“2. Asocial persons and others who are of inferior hereditary

quality will not be included in the resettlement. Their names

will be turned over at once by the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer

(Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service) to the

competent State Police (Superior) Office. The latter will

arrange for their transfer into a concentration camp.

“3. Persons with a particularly bad political record will not be

included in the resettlement action. Their names will also be

given by the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer (Inspectors of

Security Police and Security Service) to the competent State

Police (Superior) Office for transfer into a concentration camp.

The wives and children of such persons are to be resettled in

old Reich territory and to be included in the Germanization

measures. Where the wife also has a particularly bad political

record, and cannot be included in the resettlement action, her

name, too, is to be turned over to the competent State Police

(Superior) Office with a view to imprisoning her in a

concentration camp. In such cases the children are to be

separated from their parents and to be dealt with according to

III, paragraph 2 of this decree. Persons are to be considered as

having a particularly bad political record who have offended the

German nation to a very great degree (e.g., who participated in

persecutions of Germans, or boycotts of Germans, etc.).”

(_R-112_)

(5) _Nazi Colonization._ Coincident with the program of Germanizing

persons of German extraction in the incorporated areas, the

conspirators, as previously indicated, undertook to settle large numbers

of Germans of proven Nazi convictions in that area. This aspect of their

program is clearly shown by an article by SS Obergruppenfuehrer and

General of the Police, Wilhelm Koppe, who was one of Himmler’s trusted

agents. The following is an excerpt from this article:

“The victory of the German weapons in the East must therefore be

followed by the victory of the German race over the Polish race,

if the regained Eastern sphere—according to the Fuehrer’s

will—henceforth shall for all time remain an essential

constituent part of the Greater German Reich. It is therefore of

decisive importance to penetrate the regained German region with

German farmers, laborers, civil servants, merchants, and

artisans so that a living and deep-rooted bastion of German

people can be formed as a protective wall against foreign

infiltration, and possibly as a starting point for the racial

penetration of the territories further East.” (_2915-PS_)

B. _The Program in the Government-General_

(1) _Germanization._ In the Government-General there were relatively few

persons, at the outset, who qualified as Germans by the conspirators’

standards. Hence, little would be served by the introduction of a Racial

Register, categorizing persons of German extraction on the model of the

one instituted in the incorporated area; and it is not known that any

such Racial Register was prescribed in the Government-General. Rather,

the plan seems to have been (_a_) to make the Government-General a

colony of Germany, which was an objective announced by Frank (_EC-344-16

& 17_), and (_b_) to create so-called “German island settlements” in the

productive farming areas. These island settlements were to be created by

an influx of German persons who faithfully adhered to the principles of

National Socialism.

In this connection, secret notes bearing the date line, “Department of

the Interior, Krakow, 30th March, 1942,” reveal some of Himmler’s ideas

on the “planned Germanization” of the Government-General. The following

extracts are pertinent:

“The Reichsfuehrer SS (Himmler) developed further trains of

ideas to the effect that in the first five-year plan for

re-settlement after the war the new German Eastern territories

should first be filled; afterwards it is intended to provide at

this time the Crimea and the Baltic countries with a German

upper-class at least. Into the Government-General perhaps

further German Island Settlements should be newly transplanted

from European nations. An exact decision in this respect,

however, has not been issued. In any case, it is wished that at

first a heavy colonization along the San and the Brig be

achieved so that the parts of Poland are encircled with alien

populations. Hitherto, it has been always proved that this kind

of encirclement leads most quickly to the desired

nationalization.” (_910-PS_)

An entry in Frank’s Diary (1941, volume II, page 317) bears on the same

point:

“Thanks to the heroic courage of our soldiers, this territory

has become German, and the time will come when the valley of the

Vistula, from its source to its mouth at the sea, will be as

German as the Valley of the Rhine.” (_2233-H-PS_)

(2) _Confiscation of Property._ The conspirators had made plans to

confiscate the property of Poles, Jews, and dissident elements. These

plans were designed to accomplish a number of objectives. Insofar as the

Jews were concerned, they were part of the conspirators’ over-all

program of extermination. Confiscation was also a means of providing

property for German settlers and of rewarding those who had rendered

faithful service to the Nazi State. This phase of their program likewise

made dispossessed Polish farmers available for slave labor in Germany,

and operated to further the conspirators’ objective of preventing the

growth of another generation of Poles.

Proof of these matters appears in a number of reports by Kusche, who

appears to have been one of Himmler’s chief deputies in Poland. In one

of these reports Kusche pointed out that it was possible, without

difficulty, to confiscate small farms and that

“The former owners of Polish farms together with their families

will be transferred to the old Reich by the employment agencies

for employment as farm workers.” (_1352-PS_)

In another secret report by Kusche dated 22 May 1940, and entitled

“Details of the Confiscation in the Bielitz Country”, the following

appears:

“Some days ago the commandant of the concentration camp being

built at Auschwitz spoke at Staff Leader Muller’s and requested

support for the carrying out of his assignments. He said that it

was absolutely necessary to confiscate the agricultural

enterprises within a certain area around the concentration camp,

since not only the fields but also the farm houses of these

border directly on the concentration camp. A local inspection

held on the 21st of this month revealed the following: there is

no room for doubt that agricultural enterprises bordering on the

concentration camp must be confiscated at once. Further than

this, the camp commandant requests that further plots of

farmland be placed at his disposal, so that he can keep the

prisoners busy. This too can be done without further delay since

enough land can be made available for the purpose. The owners of

the plots are all Poles.”

* * * * * *

“I had the following discussion with the head of the labor

office in Bielitz:

“The lack of agricultural laborers still exists in the old

Reich. The transfer of the previous owners of the confiscated

enterprises, together with their entire families, to the Reich

is possible without any further consideration. It is only

necessary for the labor office to receive the lists of the

persons in time, in order to enable it to take the necessary

steps (collection of transportation, distribution over the

various regions in need of such labor)”.

* * * * * *

“The confiscation of these Polish enterprises in Alzen will also

be carried out within the next few days. The commandant of the

concentration camp will furnish SS men and a truck for the

execution of the action. Should it not yet be possible to take

the Poles from Alzen to Auschwitz, they should be transferred to

the empty castle at Zator. The liberated Polish property is to

be given to the needy racial German farmers for their use.”

(_1352-PS_)

On 17 September 1940, Goering issued a decree which was designed to

regularize the program of confiscation (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1940, Part

I, page 1270). Under Section 2 of this decree, sequestration of movable

and immovable property, stores, and other intangible property interests

of Jews and “persons who have fled or are not merely temporarily absent”

was made mandatory. In addition, sequestration was authorized under

Section 2, sub-section 2, if the property were required “for the public

welfare, particularly in the interests of Reich defense or the

strengthening of Germanism.” By section 9 of the decree, confiscation of

sequestrated property was authorized “if the public welfare,

particularly the defense of the Reich, or the strengthening of

Germanism, so requires.” However, Section 1, sub-section 2, provided

that property of German nationals was not subject to sequestration and

confiscation; and section 13 provided that sequestration would be

suspended if the owner of the property asserted that he was a German.

The decree, on its face, clearly indicates a purpose to strip Poles,

Jews, and dissident elements of their property. It was, moreover,

avowedly designed to promote Germanism.

Apparently some question arose at one point as to whether the decree

required that a determination be made in each case involving the

property of a Pole that the property was required “for the public

welfare, particularly in the interests of Reich defense or the

strengthening of Germanism.” The answer supplied by the conspirators was

firm and clear: In _any_ case in which the property of a Pole was

involved, the “strengthening of Germanism” required its seizure. On 15

April 1941, on paper bearing the letterhead of the Reich Leader SS,

Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood, instructions

were given “for internal use on the application of the law concerning

property of the Poles of 17 September 1940.” The following is an

excerpt:

“The conditions permitting seizure according to section II,

sub-section 2, are always present if the property belongs to a

Pole. For the Polish real estate will be needed without

exception for the consolidation of the German nationhood.”

(_R-92_)

In the Government-General, Frank promulgated a decree on 24 January

1940, authorizing sequestration “in connection with the performance of

tasks serving the public interest”, and liquidation of “anti-social or

financially unremunerative concerns.” The decree is embodied in the

_Verordnungsblatt_ of the Government-General, No. 6, 27 January 1940,

page 23. The undefined criteria in this decree clearly empowered Nazi

officials in the Government-General to engage in wholesale seizure of

property.

The magnitude of the conspirators’ confiscation program in Poland was

staggering. The Nazis’ own statistics show that as of 31 May 1943, a

total of 693,252 estates, comprising 6,097,525 hectares, had been

seized, and 9,508 estates, comprising 270,446 hectares had been

confiscated by the Estate Offices Danzig-West Prussia, Poznan, Zichenau,

and Silesia (_R-92_). This, it will be noted, represented the seizures

and confiscations which were effected by only four offices. Figures are

not available at this time for other offices maintained by the

conspirators for these purposes.

2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The conspirators had given much thought to their plans to Germanize

Bohemia and Moravia. Three plans, each characterized by severity, were

discussed, and finally the Fuehrer decided on plan (_c_), which involved

the assimilation of about one-half the Czech population by the Germans

and the extermination of the other half. Moreover, this plan envisaged a

large influx into Czechoslovakia of Germans whose loyalty to the Fuehrer

was unquestioned.

These matters appear from a top secret report dated 15 October 1940,

written by General Friderici, Deputy General of the Wehrmacht in Bohemia

and Moravia. On the face of the document, it appears that only four

copies were made. The original document bears the handwritten letters

“K” and “J” on the first page on the left side, and the handwriting is

unquestionably that of Keitel and Jodl. The report states:

“On 9 October of this year the office of the Reich Protector

held an official conference in which State Secretary SS Lt.

General K. H. Frank spoke about the following: [SS

Gruppenfuehrer K. H. Frank was Secretary of State under Von

Neurath, who at the date of this report was the Protector of

Bohemia and Moravia].

“Since creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,

Party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the

central authorities of Berlin have had difficulties about the

solution of the Czech problem.

