THE QUESTION OF A SINGLE MINIMUM

Criticism of Trade Boards has fastened on their power to determine

higher rates of wages for skilled workers, one of the additional powers

that they secured under the Act of 1918. There are many who agree that a

bare minimum should be fixed by a statutory authority with legal powers,

but think that this should be the beginning and end of law's

interference. As to this, it must be said, first, that the wide margin

between a subsistence wage and a human needs wage, brought out by Mr.

Rowntree's calculations, shows that there can be no question at present

of a single minimum. To give the "human needs" figure legislative

sanction would at present be Utopian. Very few Trade Boards ventured so

far even when trade was booming. The Boards move in the region between

bare subsistence and "human needs," as trade conditions allow, and can

secure a better figure for some classes of their clients when they

cannot secure it for all. They therefore need all the elasticity which

the present law gives them.

On the other hand, it is contended with some force by the Cave Committee

that it is improper for appointed members to decide questions of

relatively high wages for skilled men or for the law to enforce such

wages by criminal proceedings, and the Committee accordingly propose to

differentiate between higher and lower minima both as regards the method

of determination and of enforcement. I have not time here to discuss the

details of their proposal, but I wish to say a word on the retention--if

in some altered shape--of the powers given by the Act of 1918. The Trade

Board system has been remarkable for the development of understanding

and co-operation between representatives of employers and workers.

Particularly in the work of the administrative committees, matters of

detail which might easily excite controversy and passion are habitually

handled with coolness and good sense in the common interest of the

trade. A number of the employers have not merely acquiesced in the

system, but have become its convinced supporters, and this attitude

would be more common if certain irritating causes of friction were

removed. The employer who desires to treat his workers well and maintain

good conditions is relieved from the competition of rivals who care

little for these things, and what he is chiefly concerned about is

simplicity of rules and rigid universality of enforcement. It is this

section of employers who have prevented the crippling of the Boards in a

time of general reaction. It is blindness to refuse to see in such

co-operation a possible basis of industrial peace, and those were right

who in 1918 saw in the mechanism of the Boards the possibility, not

merely of preventing industrial oppression and securing a minimum living

wage, but of advancing to a general regulation of industrial relations.

At that time it was thought that the whole of industry might be divided

between Trade Boards and Whitley Councils, the former for the less, the

latter for the more organised trades. In the result the Whitley Councils

have proved to be hampered if not paralysed by the lack of an

independent element and of compulsory powers.

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