

government. No longer, apparently, can a runaway boy of sixteen

convince a secretary of war, as in the old days, that his desire for a

commission in the army entitles him to precedence over graduates of

West Point; nor will we again witness the spectacle of our president

appointing all the officers of a newly-created military unit direct

from civil life on the ground that the country “generally expected”

our trained soldiers should thus be ignored. However gratifying this

may be, the nub of the present situation lies in the fact that

whatever has been done thus far has been with a view solely to meeting

a present emergency. The country has not determined upon, and the

government has not adopted any permanent or general policy. Sooner or

later the present war will end. Shall we then, as in 1815 and 1865,

disband our military force and have recourse once more to the old

policy of trusting to Providence for the protection of our liberty and

our existence as a nation? Or shall we now highly resolve that the

destinies of the American people are too precious, that the success of

our great experiment in democracy is charged with too much importance,

not alone to ourselves but to the remainder of mankind as well, to

justify us in leaving it absolutely unprotected in a world of

potential enemies? What would be thought today of a city which should

maintain no police department, and for protection against fire should

depend upon the unorganized efforts of volunteers? Scarcely two

centuries ago, however, even the chief city of the world had no police

department, while within the memory of men now living our cities

depended upon volunteers for protection against fire.

In these matters the obvious lesson of experience has been thoroughly

learned. Professional police and fire departments are the standing

armies of our cities, highly organized and constantly alert to protect

them from the perils of disorder and fire. The American people will

not permanently be content to display a lower order of intelligence in

national affairs than it does in those of merely municipal concern.

Too long, however, have we confided the protection of our national

existence to Providence. We believe it to be the duty of every citizen

to exert the full measure of his influence upon his governmental

representatives to the end that now, before national disaster shall

have overtaken us, a permanent military policy adequate to our

protection be adopted.

The Wisconsin Magazine of History, Volume 1, 1917-1918 · 第 86 / 189 题