Opposing forces come into conflict through the encounter of the
Advanced Guards of moving columns; through the approach of a pursuing
force to the Rear Guard of a retreating enemy; through the attack of a
moving force on an enemy in position; and through the renewal of an
engagement which has died down between opposing forces.
Every commander will endeavour to prevent interference with his plans
and future movements, and while striving to surprise and outwit the
enemy he will exert every endeavour to prevent the application of this
vital principle by the enemy. The commander of a force that is at rest
will require security for that force in order that its rest may be
undisturbed, and he will require the security to be assured in order
that his plans for the overthrow of the enemy may be developed. He
will, therefore, detach a portion of his force to ensure this security
by observation, to prevent the secret occupation of localities the
hostile possession of which will interfere with his plans; and by
resistance to hostile movements he will secure the rest of the Main
Body.
The force detailed to protect troops at rest is known as Outposts, and
their duty is to preserve the security of the Main Body. Outposts
protect the Main Body from surprise by Observation, and if attacked
they gain time by Resistance until the commander of the Main Body can
put his plans into execution by the occupation of the position in which
he intends to receive attack. Observation is carried out by Aircraft,
by Patrols (mobile troops by day and infantry by night), and by
Sentries; Resistance is provided by Sentry Groups and by troops {130}
in defensive positions, called the Piquets, which have other troops as
Supports. In certain cases a Local Reserve and a General Reserve are
also provided.
STRENGTH.--Work in the Outpost Line is most exhausting. Not a man or a
horse should be employed there if their services can be dispensed with,
and although the number of troops allotted for the work depends almost
entirely upon the nature of the country and the tactical situation, it
is laid down in the text-books that if an unnecessarily large
proportion of the whole force is so employed the force will suffer in
efficiency. It can also be seen that although the work is of the first
importance and fraught with the greatest difficulties, it is clearly
possible for a comparatively small body of troops to carry it out.
Observation requires intelligence and vigilance rather than numbers;
Resistance can be provided by the Delaying Action on a wide front of
small numbers of skilled troops with the relative advantage conferred
upon them in defence by machine guns and small arms, and with the
assurance of support from their Main Body close at hand.
OBSERVATION.--A force can only be regarded as secure from surprise when
every body of the enemy within striking distance is so closely watched
that it can make no movement by night or day without its becoming known
immediately to the observers of the Outposts. By day the Outpost
commander will carry out Reconnaissance some distance ahead of his
position by means of Aircraft and Patrols of mounted troops and
cyclists, while the commander of each Outpost company keeps the
approaches to the position under observation by sentries, so posted as
to see and hear unobserved by a hostile force. By night, the Aircraft
and mounted troops are unable to render much assistance as moving
patrols, and the work of Reconnaissance and Observation falls upon the
platoons of the Outpost companies.
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RESISTANCE.--For the purposes of Resistance the Outpost commander will
rely upon his infantry and upon such artillery and machine guns as may
be allotted to him, and if the area he is occupying is that in which
the commander of the Main Body will meet attack the Outposts will be
provided with a greater proportion of artillery and machine guns.
Resistance is offered by the entrenchment of each Sentry Group in an
all-round post, and depth and elasticity are given to the defence by
the establishment of entrenched Piquets in selected, mutually
supporting positions commanding with their fire every avenue of
approach, covering the flanks of neighbouring Piquets, and so arranged
in plan as to bring converging fire upon the enemy as he advances to
the attack. These Piquet positions will be strengthened, when
required, by the Supports, who will either assist in manning the
defences of the Piquets or will occupy similarly prepared defensive
posts on the flank. Local Reserves may sometimes be required for local
counter-attacks, and in certain cases a General Reserve is provided.
The degree of Resistance to be offered by the Sentry Groups depends on
the tactical situation and will be specified by the Outpost commander.
In certain cases the Sentry Groups are permitted in face of a heavy
attack to fall back to the Piquets, but if they do so they must be
warned of the danger of arriving headlong on the Piquet only just ahead
of the enemy. In consequence of this danger such retirements are
rarely permissible at night. The Piquets are generally posted on the
Outpost Line of Resistance, in which case they hold their positions to
the last man and the last round, until further orders are received from
the commander of the force protected.
DISTANCE.--The distance of the Outpost position from the troops
protected is regulated by the time the latter will require to prepare
for action and by the importance of preventing the enemy's field
artillery from {132} approaching within effective range of the ground
on which these troops will deploy if attacked. Heavy guns and mortars,
although motor traction gives them great mobility, are unlikely to
accompany the enemy's Advanced Guard, and preparation to withstand or
prevent their fire will not usually be required from Outpost troops.
