BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.
Campaign of 1864--General Grant in the Field--Strength of the
Armies--Their Positions--Description of the Wilderness--The Battle
opened--A Brisk Day's Fighting--Longstreet's Command faces Hancock's
on the Morning of the Second Day--An Effective Flank Movement--General
Wadsworth mortally wounded--General Jenkins falls under Fire of
Friends, and Longstreet is seriously wounded--Carried from the Field
on a Litter--Tribute to General Jenkins--Criticism and Controversy.
After reporting the return of my command to service with the Army of
Northern Virginia, I took the earliest opportunity to suggest that the
preliminaries of the campaign should be carefully confined to strategic
manoeuvre until we could show better generalship. That accomplished, I
argued, the enemy's forces would lose confidence in the superiority of
their leader's skill and prowess; that both armies were composed of
intelligent, experienced veterans, who were as quick to discover the
better handling of their ranks as trained generals; that by such
successful manoeuvres the Confederates would gain confidence and power as
the enemy began to lose prestige; that then we could begin to look for a
favorable opportunity to call the enemy to aggressive work, while
immediate aggression from us against his greater numbers must make our
labors heavy and more or less doubtful; that we should first show that the
power of battle is in generalship more than in the number of soldiers,
which, properly illustrated, would make the weaker numbers of the
contention the stronger force.
In this connection I refer to the policy of _attrition_ which became a
prominent feature during part of the campaign, and showed that the enemy
put his faith in numbers more than in superior skill and generalship.
General Grant made his head-quarters near the Army of the Potomac, in
Culpeper County, Virginia, commanded by Major-General George G. Meade. It
had been organized into three corps, Second, Fifth, and Sixth, commanded
respectively by Major-General W. S. Hancock, Major-General G. K. Warren,
and Major-General John Sedgwick, all in cantonment near Culpeper
Court-House. The Ninth Corps was a distinct body reorganized under
Major-General A. E. Burnside, and posted in co-operative position near the
railroad bridge over the Rappahannock River. The aggregate of the two
commands was about one hundred and thirty thousand men, classified as
follows:
Army of the Potomac:
Infantry present for duty, equipped (aggregate) 73,390
Cavalry (aggregate) 12,424
Artillery and engineers 2,764
Quartermaster's, subsistence, and medical departments,
extra-duty men, and engineer brigade 19,183
Ninth Corps, present for duty, equipped 19,486
-------
Total 127,247
But deducting extra-duty men, claimed as non-combatants 19,183
-------
Leaves 108,064
These figures are from Major-General A. A. Humphreys, chief of staff of
the Army of the Potomac. But General Badeau, in his "Military History of
U. S. Grant," p. 94, gives as the exact numbers put into battle (after
deducting a division of colored troops, not then used for battle service)
the following:
Army of the Potomac 97,273
Ninth Corps 22,708
-------
Total 119,981
From which he deducts the division of colored troops 3,095
-------
Leaving 116,886
The Army of Northern Virginia stood on the west side of Rapidan River,
Mine Run on its right, extending north, the left division, R. H.
Anderson's, looking towards Madison Court-House; the Second and Third
Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-Generals R. S. Ewell and A. P. Hill; two
divisions and Alexander's artillery of Longstreet's (First) corps being
held at Mechanicsville.