“After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his

views about the various plans in a memorandum. In this way,

three ways of solution were indicated:

“_a._ German infiltration of Moravia and reduction of the Czech

nationality to a residual Bohemia. This solution is considered

unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if in a

diminished form, will continue to exist.

“_b._ Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical

solution, namely, the deportation of all the Czechs. Therefore,

the memorandum comes to the conclusion that it cannot be carried

out within a reasonable period of time.

“_c._ Assimilation of the Czechs, i.e., absorption of about half

of the Czech nationality by the Germans, insofar as this is of

importance by being valuable from a racial or other standpoint.

This will take place, among other things, also by increasing the

_Arbeitseinsatz_ of the Czechs in the Reich territory (with the

exception of the Sudeten-German border district), in other

words, by dispersing the closed Czech nationality.

“The other half of the Czech nationality must be deprived of its

power, eliminated and shipped out of the country by all sorts of

methods. This applies particularly to the racially mongoloid

part and to the major part of the intellectual class. The latter

can scarcely be converted ideologically and would represent a

burden by constantly making claims for the leadership over the

other Czech classes and thus interfering with a rapid

assimilation.

“Elements which counteract the planned Germanization ought to be

handled roughly and should be eliminated.

“The above development naturally presupposes an increased influx

of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate.

“After a discussion, the Fuehrer has chosen solution (_c_)

(Assimilation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech

problem and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of the

Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have to be

carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich

Protector for years to come.

“From the above no particular conclusions are drawn by the armed

forces. This is the direction which has always been represented

from here. In this connection, I refer to my memorandum which

was sent to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed

Forces, dated 12 July 1939, file number 6/39, top secret,

entitled: “The Czech Problem.” (Attached as annex.)

“The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector

in Bohemia and Moravia.”

“(Signed) FRIDERICI

Infantry Lt. General.” (_862-PS_)

Solution (_a_), as outlined in the foregoing report, would have called

for German infiltration into Moravia and the forcible removal of the

Czechs from that area to Bohemia. Moravia lies between Bohemia and

Slovakia. Thus, solution (_a_) would have involved the erection of a

German state between Bohemia and Slovakia, and would have prevented

effective inter-communications between the Czechs and the Slovaks. In

this manner, the historic desire for unity of these two groups of people

and the continued existence of their Czechoslovakian State would have

been frustrated. Solution (_a_) was rejected because the surviving

Czechs, even though compressed into a “residual Bohemia,” would have

remained to plague the conspirators.

Solution (_b_), which involved the forcible deportation of all Czechs,

was rejected, not because its terms were deemed too drastic but rather

because a more speedy resolution of the problem was desired.

Solution (_c_) was regarded as the most desirable, and was adopted. This

solution first provided for the assimilation of about one-half of the

Czechs. This meant two things: (_a_) enforced Germanization for those

who were deemed racially qualified, and (_b_) deportation to slave labor

in Germany for others. “Increasing the _Arbeitseinsatz_ of the Czechs in

the Reich territory”, as stated in the report, meant, in reality, slave

labor in Germany.

Solution (_c_) further provided for the elimination and deportation “by

all sorts of methods” of the other half of the Czech population,

particularly intellectuals and those who did not meet Nazi racial

standards. Czech intellectuals, as the conspirators well know, had a

conspicuous record of resistance to the Nazi ideology. They were,

therefore, to be exterminated. That section of the report which stated,

“elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be handled

roughly and should be eliminated,” meant that intellectuals and other

dissident elements were either to be thrown in concentration camps or

immediately exterminated.

In short, the provisions of solution (_c_) were simply a practical

application of the conspirators’ philosophy as expressed in Himmler’s

speech referred to above:

“Either we win over any good blood that we can use for ourselves

* * * or we destroy this blood.” (_L-70_)

3. THE U. S. S. R.

(The Chief Prosecutor for the Soviet Union has assumed the task of

introducing detailed evidence showing the results of the execution of

this program. The American prosecution confined itself to showing the

plan.)

The evidence, individual items of which will be discussed hereafter,

shows the following:

A. The conspirators planned to remove to Germany all foodstuffs and raw

materials from the south and southeast of the Soviet Union, over and

above the needs of the Nazi invading forces and the absolute minimum

necessary to supply the bare needs of the people in these particular

regions who produced the materials which were to be removed to Germany.

This region had previously supplied the northern area of the Soviet

Union, which the conspirators called the “Forest Zone”. The latter zone

embraced some of the leading industrial areas of the Soviet Union,

including Moscow and Leningrad.

B. They deliberately and systematically planned to starve millions of

Russians. Starvation was to be accomplished by the following means:

(1) As indicated under A above, products from the south and southeast of

the Soviet Union which ordinarily were sent to the industrial regions of

the north were to be forcibly diverted to Germany. Moreover, all

livestock in the industrial regions was to be seized for use by the

_Wehrmacht_ and the German civilian population. The necessary

consequence was that the population of the northern regions would be

reduced to starvation.

(2) They established the following order of priority in which food

produced by the Russians would be allocated:

First, the combat troops.

Second, the remainder of troops in enemy territory.

Third, troops stationed in Germany.

Fourth, the German civilian population, and

Lastly, the population of the occupied countries.

Thus, even Russians in the food-surplus area of the Ukraine, who were

not essential to the production of products for the German war machine,

were systematically to be starved.

C. They planned the permanent destruction of all industry in the

northern area of the Soviet Union in order that the remnants of the

Russian population would be completely dependent upon Germany for

consumer goods.

D. They planned to incorporate a part of Galicia and all of the Baltic

countries into Germany and to convert the Crimea, an area north of the

Crimea, the Volga territory, and the district around Baku, into German

colonies.

By a directive issued by Goering’s office for “The Operation of the

Economy in the newly-occupied Eastern Territories,” there was

established the Economic Executive Staff, East, which was directly

responsible to Goering, under which was created the Economic Staff,

East. The Economic Staff, East, in turn was subdivided into four groups:

the Chief of the Economic Staff, Group LA, Group W, and Group M. The

functions of Group LA were stated to be as follows:

“Group LA. (Functions: nutrition and agriculture, the economy of

all agricultural products, provision of supplies for the Army,

in cooperation with the Army groups concerned.)” (_EC-472_)

A report was made on 23 May 1941 (which was before the invasion of the

Soviet Union) on the subject, “Economic Policy Directives for Economic

Organization, East, Agricultural Group.” (_EC-126_). It was prepared by

the Economic Staff, East, Group LA, the Agricultural Group, which (as

shown by _EC-472_) was an important part of the organization which

Goering had established to formulate plans for the economic

administration of Russia. The report begins by a recitation of figures

pertaining to the production of agricultural products in the Soviet

Union. It states that the grain surplus of Russia is determined by the

level of domestic consumption and that this fact affords the basis upon

which the planners must predicate their actions and economic policy. The

report continues:

“The surplus territories are situated in the black soil district

(that is in the south and southeast) and in the Caucasus. The

deficit areas are principally located in the forest zone of the

north. Therefore, an isolation of the black soil areas must, in

any case, place greater or lesser surpluses in these regions at

our disposal. The consequences will be cessation of supplies to

the entire forest zone, including the essential industrial

centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg.”

* * * * * *

“This (the cessation of supplies) means:

“1. All industry in the deficit area, particularly the

manufacturing industries in the Moscow and Petersburg regions as

well as the Ural industrial regions will be abandoned. It may be

assumed that these regions today absorb an annual five to ten

million tons from the food production zone.

“2. The Trans-Caucasian oil district will have to be excepted,

although it is a deficit area. This source of oil, cotton,

manganese, copper, silk, and tea must continue to be supplied

with food in any case, for special political and economic

reasons.

“3. No further exceptions with a view to preserving one or the

other industrial region or industrial enterprise must be

permitted.

“4. Industry can only be preserved so far as it is located in

the surplus region. This applies, apart from the above-mentioned

oil field regions in the Caucasus, particularly to the heavy

industries in the Donets district (Ukraine). Only the future

will show to what extent it will prove possible to maintain in

full these industries, and in particular the Ukrainian

manufacturing industries, after the withdrawal of the food

surpluses required by Germany.

“The following consequences result from this situation, which

has received the approval of the highest authorities, since it

is in accord with the political tendencies (preservation of the

small Russians, preservation of the Caucasus, of the Baltic

provinces, of White Russia, to the prejudice of the Great

Russians).

“I. _For the forest belt_:

“_a._ Production in the forest belt (the food-deficit area) will

become ‘naturalized,’ similar to the events during the World War

and the Communistic tendencies of the war, etc., namely:

agriculture in that territory will begin to become a mere ‘home

production.’ The result will be that the planting of products

destined for the market such as, in particular, flax and hemp,

will be discontinued, and the area used therefor will be taken

over for products for the producer (grain, potatoes, etc.)

Moreover, discontinuance of fodder for that area will lead to

the collapse of the dairy production and pig producing in that

territory.

“_b._ Germany is not interested in the maintenance of the

productive power of these territories, except for supplying the

troops stationed there. The population, as in the old days, will

utilize arable land for growing its own food. It is useless to

expect grain or other surpluses to be produced. Only after many

years can these extensive regions be intensified to an extent

that they might produce genuine surpluses. The population of

these areas, in particular the urban population, will have to

face most serious distress from famine. It will be necessary to

divert the population into the Siberian spaces. Since rail

transport is out of the question, this too, will be an extremely

difficult problem.

“_c._ In this situation, Germany will only draw substantial

advantages by quick, nonrecurrent seizure, that is, it will be

vitally necessary to make the entire flax harvest available for

German needs, not only the fibers but also the oleaginous seeds.

“It will also be necessary to utilize for German purposes the

livestock which has no fodder base of its own, that is, it will

be necessary _to seize livestock holdings_ immediately, and to

make them available to the troops not only for the moment, but

in the long run, and also for exportation to Germany. Since

fodder supplies will be cut off, pig and cattle holdings in

these areas will of necessity drastically decline in the near

future. If they are not seized by the Germans at an early date,

they will be slaughtered by the population for its own use,

without Germany getting anything out of it.”