The effective range of shrapnel is 5,500 yards, the limit of the
effective range of machine guns is 2,000 yards, and of Lewis guns and
rifles the effective limit is 1,400 yards. The position on which the
Main Body will deploy will thus be protected from the shrapnel of field
artillery, if the possible fire-positions of that arm are brought under
effective fire from machine guns 3,500 yards from the Position of
Deployment, with Lewis guns and rifles about 500 yards further forward.
On the other hand, especially in the case of small forces (against
which artillery will not be likely to be sent), the distance must not
be such as would permit of the Outposts being cut off, or as would
necessitate the employment of an undue proportion of men on Outpost
duty.
THE OUTPOST COMMANDER.--Before halting, a commander should first decide
on his dispositions in case of attack, and then arrange the quartering
of his command and the general position of the Outposts. In the case
of a small independent force the commander of the force will usually
himself detail the whole of the Outpost troops, and will either retain
the command in his own hand or appoint an officer to command them, In
such a case the disposition of the troops will probably be that of a
perimeter camp, preparation being made against attack from all
directions. In the case of large bodies Outpost troops will usually
consist of all arms, and a definite commander will always be appointed.
This commander will, when necessary, divide the Outpost line into
sectors, delegating responsibility for the holding of each sector to
the commander of a subordinate unit or formation, and defining the
limits {133} of sectors by distinctive features such as trees,
cottages, or streams. The tops of hills or the bottoms of valleys are
not suitable as tactical boundaries, and roads should be inclusive to
one or other sector, for a road used as a boundary may be neglected by
one of the commands it divides under the impression that it is the duty
of the other command to patrol it.
INFORMATION AND ORDERS.--The Outpost commander must have definite
information on the following points:--
I. What is known of the enemy and information concerning friendly
bodies of troops working against the enemy.
II. The intentions of the commander of the force he is protecting,
where the Main Body will rest and the period it will stay there, and
whether it is intended to engage the enemy if he advances, and if so on
what position.
III. The general line of the Outposts, the troops at disposal for the
work, and whether there are other troops on the left and right.
IV. The hour at which the Outposts are to be relieved and the place to
which reports are to be sent.
After receiving the above information he will give such orders as are
immediately necessary for protection against surprise. He will then
allot the task of Observation to his mobile troops and will decide on a
Line of Resistance for the Outpost troops. He will co-ordinate his
arrangements with those of neighbouring Outpost commanders and will
ensure that no ground on his flanks remains unwatched.
The Outpost commander will then issue orders to his subordinate
commanders on the following points:--
(1) Information concerning the enemy and his own troops so far as they
affect the Outposts.
(2) The general line to be occupied and his frontage and limits of each
subordinate commander.
(3) The distribution of the mobile troops, artillery, and machine guns.
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(4) Instructions as to the degree of resistance to be offered and the
general line of the Outpost Line of Resistance.
(5) Special arrangements by night.
(6) Regulations as to smoking, fires, and cooking.
(7) The hour at which the Outposts will be relieved.
(8) The place to which reports are to be sent.
(9) Instructions as to the accommodation of the Reserves (if any are
provided) and whether the Supports (and Reserves, if any) may take off
accoutrements, etc.
When he receives information that the Outposts are in position, he will
transmit the information to the commander who appointed him.
THE OUTPOST LINE OF RESISTANCE.--Retirements under fire to a supporting
line are dangerous, especially at night. As a general rule, therefore,
the Piquets should be posted on the Outpost Line of Resistance.
Co-operation, intercommunication, and the exercise of command will be
facilitated by placing the Piquets along well-defined natural features,
or in the vicinity of roads. But the tactical situation may demand
that the line adopted should afford facilities for a most stubborn
resistance as well as facilities for observation, and the former
necessity will far outweigh the latter.
If the force is likely to remain halted for several days, especially if
the operations are likely to lapse into Position Warfare, commanding
ground is of great value to the artillery, and the Outpost Line of
Resistance will probably develop into the Outpost zone of a defensive
position. On the other hand, if halted for only one night, artillery
will not be largely employed, and commanding ground is not essential.