Colonel Taylor, chief of staff with the Army of Northern Virginia, gives
the strength of the army at the opening of the campaign, from the returns
of April 20, the latest up to date, as follows:[195]
Second Corps 17,093
Third Corps 22,199
Unattached commands, Maryland Line, etc. 1,125
"A liberal estimate," as he calls it, of my command 10,000
------
Total 50,417
Cavalry 8,727
Artillery corps 4,854
------
Making a total of 63,998
But General Badeau objects, on authority of a letter from General Bragg to
General Joseph E. Johnston, stating that I had fourteen thousand men in my
command. If General Bragg's letter referred to my command in East
Tennessee it was accurate enough. But Buckner's division of that command,
the cavalry, and other detachments were left in East Tennessee. General
Badeau claims, besides, six thousand furloughed men and conscripts as
joining the army between the 20th of April and the 4th of May. Of this
there is no official record, and it is more than probable that new cases
of sick and furloughed men of that interval were as many at least as the
fragmentary parties that joined us. General Humphreys reported me as
having fifteen thousand men. If he intended those figures as the strength
of the First Corps, he is accurate enough, but Pickett's division of that
corps was not with it, nor did it return to the Army of Northern Virginia
until late in the campaign. So I find no good reason for changing the
figures of Colonel Taylor, except so far as to add Johnson's brigade of
Rodes's division, which is reported to have joined the Second Corps on the
6th of May,--estimated at 1500, which, added to 63,998, would make the
total 65,498. But General Ewell's official account of numbers on the
morning of the 6th of May puts his force at 15,500, which is better
authority than Colonel Taylor's from the return of April 20, or General
Badeau's computation. To these figures should be added Johnson's brigade,
that reported later of the day, estimated by General Badeau at 1500, which
makes the aggregate of the Second Corps 17,000, and brings that of the
Army of Northern Virginia back to 65,405.
However, the numerical strength of armies should not be considered as of
exclusive bearing upon the merits of the campaign. The commanders had
chosen their battle after mature deliberation. They knew of each other's
numbers and resources before they laid their plans, and they had even
known each other personally for more than twenty years. Each had the
undivided support and confidence of his government and his army, and it
was time now to leave the past and give attention to the future.
General Lee had acquired fame as a strategist in his two years' service in
the Army of Northern Virginia, and General Grant, by his three years'
service in the West, had come to be known as an all-round soldier, seldom
if ever surpassed; but the biggest part of him was his heart. They were
equally pugnacious and plucky,--Grant the more deliberate.
Six months before the opening of the impending campaign, in November,
1863, General Meade, essaying a blow at the Army of Northern Virginia,
crossed the Rapidan below General Lee's right, and deployed along the
south side of Mine Run, but found Lee's line so strong and so improved by
field-works that he felt constrained to withdraw without making battle.
As the purpose of this writing is to convey ideas of personal observations
and experience, it will be confined, as far as practicable, to campaigns
or parts of them with which I was directly or indirectly connected. So,
when participants and partisans have passed away, I shall have contributed
my share towards putting the historian in possession of evidence which he
can weigh with that of other actors in the great drama.
At midnight of the 3d of May, 1864, the Army of the Potomac took its line
of march for the lower crossings of the Rapidan River at Germania and
Ely's Fords, the Fifth and Sixth Corps for the former, the Second for the
latter, Wilson's division of cavalry leading the first, Gregg's the second
column. The cavalry was to secure the crossings and lay bridges for the
columns as they came up. Wilson's cavalry crossed at Germania ford, drove
off the Confederate outpost, and began the construction of a bridge at
daylight. Gregg also was successful, and the bridges were ready when the
solid columns came. Warren's (Fifth Corps) crossed after Wilson's cavalry,
marching westward as far as Wilderness Tavern. Sedgwick's corps followed
and pitched camp near the crossing. Hancock's corps followed Gregg's
cavalry, and made camp at Chancellorsville. Generals Grant and Meade went
over after Warren's column and established head-quarters near the
crossing. General Grant despatched for Burnside's corps to come and join
him by night march. Sheridan was expected to engage Stuart's cavalry at
Hamilton's Crossing near Fredericksburg.
General Grant had no fixed plan of campaign beyond the general idea to
avoid the strong defensive line occupied by General Lee behind Mine Run,
and find a way to draw him out to open battle.
The Wilderness is a forest land of about fifteen miles square, lying
between and equidistant from Orange Court-House and Fredericksburg. It is
broken occasionally by small farms and abandoned clearings, and two
roads,--the Orange Plank road and the turnpike, which are cut at right
angles by the Germania road,--in general course nearly parallel, open ways
through it between Fredericksburg and the Court-House. The Germania Ford
road joins the Brock road, the strategic line of the military zone, and
crosses the turnpike at Wilderness Tavern and the Plank road about two
miles south of that point.
