STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FIELD.
Longstreet again considers Relief from Service--General Grant at
Knoxville--Shoeless Soldiers leave Bloody Trails on Frozen Roads--A
Confederate Advance--Affair at Dandridge--Federals retreat--Succession
of Small Engagements--General Grant urges General Foster's Army to the
Offensive--General Foster relieved--General Schofield in Command of
Federals--General Grant's Orders--General Halleck's Estimate of East
Tennessee as a Strategic Field--Affair of Cavalry--Advance towards
Knoxville--Longstreet's Command called back to Defensive for Want of
Cavalry.
During the last few days of the year 1863 the cold of the severest winter
of the war came on, and constantly increased until the thermometer
approached zero, and on New Year's dropped below, hanging near that figure
for about two weeks. The severe season gave rest to every one. Even the
cavalry had a little quiet, but it was cold comfort, for their orders were
to keep the enemy in sight.
The season seemed an appropriate one for making another effort to be
relieved from service,--that service in which the authorities would not
support my plans or labors,--for now during the lull in war they would
have ample time to assign some one to whom they could give their
confidence and aid. But this did not suit them, and the course of affairs
prejudicial to order and discipline was continued. It was difficult under
the circumstances to find apology for remaining in service.
The President asked Congress to provide for another general officer when
he had five on his rolls,--one of whom was not in command appropriate to
his rank,--and appointed Lieutenant-General Smith, of the
Trans-Mississippi Department, of lower rank than mine, to hold rank above
me. A soldier's honor is his all, and of that they would rob him and
degrade him in the eyes of his troops. The occasion seemed to demand
resignation, but that would have been unsoldierly conduct. Dispassionate
judgment suggested, as the proper rounding of the soldier's life, to stay
and go down with faithful comrades of long and arduous service.
On the other side of the picture affairs were bright and encouraging. The
disaffected were away, and with them disappeared their influence. The
little army was bright and cheerful and ready for any work to which it
could be called.
General Grant made his visit to Knoxville about New Year's, and remained
until the 7th. He found General Foster in the condition of the
Confederates,--not properly supplied with clothing, especially in want of
shoes. So he authorized a wait for the clothing, then in transit and
looked for in a week; and that little delay was a great lift for the
Confederates. We were not timid, but were beginning to think ourselves
comfortable and happy, and were expectant of even better condition. We
were receiving a hundred pairs of shoes a day of our own make, the
hand-looms of the farmers were giving help towards clothing our men,
promises from Richmond were encouraging, and we were prepared to enjoy
rest that we had not known for a twelvemonth. The medical inspector of the
Cis-Mississippi District came to see us, and after careful inspection told
us that the army was in better health and better heart than the other
armies of the district.
Before leaving General Foster, General Grant ordered him on the receipt of
the clothing to advance and drive us "at least beyond Bull's Gap and Red
Bridge." And to prepare for that advance he ordered the Ninth and
Twenty-third Corps to Mossy Creek, the Fourth Corps to Strawberry Plains,
and the cavalry to Dandridge.
The Union army--equipped--marched on the 14th and 15th of January.
The Confederate departments were not so prompt in filling our
requisitions, but we had hopes. The bitter freeze of two weeks had made
the rough angles of mud as firm and sharp as so many freshly-quarried
rocks, and the poorly protected feet of our soldiers sometimes left bloody
marks along the roads.
General Sturgis rode in advance of the army, and occupied Dandridge by
Elliott's, Wolford's, and Garrard's divisions of cavalry and Mott's
brigade of infantry. The Fourth and Twenty-third Corps followed the
cavalry, leaving the Ninth Corps to guard at Strawberry Plains.
General Martin gave us prompt notice that the march was at Dandridge, and
in force. The move was construed as a flanking proceeding, but it was more
convenient to adopt the short march and meet it at Dandridge than to leave
our shoe factory and winter huts and take up the tedious rearward move.
The army was ordered under arms, the cavalry was ordered concentrated in
front of General Sturgis, and the divisions of Jenkins and B. R. Johnson
and Alexander's batteries were marched to join General Martin. McLaws's
division under General Wofford, and Ransom's under General Carr, with such
batteries as they could haul, were assigned to positions on the Morristown
(Strawberry Plains) road, to strike forward or reinforce at Dandridge as
plans developed. The men without shoes were ordered to remain as camp
guards, but many preferred to march with their comrades.
I rode in advance to be assured that our cavalry had not mistaken a strong
cavalry move for one by the enemy. We found General Martin on the Bull's
Gap road sharply engaged with the enemy, both sides on strong defensive
grounds and using their horse batteries, but no infantry was in sight.
General Martin was ordered to push on, gain the opposing plateau, and
force the enemy to show his infantry.
