"Fabius, the saviour of Rome, used to say that a commander could not
make a more disgraceful excuse than to plead, 'I never expected it.'
It is, in truth, a most shameful reason for any soldier to urge.
Imagine everything, expect everything."--SENECA, "_De Ira._"
Every moving body of troops must be protected by detachments, the force
detached to precede the advance being known as an Advanced Guard, and
when a body of troops so protected halts, the responsibility for
protection during the halts remains with the troops which have been
protecting the march until they are relieved, the commander of the
Advanced Guard exercising his discretion as to halting at once or
moving forward to occupy a position which may be of more tactical
advantage.
STRENGTH.--The strength of this Guard depends on the proximity of the
enemy, but it must always be strong enough to brush aside slight
opposition, so that the advance of the force it is covering may not be
delayed by small hostile forces, and to resist the enemy, when
encountered in strength, for such time as will enable the force it is
covering to prepare to meet or deliver an attack. No general rule as
to the numerical strength of an Advanced Guard can be given, as the
number of troops required depends almost entirely upon the tactical
situation and the country through which the protected force is passing.
It should, however, whenever possible be composed of a complete unit or
formation under its own commander, and it is found in practice that an
Advanced Guard will seldom be less than one-eighth or more than a
quarter of the whole {103} force. When a large force is advancing in
several columns on parallel roads it will be preceded by a "Strategical
Advanced Guard," which protects the front and flanks of all the
columns. The "Tactical Advanced Guard" provided by each column may
then be reduced in strength.
DISTANCE.--The distance at which it moves ahead of the force it is
covering depends upon the nature of the country through which the force
is moving, upon the strength of the Main Body, and upon the tactical
situation, but it must always be sufficient to enable the Main Body to
deploy, to get into battle formation--unmolested by the enemy's
artillery, if required to do so. It is clear, therefore, that the
larger the Main Body the greater the distance must be, as more time
will be required for deployment. The Advanced Guard of a Brigade of
infantry, with artillery, would move at a distance of 1 to 2 miles
between the Main Guard and the Main Body, with the mounted patrols of
the Vanguard 4 to 5 miles ahead of the Main Body. These mounted
patrols would discover the presence of an enemy, and with the supports
of the Vanguard would feel for his strength and ascertain his
dispositions. The Main Guard would either assist in brushing him away
or would resist, in the best available position, any attempts to attack
the Main Body while the latter formed up for battle.
IN ADVANCES.--Infantry forming part of an Advanced Guard to a force
advancing must always act with dash and resolution, but their action
must always be regulated by the one motive of complying with the
intentions of the commander of the force they are covering. Any action
contemplated by the Advanced Guard commander must therefore be
considered from the point of view of its effects upon the plans of the
commander of the main body, but if these plans are not known, the
guiding principle will be _to regulate his action solely in the
interests {104} of the force he is covering_, and by driving in the
advanced troops of the enemy he will obtain information which will
assist his superior in coming to a decision, without interfering with
his liberty of action, whereas hesitation and delay may give the
initiative to the enemy. For this reason, a wide turning movement by
the Advanced Guard troops is seldom possible, as time is thereby lost
and the front of the Main Body is uncovered. "The ruling factor should
be the discovery of some tactical locality held by the enemy, the
capture of which will compel his whole line to fall back. If this
point can be discovered the whole energies of the Advanced Guard should
be directed against it alone, and elsewhere a defensive attitude should
be adopted, to avoid surprise of or interference with the Main Body"
(General R. C. B. Haking).
It must always be assumed that the enemy will have taken all the
necessary steps to protect himself and to hamper reconnaissance by an
adversary. If, therefore, hostile troops are known to be in a certain
locality, opposition must be expected before that locality is reached,
and study of the map should enable the Advanced Guard commander to
determine the approximate neighbourhood in which opposition may be
expected.
IN RETREATS.--While it is clear that a force advancing towards the
enemy must always be preceded by an Advanced Guard it must not be
forgotten that a force withdrawing from the enemy must also be so
protected, even when it is moving in or towards friendly territory.
Such a force will not only prevent the Main Body being surprised by an
energetic enemy, pursuing swiftly and getting round to attack where he
is least expected, but will also prevent the Main Body being delayed by
obstacles, and can delay the pursuit by preparing bridges, etc., for
demolition, which can be completed by the Rear Guard when the Main Body
has passed over {105} them. It can also reconnoitre the route to be
followed, so that the Main Body can proceed without delay.