Though the march was set on foot at midnight it was soon made known to
General Lee, and its full purport was revealed by noon of the 4th, and
orders were sent the different commanders for their march to meet the
enemy,--the Second Corps (Ewell's), consisting of Rodes's, Johnson's, and
Early's divisions, by the Orange Turnpike; the Third (A. P. Hill's)--R. H.
Anderson's, Heth's, and Wilcox's divisions--by the Orange Plank road.
General Lee's signals were interpreted and sent to General Grant, who so
far modified his plans as to prepare for immediate battle. The commands of
the First Corps, Field's and Kershaw's divisions and Alexander's
batteries, were stationed, Field's north of Gordonsville, where he had
been posted on the 1st of May in anticipation of a move around our left,
the other commands near Mechanicsville. We were ordered forward by the
Plank road to Parker's Store; the order was received after one o'clock,
and sent out for information of the commanders, who were ordered to
prepare and march. But I asked for and received authority to march by a
shorter route that would at the same time relieve the Plank road of
pressure of troops and trains (for we had been crowded off the road once
before by putting too many troops upon a single track). By the same
despatch I asked and subsequently obtained leave to go on to the Brock
road, where we could look for and hope to intercept the enemy's march, and
cause him to develop plans before he could get out of the Wilderness.
We marched at four o'clock by the Lawyer's road. Our chief quartermaster,
Colonel Taylor, whose home was between Orange Court-House and the
Wilderness, had been ordered to secure the services of the most competent
guide to be found. We halted at Brock's Bridge for rest, and there Colonel
Taylor brought up our guide, James Robinson, who had been for several
years the sheriff of the county, and whose whole life had been spent in
the Wilderness. The march was resumed, and continued with swinging step,
with occasional rests, until we reached Richard's Shops, at five P.M. of
the 5th. There we overtook Rosser's cavalry, engaged in severe encounter
with part of Sheridan's. The enemy abandoned the contest and rode away,
leaving his dead with some of ours on the field.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS, VA. May 5th, 6th and 7th, 1864.]
The distance of march was twenty-eight miles. Soon after my arrival at the
shops, Colonel Venable, of general head-quarters staff, came with orders
for a change of direction of the column through the wood to unite with the
troops of the Third Corps on the Plank road. The rear of my column closed
up at dark, and orders were sent to prepare to resume march at twelve
o'clock. The accounts we had of the day's work were favorable to the
Confederates; but the change of direction of our march was not reassuring.
In accordance with the general plan of turning the Confederate right
without touching our intrenched line along Mine Run, the Army of the
Potomac had been put in motion early on the 5th, the Second Corps towards
Shady Grove Church by the Todd's Tavern road, the Fifth by the dirt road
towards Parker's Store on the Plank road, the Sixth on the right, to
follow the Fifth as movements developed. General Warren moved with three
divisions, leaving Griffin's on the turnpike. Presently, after taking up
his march towards Parker's Store, the Confederates were discovered on the
Plank road, and General Meade ordered the corps made ready for battle.
The Sixth, except Getty's division, was ordered to make connection on the
right of the Fifth by wood roads, and prepare for the battle. Getty's
division was ordered to the Plank road at the Brock road crossing, to hold
that point at all hazards until the Second Corps could join it, the latter
being recalled from Todd's Tavern for that holding and developments there
indicated.
At noon General Warren was prepared on the turnpike and attacked with
Griffin's and Wadsworth's divisions.
General Lee's orders were against a general engagement until his forces
were in hand, but the troops had met and action could not wait. Warren's
attack had some success, as by his orders General Ewell felt called upon
to delay battle, but a sudden dash of the enemy broke into disorder his
brigade under J. M. Jones, also Battle's brigade; but other of his troops
joined them, recovered his ground, drove off the attacking forces, taking
two guns, and called Warren's corps to better concentration. The Sixth was
to be with Warren, but was delayed by the narrow, tangled roads till
night. General Ewell prepared for the next day by intrenching his front.
Meanwhile, General Hill had pushed the divisions under Heth and Wilcox
along the Plank road until they were near the Brock road crossing,
occupied by Getty's division of the Sixth Corps.