* * * * * *

“It has been demanded by the Fuehrer that the reduction in the

meat ration should be made good by the fall. This can only be

achieved by the most drastic seizures of Russian livestock

holdings, particularly in areas which are in a favorable

transport situation in relation to Germany.”

* * * * * *

“In future, southern Russia must turn its face toward Europe.

Its food surpluses, however, will only be paid for if it

purchases its industrial consumer goods from Germany, or Europe.

Russian competition from the forest zone must, therefore, be

abolished.

“It follows from all that has been said that the German

administration in these territories may well attempt to mitigate

the consequences of the famine which undoubtedly will take

place, and to accelerate the return to primitive agricultural

conditions. An attempt might be made to intensify cultivation in

these areas by expanding the acreage under potatoes or other

important food crops giving a high yield. However, these

measures will not avert famine. Many tens of millions of people

in this area will become redundant and will either die or have

to emigrate to Siberia. Any attempt to save the population there

from death by starvation by importing surpluses from the black

soil zone would be at the expense of supplies to Europe. It

would reduce Germany’s staying power in the war, and would

undermine Germany’s and Europe’s power to resist the blockade.

This must be clearly and absolutely understood.”

* * * * * *

“I. Supplies for the Army

“Germany’s food situation in the third year of war demands it

imperatively that the _Wehrmacht_, in all its provisioning, must

not live off Greater German territory or that of incorporated or

friendly areas from which this territory receives imports. This

minimum aim, the provisioning of the _Wehrmacht_ from enemy

territory in the third year, and if necessary in later years,

must be attained at any price. This means that one-third of the

_Wehrmacht_ must be fully provisioned by French deliveries to

the army of occupation. The remaining two-thirds (and even

slightly more in view of the present size of the Wehrmacht) must

without exception be provisioned from the Eastern _space_.”

* * * * * *

“Thus it is not important, under any circumstances, to preserve

what has existed, but what matters is a deliberate turning away

from the existing situation and introducing Russian food

resources into the European framework. This will inevitably

result in an extinction of industry as well as a large part of

the people in what so far have been the food-deficit areas.

“It is impossible to state an alternative in sufficiently hard

and severe terms.”

* * * * * *

“Our problem is not to replace intensive food production in

Europe through the incorporation of new space in the East, but

to replace imports from overseas by imports from the East. The

task is twofold:

“1. We must use the eastern spaces for overcoming the food

shortages during and after the war. This means that we must not

be afraid of drawing upon the capital substance of the East.

Such an intervention is much more acceptable from the European

standpoint than drawing upon the capital substance of Europe’s

agriculture.”

* * * * * *

“2. For the future new order, the food-producing areas in the

East must be turned into a permanent and substantial

complementary source of food for Europe, through intensified

cultivation and resulting higher yields.

“The first-named task must be accomplished at any price, even

through the most ruthless cutting down of Russian domestic

consumption, which will require discrimination between the

consuming and producing zones.” (_EC-126_)

It is submitted that this document discloses, on its face, a studied

plan to murder millions of people through starvation. It reveals a

program of premeditated murder on a scale so vast as to stagger human

imagination. This plan was the logical culmination of general objectives

clearly announced by Adolf Hitler in _Mein Kampf_. (See Section 6 of

Chapter IX.)

A top secret memorandum, dated 16 July, 1941, of a conference at the

Fuehrer’s headquarters concerning the war in the East, seems to have

been prepared by Bormann, because his initials appear at the top of page

one (_L-221_). The text of the memorandum indicates that the conference

was attended by Hitler, Lammers, Goering, Keitel, Rosenberg, and

Bormann. This memorandum throws light upon the conspirators’ plans to

Germanize conquered areas of the Soviet Union. It also discloses the

fraudulent character of the Nazi propaganda program; and shows how the

conspirators sought to deceive the entire world; how they pretended to

pursue one course of action when their aims and purposes were to follow

precisely the opposite course. The following portions are particularly

relevant.

“Now it was essential that we did not publicize our aims before

the world; also there was no need for that, but the main thing

was that we ourselves knew what we wanted. By no means should we

render our task more difficult by making superfluous

declarations. Such declarations were superfluous because we

could do everything wherever we had the power, and what was

beyond our power we would not be able to do anyway.

“What we told the world about the motives for our measures ought

to be conditioned, therefore, by tactical reasons. We ought to

act here in exactly the same way as we did in the cases of

Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. In these cases too we did

not publish our aims, and it was only sensible to continue in

the same way.

“Therefore, we shall emphasize again that we were forced to

occupy, administer, and secure a certain area; it was in the

interest of the inhabitants that we provided order, food,

traffic, etc., hence our measures. Nobody shall be able to

recognize that it initiates final settlement. This need not

prevent our taking all necessary measures—shooting,

de-settling, etc.—and we shall take them.

“But we do not want to make any people into enemies prematurely

and unnecessarily. Therefore we shall act as though we wanted to

exercise a mandate only. At the same time we must know clearly

that we shall never leave those countries.

“Our conduct therefore ought to be:

“1. To do nothing which might obstruct the final settlement, but

to prepare for it only in secret. * * *”

“2. To emphasize that we are liberators.

“In particular: The Crimea has to be evacuated by all foreigners

and to be settled by Germans only. In the same way the former

Austrian part of Galicia will become Reich territory.

“Our present relations with Roumania are good, but nobody knows

what they will be at any future time. This we have to consider,

and we have to draw our frontiers accordingly. One ought not to

be dependent on the good will of other people. We have to plan

our relations with Roumania in accordance with this principle.

“On principle, we have now to face the task of cutting up the

giant cake according to our needs, in order to be able—

“first, to dominate it;

“second, to administer it, and;

“third, to exploit it.

“The Russians have now ordered partisan warfare behind our

front. This partisan war again has some advantage for us; it

enables us to eradicate everyone who opposes us.

“Principles: Never again must it be possible to create a

military power west of the Urals, even if we have to wage war

for a hundred years in order to attain this goal. Every

successor of the Fuehrer should know: security for the Reich

exists only if there are no foreign military forces west of the

Urals; it is Germany who undertakes the protection of this area

against all possible danger. Our iron principle is and has to

remain: We must never permit anybody but the Germans to carry

arms.”

* * * * * *

“The Fuehrer emphasizes that the entire Baltic country will have

to be incorporated into Germany.

“At the same time the Crimea, including a considerable

hinterland, (situated north of the Crimea) should become Reich

territory; the hinterland should be as large as possible.

“Rosenberg objects to this because of the Ukrainians living

there.

“Incidental question: It occurred to me several times that

Rosenberg has a soft spot for the Ukrainians; thus he desires to

aggrandize the former Ukraine to a considerable extent.”

“The Fuehrer emphasizes furthermore that the Volga Colony, too,

will have to become Reich territory, also the district around

Baku; the latter will have to become a German concession

(military colony).”

“The Finns wanted East Carelia, but the Kola Peninsula will be

taken by Germany because of the large nickel mines there.

“The annexation of Finland as a federated state should be

prepared with caution. The area around Leningrad is wanted by

the Finns; the Fuehrer will raze Leningrad to the ground and

then hand it over to the Finns.” (_L-221_)

Thus, the program, as outlined by the conspirators at this meeting of 16

July, 1941, called for the unlawful incorporation of a part of Galicia

and all the Baltic countries into Germany; and for the unlawful

conversion of the Crimea and areas north of it, the Volga territory and

the district around Baku, into German colonies.

This point is reinforced by a directive entitled, “Instruction for a

Reich Commissar in the Baltic Countries and White Russia,” which states:

“The aim of a Reich Commissar for Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania,

and White Russia [last two words added in pencil] must be to

strive to achieve the form of a German protectorate, and then

transform the region into part of the Greater German Reich by

Germanizing racially possible elements, colonizing Germanic

races, and banishing undesirable elements. The Baltic Sea must

become a Germanic inland sea, under the guardianship of Greater

Germany.” (_1029-PS_)

Even in the food-surplus areas of the occupied regions of the Ukraine,

the conspirators planned to allocate food on a basis which left

virtually nothing for those persons who were not engaged in the

compulsory production of commodities for the German war machine. This

was in violation of the explicit provision in Article 52 of the Hague

Regulations of 1907, that requisitions in kind and services shall not be

demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the

army of occupation. This program was disclosed in a top secret

memorandum, dated 18 September, 1941, concerning a meeting of German

military officials presided over by Goering (_EC-3_). The memorandum was

signed by General Nagl, liaison officer between Goering’s Four Year Plan

Office and the OKW. The memorandum states:

“At this conference which was concerned with the better

exploitation of the occupied territories for the German food

economy, the Reich Marshal (Goering) called attention to the

following:”

* * * * * *

“It is clear that a graduated scale of food allocations is

needed.

“First in line are the combat troops, then the remainder of

troops in enemy territory, and then those troops stationed at

home. The rates are adjusted accordingly. The supply of the

German nonmilitary population follows and only then comes the

population of the occupied territories.” (_EC-3_)

Another memorandum, dated 25 November 1941, relating to the general

principles of economic policy in the newly-occupied eastern territories,

as prescribed in a conference held in Berlin on 8 November 1941, also

bears out this point. This memorandum was also written by General Nagl.

It is on the stationery of the Supreme Headquarters Armament Procurement

Office. The following portions are pertinent:

“I. For the duration of the war the requirements of the war

economy will be the all-dominant factor of any economic measures

in the newly-occupied Eastern territories.

“II. Seen from a long range point of view the newly-occupied

eastern areas will be exploited economically from the point of

view of colonial administration and by colonial methods.

“Exceptions will be made only for those parts of the Eastland

which are to be Germanized by order of the Fuehrer, but even

they are subject to the principle expressed in paragraph I.

“III. The main emphasis of all economic work rests with the

production of food and raw materials.

“The highest possible production surplus for the supply of the

Reich and of other European countries is to be attained by cheap

production based on the maintenance of the low living standard

of the native population. Besides covering thereby the European

needs for food supplies and raw materials as far as possible,

this measure is intended to create a source of income for the

Reich which will make it possible to liquidate in a few decades,

with utmost consideration for the German taxpayer, an essential

part of the debts incurred in the financing of the war.”