He found the enemy in strong fight, but got the plateau, when the enemy
deployed in stronger force; but his infantry did not appear. When asked
to take the next hill, he thought it could not be done without infantry,
but my idea was to save the infantry the trying march, if possible, and to
that end it was necessary to push with the cavalry. He was called to send
me a detachment of his troopers, and about six hundred came,--Harrison's
brigade, as I remember.
We rode away from the enemy's left, concealing our march under traverse of
an elevated woodland, while General Martin engaged their front attention.
At a secluded spot, a little beyond the enemy's left, the men dismounted,
leaving their animals under guards, moved under cover to good position,
deployed into single line, and marched for the second plateau. Part of the
march was over a small opening, near a farm-house. The exposure brought us
under fire of some sharp-shooters, but we hadn't time to stop and shoot.
As our line marched, a chicken, dazed by the formidable appearance,
crouched in the grass until it was kicked up, when it flew and tried to
clear the line, but one of the troopers jumped up, knocked it down with
the end of his gun, stooped, picked it up, put it in his haversack, and
marched on without losing his place or step and without looking to his
right or left, as though it was as proper and as much an every-day part of
the exercise of war as shooting at the enemy. Presently we got up the
hill, and General Martin advanced his mounts to meet us. We lost but two
men,--wounded,--an officer and a soldier. The officer was at my side, and,
hearing the thud of the blow, I turned and asked if he was much hurt. He
said it was only a flesh-wound, and remained with his command until night.
From that point we saw enough to tell that a formidable part of the army
was before us, and orders were sent for the command to speed their march
as much as they could without severe trial.
When General Martin made his bold advance General Sturgis thought to ride
around by a considerable detour and strike at his rear, but in his ride
was surprised to encounter our marching columns of infantry, and still
more surprised when he saw a thousand muskets levelled and sending
whistling bullets about his men, and our batteries preparing something
worse for him. His troopers got back faster than they came. In trying by a
rapid ride to find position for handling his men he lost a number of his
staff, captured, and narrowly escaped himself.
It was near night when the command got up skirmishers from the advance
division, reinforced the cavalry, and pushed the enemy back nearer the
town.
Dandridge is on the right bank of the French Broad River, about thirty
miles from Knoxville. Its topographical features are bold and inviting of
military work. Its other striking characteristic is the interesting
character of its citizens. The Confederates--a unit in heart and
spirit--were prepared to do their share towards making an effective
battle, and our plans were so laid.
At the time ordered for his advance, General Foster was suffering from an
old wound, and General Parke became commander of the troops in the field.
The latter delayed at Strawberry Plains in arranging that part of his
command, and General Sheridan, marching with the advance, became
commander, until superseded by the corps commander, General Gordon
Granger.
Our plans were laid before the army was all up. Our skirmish line was made
stronger and relieved the cavalry of their dismounted service. A narrow
unused road, practicable for artillery, was found, that opened a way for
us to reach the enemy's rearward line of march. Sharp-shooters were
organized and ordered forward by it, to be followed by our infantry
columns. It was thought better to move the infantry alone, as the ringing
of the iron axles of the guns might give notice of our purpose; the
artillery to be called as our sharp-shooters approached the junction of
the roads. The head of the turning force encountered a picket-guard, some
of whom escaped without firing, but speedily gave notice of our feeling
towards their rear. General Granger decided to retire, and was in time to
leave our cross-road behind him, his rear-guard passing the point of
intersection before my advance party reached it about midnight.
The weather moderated before night, and after dark a mild, gentle rain
began to fall.
When I rode into Dandridge in the gray of the morning the ground was
thawing and hardly firm enough to bear the weight of a horse. When the
cavalry came at sunrise the last crust of ice had melted, letting the
animals down to their fetlocks in heavy limestone soil. The mud and want
of a bridge to cross the Holston made pursuit by our heavy columns
useless. The cavalry was ordered on, and the troops at Morristown, on the
Strawberry Plains road, were ordered to try that route, but the latter
proved to be too heavy for progress with artillery.
While yet on the streets of Dandridge, giving directions for such pursuit
as we could make, a lady came out upon the sidewalk and invited us into
her parlors. When the orders for pursuit were given, I dismounted, and
with some members of my staff walked in. After the compliments of the
season were passed, we were asked to be seated, and she told us something
of General Granger during the night before. She had never heard a person
swear about another as General Granger did about me. Some of the officers
proposed to stop and make a battle, but General Granger swore and said it
"was no use to stop and fight Longstreet. You can't whip him. It don't
make any difference whether he has one man or a hundred thousand."