General Getty was in time to drive back a few of our men who had reached
the Brock road in observation, and Hancock's corps joined him at two P.M.,
fronting his divisions--Birney's, Mott's, Gibbon's, and Barlow's--along
the Brock road, on the left of Getty's. His artillery was massed on his
left, near Barlow, except a battery nearer the Plank road, and one section
at the crossing. He ordered his line intrenched.
As soon as he found his troops in hand at the cross-roads, General Meade
ordered them into action. Getty's division, supported by the Second Corps,
was to drive Hill back, occupy Parker's Store, and connect with Warren's
line. He afterwards learned of the repulse of Warren on the turnpike, but
repeated his orders for the advance on the Plank road. At 4.15 Getty's
division advanced, and met the divisions of Heth and Wilcox a few hundred
yards in advance of their trenches.
In the fierce engagement that followed, Birney's and Mott's divisions were
engaged on Getty's left, and later the brigades of Carroll and Owen, of
Gibbon's division. Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the Fifth
Corps were put in to aid Getty's right. The combination forced Heth and
Wilcox back about half a mile, when the battle rested for the night.
Hancock reinforced his front by Webb's brigade of Gibbon's division, and
was diligently employed at his lines during the night putting up
field-works.
About eleven o'clock in the night the guide reported from General Lee to
conduct my command through the wood across to the Plank road, and at one
o'clock the march was resumed. The road was overgrown by the bushes,
except the side-tracks made by the draft animals and the ruts of wheels
which marked occasional lines in its course. After a time the wood became
less dense, and the unused road was more difficult to follow, and
presently the guide found that there was no road under him; but no time
was lost, as, by ordering the lines of the divisions doubled, they were
ready when the trail was found, and the march continued in double line. At
daylight we entered the Plank road, and filed down towards the field of
strife of the afternoon of the 5th and daylight of the 6th.
R. H. Anderson's division of the Third Corps, marching on the Plank road,
had rested at Verdierville during the night, and was called to the front
in the morning. The divisions of Heth and Wilcox rested during the night
of the 5th where the battle of that day ceased, but did not prepare
ammunition nor strengthen their lines for defence, because informed that
they were to be relieved from the front. Both the division commanders
claim that they were to be relieved, and that they were ordered not to
intrench or replenish supplies. So it seems that they were all night
within hearing of the voices of Hancock's men, not even reorganizing their
lines so as to offer a front of battle! General Heth has stated that he
proposed to arrange for battle, but was ordered to give his men rest.
While Hancock was sending men to his advanced line during the night and
intrenching there and on his second line, the Confederates were all night
idle.
Hancock advanced and struck the divisions before sunrise, just as my
command reported to General Lee. My line was formed on the right and left
of the Plank road, Kershaw on the right, Field on the left. As the line
deployed, the divisions of Heth and Wilcox came back upon us in disorder,
more and more confused as their steps hurried under Hancock's musketry. As
my ranks formed the men broke files to give free passage for their
comrades to the rear. The advancing fire was getting brisk, but not a shot
was fired in return by my troops until the divisions were ready. Three of
Field's brigades, the Texas, Alabama, and Benning's Georgia, were formed
in line on the left of the road, and three of Kershaw's on the right.
General Lee, appalled at the condition of affairs, thought to lead the
Texas brigade alone into desperate charge, before my lines were well
formed. The ordeal was trying, but the steady troops, seeing him off his
balance, refused to follow, begged him to retire, and presently Colonel
Venable, of his staff, reported to me General Lee's efforts to lead the
brigade, and suggested that I should try to call him from it. I asked that
he would say, with my compliments, that his line would be recovered in an
hour if he would permit me to handle the troops, but if my services were
not needed, I would like to ride to some place of safety, as it was not
quite comfortable where we were.
As full lines of battle could not be handled through the thick wood, I
ordered the advance of the six brigades by heavy skirmish lines, to be
followed by stronger supporting lines. Hancock's lines, thinned by their
push through the wood, and somewhat by the fire of the disordered
divisions, weaker than my line of fresh and more lively skirmishers, were
checked by our first steady, rolling fire, and after a brisk fusillade
were pushed back to their intrenched line, when the fight became steady
and very firm, occasionally swinging parts of my line back and compelling
the reserves to move forward and recover it.