(_EC-3_)

On 17 July, 1941, Hitler and Keitel issued a decree appointing Rosenberg

as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. This was the day

following the meeting at the Fuehrer’s headquarters, which is reported

in the document previously quoted from (_L-221_). This decree states,

_inter alia_:

“The Civil Administration in the newly-occupied Eastern

territories where these territories are not included in the

administration of the territories bordering on the Reich or the

Government-General, is subject to the Reich Minister for the

Occupied Eastern Territories.

* * * * * *

“I appoint Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as Reich Minister for

the occupied Eastern territories. He will hold office in

Berlin.” (_1997-PS_)

Rosenberg’s views well fitted him for his task as one of the chief

executioners of the conspirators’ plans in the Soviet Union. His views

were plainly expressed in a speech delivered on 20 June 1941:

“The job of feeding the German people, stands, this year,

without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany’s claims on

the East; and here the southern territories and the northern

Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the

German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on

our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of

that surplus territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity,

bare of any feelings.” (_1058-PS_)

These views were implemented in the directives issued by Rosenberg in

his capacity as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

Among his directives were these:

“The principal task of the civilian administration in the

occupied Eastern territories is to represent the interest of the

Reich. This basic principle is to be given precedence in all

measures and considerations. Therefore, the occupied

territories, in the future, may be permitted to have a life of

their own in a form not as yet to be determined. However, they

remain parts of the Greater German living space and are always

to be governed according to this guiding principle.

“The regulations of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, which

concern the administration of a country occupied by a foreign

belligerent power, are not applicable, since the USSR is to be

considered dissolved, and therefore the Reich has the obligation

of exercising all governmental and other sovereign functions in

the interests of the country’s inhabitants. Therefore, any

measures are permitted which the German administration deems

necessary and suitable for the execution of this comprehensive

task.” (_EC-347_)

Implicit in Rosenberg’s statement that the Hague Regulations are not

applicable to the Soviet Union is the recognition by him that the

conspirators’ action in the Soviet Union flagrantly violated the Hague

Regulations and applicable principles of International Law.

A top secret memorandum, dated 5 October 1942, written by Braeutigam,

who was a high official in Rosenberg’s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern

Territories, made the following statements:

“In the East, Germany is carrying on a threefold war: a war for

the destruction of Bolshevism, a war for the destruction of the

greater Russian Empire, and finally a war for the acquisition of

colonial territory for colonizing purposes and economic

exploitation.

* * * * * *

“With the inherent instinct of the Eastern peoples the primitive

man soon found out also that for Germany the slogan: ‘Liberation

from Bolshevism’ was only a pretext to enslave the Eastern

peoples according to her own methods.” (_294-PS_)

Certain German industrialists and financiers aided and abetted Himmler

in his relentless program of Germanization, exploitation, oppression,

and destruction. A letter from the banker, Baron Kurt von Schroeder to

Himmler, dated 27 August 1943, stated:

“My very honorable Reichsfuehrer:

“With great joy I learn of your appointment as Reichsminister of

the Interior and take the liberty to extend my heartiest

congratulations to you on assuming your new post.

“A strong hand is now very necessary in the operation of this

Department and it is universally welcomed but especially by your

friends that it was you who were chosen for this by the Fuehrer.

Please be assured that we will always do everything in our power

at all times to assist you in every possible way.

“I am pleased to inform you at this opportunity that your circle

of friends has again placed at your disposal this year a sum

slightly in excess of RM 1 million for ‘special purposes.’ An

exact list showing the name of the contributors will be sent to

you shortly.

“Again all my very best wishes—as well as those of my family—I

remain yours, in old loyalty and esteem.

“Heil Hitler! Yours truly.” (_EC-454_)

A later letter from von Schroeder to Himmler, dated 21 September 1943,

enclosed the list of contributors. The letter stated:

“Dear Reichsleader:

“I thank you very much for your kind letter of the 14th of this

month with which you made me very happy. At the same time, I am

enclosing a list with the total amount of funds made available

to you by your circle of friends and totalling RM 1,000,000. We

are very glad indeed to render some assistance to you in your

special tasks and to be able to provide some small relief for

you in your still further extended sphere of duties.

“Wishing you, dear Reichsleader, the best of luck, I remain in

old loyalty and esteem.

“Heil Hitler! Yours very truly.” (_EC-453_)

The Himmler “circle of friends,” it may be noted, was a relatively

small, select group. It did not include all, or even a majority of the

industrialists and financiers in Germany. These contributions were not

like the “_Hitler Spende_” or the Winter Relief contributions which were

exacted from all industrialists by the Nazi state. These were

contributions by a small group of very influential industrialists and

financiers who, for selfish reasons, were anxious to “do everything in

our power at all times to assist you “(Himmler)” in every possible way.”

By a rather strange coincidence, firms like I. G. Farben, the Flick

Combine, and the Herman Goering Werke, which are on the list of

contributors to Himmler, were among the chief beneficiaries of the

conspirators’ program of plunder of public and private property in the

occupied countries. (_EC-453_)

4. THE WESTERN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

(This section is based on a brief originally prepared for submission by

the United States Prosecution in support of the allegation, in Count One

of the Indictment, of a plan or conspiracy to commit war crimes. The

evidence relating to the plan or conspiracy, however, proved to be

inseparable from that on the execution thereof, a subject assigned to

the French Prosecution. The materials contained herein were accordingly

made available to the French for such use as they might deem appropriate

in connection with the proof of their case.)

A. _The Nazi Conspirators Obtained Enormous Quantities of Foodstuffs,

Raw Materials and Equipment From the Occupied Western Countries._

(1) _The Nazis planned in advance of the invasion to secure from the

conquered territories the strategic materials which Germany lacked and

without which Germany could not prevail in a war of long duration._ In

this war, as in the last, German resources were sufficient only for a

conflict of short duration. As early as the winter of 1939-40, following

the swift and crushing defeat of Poland, Germany suffered from a

critical shortage of essential raw materials (_EC-615_). The Nazi

leaders were thus faced with the question whether to conserve their

supplies for a long war or to commit their limited reserves in the hope

of obtaining an early decision. Hitler decided on the latter course. As

Goering told General Thomas:

“The Fuehrer is firmly convinced that he will succeed in

reaching a decision * * * in the year 1940 by a big attack in

the West. He reckons that Belgium, Holland, and Northern France

will get into our possession and * * * had figured out that the

industrial areas of Douai and Lens and those of Luxembourg,

Longwy, and Briey could, from the point of view of raw material,

replace the supplies from Sweden. Therefore, the Fuehrer had

decided now to make use of our reserve of raw materials without

regard to future times. * * *” (_EC-606_)

Careful plans were made in advance of the invasion in 1940 to secure for

Germany the raw material resources of the to-be-occupied countries. A

manual of directives and decrees issued by the Quartermaster, OKH, for

the economic administration of the military government set forth an

exhaustive list of important raw materials to be seized wherever found

(_EC-155_). Directives were issued to the so-called economic squads

(_Wirtschafts Truppe_) attached to the tactical units on the procedures

to be followed in locating, seizing, and preparing such materials for

shipment to Germany (_EC-618_). Also included in the manual mentioned

were drafts of decrees to be promulgated by the German occupation

authorities, for the establishment in the occupied countries of Goods

Offices, modeled after the German rationing boards, to control

production and distribution in the occupied countries in the German

interest. (_EC-155_)

(2) _The occupied Western countries were ruthlessly exploited according

to plan._ The occupied areas were systematically stripped of their

economic resources to feed the German war machine. The extent of German

exploitation is partially indicated by the staggering totals of the

occupation levies and the “credit” balances of the local central banks

under clearing arrangements imposed by the Nazis, the principal sources

of the funds with which Germany financed the spoliation of Western

Europe. (For a brief explanation of the clearing system, see _infra_

under D, 2.)

The total occupation charges exacted from France alone were

31,600,000,000 RM from 25 June, 1940, to 5 September, 1944 (_3615-PS_).

They averaged more than 7,000,000,000 RM annually, a sum more than four

times the German annual payments under the Dawes and Young Plans. This

sum is in addition to a “credit” of the Bank of France under the

Franco-German clearing, which, as of September, 1943, amounted to

4,400,000,000 RM (_3615-PS_). For the period May 1942-43, the tribute

exacted from Belgium (mainly from occupation charges and clearing

credits) amounted to more than two-thirds of the Belgium national income

(_ECR-149_). These figures, large as they are, take no account of the

substantial quantities of materials seized and removed to the Reich

without compensation (see _infra_ under B, (1)) nor do they reflect the

windfall to the Reich resulting from the substantial over-valuation of

the Reichsmark, particularly in the case of France and Belgium.

(_EC-86_)

A few illustrative examples of specific items, taken from the report of

the German Military Commander for France of 10 September, 1942

(_EC-267_), will serve to show even more concretely than monetary

figures, the extent to which materials and equipment were taken from the

occupied countries for the benefit of the Reich. Since the Armistice,

according to this report, the French contributed to the Germans 73

percent of the normal annual French consumption of iron, amounting to

nearly 5 million tons. From the Armistice to July, 1942, 225,000 tons of

copper and 5,700 tons of nickel were delivered by France to Germany,

amounting to 80 percent and 86 percent of French supplies respectively;

also 55 percent of the French aluminum and 80 percent of the magnesium

production. For her own needs France retained only 30 percent of the

normal production of the wool industry, 16 percent of the cotton

production, and 13 percent of the linen production. The total French

production of locomotives and the major part of the machine tool

industry were put at the disposal of the Germans. (_EC-267_)

B. _The Foodstuffs, Raw Materials and Equipment Delivered to Germany

were Obtained by Compelling the Nationals of the Conquered Countries to

Produce and Distribute in Accordance with German War Requirements, by

Seizure and Requisition, and by Purchases Financed with Funds Exacted

from the Occupied Countries and Their Nationals._

(1) _Much of the material and equipment removed to Germany was obtained

by seizure, requisition, and confiscation of private property._ During

the first phase of the occupation, the Nazis systematically removed to

the Reich almost all available supplies to satisfy the immediate German

requirements. This phase, according to the German Military Commander’s

description of the practice in France, was one of “stripping” occupied

areas of “foodstuffs, raw materials and machinery”, leaving only enough

to secure the “bare subsistence” of the population (_EC-614_). In the

words of the report of the Wi-Rue Staff in France:

“In this period the legal concepts of the Hague Regulations

regarding Land Warfare are not yet strictly observed. The main

purpose is to get out of France through seizure _Beschlagnahme_

or purchase at infinitesimal prices the materials of use for the

German armament.” (_EC-422_)

By order of the German High Command, booty was defined to include not

merely public property but “beyond the Hague Regulations on Land

Warfare,” also “privately owned finished and semi-finished products if

they were manufactured in fulfillment of an order of the French armed

forces” (_EC-422_). At the same time, payments made by the French armed

forces on account of war material orders were likewise treated as war

booty. Even goods in transit were arbitrarily placed in this category

(_EC-422_). Machinery and equipment affixed to the realty were seized

and shipped to Germany in wilful disregard of the limitations of the

Hague Regulations authorizing seizure only of chattels. (_EC-84_)

The “stripping phase” of Nazi spoliation was relatively short-lived.

