BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS.
Various Affairs of the Closing Campaign--The Massing of Grant's
Forces--Sortie against Fort Steadman--Captured but quickly
retaken--General Grant's Move around the Confederate Right--General
Lee anticipates with Aggressive Work--Sheridan makes Battle with his
Whole Force at Five Forks--Desperate Situation of the
Confederates--Disparity of Numbers--Splendid Stand and Battle of
Generals Pickett and Ransom--Colonel Pegram mortally wounded--W. H. F.
Lee, the "Noble Son of a Noble Sire"--Corse's Division--Pickett's
Generalship--Casualties.
Meanwhile General Grant was drawing forces from the North and West to
further strengthen his already overwhelming combinations against Richmond.
General Schofield was called from Tennessee to North Carolina to guard and
join on, if necessary, the flank of Sherman's column. The cavalry and
infantry of the Valley of Virginia were brought down to the Union army
about Richmond and Petersburg,--the latter by transports.
General Sheridan marched his cavalry, ten thousand strong, from the Valley
to ride across James River, through Lynchburg, to join the northward march
of Sherman's column. His divisions were under Generals Custer and Devens;
General Wesley Merritt was his chief of cavalry. He was to destroy
railroads, canals, bridges, and other works of value as he marched. At
Staunton he decided to take in the balance of General Early's command near
his route at Waynesboro'. He found that command posted behind field-works,
but the line did not cover the left of the position near the river. After
some preliminary dashes, General Custer found his way around General
Early's left, and, with part of the cavalry dismounted, made a bold,
simultaneous charge on the front and flank, breaking up the line and
capturing most of the troops.
Some of the Union commanders claimed that the Confederates cheered them as
they surrendered. This, however, the Confederates deny. The affair is
mentioned in the diary of Major J. Hoskiss, the engineer of the
Confederate army of the Valley, in not more creditable terms than General
Early gave of his battle of Cedar Run.
Pickett's division, Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, and other detachments were
sent to Lynchburg to defend against Sheridan's ride; but the high waters
of James River and other obstacles turned Sheridan from his southern
course to a sweep down the north side.
Generals Pickett and Fitzhugh Lee were recalled and ordered to the north
side to join me at Richmond for a march to intercept Sheridan's forces.
General Pickett reported on the 13th, and we marched for Hanover on the
14th. I made requisition for a pontoon bridge, and was delayed a day
waiting for it and for the cavalry. The bridge was not sent. As we marched
towards the Pamunkey River, General Sheridan heard of the move and crossed
to the north bank with his main force, leaving a brigade to watch our
march, but presently drew the brigade after him.
General Rosser reported to me with five hundred cavalry, one of the
remnants of General Early's army not captured, and was ordered across the
Pamunkey River to follow Sheridan's ride. Our artillery and infantry were
delayed part of a day and night building a bridge from the timbers of an
old barn that stood near the bank of the river, and part of the command
crossed early in the morning to find a cold cavalry trail, growing colder.
As the prospect of overhauling the march was not encouraging, we retraced
our steps, returning to Richmond on the 18th, where Pickett's men rested
until the 24th.
As Sherman's army drew towards Richmond, General Grant gave up the thought
of taking the city by attack of his strong columns on the north side, lest
he should leave open the way of escape of the Confederate army, and give
time for it to combine with Johnston's forces before he could overhaul it.
He found, too, that the "attrition" policy could not be made effective,
even with his superior numbers, unless he could so manoeuvre as to call
his adversary from his fortified grounds to make the work of attrition
mutual.
On the 14th of March he gave instructions of preparation for a general
move by his left, and on the 24th gave definite orders for the move to be
made on the 29th.
On the 24th, General Lee gave consent to the making of a sortie from his
line at Hare's Hill, in front of Petersburg, against Fort Steadman of the
enemy's works. The distance between the lines at that point was one
hundred and fifty yards, the distance between the picket lines fifty
yards. Union officers had given out that deserters from the Confederate
army were permitted to march into the Union lines with their arms.
Under the circumstances it was conceived to be practicable to gain Fort
Steadman by surprise, and the Confederate chief was led to believe that
there were other forts to the rear of Steadman that could be carried and
held until General Grant could be forced to make a longer line to reach
our southern communications, and give us time to find dry roads for our
march away, or for reinforcements to join us. It was a hazardous adventure
at best, but his brave heart usually went with a proposition for a bold
fight.