General Lee sent General M. L. Smith, of the engineers, to report to me.
He was ordered through the wood on my right to the unfinished railroad to
find a way around the left of the enemy's line, while we engaged his
front. R. H. Anderson's division of the Third Corps came up about eight
o'clock and was ordered to report to me.
Hancock's early advance was under a general order including the Army of
the Potomac. The Ninth Corps that had been called up reported to General
Grant, and was ordered in between the Plank and Turnpike roads. At eight
o'clock Hancock was reinforced by Stevenson's division of the Ninth, and
Wadsworth of the Fifth was put under his orders. At nine o'clock he
attacked with Wadsworth's, Birney's, Stevenson's, and Mott's divisions,
and the brigades of Webb, Carroll, and Owen, of Gibbon's division, making
as formidable battle as could be organized in the wood, but the tangle
thinned his lines and our fire held him in desperate engagement.
Two divisions of the Ninth Corps, at the same time marching for Parker's
Store, were encountered between the Plank and Turnpike roads by our
Second Corps (Ewell's). Under this combination the forces struggled an
hour at the extreme tension of skill and valor.
About ten o'clock General Smith returned and reported favorably of his
reconnoissance: that the heavy woodland concealed the route of the
proposed flank march, and that there was no force of the enemy in
observation. Hancock's left on the Brock road was in strong, well-guarded
position, but there was room along its front for our troops to march near
the unfinished railroad beyond view of that left on the Brock road.
General Smith was then asked to take a small party and pass beyond the
Brock road and find a way for turning the extreme Union left on that road.
There were two brigades of Field's division and one of Kershaw's not on
the line of battle, but on flank march as supports, and R. H. Anderson's
division of the Third Corps. Colonel Sorrel, chief of staff, was ordered
to conduct three brigades, G. T. Anderson's of Field's, Mahone's of R. H.
Anderson's, and Wofford's of Kershaw's division, by the route recommended
by General Smith, have them faced to the left, and marched down against
Hancock's left. Davis's brigade of the Third Corps also got into this
command.
As soon as the troops struck Hancock his line began to break, first
slowly, then rapidly. Somehow, as they retreated, a fire was accidentally
started in the dry leaves, and began to spread as the Confederates
advanced. Mahone's brigade approached the burning leaves and part of it
broke off a little to get around, but the Twelfth Virginia was not
obstructed by the blaze and moved directly on. At the Plank road Colonel
Sorrel rode back to join us. All of the enemy's battle on the right of the
Plank road was broken up, and General Field was fighting severely with his
three brigades on the left against Wadsworth and Stevenson, pushing them a
little.
The Twelfth Virginia Regiment got to the Plank road some little time
before the other regiments of the brigade, and, viewing the contention on
the farther side between Field's and Wadsworth's divisions, dashed across
and struck the left of Wadsworth's line. This relieved Field a little,
and, under this concentrating push and fire, Wadsworth fell mortally
wounded. In a little while followed the general break of the Union battle.
The break of his left had relieved Kershaw's troops, and he was waiting
for the time to advance, and Jenkins's brigade that had been held in
reserve and that part of R. H. Anderson's division not in use were ready
and anxious for opportunity to engage, and followed as our battle line
pushed forward.
General Smith then came and reported a way across the Brock road that
would turn Hancock's extreme left. He was asked to conduct the flanking
brigades and handle them as the ranking officer. He was a splendid
tactician as well as skilful engineer, and gallant withal. He started,
and, not to lose time or distance, moved by inversion, Wofford's left
leading, Wofford's favorite manoeuvre. As Wofford's left stepped out, the
other troops moved down the Plank road, Jenkins's brigade by the road,
Kershaw's division alongside. I rode at the head of the column, Jenkins,
Kershaw, and the staff with me. After discussing the dispositions of their
troops for reopening battle, Jenkins rode closer to offer congratulations,
saying, "I am happy; I have felt despair of the cause for some months, but
am relieved, and feel assured that we will put the enemy back across the
Rapidan before night." Little did he or I think these sanguine words were
the last he would utter.