THE OUTPOST COMPANY.--The Outpost Company is the Outpost infantry unit,
the company commander providing Piquets, Supports, and Detached Posts
as required. Upon receiving his orders the commander will move his
command, with due precautions against {135} surprise, to the allotted
ground where the men will be halted under cover. Before proceeding to
the part of the line assigned to him the commander of the Outpost
company will detail a force to precede his advance and cover his
operations, and the force so pushed forward will not be withdrawn until
his Piquets have entrenched themselves. By the map he can decide the
number of Piquets he will require, in accordance with the number of
roads to be watched, the facilities for resistance, and the
requirements for patrolling. The extent of frontage allotted to an
Outpost company depends upon the number of avenues of approach (roads
and tracks, and open, unfenced country) to be watched, and under
ordinary circumstances a frontage up to 1,500 or 2,000 yards may be
allotted to a company with 4 platoons at fighting strength. Each
Piquet should consist of a complete unit and should be posted on a good
defensive position. The Support (or Supports, if more than one is
detailed for the company frontage) should also be composed of a
complete unit, and should generally be posted 400 to 800 yards in rear
of the Piquets, with good lines of approach to each. _Detached Posts_
may be required, to watch an extreme flank, or to occupy a position in
front of the Sentry line, where the enemy might otherwise collect
unseen for the attack or initiate steps for hostile reconnaissance. A
further use is to deal with traffic through the line, where a main road
has no Piquet upon it. The Outpost company commander must inform his
Piquet commander, and his immediate superior, of his position, as all
reports received by the Piquets require to be sent to him, and his
superior commander will need to keep in communication with him at all
times. The first duty of a Piquet commander (who is almost invariably
a Platoon commander) is to consolidate his position by entrenchment and
by all available means, and to prepare a range card, so that the enemy
may not approach without heavy loss; and if the Piquet has a Support
ordered to reinforce it in case {136} of attack, the entrenchments must
be constructed to accommodate the supporting troops (including the
Sentry Groups thrown out, if these have been ordered to withdraw to the
Piquet in case of a heavy attack). The commander must impress on all
men of his Piquet the importance of gaining a clear mental picture of
their surroundings while daylight lasts, so that they may the more
easily find their way about by night. On his way to the position the
Piquet commander will decide from the map what roads he has to watch
and where sentries will need to be posted, and he will provide from his
platoon, patrols and sentries (with the necessary reliefs for the
patrols), will detail the various duties, and will make the necessary
sanitary arrangements. His sentries should be posted as expeditiously
as possible, and his patrols sent out at once. The number of patrols
to be furnished depends upon the nature of the country, and as each
patrol requires two reliefs, their number should not be greater than
circumstances demand. The duties of infantry patrols are to search the
ground and buildings, etc., for about 2,000 yards in front of the
sentry line, to find out whether the enemy is there or not, and if the
enemy is found to be close at hand to watch his movements and report
frequently. The number of Sentry Groups depends upon the nature of the
country and the height of the line of observation, but between them the
groups must be answerable for the whole of the ground in front of their
Piquet (up to its junction on the left and right with neighbouring
Piquets). A Sentry Group consists of 6 men under a N.C.O. (2 on duty
and 4 off), and groups are usually posted not more than 400 yards from
their Piquet, and hold their ground unless ordered to withdraw. If
invisible from their Piquet a connecting sentry should be posted by the
Piquet commander. Sentry Groups required for night dispositions only
will not be posted until after dark. In order to prevent the men of
the Piquet being unnecessarily disturbed at night the N.C.O. and {137}
men of each relief must be made to bivouac together, apart from other
reliefs and from the remainder of the Piquet. A sentry will always be
posted over the Piquet, to watch the Sentry Groups and connecting
sentries, and ready to alarm the Piquet at any moment of need. Patrols
consist as a rule of a complete unit of 3 to 8 men under a N.C.O., and
should be formed of men trained as scouts, although it will sometimes
be possible to use only single scouts for this purpose, owing to the
vigilance of the enemy. Standing patrols may also have to be
furnished, if required to watch some special point, particularly at
night, or at the junction of roads converging towards the Piquet line,
at cross roads, etc., when they are out of sight of the sentries. The
Piquet will stand to arms, every man in his allotted place, an hour
before dawn, and will remain alert until the patrols (which are
invariably sent out about that time) have reported absence of movement
by the enemy. Outposts are generally relieved at dawn, so that the
force is doubled at the hour of danger. All troops in the Outpost Line
must entrench themselves, if posted as sentries, or in the Piquet or
Support positions, and must be ready at any moment to resist a sudden
attack. A detachment of Royal Engineers will usually be available to
superintend the consolidation of the main position.