TRAINING.--In formulating any scheme for the exercise of troops in
Advanced Guard work all officers and other ranks should be made to
understand the nature of the scheme, and should be informed (a) whether
the force is advancing or retreating, whether it is moving before or
after action with the enemy, and whether it is in a friendly or a
hostile country; (b) what is known of the enemy; (c) the direction and
objective of the march; (d) the general intentions of the commander of
the Main Body; and (e) the general instructions issued to the commander
of the Advanced Guard. "Unless such exercises are carried out in a
practical manner, young officers and inexperienced N.C.O.'s will get
the impression that an Advanced Guard consists merely of a procession
of small bodies of infantry, strung out at fixed intervals on a single
road. It is of the highest importance that the training should be
carried out on the lines that would be adopted in action" (G.H.Q.
Circular).
TACTICAL PRINCIPLES.--"Speed of advance is the first consideration when
not in contact with the enemy. Hence an Advanced Guard will move on a
narrow front along roads and other channels of communication, with such
distances between advanced and supporting bodies as to avoid
possibility of surprise. When in contact with, or in the vicinity of,
the enemy, security and speed of advance are equal considerations.
Hence the Advanced Guard should move by bounds on a broad fighting
front across country" ("Infantry Training, 1921").
Before an Advanced Guard commander moves off in compliance with his
instructions he will take certain steps in accordance with these
tactical principles. He will divide his troops into two portions,
known as the _Vanguard_ and the _Main Guard_, and as the duties of the
{106} Vanguard are reconnaissance in general, as well as the protection
in particular of the Main Guard, it will contain a large proportion of
mobile troops, with infantry for assault and resistance, and engineers
for clearing the way through or over obstacles. Aircraft, in advance
of the Vanguard, not only increase the area under search and expedite
the discovery of the enemy, but prevent surprise and assist the
Advanced Guard as a whole by close co-operation in feeling for and
fighting the enemy when encountered. "In order to reconnoitre one must
compel the enemy to show himself wherever he may be. To this end he
has to be attacked until the extent of his position has been clearly
defined. But the attack is made with the intention not to bring on an
action. The skirmishing lines will advance, but they must be able to
disengage themselves at a given moment. Pressure is exercised from a
distance without allowing the forces exerting that pressure to become
tied up" (Marshal Foch). The duty of the Main Guard is Resistance,
that is to say, fighting. It will therefore consist mainly of
infantry, with artillery and machine guns, and the troops will move in
the order in which they will come into action. The Vanguard will be
preceded by scouts, special attention being paid to roads and tracks
parallel with the advance. This screen is followed by the remainder of
the Vanguard, in collected formation, until it is in contact with or in
the vicinity of the enemy, with protection at all times against local
surprise. The Main Guard follows, in touch with the Vanguard, and with
local protection. Both portions have definite commanders, and the
commander of the whole Advanced Guard will probably move with the
supports of the Vanguard. The commander will also determine the
_relative distances_ between the Vanguard and the Main Guard, these
being regulated by the strength of the Advanced Guard, and being based
upon the necessity of one part supporting the other. The distance of
the {107} Advanced Guard ahead of the Main Body may have been mentioned
in the operation orders, but if it is left to the discretion of the
Advanced Guard commander he will be guided solely by the interests of
the force he is covering, and his decision will be influenced by the
nature of the country (whether it is open, or intersected by woods,
hedges, sunken roads, etc., which make observation even by aircraft a
matter of great difficulty) and by the tactical situation, such
distance being chosen as will suit these conditions, while admitting
the fulfilment of the objects in view, viz.:--to obtain information
concerning the enemy and to prevent hostile reconnaissance; to prevent
surprise and delay; and to enable the Main Body to deploy into battle
formation without interruption by the enemy's fire.
It is also the duty of the commander to ensure _communication_ between
the various parts of the Advanced Guard and between that force and the
Main Body, by arranging for mounted orderlies and cyclists, signallers
and connecting files, in addition to the contact patrols furnished by
the Air Service, and to such telegraphic and telephonic communication
as can be provided in the field by the Signals. This is of the first
importance, as the action of the commanders of the Advanced Guard and
of the Main Body will depend on information received, and not only must
information be gained by every available means, but it must also be
communicated without delay to all concerned while it is fresh and
before it becomes stale. It must also be remembered that negative
information (_e.g._ that such and such a village has been thoroughly
searched and no trace of the enemy found) is at least of equal value to
positive information. The repetition or confirmation of information
already sent are also of importance, as it is clearly of value to a
commander to know positively that the enemy is still absent, or still
present, at a certain time in a certain locality. In the American
Civil War, during an encounter battle between {108} advanced troops,
the commander of the cavalry of the United States Army held up the
Confederate advanced troops. A sharp fight took place at _Sulphur
Springs_ (October 12, 1863) and the United States cavalry commander
became so absorbed in the battle that he failed to send information to
headquarters, and General Meade did not learn that he was in contact
with the Army of Northern Virginia until late in the afternoon. In the
campaign of _Fredericksburg_, General R. E. Lee, with the Army of
Northern Virginia, was confronted by General Burnside, with the Army of
the Potomac. On November 15, 1862, a patrol of Confederate cavalry
discovered Burnside's troops moving eastwards, and another patrol
brought news the same day that gunboats and transports had entered
Acguia Creek on the Potomac. These two pieces of information,
collected at points 40 miles distant from one another, gave Lee an
insight into his opponent's design. Information gained by aircraft on
September 4 and 5, 1914, and communicated immediately to General
Joffre, led to the discovery of the flank march across the
Franco-British front by the German I. Army, and to the decisive
counter-attack at the _First Battle of the Marne_ (September 6, 1914).