When Wadsworth fell the Union battle broke up in hasty retreat. Field's
brigades closed to fresh ranks, the flanking brigades drew into line near
the Plank road, and with them the other regiments of Mahone's brigade;
but the Twelfth Regiment, some distance in advance of the others, had
crossed the road to strike at Wadsworth's left before the other regiments
were in sight, and was returning to find its place in line. The order for
the flanking brigades to resume march by their left had not moved those
brigades of the right. As the Twelfth Regiment marched back to find its
place on the other side of the Plank road, it was mistaken, in the wood,
for an advance of the enemy, and fire was opened on it from the other
regiments of the brigade. The men threw themselves to the ground to let
the fire pass. Just then our party of officers was up and rode under the
fire. General Jenkins had not finished the expressions of joyful
congratulations which I have quoted when he fell mortally wounded.
Captain Doby and the orderly, Bowen, of Kershaw's staff, were killed.
General Kershaw turned to quiet the troops, when Jenkins's brigade with
levelled guns were in the act of returning the fire of the supposed enemy
concealed in the wood, but as Kershaw's clear voice called out
"_F-r-i-e-n-d-s!_" the arms were recovered, without a shot in return, and
the men threw themselves down upon their faces.
At the moment that Jenkins fell I received a severe shock from a minie
ball passing through my throat and right shoulder. The blow lifted me from
the saddle, and my right arm dropped to my side, but I settled back to my
seat, and started to ride on, when in a minute the flow of blood
admonished me that my work for the day was done. As I turned to ride back,
members of the staff, seeing me about to fall, dismounted and lifted me to
the ground.
Orders were given General Field, the senior officer present, to push on
before the enemy could have time to rally. The two lines marching along
the Plank road, southward, in pursuit, and the flanking brigades to move
in the other direction, were, for the moment, a little perplexing, as he
was not accurately advised of the combinations, but he grasped the
situation. Before he was prepared, however, General R. H. Anderson came
into command as senior, and then General Lee came up. The plans, orders,
and opportunity were explained to him, but the woods concealed everything
except the lines of troops alongside the road. General Lee did not care to
handle the troops in broken lines, and ordered formation in a general line
for parallel battle. The change in the forest tangle consumed several
hours of precious time, and gave General Hancock time to collect his men
into battle order, post his heavy reinforcements, and improve his
intrenchments.
[Illustration: THE WOUNDING OF GENERAL LONGSTREET AT THE WILDERNESS, MAY
6, 1864.]
After several hours of work our new line was finally adjusted and ordered
forward. It approached the enemy's stronghold (in ranks a little thinned
by the march through the wood and the enemy's fire), made desperate and
repeated charges, and Jenkins's gallant brigade mounted their breastworks,
but the solid ranks behind them threw it off, with the lines that essayed
to give it support, and the whole were forced back from their fight. Thus
the battle, lost and won three times during the day, wore itself out.
General Ewell found opportunity before night to push some of his brigades
around the enemy's right, and did clever work in taking a number of
prisoners,--Generals Seymour and Shaler among them,--but it was too late
in the day to follow his work with a strong fight. He handled his troops
with skill and care, putting defensive works before them whenever they
halted.
Like attention by General Hancock may be noted; while in marked contrast
was the conduct of the Third Corps after their affair on the afternoon of
the 5th. The commanders of the leading divisions of the Third had proposed
to prepare their troops for the next day, but were ordered to give their
men rest,[196] and told that they were to be relieved and withdrawn from
the battle. Not even a line of battle was formed, so that they were in
disorder when they were struck in the morning, and speedily fell into
confusion.
My command, less than ten thousand, had found the battle on the Plank road
in retreat, little less than a panic. In a few hours we changed defeat to
victory, the broken divisions of the Third Corps rallying in their rear.
As my litter was borne to the rear my hat was placed over my face, and
soldiers by the road-side said, "He is dead, and they are telling us he is
only wounded." Hearing this repeated from time to time, I raised my hat
with my left hand, when the burst of voices and the flying of hats in the
air eased my pains somewhat.