Decision was soon reached to utilize at least part of the industrial

capacity of the occupied areas to relieve the burden on the armament

plants in Germany (_EC-620_). Throughout the period of occupation,

however, the Nazis continued the seizure and requisition of machinery

and certain raw materials in short supply in the Reich. From December,

1942, to the end of the occupation, for example, 242 German demands for

Belgian machinery were met, of which 110 were fulfilled by requisitions

(_ECH-10_). In 79 instances the requisitioned equipment was shipped to

Germany. (_ECH-10_)

Support for such requisitions was found in an order of the Military

Commander of Belgium of 6 August 1942. This order was explained as

embodying the “modern” German view that, as “total war is no longer

limited in space but has become a struggle of peoples and nations

against each other,” requisitions under Article 52 of the Hague

Regulations should no longer be limited to the “needs of the occupying

forces” but may also be used in the “general interest of the German war

effort”; and that requisitioned articles may be used not only in the

territory in which they were obtained but also “in other territories in

the sphere of the occupying power.” (_ECH-10_)

In April 1941, Goering ordered the removal of church bells in France

“which represent the most important and last reserve of copper and tin,”

stressing that “no church bells would be removed in Germany before all

bells had been removed in France” (_EC-323_). In 1943, after the removal

of church bells from the other occupied countries and even from the

Reich, Hitler ordered their removal from Belgium (_ECH-11_). The

Belgians protested, invoking the Hague Regulations, and refused an offer

to buy; thereupon the Germans requisitioned the bells against receipt.

(_ECH-11_)

By circular letter, dated 23 June 1943, Speer ordered that scientific

instruments and apparatus be taken out of the laboratories and research

institutes in the occupied Western countries, directing that

applications for instruments be made through channels and that the

requisitions be made by the Military Government. (_ECH-14_)

In many cases, representatives of German scientific institutions sought

to acquire scientific instruments in order to modernize their own

installations, appearing in Army uniforms to give the impression that

the requisition was a military measure (_ECH-15_). The Military

Government of Belgium decided that Articles 52 and 56 of the Hague

Regulations were inapplicable because the Allies had destroyed a number

of German scientific installations in the Reich through bombing, which

therefore had to be replaced from the occupied territories, and that “in

a total war, no consideration could be given to the cited articles of

the Hague Regulations”. (_ECH-16_)

As part of the design to supply the armament industry in Germany with

material from the occupied Western territories, a program for the

removal of copper and lead from transmission installations of power

distribution plants in the occupied Western countries was instituted by

a decree of Speer dated 31 May, 1943 (_EC-101_). The plan contemplated

from the outset that the transmission of facilities would not be

restored (as required by the second paragraph of Article 53 of the Hague

Regulations) but that an equivalent amount of metal would be returned

after the war. (_EC-101_)

(2) _The Nazis purchased war materials and consumer goods_ _in the

regular and black markets for shipment to the Reich, all with funds

exacted from the occupied countries._ Following the initial “stripping”

phase of the occupation, the Nazis promptly instituted an extensive

“buying-out” program (_061-PS_) with the object of procuring not merely

materials required for the German war effort, but to obtain also

consumer goods, including luxury items, for the civilian population of

Germany (_EC-485_).

No limitations, legal or moral, were observed in the execution of this

program. Supplies which could not be obtained through normal channels

were purchased on the black market. The disastrous effects of

competition among various German agents led the central occupational

authorities in Belgium, France, and Holland to take over black market

operation directly (_1765-PS_). On 13 June 1942, by order of Goering,

Col. Veltjens was appointed to direct black market purchases in all

occupied territories and a new agency, the so-called UEWA, was placed at

his disposal. (_ECH-7_)

The actual purchases were made by several corporations, including

Pimetex, an agency of the Speer Ministry of Armament and Munitions. The

goods were distributed through Roges according to directives of the

Central Planning Board (Speer, Koerner, Milch) and in appropriate cases

by the German Ministry of Economics and the _Reichsstellen_ (_ECH-7_).

Black market operations were finally abolished by order of Goering dated

2 April, 1943, confirmed in Belgium by circular of the Military

Commander of 19 June, 1943. (_ECH-9_)

Certain of the purchases made through the black market while under the

direction of Col. Veltjens are of special interest:

_Christmas Drive._ On 22 September 1942, Goering ordered a

special drive in the Western occupied countries to purchase

presents for the civil population in Germany for the coming

Christmas. The Roges Company effected the distribution of the

articles in Germany.

_Special Drive WABO._ This drive was pursuant to Hitler’s order

to Speer to procure Christmas packages for the soldiers. The O.

Todt Cantine accepted offers of sale on the black market and

Pimetex did the buying.

_Special Drive LOWA_ (Degenkolb locomotive program). The

purchase were made by Pimetex. (_ECH-7_)

As of 15 January 1943, black market purchases totaled approximately

1,100,000,000 RM, including:

RM 929,100,000 in France.

RM 103,881,929 in Belgium, and

RM 73,685,162.64 in Holland. (_1765-PS_)

Payment in France was made out of occupation funds, in Belgium out of

such funds and through the clearing, and in Holland through “normal bank

transactions” (_1765-PS_; _ECR-132_). As appears very clearly from the

report of Col. Veltjens of 15 January, 1943, substantially all the goods

so purchased were shipped to the Reich. (_1765-PS_)

(3) _The Nazi conspirators compelled the nationals of the occupied

countries to produce and distribute materials and equipment in

accordance with the German general war requirements._ The “stripping”

and “buying-out” phases of the Nazi spoliation were both gradually

superseded by a regulated program for the utilization of the industrial

plant of the occupied areas and the transfer of orders (subcontracting)

to local concerns. The Nazi conspirators established comprehensive

rationing controls under which essential raw materials were made

available only to those who produced in the German interest; those

reluctant to produce on German order were placed under compulsory

administration. “This,” Keitel noted in commenting on the controls

established in France, “is * * * booty of the victor”. (_EC-613_)

_Belgium_

The means employed in Belgium were typical. Production quotas for coal,

iron and steel, textiles and leather, and other products were fixed by

the Ministry of Economics and its _Reichsstellen_, in some cases after

consultation with the Reich Minister (Funk). (_ECH-2_)

Comprehensive production controls were established in Belgium to assure

the fulfillment of these quotas. Pursuant to plans developed in advance

of the invasion (_EC-155_), a decree was issued by the Military

Commander on 27 May, 1940, creating so-called “Goods Offices,” endowed

with authority to issue general and special orders to Belgian firms

requiring production of designated products, and the sale thereof to

designated buyers, and with the further power to prohibit production or

sale without license (_3604-PS_). By decree of the Military Commander of

29 April, 1941, the appointment of a commissar to direct operations of

private plants was authorized. (_3610-PS_)

The German Goods Offices (_ECH-3_) were transferred to similar units

established by Belgian decree of 3 September, 1940. (Whether this decree

was issued on German order or suggestion does not appear.) The Germans

supervised the Belgian Goods Offices and adopted as German orders both

the Belgian decree establishing the Offices and the orders issued

thereunder, and prescribed punishment by fine and imprisonment for

violations. (_3609-PS_)

For the first two years of the occupation, German control was exercised

mainly through prohibitions and restrictions, that is, by a priority

system (_ECH-4_), although even then important sectors of the Belgian

economy, notably textiles and leather products, were controlled by

“positive” orders directing the amount in kind to be produced and the

persons to whom distribution must be made (_ECH-4_; _ECH-2_). During

this period the Military Commander issued instructions to the Goods

Offices through “command channels,” that is, through the Belgian

Minister of Economics. (_ECH-3_)

On 6 August, 1942, the Military Commander, however, published a decree

reaffirming explicitly the power to compel production of designated

articles (_3612-PS_), a signal for the introduction of “positive”

controls. In 1943, on instructions from the Reich Ministry of Economics,

German representatives selected from the _Reichsstellen_ were attached

directly to the Belgian Goods Offices (_ECH-3_). At the end of 1943, the

office of the “Ruestungsobmann” of the Speer Ministry for Armaments and

War Production began issuing “positive orders” for production to

individual concerns directly, without clearing with the Goods Offices,

pursuant to decree of the Minister for Armaments and War Production

(Speer). (_ECH-3_)

Production facilities in Belgium which were not deemed to serve the

German interest were shut down. By order of 30 March 1942, the Military

Commander prohibited the enlargement of existing plants and the

construction of new ones without German authorization, and provided for

the closing down of factories at his discretion (_3616-PS_). In the iron

and metal industry alone at least 400 plants “not important for the war

effort” had been closed down by 15 April 1943 (_EC-335_). By the end of

the occupation, 1360 put of a total of 2164 plants in the textile

industry had been closed down. (_ECH-19_)

_France and Holland_

Substantially the same system was put into effect in France and Holland.