The Advanced Guard commander must be careful how he becomes seriously
engaged, and must avoid any enterprise not strictly in accordance with
the known intentions of the commander of the Main Body. The tendency
to independent action of this kind, which militates against the success
of the best laid plans, was very observable in the early battles of the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Actions were hastily entered on by
Advanced Guards, maintained with varying success by the gradual arrival
of reinforcements, and finally concluded with barren results and losses
in excess of those inflicted. At the _Battle of Spicheren_ (August 6,
1870) the Advanced Guard of the 14th Prussian Division commenced the
battle, which had to {109} be sustained for three hours by 11
battalions against 39. During the next three hours 8 more battalions
arrived, and at the conclusion of the battle only 27 battalions and 10
batteries in all had come into action against a whole French Corps, and
there were two French Corps within reach of the one engaged. Had these
"marched to the sound of the cannon," as Napoleon would have marched,
the 14th Prussian Division would have been unable to extricate itself
without complete disaster. At the _Battle of Worth_ (August 6, 1870)
the Prussian Crown Prince had expressed his intention not to engage the
French on that day. Yet the Advanced Guard of the V. Corps brought on
a battle into which the Bavarian Corps was perforce drawn. The Crown
Prince sent word for the action to be discontinued, but the advanced
troops were so seriously involved in the battle that reinforcements had
to be sent into action. Although tactically successful the battle was
out of accord with the settled plans of the Commander-in-Chief. In the
same way the Advanced Guard of the VII. Prussian Corps, contrary to the
letter and the spirit of the orders of the commander of the I. Army,
precipitated an action at _Colombey_ (August 14, 1870). Other troops
were drawn into the fight, and finally the whole of the I. Army was
engaged in a battle which its commander not only disapproved but had
expressly forbidden. The battle had no tactical or strategical
results, and heavy losses were sustained on both sides. "Precipitate
action of this kind prevents the troops being engaged in the most
advantageous manner. For when a small force is engaged against a
larger one it becomes necessary, as reinforcements arrive, to move them
up to support some point already hard pressed, and the whole force is
thus used up and disseminated, instead of being employed collectively
where an effective blow may be struck. Thus the direction of the fight
is surrendered to the enemy, as at Spicheren and Colombey. The French
positions were so strong that the German {110} reinforcements as they
arrived were frittered away in support of troops already engaged, and
the state of the latter during the action was frequently very critical.
At Colombey the battle resolved itself into a desperate struggle along
the front of the French position, where the Prussians made little
impression, while their losses considerably exceeded those inflicted on
the French" (Clery). It is thus seen that the commander of the
Advanced Guard must limit his aggressive action in accordance with his
instructions and with the tactical and strategical requirements of the
force he is covering. But his action in _protecting_ the Main Body is
unfettered by any considerations of prudence, and must ever be vigorous
and resolute, any risks being taken that ensure the safety of the Main
Body. On the morning of the _Battle of Nachod_ (June 27, 1866) the
Advanced Guard of General Steinmetz's V. Corps (of the Army of the
Crown Prince of Prussia) was in bivouacs on a plateau, after emerging
from a long and narrow defile through which the Main Body must march to
the open country beyond. About 8 a.m. the cavalry of the Vanguard was
checked by the advanced troops of the VI. Austrian Corps. It was
imperative that the Prussian Advanced Guard should hold the plateau
until the Main Body had extricated itself from the defile. By the
rapid and accurate fire of the infantry and horse artillery, and the
co-operation of the cavalry against the Austrian squadrons, the thin
line was maintained for more than three hours. Less than 7 battalions
of infantry, with 13 squadrons of cavalry and 3 batteries of light
artillery, kept in check 21 battalions, 11 squadrons, and 4 batteries.
Had the Advanced Guard suffered itself to be driven back on the Main
Body in the defile a disaster could scarcely have been avoided, and
owing to the steadfast endurance of the Advanced Guard the Main Body
was able to drive the Austrian Corps from the field.