But Micah Jenkins, who fell by the same fire, was no more. He was one of
the most estimable characters of the army. His taste and talent were for
military service. He was intelligent, quick, untiring, attentive, zealous
in discharge of duty, truly faithful to official obligations, abreast with
the foremost in battle, and withal a humble, noble Christian. In a moment
of highest earthly hope he was transported to serenest heavenly joy; to
that life beyond that knows no bugle call, beat of drum, or clash of
steel. May his beautiful spirit, through the mercy of God, rest in peace!
Amen!
"_L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace._" An Americanism which seems an
appropriate substitute is, _A level head, a level head, always a level
head_. With patience to wait ten minutes to see my flanking brigades
stretched out on their march to retrieve my _aplomb_, we could have found
a good battle against Hancock's strong left, while we broke over his
confused front. Fearing another change of plan, I hurried on to execute
before it could be ordered.
There were twenty-two thousand men in the Third Corps. It is not claiming
too much, therefore, to say that that corps, carefully prepared during
the night of the 5th, could have held Hancock's battle on the morning of
the 6th until my attack of his left could have relieved them.
Under that plan events support the claim that the Third Corps, intrenched
in their advanced position, with fresh supplies and orders to hold their
ground, could have received and held against Hancock's early battle until
my command could have come in on his left rear and completed our strongly
organized battle by which we could have carried the Wilderness, even down
and into the classic Rapidan.
General Field says in his account of the day,--
"I was at Longstreet's side in a moment, and in answer to my anxious
inquiry as to his condition, he replied that he would be looked after
by others, and directed me to take command of the corps and push
ahead. Though at this moment he could not have known the extent or
character of his wounds (that they were severe was apparent), he
seemed to forget himself in the absorbing interest of the movement he
was making.
"Had our advance not been suspended by this disaster, I have always
believed that Grant would have been driven across the Rapidan before
night; but General Lee was present, and ordered that our line, which
was nearly a right angle (my division being the base, and Kershaw's
and the other flanking force the perpendicular), should first be
straightened out. The difficulty of manoeuvring through the brush made
this a tedious operation, so that when we did advance with large
reinforcements from Ewell's corps placed under my orders, the enemy
was found awaiting us behind new breastworks, thoroughly prepared."
Colonel Fairfax says,--
"On reaching the line of troops you were taken off the horse and
propped against a tree. You blew the bloody foam from your mouth and
said, 'Tell General Field to take command, and move forward with the
whole force and gain the Brock road,' but hours were lost."[197]
A Northern historian says,--
"It seemed, indeed, that irretrievable disaster was upon us; but in
the very torrent and tempest of the attack it suddenly ceased and all
was still. What could cause this surcease of effort at the very height
of success was then wholly unknown to us."[198]
Some years after the affair on the Plank road, General Hancock said to
me,--
"You rolled me up like a wet blanket, and it was some hours before I
could reorganize for battle."
He explained that reinforcements crowding up through the wood, the
retreating troops, and confusion caused by mixing in with wagon-trains and
horses, made a troublesome tangle, but it was unravelled and his troops at
rest when the final attack was made. He had sixty thousand men in hand.
Bad as was being shot by some of our own troops in the battle of the
Wilderness,--that was an honest mistake, one of the accidents of
war,--being shot at, since the war, by many officers, was worse. Fitzhugh
Lee wrote of me in the Southern Historical Society papers, vol. v., No. 4,
April, 1878, saying, among other things, "He lost his way and reached the
Wilderness twenty-four hours behind time."
Now, from Mechanicsville to Parker's Store by our line of march was
thirty-four miles,--by the Plank road, thirty-five; from Parker's Store to
the battle, three miles. From the time of our march to going into battle
was thirty-six hours, including all of two nights. Deducting twenty-four
hours alleged as lost leaves twelve hours, including all night of the 4th,
for the march of thirty-seven miles!
His logic and method of injury remind one of the French teacher who, when
out of patience with the boys, used to say, "I will give you zero and mark
you absent."
Another report started by Fitzhugh Lee as coming from his cousin, G. W. C.
Lee, was that General Lee said that he "sent an officer to Longstreet to
stay with and show him the roads."
