THE MISTAKE OF VERSAILLES

These are the two aspects I wanted to bring before you. If we are to get

down to the root of the matter; if we are to uproot the old jungle

theory of international relations, we must recognise that the chief

danger and difficulty before us is what may be described as excessive

nationalism. We have to recognise in this and other countries that a

mere belief in narrow national interests will never really take you

anywhere. You must recognise that humanity can only exist and prosper as

a whole, and that you cannot separate the nation in which you live, and

say you will work for its prosperity and welfare alone, without

considering that its prosperity and welfare depend on that of others.

And the differences on that point go right through a great deal of the

political thought of the day.

Take the question of reparations. I am not going to discuss in detail

what ought to be done in that difficult and vexed question, but I want

to call your attention to the mistake which was originally made, and

which we have never yet been able to retrieve. The fundamental error of

Versailles was the failure to recognise that even in dealing with a

conquered enemy you can only successfully proceed by co-operation. That

was the mistake--the idea that the victorious Powers could impose their

will without regard to the feelings and desires and national sentiment

of their enemy, even though he was beaten. For the first time in the

history of peace conferences, the vanquished Power was not allowed to

take part in any real discussion of the terms of the treaty. The

attitude adopted was, "These are our terms, take or leave them, but you

will get nothing else." No attempt was made to appreciate, or even

investigate the view put forward by the Germans on that occasion. And

last, but not least, they were most unfortunately excluded from

membership of the League at that time. I felt profoundly indignant with

the Germans and their conduct of the war. I still believe it was due

almost exclusively to the German policy and the policy of their rulers

that the war took place, and that it was reasonable and right to feel

profound indignation, and to desire that international misdeeds of that

character should be adequately punished. But what was wrong was to think

that you could as a matter of practice or of international ethics try to

impose by main force a series of provisions without regard to the

consent or dissent of the country on which you were trying to impose

them. That is part of the heresy that force counts for everything. I

wish some learned person in Oxford or elsewhere would write an essay to

show how little force has been able to achieve in the world. And the

curious and the really remarkable thing is that it was this heresy which

brought Germany herself to grief. It is because of the false and immoral

belief in the all-powerfulness of force that Germany has fallen, and yet

those opposed to Germany, though they conquered her, adopted only too

much of her moral code.

It was because the Allies really adopted the doctrine of the mailed fist

that we are now suffering from the terrible economic difficulties and

dangers which surround us. I venture to insist on that now, because

there are a large number of people who have not abandoned that view.

There are still a number of people who think the real failure that has

been committed is not that we went wrong, as I think, in our

negotiations at Versailles, but that we have not exerted enough force,

and that the remedy for the present situation is more threats of force.

I am sure it won't answer. I want to say that that doctrine is just as

pernicious when applied to France as when applied to Germany. You have

made an agreement. You have signed and ratified a treaty; you are

internationally bound by that treaty. It is no use turning round and

with a new incarnation of the policy of the mailed fist threatening one

of your co-signatories that they are bound to abandon the rights which

you wrongly and foolishly gave to them under that treaty.

I am against a policy based on force as applied to Germany. I am equally

opposed to a policy based on force as applied to France. If we really

understand the creed for which we stand, we must aim at co-operation all

round. If we have made a mistake we must pay for it. If we are really

anxious to bring peace to the world, and particularly to Europe, we must

be prepared for sacrifices. We have got to establish economic peace, and

if we don't establish it in a very short time we shall be faced with

economic ruin. In the strictest, most nationalistic interests of this

country, we have to see that economic war comes to an end. We have got

to make whatever concessions are necessary in order to bring that peace

into being.

Essays in Liberalism Being the Lectures and Papers Which Were Delivered at the Liberal Summer School at Oxford, 1922 · 第 22 / 127 题