German Goods Offices were established in Occupied France at the same

time as in Belgium (_3604-PS_). These were subsequently abolished in

November, 1940, however, when the Vichy Government, at the “suggestion”

of the Nazis, created raw material rationing boards, on which delegates

of the German Military Administration served as technical advisers

(_EC-613_; _EC-616_). In the Netherlands, controls were exercised by the

local German Armament Inspectorate (_EC-471_; _EC-472-A_), who, it is

believed, made use of the rationing boards set up in Holland before the

outbreak of war.

C. _The Nazi Conspirators Acquired Ownership of Belgian, Dutch, and

French Participations in European Industries by Means of Governmental

Pressure and Through the Use of Funds Unlawfully Exacted from the

Occupied Countries and Their Nationals._

The Nazi conspirators were not content with securing for Germany the

supplies necessary for the period of the war. They aimed at obtaining

permanent ownership and domination of European industry to the fullest

extent possible, and embarked on a program to that end even during the

progress of the war.

(1) _The Nazi conspirators established a program to acquire for German

interests ownership of Belgian, Dutch, and French participations during

the war._ On 23 May 1940, recommendation was made that it would be

opportune to secure all Dutch and Belgian stocks “in order, especially

in the case of holding companies, to win influence * * * over the

controlled companies” (_EC-41_). The memorandum recommended the taking

possession of stocks of the dominated companies located in foreign

countries and influencing the decisions of members of holding companies

located in Holland and Belgium or of other owners of such stock. Because

of the provisions of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations prohibiting

confiscation of private property, it was deemed more advisable to

influence members of holding companies through careful guiding than

through plain force. (_EC-41_)

At a meeting held in the Reich Ministry of Economics on 3 June 1940 on

the subject of “Belgian and Dutch capital shares in southeastern

European countries,” it was decided that regulations should be issued

immediately by the Military Commander for Belgium prohibiting the

destruction, transfer, or disposition of any bonds or stocks of these

countries, and that registration should be required of owners and

trustees. (_1445-PS_)

In a memorandum of 2 August 1940 Goering declared that the goal of the

Germans’ economic policy was the “increase of German influence with

foreign enterprises,” that it was “necessary already now that any

opportunity is used to make it possible for the German economy to start

the penetration even during the war of the interesting objects of the

economy of the occupied countries,” and directed that the transfer of

capital from Germany to the occupied countries be facilitated to make

possible the immediate purchase of enterprises in the occupied

countries. (_EC-137_)

At a meeting at the Reich Ministry of Economics on 8 August 1940 on the

subject of “Acquisition of shares of important foreign enterprises in

southeastern Europe,” Dr. Schlotterer of the Reich Ministry of Economics

commented that “private economical penetration of the Southeast area by

German influence is desirable, likewise the supplanting of British and

French interests in that territory” (_EC-43_). The group present,

including representatives of the Reich Ministry of Economics and the

Reichsbank, agreed that “attempts should be made immediately to acquire

shares” and that “in doing so the tendency should be preserved to

present a bill for the shares at the peace conference.” It was further

agreed that “it should be attempted if possible to transfer the shares

into private hands” but that “in order to make the right selection it

appears necessary to introduce an intermediary stage” in which “first of

all, enterprises should be taken over through banks, thereupon the

plants should be managed as a matter of trusteeship for the Reich with

the aim that the Reich (Reich Marshal Goering)” undertake handing them

over to private industry. (_EC-43_)

(2) _The Nazi conspirators carried out this program by compulsory sale

where necessary and by purchases financed out of occupation charges and

under clearing agreements with the occupied countries._

_Belgium_

Immediate steps were taken to implement these measures in Belgium. The

annual report of the Commissar at the National Bank from May 1940-41

states:

“According to the directions of the Reichsmarshal Goering as

early as September 1940 the first measures for a closer

formation of capital ties between the Belgian and German economy

were taken. Two different procedures were concerned here:

“1. Direct negotiations between German industrialists and

Belgian industrialists, for the purpose of obtaining

constructive participations in important Belgian enterprises

which offer the basis for collaboration between the two

economies even after the war. Furthermore, it is desired to

transfer to German hands important Belgian participations in

foreign enterprises whose administration is located in Belgium,

particularly so far as enterprises are concerned which are

located in the Balkans and in which a general German interest

exists.

“2. Ties which result from purchases of stock by German parties

on the Belgian stock markets. For this purpose the Reich

Economic Minister has given general permission to 32 German

banks to obtain participation rights, particularly stocks, in a

limited quantity in Belgium. Till now use has been made of this

permission in the amount of about 25 million RM, to which can be

added an additional 10 million RM for the procurement of Belgian

participations in Rumania, Bulgaria, and the former Poland.”

(_ECR-24_)

In his report for November 1940 the Military Commander for Belgium

stated:

“A certain readiness exists on the part of the Belgians to give

up investments in stocks in such countries which, at the present

time, are being ruled militarily or economically by Germany.

Among the important business deals of this kind which have been

concluded should be mentioned the taking over by the

_Kreditanstalt, Wien_ (Credit Institute, Vienna) of an essential

interest in the _Allgemeiner Jugoslawischer Bankverein_ (General

Yugoslav Bank Association) from the _Societé Generale_ (capital

approximately 1 million RM) and the taking over by the _Deutsche

Bank_ of the overwhelming majority [translator’s note: of

shares] of the _Banca Commerciala Romana_ from the _Societé

Generale_ (capital approximately 2 million RM). The _Deutsche

Bank_ also succeeded in acquiring shares of the _Kreditanstalt,

Wien_, of approximately 800,000 RM nominally from the _Societé

Generale_ and from one of its subsidiaries. Negotiations between

the _Deutsche Bank_ and the _Societé Generale_ on the transfer

of approximately 25% of the capital of the _Banque Generale du

Luxembourg_ are about to be concluded. Through this deal the

_Deutsche Bank_ together with the other German groups obtains

the absolute majority of the Luxembourger Bank (approximately

70% of the shares). The _Deutsche Bank_ gets the right to

acquire another 25% of the shares which for the time being,

remained with the _Societé Generale_.” (_EC-34_)

While the Military Commander of Belgium may have given some assurance

that the owners would not be compelled to sell (_ECH-22_), in at least

one instance, purchase could be effected only by military order

(_EC-335_). In this instance the procurement for the Main Branch of

Trustees East of shares of the Belgian “Trust Metallurgique” in

electricity and road enterprises of East Silesia and the General

Government, as well as purchase of shares in the iron works Ostrovica

for the Reichswerk Hermann Goering had “to be done, at the request of

the Reich Ministry for Economics, forcibly, as an agreement on a

financial basis could not be obtained.” (_EC-335_)

The German acquisition of Belgian stock participations was financed

through the Belgium-German clearing. The Belgian clearing balances of 20

March 1940 included an item of 296 millions bfrs., which “is explained

by out-payment of large clearing transfers to purchase Belgian capital

participations in Balkan enterprises” (_ECR-14_). Increasing transfers

resulting from the German capital penetration program precipitated a

controversy with the Emission Bank, which was resolved by the

Commissar’s issuance of an order requiring the bank to make payment

(_ECR-24_). As a sequel, “capital” payments were separated from those

for “goods and services” and financed by a separate “capital” clearing

agreement covering purchases of securities and other “capital”

transactions (_ECR-24_). The Belgian clearing “credit” under the capital

clearing, as of 31 July 1943, amounted to 1,071,000,000 bfrs

(_ECR-173_). As shown below, (see _infra_, D, 2) the Belgian credit

under the capital clearing traffic represents a forced loan, exacted for

a purpose not even remotely related to the needs of the occupation army.

_France and Holland_

The limited evidence, in the presently available German documents

indicates that similar methods were employed in French and Dutch

participations. The procedure followed in the Netherlands is indicated

below in the discussion of the removal of restrictions on the free

transfer of Reichsmarks in that country. (See _infra_, D, 5.) In France,

participations of a value of 121,000,000 RM were purchased for German

interests, paid for in part out of occupation funds and in part through

the clearing. (_1991-PS_)

D. _The Nazi Conspirators Compelled the Occupied Countries and Their

Nationals to Furnish the Monetary Requirements for the German

Exploitation, by Means of Occupation Levies, Forced Loans, and the

Requisition of Gold and Foreign Exchange in Amounts Far in Excess of the

Needs of the Occupation Armies._

Except for the early period of the occupation, during which

_Reichskreditkassen_ certificates were issued to finance the needs of

the occupation troops (Lemkin, _Axis Rule In Occupied Europe_, p. 329),

the Nazis obtained the necessary local currency through the levy of

excessive occupation charges, the imposition of clearing arrangements

under which the local central banks were compelled to finance exports to

the Reich, and by requisition of gold and foreign exchange.

(1) _The Nazi conspirators exacted excessive occupation charges from the

conquered countries._

_Belgium_

The Nazi conspirators demanded from Belgium both “internal occupation

costs” and “external occupation costs” (_ECR-32_). The former was

defined as “those sums which are gotten out of the country to finance

the needs of the German military formations located in the country”

(_ECR-32_). The term “external occupation costs” was used

interchangeably with the title “antibolshevistic contribution”

(_EC-401_). Under whatever theory, the exaction of occupation charges

was made “to the limit of capacity”. (_ECR-59_)

Throughout the period of German occupation, a substantial part of the

contribution charges obtained from Belgium was used as a matter of

regular practice “not for occupation cost purposes” (_ECR-166_;

_ECR-155-A_; _ECR-35_), including:

(_a_) Exports to Germany, Holland, and France (_ECR-89_; _ECR-104_).

(_b_) Exchange for Belgian francs of RKK certificates, a “not

inconsiderable part” of which did “not have the least thing to do with

occupation costs” (_ECR-39_; _ECR-142_).

(_c_) “Political purposes (that is, SS, Propaganda, Hitler Youth)”

(_ECR-106_).

(_d_) Purchases in the “black market” (_ECR-106_), many of them destined

for export. (See _supra_, B, (2).)