This, like all other reported sayings of General Lee in regard to me, was
not published until after General Lee's death. When it was first published
I wrote General G. W. C. Lee for the name of the officer sent. He referred
me to the members of General Lee's staff. Not one of them knew of the
circumstance or the officer, but referred me to General Lee's engineers.
After long search I found the engineers and applied for information, but
not one of them knew anything of the alleged fact. I had the letters
published as an advertisement for the officer who was claimed as my guide.
No response came. I inquired of the members of the staff, First Corps; not
one had seen or heard of such a person. The quartermaster, Colonel Taylor,
who was ordered to secure a competent guide at the first moment of receipt
of orders to march, reported of the matter thus:
"MEADOW FARM, ORANGE COURT-HOUSE,
"July 1, 1879.
"GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET:
"DEAR GENERAL,--Your favor of the 30th ultimo is this moment to hand,
and I reply at once. I think General Fitzhugh Lee entirely in error as
to any engineer or other officer being sent to guide you in the spring
of 1864 from your camp near Gordonsville to the Wilderness. I well
remember your sending for me, and directing me to procure a guide for
you, which I did after some difficulty in the person of Mr. James
Robinson, the then sheriff of the county. I saw no such person, nor
can I think that any such was at any time at our quarters before we
broke camp.
"Sincerely yours,
"ERASMUS TAYLOR."
These efforts to secure one witness in support of the allegation, or
rather to prove a negation, were all that occurred to me at the time, and
now I can think of but one more chance, which is for Fitzhugh Lee to offer
a liberal reward. It is not probable that he would fail to find a false
witness who could answer for a time to support the false charges.
It may be added that the accounts of the march by other officers agree
with mine, as already given. I present here a letter from General
Alexander and an extract from one written me by Colonel Venable. The
former says,--
"AUGUSTA, GA., June 12, 1879.
"MY DEAR GENERAL,--Absence prevented an earlier response to your favor
of the 5th. My recollection of the events is as follows: My command,
the artillery, got orders to move about noon on May 4, 1864, being in
camp near Mechanicsville, some four or five miles west of
Gordonsville. We marched about four P.M., and with only short rests
all night and all next day till about five P.M., when we halted to
rest and bivouac at a point which I cannot remember; but our cavalry
had had a skirmish there with the enemy's cavalry just before our
arrival, and I remember seeing some killed and wounded of each side.
Your whole corps, Hood's and McLaws's, and the artillery, I think, was
concentrated at that point, and my recollection is that we had orders
to move on during the night, or before daylight the next morning, to
get on the enemy's left flank on the Brock road.
"But whatever the orders were, I remember distinctly that during the
night news of the fight on the Plank road came, and with it a change
of orders, and that we marched at one A.M., or earlier, and turned to
the left and struck the Plank road at Parker's Store, and pushed
rapidly down it to where the battle had already begun. I remember,
too, that the march was so hurried that at one point, the head of the
leading division (I forget which it was, however) having lost a little
distance by taking the wrong road, the rear division was not allowed
to halt, but pushed right on, so that it got abreast of the leading
division, and the two came down the road side by side, filling the
whole road and crowding the retreating men of the divisions which were
being driven back into the woods on each side.
"These are facts as I recollect them, and while I don't know what your
orders were, I remember that there was a change in them during the
night, according to my understanding, and that the change was as
promptly and vigorously and successfully carried out as time and
distance could possibly permit. There was certainly _no loss of time_
from the moment we received orders to the moment we went under fire in
the Wilderness, as the distance covered will show.
"Very truly yours,
"E. P. ALEXANDER.
"GENERAL LONGSTREET."
Colonel Venable writes,--
"July 25, 1879.
"DEAR GENERAL,--... Well, the morning came. The enemy attacked Wilcox
and Heth before your arrival. Disaster seemed imminent. I was sent to
meet you and hasten your march. I met your two divisions within less
than half a mile of the battle-field coming up in parallel columns
very rapidly (I was going to say in double-quick) on the Plank road,
side by side, and that they came in grandly, forming line of battle,
Kershaw on the right and Field on the left, restoring the battle. It
was superb, and my heart beats quicker to think about it even at this
distance of time....
"Yours, very truly,
"CHARLES S. VENABLE.
"GENERAL LONGSTREET."