Presently she brought out a flask that General Granger had forgotten, and
thought that I should have it. It had about two refreshing inches left in
it. Though not left with compliments, it was accepted. Although the
weather had moderated, it was very wet and nasty, and as we had taken our
coffee at three o'clock, it was resolved to call it noon and divide the
spoils. Colonel Fairfax, who knew how to enjoy good things, thought the
occasion called for a sentiment, and offered, "General Granger--may his
shadow never grow less."
The cavalry found the road and its side-ways so cut up that their pursuit
was reduced to labored walk. The previous hard service and exposure had so
reduced the animals that they were not in trim for real effective cavalry
service. They found some crippled battery forges and a little of other
plunder, but the enemy passed the Holston and broke his bridges behind
him. Our army returned to their huts and winter homes.
Part of our cavalry was ordered to the south side of the French Broad, and
General Martin was ordered to press close on the enemy's rear with the
balance of his force. General Armstrong followed the line of retreat, and
by the use of flat-boats passed his cavalry over the Holston and rode to
the vicinity of Knoxville. He caught up with some stragglers, equipments,
ammunition, and remains of some caissons, and at last made a grand haul of
a herd of eight hundred beef cattle and thirty-one wagons.
Upon getting his cavalry back to Knoxville, General Foster crossed them
over the bridge at the city below the French Broad to foraging grounds
about Louisville, and called his Dandridge march a foraging excursion,
saying that he was building a bridge to cross to the south side when we
bore down against him. But the strategy of his tedious march by our front
to find a crossing point at Dandridge and build a bridge in our presence,
when he could have crossed to the south side of the French Broad by his
bridge at Knoxville and reached those foraging grounds unmolested, was not
like Napoleon. He claimed that he recovered two hundred of the lost herd
of beef cattle. In that our reports do not agree. It is possible that his
officers may have confounded that adventure with another. My explanation
of the discrepancy--from memory--is that another of our parties undertook
to get in a herd of swine, with which there was a smaller herd of beef
cattle; that all of the latter herd were recovered, and the reports of the
two adventures were confounded.
On the 14th, General Vance came down from the mountains of North Carolina
on a raid towards Sevierville. He captured a number of wagons, but was
promptly pursued by the enemy, his prize recovered, and he and a number of
his staff were taken prisoners, with the loss of a hundred or more horses
and equipments. They were not a part of my command, and failed to give us
notice of their ride. The first intimation we had of them was of their
unfortunate adventure.
On the 21st orders came from Richmond to send Corse's brigade back to
Petersburg, in Virginia. It was so ordered, and Hodges's brigade was
ordered to us from the department of West Virginia, in place of Corse's.
To seek some of the fruits of our advantage at Dandridge, the roads being
a little firmer, our leading division, under General Jenkins, was ordered
on the 21st to prepare to march towards Strawberry Plains, and the
Richmond authorities were asked to send us a pontoon bridge, tools of
construction, and to hurry forward such shoes as they could send.
On the 24th, as the Official Records show, General Grant sent word to
General Halleck of our return towards Knoxville, that he had ordered
General Foster to give battle, if necessary, and that he would send
General Thomas with additional troops to insure that we would be driven
from the State. He also directed General Thomas to go in person and take
command, and said, "I want Longstreet routed and pursued beyond the limits
of the State of Tennessee." And he ordered General Foster to put his
cavalry on a raid from Cumberland Gap to cut in upon our rear.
On the 26th we were advised of the advance of the enemy's cavalry up the
south side of the French Broad to some of the fords above Dandridge.
General Martin was ordered to cross in force below it, get in rear of the
enemy, and endeavor to put him to confusion. He crossed with Morgan's
division, and called Armstrong's to follow, but the enemy, finding
opportunity to put his force against the division, advanced and made a
severe battle on the 27th, which became desperate as developed until, in
their successive gallant charges, our ranks were broken to confusion, when
the enemy made a dash and got two of our guns and two hundred prisoners,
driving us towards the river.
General Armstrong crossed pending these operations and received the
enemy's attack on the 28th. General B. R. Johnson's infantry division had
been ordered near Dandridge, and crossed while Armstrong's command held
the enemy. The latter was caught in battle from which there was no escape
but to fight it out. Johnson's infantry crossed in time to march towards
the enemy's rear before he could dislodge Armstrong. I rode a little in
advance of Johnson's command. The enemy, advised of the approach of
infantry, made his final charge and retired south towards Marysville. In
his last effort one of his most reckless troopers rode in upon
head-quarters, but Colonel Fairfax put spurs into his horse, dashed up
against him, had his pistol at his head, and called "surrender" before the
man could level his gun. The trooper was agreeably surprised to find it no
worse. The enemy's move to Marysville left us in possession of the
foraging grounds.