DAY AND NIGHT WORK.--By day, the work of an Outpost Line will consist
in Reconnaissance of the approaches for some miles by the Aircraft and
mounted troops and cyclists, while infantry, with artillery and machine
guns, hold the Line of Resistance. By night, the mounted troops will
be withdrawn, except such "Cossack Posts" (standing patrols of mounted
troops) and "Vedettes" (mounted sentries), as it may be deemed
necessary to leave established in front of the line, while Aircraft
will have much difficulty in discerning movement. The whole work of
observation and resistance therefore falls on the infantry, who may be
in their day {138} position or may be withdrawn to the reverse slope of
a ridge, in order to obtain a sky line by night upon which to train
their rifles.
Neglect of the Principles of War is almost inevitably followed by
disaster, and Protection is the first of the Tactical Principles.
During the later stages of the Franco-Prussian War a French force of
the strength of a brigade was billeted in the _Chateau of Chambord_
(December 9, 1870), which stands in a large park, near Blois. No
outpost precautions were taken, and the Chateau was captured by two
companies of Prussian infantry. The minor disasters suffered by
British arms in the South African War were almost entirely due to
neglect of the warnings contained in the official text-books. In spite
of the established superiority of the Boers in mobility and vigilance
the most elementary precautions against surprise were frequently
neglected. At _Tweefontein_ (December 24, 1901) a force of Yeomanry
was surprised in an unprotected camp by a mobile force of Boers, and
heavy losses were suffered. The mystic atmosphere of Christmas Eve was
insufficient protection against the militancy of Christian De Wet.
BATTLE OUTPOSTS.--When a battle dies down at night, or when the forces
are in close proximity and a battle is imminent, the whole of the
troops must be kept in readiness for instant action. Protection by
Outposts in the normal formation is generally impossible and can only
be provided by patrols, who keep touch with the enemy without causing
unnecessary alarms or looking for purposeless encounters, and by
sentries over the Forward Troops, which take the place of the Piquets.
The troops must be ready at any moment to repel attacks with bullets
and bayonets. Unless otherwise ordered, the patrols should refrain
altogether from aggressive action and should confine their operations
to secret observation of the enemy.
It is, however, essential that touch with the enemy {139} should be
maintained as advances, withdrawals, and other surprise movements, are
usually prepared and often carried out under cover of darkness when
hostile troops are within striking distance. In the American Civil
War, by losing touch with the Northern Army, the Southern Army
permitted it to escape although it had been very severely mauled.
During the Third Battle of Ypres (July 31-November 6, 1917) the Allies
renewed the attack on a six-mile front from Zonnebeke to Langemarck
(the junction of the Franco-British Armies in Flanders). This action,
known as the _Battle of Broenbeck_, or _Brombeek_ (October 9, 1917),
was marked by the successful repulse of counter-attacks by the 1st
Battalion Royal Newfoundland Regiment through the correct employment of
Battle Outposts. Germans massing for the counter-attack in Taube Farm
were pinned by Lewis-gun and rifle fire, while a message sent to the
supporting artillery caused the annihilation of the enemy; another
attacking force was destroyed by Lewis-gun and rifle fire, before it
was launched. A defensive flank was also formed under heavy fire, and
from this flank a further counter-attack was similarly dealt with. The
casualties of the Newfoundlanders throughout this battle were 50
killed, 14 missing, and 132 wounded out of a total strength of 500 all
ranks, and the losses inflicted by them probably exceeded 800.
After the _Battle of Fredericksburg_ (December 13, 1862) the Army of
the Potomac under Gen. Burnside eluded the vigilance of Gen. R. E. Lee,
who had defeated it on December 13, 1862. Burnside withdrew (December
15, 1862) across the Potomac to Stafford Heights with the whole of his
army, under cover of a heavy storm. If special orders had been given
by the Outpost commanders for constant and vigorous patrolling, and if
scouts had been instructed to penetrate the Federal lines from time to
time at all risks, Burnside could have been attacked at a disadvantage
while on the move and should have been driven into the Potomac. {140}
During the battle itself a Confederate Brigade was surprised in its own
front line through failure to patrol a triangular wood which jutted out
in front of the position and screened the brigade on the left with
which touch was not maintained. At all times of action with enemy
forces all ground to the front or flank must be kept under close
observation, or surprise may lead to disaster.
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