The Second Corps, under Major-General Gordon, was assigned for the sortie,
to be reinforced by other troops to be called. Pickett's division of the
First Corps, that had been resting on the north side since the 18th, was
called to report to General Lee at Petersburg, without intimation of the
service proposed, but all calls and orders of the times were looked upon
as urgent. The quartermaster was despatched to Richmond to have the
transportation at the station as soon as the troops could reach the
depot, and the division was ordered to march in anticipation of due
preparation for their transit. But the quartermaster found that the
railroad company could furnish transportation for three brigades only.
General Lee was informed of the fact, and I suggested that his only way to
be assured of the service of a division was to draw Mahone's from Bermuda
Hundred and have Pickett's march to replace it. He preferred part of
Pickett's division,--finding it could not be used as a division, as
Pickett, the ranking officer, would be called to command the work during
the early morning, for which he had no opportunity to prepare.
General Lee collected about eighteen thousand men near the sallying field,
ordered men selected to cut away the fraise and abatis for the storming
column that should advance with empty guns (to avoid premature alarms),
and ordered a squadron of cavalry ready to dash across the lines to cut
the wires about General Grant's lines.
The Army of the Potomac, General Meade commanding, was posted,--the Ninth
Corps on the right from James River to Fort Howard, including Fort
Steadman, General Parke commanding; next, on Parke's left, was the Sixth
Corps, under General Wright; then General Humphreys with the Second Corps,
General Warren with the Fifth; General Sheridan's cavalry, armed with
repeating rifles, on the extreme left; General Ord, commanding the Army of
the James, on the north side, Generals Gibbon and Weitzel commanding
corps,--all officers of the highest attainments and veterans in service.
The armies of the Potomac and the James and Sheridan's cavalry,
constituting General Grant's immediate command, numbered one hundred and
eleven thousand soldiers.[203] Colonel W. H. Taylor, chief of staff with
General Lee, reports, "Lee had at that time only thirty-nine thousand
eight hundred and ninety-seven available muskets for the defence of
Richmond and Petersburg."[204]
The stormers advanced before daylight, gained quiet possession of the
enemy's picket line, carried his works between Batteries 9 and 10, moved
to the right and left, captured Fort Steadman and its garrison, and turned
the guns there and at Battery 10 against the enemy. But the alarm spread
and the enemy was afield, feeling his way towards the assailants, for it
was not yet light enough to see and direct his artillery fire over his own
men. Batteries 11 and 12 were taken, and guides sent to conduct the
Confederate columns to forts reported to be in rear of Steadman were in
search, but there were no forts there. Redoubts constructed on the main
line had commanding positions over Fort Steadman, and a sweeping fire
along its lines, in anticipation of a surprise attack, but their fire was
withheld for daylight to direct it.
Light broke and the fire opened. General Parke called his field artillery
under Tidball into practice from high ground over the Confederates, put
the divisions of Hartranft and Wilcox against the Confederate flanks, and
held them back near the troops crowding in along the breach, and called
for a division from the Second Corps.
The Confederate columns were strong enough to repel the attack of two
divisions,--were put there for that purpose,--but so far from breaking up
and pushing back the ninety thousand men in front of them, they were not
so handled as to check two divisions long enough for the forces to get
back to their lines.
The artillery fire not only tore the Confederate ranks, but crossed fire
in their rear, cutting off reinforcements and retreat. Our side was
without artillery, except captured guns, which were handled by infantry.
As the sortie was noised along the line, General Humphreys and General
Wright advanced the Second and Sixth Corps against the Confederate lines
along their fields to learn if troops had been drawn from their fronts to
join the attack. Batteries 11 and 12 were recovered before eight o'clock,
and General Parke ordered Hartranft's division to regain Fort Steadman and
Battery 10, which was done with slight loss before nine o'clock.
Many Confederates got back to their lines in disordered flight, but 1949
prisoners and nine stands of colors were taken by the Ninth Corps.
The aggregate of Union losses was reported as 2107. Confederate losses are
not reported in detail or in numbers. General Meade's estimate of our loss
was 5000.
General Humphreys captured the intrenched picket line in front of him, but
found the Confederate works in front well manned. General Wright got well
in on the front of his line to favorable position, from which he assaulted
and carried the Confederate works on the 2d of April.
Corse's and Terry's brigades of Pickett's division remained in wait under
arms until a late hour of the 25th, but were not called to take part in
the sortie.[205]
The result calls for little comment upon the adventure. For an army of
forty thousand veterans, without field batteries, to dislodge from their
well-chosen and strongly-fortified lines an army of ninety thousand
well-armed and thoroughly-appointed veterans was impossible.
Pursuant to previous orders, General Grant started on his move around the
Confederate right on the 27th. General Ord was called to the south side
with fourteen thousand men of the Army of the James, leaving General
Weitzel with twenty thousand on the north side.[206] In front of that
force we had ten thousand men of Field's and Kershaw's divisions and G.