(_e_) General war expenses, including the supply of troops based in

Belgium for military operations against England (_ECH-5_); the

Commander-in-Chief of the Army rejected a recommendation of the Military

Commander that a distinction be drawn between occupation troops and

those for military operations (_ECH-5_).

Notwithstanding the extensive use of occupation levies for

non-occupation purposes, the contributions exacted from Belgium

“were not only sufficient to cover the needs of the _Wehrmacht_

* * * but also made it possible * * * to fund a cash reserve

which reached at certain times about 2,500,000,000 bfrs”.

(_ECH-5_)

_France_

The occupation cost accounts of the _Reichskreditkasse_ in Paris

disclose on their face that a large part of the occupation funds was

obtained and used for nonoccupational purposes. Two sets of occupation

cost accounts, were maintained: Account A, into which payments were made

on behalf of various Reichs ministeries and agencies, and for specified

purposes; and Account B, into which payments were made for disposal for

the _Wehrmacht_ (_3615-PS_). The funds in Account A were used for

obviously nonoccupational purposes, as follows:

_June 1940 to end

1943_

A I. Reich Minister for Economic Affairs

(primarily for the buying agency,

“Roges,” also for the purchase of

securities and devisen) RM 1,518,000,000

A II. Foreign Office (for propaganda

purposes in France) 27,000,000

A III. Payment of support to dependents of

laborers recruited in France for

work in Germany 1,500,000

A IV. Reich Minister for Transportation

(purchase of securities) 2,500,000

A V. Paris Agency of the

_Reichstierstelle_ (Reich Agency

for Animals)—imports of meat and

meat products 19,000,000

A VI. Exchange by the Bank of France of

RM notes for persons evacuated

from Alsace-Lorraine 900,000

A VII. Financing purchases of raw sugar in

North France by sugar refinery in

South Germany 1,285,000

A VIII. Compensation for war damage to

_Reichsdeutsche_ and

_Volkdeutsche_ in France 8,500,000

A IX. Sale of French francs to the Reich

(Commodity imports into

Alsace-Lorraine) 66,000,000

A X. Reich Minister of Education

(Purchases for libraries in the

Reich of books destroyed in air

raids) 1,000,000

(_3615-PS_)

The available records do not disclose the full extent to which the

_Wehrmacht_ used the funds at its disposal in Account B for

nonoccupational purposes. It is certain, however, that large sums were

expended for such purposes. Thus, a communication of the OKW to the

Foreign Office of 6 November 1942, explaining the decrease in reserve

for Account B, states:

“In addition, payments to a considerable extent had to be made

from the occupation cost funds which were not allotted to meet

the demands of those units of the German Wehrmacht stationed in

France. On 15 January the B account of occupation costs was

approximately 3 bill. RM. The reason for the decrease appears

from the following compilation:

_Million

RM._

_a._ For procurement of goods exported from France during

the period of 1 Jan.-31 Oct. 1942 an estimated 10 × 90 mill.

RM  900

_b._ To Roges Raw Material Trading Company Ltd. for

purchases on black market  700

_c._ For procurement of foreign bills by the Navy (the

purchase of foreign bills with French francs was necessary

to buy and repair merchant ships in Spanish harbors. These

merchant ships are to serve for supplying Rommel’s Panzer

army in Africa)  40

_d._ Reimbursement to Foreign Office (account Syria)  4

_e._ Allotments in favor of families of French workersw

orking in Germany  1.5

_f._ Special commissioner Rumania  1.3

_g._ Costs of building completions for directors of French

powder factories  0.2

———

1,647

Therefrom it appears that the decrease of reserves of occupation

cost funds amounting to 3,000 mill. RM on 15 January 1942 is

primarily due to expenditures for purposes unrelated to the

occupation.” (_1741-PS_)

_Holland_

Occupation charges were fixed at about 100,000,000 gulden a month

(_ECR-174_; _EC-86_). (100 RM = 75 gulden, approximately (_EC-468_)).

Expenditures were divided between “occupation” purposes and

“nonoccupation” purposes, according to whether “the products purchased

or produced on orders of the armed forces of the Netherlands remain in

the Netherlands (occupation cost) or leave the Netherlands

(nonoccupation cost)” (_ECR-174_). During the 20-month period from March

1941 to October 1942, inclusive (the only period for which figures are

available), out of the total occupation charges of 1,545,500,000 gulden,

433,800,000 gulden were expended for “nonoccupation” purposes

(_ECR-175-193_). A large part of the “pure” occupation expenditure,

moreover, was for general war expenses, including the construction of

fortifications and airfields, and the letting of shipbuilding contracts.

(_ECR-180, 181, 183, 187, 191_)

In theory, only the “occupation” costs were supposed to be charged to

the Netherlands (_ECR-174_); until April 1941, the “nonoccupation”

expenditures were returned to the Military Commander in the Netherlands

(_ECR-175_). The claim of the Netherlands to the sums “returned,”

however, was rejected. Moreover, as appears from the above cited reports

(_ECR-175-193_), nonoccupation expenditure continued even after April

1941, when reimbursements ceased. (_ECR-176_)

During the first year of the occupation Germany exacted an additional

levy from the Netherlands under the heading of “external occupation

costs,” amounting to 500,000,000 RM (_ECR-194_). Of this sum,

100,000,000 RM was paid in gold; the remainder was paid by a transfer of

the clearing balance of the Netherlands Bank at the _Verrechnungskasse_

to the German Ministry of Finance, that is, was used to reduce a credit

which arose by reason of exports to the Reich. (_ECR-194_)

In April 1942, “at the instigation of the Reich Commissioner

Seyss-Inquart,” the Netherlands began to pay a “voluntary contribution

to the war against Bolshevism” of 50,000,000 guilders per month,

retroactive to 1 July 1941, of which 10,000,000 per month was paid in

gold (_ECR-195_). By 31 March 1944, this “contribution” amounted to

2,150,000,000 RM. (_EC-86_)

It is immaterial whether this “contribution” was made at the direction

of Seyss-Inquart or was in fact the “voluntary” act of the then

President of the Netherlands Bank and Treasurer in the Ministry of

Finance, Van Tonningen. Van Tonningen was appointed by Seyss-Inquart and

acted in the German interest. His acts, like that of civilian

administrators in occupied territories generally, must be charged to the

occupant. (See _infra_, _Conclusion_.) The spirit in which he discharged

his duties is sympathetically described by the German Commissar at the

Netherlands Bank as follows:

“The new President of the Netherlands Bank, Mr. Rost Van

Tonningen, is, in contrast to a large part of the leadership,

penetrated in his movements and his official acts by the greater

German thought, and convinced of the necessity of the creation

of a greater European economic space. This ideological attitude

in itself gives him the correct position on financial and

monetary policy questions for his country in relation to the

greater German economic space. Furthermore, it makes easier

cooperation with my office, a fact which deserves special

mention in consideration of the frequently observed passive

conduct of the Netherlands agencies before the entrance into

office of the new President. I consider as a fortunate solution

the fact that the Reichskommissar for the Occupied Dutch Areas

has also entrusted Mr. Rost Van Tonningen with the Treasury of

the Ministry of Finance (_Schatzamt des Finanzministeriums_).

Mr. Rost Van Tonningen took over this office at the end of the

month of April. Thus there is a guarantee that the financial and

monetary policy of the country will be conducted according to

unified points of view.” (_ECR-196_)

(2) _The Nazi conspirators financed exports from the occupied countries

to Germany by means of forced loans under the guise of clearing

agreements._

_Belgium_

The principle of the clearing system is as follows:

The importer makes a deposit of the purchase price in his own currency

at the national clearing agency of his country, which places the same

amount to the credit of the clearing agency of the exporting country.

The latter institution then pays the exporter in his own currency. Thus

if trade between two countries is unequal the clearing agency of one

acquires a claim against the agency of the other which, however, is

satisfied only when a shift in the balance of trade gives rise to an

offsetting claim.

In the order establishing the German-Belgium clearing, the Belgium

clearing agency was the National Bank of Belgium (_3608-PS_). The

administration of the clearing was shortly thereafter transferred to

Emission Bank, an organization originally incorporated by Belgian

interests pursuant to order of the Military Commander of 27 June 1940

(_ECR-24_). The change was one in name only, however, since at this time

the management of the two banks was substantially identical and the

Emission Bank obtained its currency by loan from the National Bank. The

Emission Bank was, by its charter terms, subject to orders of the

Commissar at the National Bank; the Commissar obtained the same powers

over the National Bank by German order of 16 December 1940. (_ECR-24_)

The Belgian total “credit” under the clearing, as of 31 July 1944,

amounted to 60,837,000,000 bfrs = 4,867,000,000 RM, of which

54,993,000,000 bfrs = 4,399,000,000 RM arose from the Belgian-German

clearing for goods and services. (_ECR-173_)

The continued increase in the Belgian “credit” was due mainly to “the

increasing Belgian export to Germany for which there are only small

imports from Germany on the other side of the account.” (_ECR-149_)

The entire Belgian credit under the clearing constitutes a forced loan,

largely for nonoccupation purposes:

(_a_) The Belgian-German clearing was established by circular of the

Reichs Minister of Economics, 4 July 1940 (_ECH-6_), which was published

to the Belgians by proclamation of the Military Commander of 10 July

1940 (_EC-604_; _3608-PS_).

(_b_) “Since it was to be foreseen that as the result of the increased

deliveries from Belgium to the Reich, which were not matched by opposite

accounts, particularly in the early period, the clearing status would

develop to the favor of the Emission Bank” (_ECR-24_), an agreement was

signed by the Emission Bank and the German Reichsbank on 16/17 August

1940 under which each undertook to pay out clearing transfers

immediately (_ECR-24_; _ECH-5_).

(_c_) This agreement did not prescribe what must be financed through the

clearing; it merely provided for immediate payment of claim arising

thereunder without waiting until the account should be balanced by

equalizing of imports and exports. As the Military Commander stated, the

German-Belgian clearing was “not regulated by an agreement, but has been

regulated unilaterally by my proclamation of 10 July 1940” (_EC-604_).

