As things stand at present, there is a remarkable lull. It would be
futile to predict whether it will last. It is due in part, as I have
suggested, to general political weariness, in part to the drastic action
taken against the smaller agitating fry, in part to the depletion of the
coffers of the extremists, in part to the fact that the extremists are
quarrelling amongst themselves as to their future programme. Some are
for continuing a boycott of the Councils; others are for capturing all
the seats and dominating the legislature; others are for re-beating the
dead horse of non-co-operation. Meanwhile, with disunion in the
extremist camp, the Councils conduct their business on moderate lines,
and, so far as one can judge, with marked temperance and sanity.
The work of the first Councils has indeed been surprisingly good, and
augurs well for the future. India has not yet, of course, by any means
grasped the full significance of representative government. The party
system is still in embryo, although two somewhat vague and nebulous
parties calling themselves the "Nationalists" and the "Democrats" do
exist. But these parties have no clear-cut programme, and they do not
follow the lead of the Ministers, who are regarded, not as representing
the elected members of the Council, but as newly-appointed additional
members of the official bureaucracy. There will doubtless in time be
gradual sorting of politicians into definite groups, but there are two
unbridgeable gulfs in the Indian social system which must always
militate against the building up of a solid political party system:
first, the gulf between Hindu and Moslem, which still yawns as wide as
ever, and second, the gulf between the Brahman and the "untouchables"
who, by the way, have found their fears that they would be downtrodden
under the new Councils completely baseless.
There are and must be breakers ahead. Some we can see, and there are
doubtless others still bigger which we cannot yet glimpse over the
welter of troubled waters. What we can see is this: first, there is a
danger that unless Government and the Councils together can before the
next elections in 1923-24 take definite steps towards the industrial
development and the self-defence of India, the extremist party are
likely to come in in full force and to create a deadlock in the
administration; second, unless the Councils continue to accept a fiscal
policy in accordance with the general interests of Great Britain and the
Empire, there will be trouble. The fiscal position is obscure, but it is
the crux, for the Councils can indirectly stultify any policy
distasteful to them, and this too may mean a deadlock; third, there is a
danger that the Indianisation of the Services will advance much more
rapidly than was ever contemplated, or than is desirable in the
interests of India for many years to come, for the simple reason that
capable young Englishmen of the right stamp will not, without adequate
guarantees for their future, accept employment in India. Those
guarantees can be given satisfactorily by one authority alone, and that
is by the Indian Legislatures voicing popular opinion. For a complex
administration bristling with technical questions, administrative,
political, and economic, it is essential that India should have for many
years to come the assistance of highly-educated Britons with the
tradition of administration in their blood. The Councils will be wise to
recognise this and make conditions which will secure for them in the
future as in the past the best stamp of adventurous Briton.
Finally, the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme, though a capable and
conscientious endeavour to give gradual effect to a wise and generous
policy, has of necessity its weak points. The system of diarchy--of
allotting certain matters to the bureaucratic authority of the Viceroy
and of the Provincial Governors and other matters to the representatives
of the people--is obviously a stop-gap, which is already moribund. The
attempt to fix definite periods at which further advances towards
self-government can be considered is bound to fail: you cannot give
political concessions by a stop-watch; the advance will either be much
more rapid or much slower than the scheme anticipates. Again, the
present basis of election is absurdly small, but any attempt to broaden
it must tend towards adult suffrage, which in itself would appear
impracticable with a population of over 200 millions.