W. C. Lee's division of local defence troops (not including Gary's
cavalry, the sailors and marines) holding the forts at Drury's and
Chapin's farms. General Grant's orders were that his troops at all points
should be ready to receive orders for assault.
Duly informed of the enemy's movements, and understanding his purpose,
General Lee marched to his right on the 29th. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry was
called in advance to march for Five Forks. General Lee marched with
fifteen thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry (including Fitzhugh
Lee's division), and a quota of artillery, along the White Oak road to his
right.
The purpose of the enemy was to overreach the fortified grounds and call
the Confederates to field work, and General Lee thought to anticipate him
by aggressive work as soon as he was in the open field, and ordered battle
for the 31st.
General Pickett, with three brigades of his division, two of B. R.
Johnson's division (Ransom's and Wallace's), with the cavalry, was ordered
to engage Sheridan's cavalry at Five Forks, while General Lee attacked,
with McGowan's, Gracie's, Hunton's, and Wise's brigades, the Fifth Army
Corps, that was between Pickett and our line of fortifications. The
opening of this part of the battle was in favor of the Confederates.
General Lee drove back the advance division of the Fifth Corps to the
next, and pushed the two back to concentration upon the third, where that
part of the battle rested.
General Pickett made his part of the battle by putting W. H. F. Lee's and
Rosser's divisions of cavalry on his right, and following that leading by
his infantry and artillery, leaving Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division, under
General T. T. Mumford, along the right front of Sheridan's cavalry. He
pressed his separate battle by his right advance until night, forcing
Sheridan back to Dinwiddie Court-House, where the latter reported to
General Grant that the force in front of him was too strong, and asked for
reinforcements. Pickett prepared to follow his success by early morning
battle and rested for the night, but Miles's division of the Second Corps
was put against the other end of the battle, and the Fifth Corps rallied
and advanced against the brigades that were with General Lee. They were
forced back to the White Oak road, then into their fortified lines,
leaving an interval of five miles behind Pickett's left.
Responding to General Sheridan's call, General Grant ordered the Fifth
Corps, under General Warren, fifteen thousand[207] strong, and Mackenzie's
cavalry division (sixteen hundred). The design was that the Fifth Corps
should come in on Pickett's left rear and cut off his retreat, but heavy
rains of the 30th and morning of the 31st had so flooded the streams and
roads that the night march was slow and fatiguing, and Pickett receiving
notice during the night of the projected move against his rear, changed
his orders for battle, and directed the troops withdrawn for Five Forks
before daylight. His retrograde was made in time to escape the Fifth
Corps, and was followed by Sheridan's cavalry, but no serious effort was
made to delay his movements. He made his march of five miles to Five
Forks, put his troops in order of battle by nine o'clock of the morning of
the 1st of April, and ordered his well-chosen line examined and put under
construction of field-works. Corse's, Terry's, and Steuart's brigades of
Pickett's division, and Ransom's and Wallace's brigades of B. R. Johnson's
division, were posted from right to left. Of Pegram's artillery, three
guns were planted at the Forks, and three more near his right; W. H. F.
Lee's division of cavalry on his right; Fitzhugh Lee's division on his
left,--General T. T. Mumford commanding the latter; Rosser's division in
rear guarding trains. General Fitzhugh Lee was chief of cavalry.
As soon as the infantry line was formed, the troops set to work
intrenching the position. The line of battle was parallel to and lay along
the White Oak road, the left broken smartly to the rear, the retired end
in traverse and flanking defence. The extreme right of the infantry line
was also refused, but not so much. Four miles east from Pickett's left was
the right of the fortified lines of General Lee's army. On the right and
outside of those lines was a detachment of cavalry under General Roberts.
The division of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry was ordered to cover the ground
between Roberts's cavalry and Pickett's left by a line of vedettes, and
his division was posted on that part of the field.
W. H. F. Lee's cavalry held strong guard on the right, and had the benefit
of some swamp lands. His lines formed and field-works under construction,
General Pickett rode to the rear for his noon lunch, and was soon followed
by the cavalry chief.
Sheridan's cavalry followed close on Pickett's march, but did not attempt
to seriously delay it. He made a dash about ten o'clock to measure the
strength of the works under construction, and found them too strong to
warrant fierce adventure. Delayed by the heavy roads and flooding streams,
the Fifth Corps was not in position until four o'clock in the afternoon.