The Military Commander made clear the absolute power asserted by the

German authorities over the Belgian Note Banks (as the Germans described

the Emission and National Banks). He stated:

“* * * The claim made to the Commissar that the Emission Bank is

entitled to ask in every case for detailed explanation of

compensation payments coming from Germany is incorrect. The

clearing activities between Germany and Belgium are not

regulated by an agreement but have been regulated unilaterally

by my proclamation on July 10, 1940 and are not subject to any

Belgian control. Inter-alia the transfer of all payments which

have been specially authorized by the Reich Ministry of Economy

has been expressly permitted * * *.” (_EC-604_)

(_d_) The Commissar freely invoked his directive power over the Note

Banks.

1. When, in April 1941, the clearing balance of the Emission

Bank exceeded 1,500,000 bfrs the Emission Bank refused to pay

out several large sums arising by virtue of German-Belgian

“capital” transactions. Thereupon, the Commissar issued an order

directing the bank to make the payment. (_ECR-24_)

2. In December 1941, the Emission Bank refused to pay out a sum

of 43,256,000 RM transferred from Paris. The Commissar thereupon

issued an order directing the bank to do so. (_ECR-172_)

3. In October 1942, the Emission Bank refused to pay out certain

amounts expended for purchases on the Belgian black market. The

military administrator, however, “held down the increasing

resistance of the Note Banks which culminated at the end of

October of this year in a public threat of resignation by the

Governor of the National Bank, by the heaviest pressure, and

forced the Note Banks, while emphasizing his willingness to

negotiate on certain Belgian proposals, again to take up the

global clearing transfers for German procurement agencies which

were cut off for a period” (_ECR-132_). The nature of this

pressure is explicitly shown in the following communication from

the Commissar to the President of the Emission Bank dated 29

October 1942:

“The Military Commander has ordered me to inform you of the

following:

“The requested extension of time for the resumption of business

relations with the Armed Forces Clearing Institute

(_Wehrmachtverrechnungskasse_) and for the payment of the

arrears of RM 60 million have been denied. An official will

determine tomorrow at 10 a. m. whether payment has been made.

“Severest measures against you and all responsible parties must

be expected in case of failure to pay.

“If acts of sabotage occur on the equipment and the values of

the National Bank or the Emission Bank, you and the gentlemen

designated on the enclosed list will be held responsible

personally and your property will be seized. Your liability is a

joint one.” (_EC-605_)

_France_

The “credit” balance of the Bank of France under the Franco-German

clearing established on 14 November 1940 amounted to 4,400,000,000 RM as

of September 1943 (_3615-PS_). The clearing arrangement was designed, of

course, principally for the financing of exports, that is, for purposes

not related to the needs of the occupation army. (_EC-619_)

Coercion in the establishment of the Franco-German clearing is readily

demonstrable. Extreme pressure was brought to bear, particularly in

regard to the rate of exchange established in the agreement, by

threatening to cut off communications between “occupied” and

“nonoccupied” zones in France (_3602-PS_; _3603-PS_), a step which would

have destroyed the last vestige of economic order in France. The harsh

terms of the agreement, which required the Bank of France to make

immediate payment for exports to Germany regardless of the balance of

trade, fixed the rate of exchange at 20 francs to the mark (as compared

to 10 to 1 before the war), and gave Germany a unilateral option to

cancel at any time, forcibly suggest that the agreement would not

voluntarily have been accepted. (_EC-619_)

_Holland_

The clearing system between Holland and Germany was of short duration,

being cancelled effective 1 April 1941, when free transfer of

Reichsmarks to Holland was introduced. (See _infra_, D, (5).) It is

therefore not deemed of sufficient importance to warrant discussion at

this point.

(3) _The Nazi conspirators unlawfully took over the gold reserve of the

National Bank of Belgium and the Netherlands Bank in the interest of the

German general war effort._

_Belgium_

The gold of the National Bank, deposited with the Bank of France and

transferred to Dakar, was brought to Berlin pursuant to German-French

“agreement” in the amount of 545,700,000 RM (_ECR-149_), and there

deposited with the Reichsbank in Berlin (_ECR-24_). Because of the “high

demands on gold and foreign exchange” which led to a “considerable

straining of the reserves” (_EC-401_), the “Reich Government felt itself

required to lay claim to the gold of the National Bank for the Reich”

(_ECR-149_). A decision to proceed by requisitioning under paragraph 52

of the Hague Regulations (_EC-401_) was not executed, apparently because

of fears on the part of the Reichsbank that title thus acquired would

not be recognized (_ECR-115_). On order of Goering (_ECH-5, part 9,

Annex XIII_), the gold was then “requisitioned on 19 September 1942 by

the Oberpraesident of the Province of Mark Brandenburg for the Deputy of

the Four-Year Plan, on the basis of the Reich Contribution Law

(_Reichsleistungsgesetz_) of 1.IX.1939 (Sec. 15, paragraph 1, No. 5, and

Sec. 2a)” (_ECR-149_).

_Holland_

As shown above, part of the Dutch “voluntary” contribution to the “war

against Bolshevism” was paid in gold. The gold was, in fact, taken from

the Netherlands Bank. (_EC-401_)

(4) _The Nazi conspirators unlawfully compelled the nationals of the

occupied countries to surrender and offer for sale all precious metals

and foreign exchange to the local central banks, which delivered them to

the German Reichsbank._

_Belgium_

By German decree of 17 June 1940 and administrative orders issued

pursuant thereto the Belgians were required to surrender gold and

foreign exchange notes to the Emission Bank, which in turn, delivered

the loot to the Reichsbank (_ECR-24_).

By May 1943, the Reichsbank had acquired in this fashion gold and

foreign exchange of the value of 23,400,000 RM. (_ECR-149_)

_Holland_

Gold and foreign exchange delivered by the Netherlands Bank to the

Reichsbank “on the basis of the direction of the Reichsmarshal”

(Goering) amounted to 74,000,000 RM through November 1940. (_EC-465_)

_France_

It is believed that the same practice was followed in France, but

evidence as to details has not been found in the German documents

presently available.

(5) _The Nazi conspirators used German Reichsmarks as currency in the

Netherlands, for purposes unrelated to the needs of the occupational

troops, which currency they caused to be freely exchanged for gulden by

the Netherlands Bank._ The Nazi conspirators, animated in part by the

view that the Netherlands were “akin in blood to the German nation”

(_3613-PS_), sought to promote a “mutual interpenetration of the German

and Netherlands economies” through the acquisition by Germans of Dutch

participations (_EC-468_) and Dutch investment in German securities.

(_ECR-174_)

To this end, restrictions on the free transfer of Reichsmark and gulden

across the German-Dutch border were removed. Conversations between the

Reich Economics and Finance Ministers in October 1940 led to the first

step in this direction, the issuance by the Economics Minister of a

Circular (_Runderlass_)—No. 89/40—which produced substantial changes

in the foreign exchange control along the German-Dutch borders

(_EC-468_). This provided, _inter-alia_, that RM 1,000 or its equivalent

in gulden could be taken across the German-Dutch border by travelers or

in border trade without permit, and permitted Germans to transfer to

Holland up to 5,000 RM per person per month for any purpose except

purchase of goods without any permission (_EC-468_).

These relaxations were made effective in Holland by free exchange of

Reichsmarks for gulden by the Netherlands Bank, introduced “on the

initiative” of the Commissar, and by enforced acceptance of Reichsmark

currency by the Dutch business population. (_EC-468_)

The Reichsmarks thus made available in the Netherlands were mainly used

to purchase Dutch securities on the stock exchange (_EC-468_).

Permission to make such purchases was extended to a large number of

German banks by the German Ministry of Economics. The transfers were

made with “reluctance” by the Dutch, in connection with which the Reich

Commissar at the Netherlands Bank observed, “it may be pointed out with

some justification that an out-payment of gulden made against a

Reichsmark credit, which can only result through the burdening of the

Netherlands State credit, represents no genuine transfer” (_EC-468_).

Notwithstanding the objections of the then Commissar at the Netherlands

Bank (_EC-468_), circular 87/40 was soon followed by No. 29/41 of 31

March 1941, which abolished almost completely all restrictions on the

free use of the Reichsmark in Holland (_ECR-197_). Circular 29/41

provided that all foreign exchange transactions between Germany and the

Netherlands were freed of control, the only important exception being

that German investments of more than 100,000 gulden in Holland required

permission of the Reichskommissar in the Netherlands. The clearing

agreement was abolished, and payments between Germany and the

Netherlands were permitted by simple bank checks, drafts, or postal

money orders. A simultaneous order by the Reich Commissar for the

Occupied Netherlands Areas lifted all restrictions set by Netherlands

foreign exchange law on such transactions (_ECR-197_).

After this “introduction of free payments traffic” or “removal of the

foreign exchange frontiers,” payments for exports from Holland were made

in Germany “through the accounts of the banks, mainly through the

account of the Netherlands Bank, which takes on the exchange into gulden

means of payment without further formalities.” (_ECR-174_)

This exchange presumably merely continued the practice introduced

earlier at the “instigation” of Seyss-Inquart. At all events, the

President of the Bank, Van Tonningen, was a Nazi agent, and his acts may

be charged to the Nazi conspirators.

The result of this radical step was this:

“Ever since the introduction of free payments traffic the status

of the Netherlands Bank is mainly influenced by the taking up of

Reichsmarks. On 31 March 1941, the day before the introduction

of free payments traffic, the Netherlands Bank had a total stock

of about 83 million RM of Reichsmark credits, on 30 April 1941

of about 213 million RM, and on 31 May 1941 of about 366 million

RM. Thus, in the two months after the removal of the foreign

exchange frontier, it has taken up about 283 million RM, the

gulden equivalent, at the rate of RM 132.7 equals florin 100, on

the basis of the transfer agreement with the Reichsbank.”

(_ECR-174_)

Thus the Netherlands Bank was caused to pledge its credit (in the form

of Dutch currency) in exchange for a Reichsmark credit. In this manner

the Nazi conspirators were enabled to exact from the bank a loan

unlimited in quantity and beyond the bank’s control, by the simple

expedient of writing out a check in Germany.

E. _Argument and Conclusion._