ADVANCED GUARD PROBLEMS.--The Advanced Guard commander must be able to
appreciate without delay {111} the situation which confronts his force,
and to solve the problem before him with regard solely to the interests
of the force he is covering.
(a) If the Vanguard is held up by the enemy who is ascertained to be
inferior in strength to the Advanced Guard, the commander will transmit
information to the Main Body and will attack vigorously to disperse the
enemy, in order that the movements of the Main Body may not be delayed.
A fire attack would be organised on the front of the enemy, supported
by close-range artillery fire, and a turning movement with Lewis guns
and rifles on one or both flanks. If the enemy held to a covered
position they could be ejected by rifle bombers or light mortars from a
flank, while artillery and machine guns prevented aimed fire at the
attacking force.
(b) If fire is opened on the Vanguard and definite information as to
the strength and dispositions of the enemy cannot be ascertained, such
information as had been gained would be transmitted and a bold
procedure would be adopted in order that the information might be
supplemented as quickly as possible. The commander would reinforce his
Vanguard with infantry from the Main Guard, and should be able to force
the enemy to disclose his position and strength, but unless ordered to
do so would take care not to become so involved in action that the Main
Body would be compelled to come up and extricate them.
(c) If the enemy is encountered when the Advanced Guard commander knows
that it is the intention of his superior to deliver an attack the
information would be transmitted with an outline of the steps taken in
seizing and securing all tactical points that will be of service to the
Main Body. The Advanced Guard would work on a wider front than would
otherwise be used by a force of that strength, and the artillery would
be posted with a view to its position being adopted as the main
artillery position.
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(d) If, under similar circumstances, the intention not to be drawn into
a decisive engagement is known by the Advanced Guard commander he would
limit his activities to reconnaissance of the enemy's position and
numbers, and while hampering the enemy and preventing him from finding
out particulars concerning the Main Body, he must take care not to
become involved in a general engagement.
(e) A case may easily occur in which vigorous action is demanded,
whether the commander of the Main Body intends to attack at once or to
defer an engagement. Such a situation would arise if the Vanguard
discovered the approach of the enemy towards a ridge or other position
of tactical advantage, and if the Advanced Guard commander could, by a
rapid advance, forestall the enemy in the occupation of such a
position, his failure to do so, or hesitation in waiting for explicit
orders to do so, would be a grave neglect of duty.
(f) In the American Civil War a tactical blunder of another kind, due
to the impetuosity of the commander of the Independent Cavalry of the
Army of Northern Virginia, prevented the Southern commander from
obtaining a great strategical advantage over the Army of the Potomac.
The latter force had been withdrawn by General McClellan, after the
Seven Days' Battle around Richmond, to a secure position at Malvern
Hill, where the assaults of the Army of Northern Virginia were beaten
back with heavy losses. McClellan continued the withdrawal and had
reached Harrison's Landing on the James River. The Independent Cavalry
of the Southern Army had previously been dispatched on a false scent,
but at 9 a.m. on July 3 touch was regained with the Northern forces,
which were sighted from _Evelington Heights_ (July 3, 1862), a
commanding ridge within two miles of the bivouacs of the Army of the
Potomac, which was resting in apparent security, with inadequate
precautions against surprise. General J. E. B. Stuart, the Confederate
cavalry commander, {113} reached Evelington Heights with 1,200 sabres
and carbines and one light howitzer, and the whole Army of the Potomac,
90,000 all arms, was in bivouacs in full view from the Heights, and it
was clear that his presence was not suspected. The nearest column of
the force he was covering was six miles away, and there remained about
ten hours of daylight. It is easy to see, after the event, that this
was a case where "Silence is golden." Stuart should have sent the
information to Lee and to every column commander, urging them to press
on at all speed, while he occupied the Heights with his dismounted men
with the determination to hold his position with fire action, if
discovered, until the arrival of one or more columns of the Army of
Northern Virginia. But he failed to appreciate the situation, and
forgetting the larger question, he seized the opportunity to spread
panic in the ranks of the Army of the Potomac, and opened fire with his
one light howitzer. The Northerners recovered from the panic caused by
this unexpected attack, when it was realised that only one gun was in
action against them, and attacked and captured the Heights, and were
strongly entrenched there before the nearest Confederate column arrived.
(g) Among the examples of Advanced Guard work in Marshal Foch's
"Principles of War" is a problem for a battalion as the Advanced Guard
of a Brigade. "What is the problem the battalion commander has to
solve? It consists in preparing for the brigade to go into action
against an enemy who may debouch from Bettwiller. What does the
brigade require for such an action? It requires the _space_ necessary
for the full employment of its forces, and the _time_ necessary for
their arrival and deployment. In order to achieve that double task the
battalion commander orders his troops to occupy _the whole space
necessary_, and places them in points where they may hold on for the
_necessary time_."
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