General Sheridan planned for battle to have General Merritt display the
cavalry divisions of Custer and Devens against the Confederate front and
right, to convey the impression that that was the field from which his
battle would be made, while he drew up and massed the Fifth Corps at the
other end of the field for the real fight. The corps was arranged,
Crawford's division in column on the right, Ayres's on Crawford's left,
Griffin's division in support, Mackenzie's cavalry division on the right
of the infantry column, at the White Oak road. The Fifth Corps was to
wheel in close connection and assault against the face of the return of
Confederate works, while the cavalry divisions in front were to assail on
that line and the right of the works.
The march and wheel of the Fifth Corps were made in tactical order, and
the lines advanced in courageous charge, but staggered and halted under
the destructive infantry fire. The charge was repeated, but held in check
until Crawford's division found a way under cover of a woodland beyond the
Confederate works, and marched to that advantage.
Ransom drew his brigade from the intrenched line to meet that march, but
it was one brigade against three--and those supported by part of Griffin's
division.
Ransom's horse was killed, falling on him; his adjutant-general, Captain
Gee, was killed, and the brigade was forced back.
This formidable move by open field to Pickett's rear made his position
untenable. Feeling this, the veteran soldiers of the left brigades
realized that their battle was irretrievable. Those who could find escape
from that end of the works fell back in broken ranks, while many others,
finding the enemy closing in on their rear, thought it more soldierly to
surrender to Ayres's brave assaulting columns, and not a few were the
captives of Crawford's division.
It was not until that period that General Pickett knew, by the noise of
battle, that it was on. He rode through the fire to his command, but his
cavalry chief, riding later, was cut off from the field and failed to take
part in the action. When Pickett got to the Forks, Colonel Pegram, of the
artillery, had been mortally wounded, the battery commander was killed,
and many of the cannoneers killed or wounded. He found an artillery
sergeant and enough men to man one gun, and used it with effect until the
axle broke.
The brigades of Steuart and Terry changed front and received the rolling
battle. The cavalry assailants of the front and right had no decided
success, but the infantry columns pressing their march, the Confederate
brigades were pushed back to their extreme right, where in turn Corse's
brigade changed front to receive the march, leaving W. H. F. Lee's cavalry
to look to his right.
The Union cavalry essayed to charge the Confederate remnants to dismay,
but the noble son of the noble sire seized opportunity to charge against
the head of this threatening column before it could pass the swamp lands,
drove back its head until Corse's brigade got back to cover of woodland,
and night came to cover the disastrous field.[208]
The remnants of the command were collected as soon and as well as they
could be in the dead of night and marched towards Exeter Mills, where
Pickett proposed to cross the Appomattox and return to the army, but early
movements of the next morning changed the face of the military zodiac.
The position was not of General Pickett's choosing, but of his orders, and
from his orders he assumed that he would be reinforced. His execution was
all that a skilful commander could apply. He reported as to his position
and the movements of the enemy threatening to cut his command from the
army, but no force came to guard his right. The reinforcements joined him
after night, when his battle had been lost and his command disorganized.
The cavalry of his left was in neglect in failing to report the advance of
the enemy, but that was not for want of proper orders from his
head-quarters. Though taken by surprise, there was no panic in any part of
the command; brigade after brigade changed front to the left and
received the overwhelming battle as it rolled on, until crushed back to
the next, before it could deploy out to aid the front,--or flank
attack,--until the last right brigade of the brave Corse changed and stood
alone on the left of W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, fronting at right angle
against the enemy's cavalry columns.
It is not claiming too much for that grand division to say that, aided by
the brigades of Ransom and Wallace, they could not have been dislodged
from their intrenched position by parallel battle even by the great odds
against them. As it was, Ayres's division staggered under the pelting
blows that it met, and Crawford's drifted off from the blows against it,
until it thus found the key of the battle away beyond the Confederate
limits.
In generalship Pickett was not a bit below the "gay rider." His defensive
battle was better organized, and it is possible that he would have gained
the day if his cavalry had been diligent in giving information of the
movements of the enemy.[209]
[Illustration: FIVE FORKS]
The losses are not found in separate reports. Both sides suffered
severely, Pickett losing two thousand. He had nine thousand men of all
arms. His adversary had twenty-six thousand.
Reinforcements of Hunton's brigade, and Lieutenant-General R. H. Anderson
with the other brigades of B. R. Johnson, were sent him too late, and a
telegram came for me at Richmond to march a division to Petersburg to
report to General Lee. The hour at which the telegram was received was not
noted. As the operations at Five Forks were not decisive until after five
o'clock, the telegram may have been received about seven P.M. Field's
division was ordered to the railway station, and the quartermaster was
sent in advance to have the cars ready to move it.
To give the troops the benefit of our limited transportation I rode with
the staff by the dirt road.