On the 30th, General Grant urged General Foster's army to the offensive,
and called for the cavalry raid through the Powell River Valley and
Cumberland Gap towards our rear, and General Foster called on General
Thomas for a force of ten thousand infantry and working details to repair
the railroad and bridges between Knoxville and Chattanooga. General Thomas
was willing to respond to the call for troops, but asked timely notice so
that he could call Sherman's forces from Mississippi to replace those to
be sent and make a co-operative move against General Johnston at Dalton.
At the same time General Foster called for a pontoon bridge to make his
crossing of the Holston at Strawberry Plains, which was ordered.
General Sturgis could not approve the ride through Powell River Valley,
and expressed preference for a route through the mountains of North
Carolina towards Asheville, to find our rear. General Grant had suggested
raids from both these points on the 24th of January, but General Foster
decided against the raid from Cumberland Gap, explaining that General
Jones was at Little War Gap to intercept a column that might ride from
that point. He found, too, upon counting his effectives for the raid, that
he could only mount fifteen hundred men, and that our guards at weak
points had been doubled.
Our railroad was in working order on the 26th of January, and the part of
the pontoon bridge ordered for us was on the road. General Jenkins was
ordered with the leading division down towards Strawberry Plains to
collect such material as he could, and be prepared to throw the bridge
across the Holston as soon as it was up and ready for us. Notice was given
General A. E. Jackson of indications of raids; to Captain Osborn,
commanding scouts; to General Wharton; to Rucker's Cavalry Legion and
Jones's cavalry; and General Vaughn was ordered to collect his command at
Rogersville, to be prepared to threaten Cumberland Gap if the forces there
should be reduced.
Due notice was sent our outlying parties and scouts to be on the watch for
the reported raiding parties, and the guards of bridges in our rear were
reinforced.
On the 6th of February, General Grant reported from Nashville,--
"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK,
"_General-in-Chief_:
"I am making every effort to get supplies to Knoxville for the support
of a large force--large enough to drive Longstreet out. The enemy have
evidently fallen back with most of their force from General Thomas's
front, some going to Mobile. Has there been any movement in that
direction by our troops?
"U. S. GRANT,
"_Major-General, Commanding_."
"MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS:
"Reports of scouts make it evident that Joe Johnston has removed most
of his force from your front, two divisions going to Longstreet.
Longstreet has been reinforced by troops from the East. This makes it
evident the enemy intends to secure East Tennessee if they can, and I
intend to drive them out or get whipped this month. For this purpose
you will have to detach at least ten thousand men besides Stanley's
division (more will be better). I can partly relieve the vacuum at
Chattanooga by troops from Logan's command. It will not be necessary
to take artillery or wagons to Knoxville, but all the serviceable
artillery horses should be taken to use on artillery there. Six mules
to each two hundred men should also be taken, if you have them to
spare. Let me know how soon you can start.
"GRANT,
"_Major-General_."
On the 9th, Major-General J. M. Schofield arrived at Knoxville, and
assumed command of the Army of the Ohio.
General Grant reported on the 11th,--
"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK,
"_General-in-Chief_:
"I expect to get off from Chattanooga by Monday next a force to drive
Longstreet out of East Tennessee. It has been impossible heretofore to
subsist the troops necessary for this work.
"U. S. GRANT,
"_Major-General_."
"MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD,
"_Knoxville, Tenn._:
"I deem it of the utmost importance to drive Longstreet out
immediately, so as to furlough the balance of our veterans, and to
prepare for a spring campaign of our own choosing, instead of
permitting the enemy to dictate it for us. Thomas is ordered to start
ten thousand men, besides the remainder of Granger's corps, at once.
He will take no artillery, but will take his artillery horses, and
three mules to one hundred men. He will probably start next Monday.
"U. S. GRANT,
"_Major-General_."
General Schofield ordered preparations for the eastern raid continued, but
to await further orders of execution, and reported that its execution
would require all of his effective mounts, break his animals down, and
leave him without cavalry.
General Grant wired these several despatches from Nashville on February
12:
"MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS:
"Conversation with Major-General Foster has undecided me as to the
propriety of the contemplated move against Longstreet. Schofield
telegraphs the same views. I will take the matter into consideration
during the day, after further talk with Foster, and give you the
conclusion arrived at. If decided that you do not go I will instruct
Schofield to let Granger send off his veterans at once.
"Should you not be required to go into East Tennessee, could you not
make a formidable reconnoissance towards Dalton, and, if successful in
driving the enemy out, occupy that place and complete the railroad up
to it this winter?
"GRANT,
"_Major-General_."
"MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS:
"Logan's troops started yesterday morning. If I decide not to make the
move at present into East Tennessee, I will send them back, unless you
require them to aid in advance on Dalton. (See my telegram of this
morning.)
"GRANT,
"_Major-General_."
"MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD:
"No movement will be made against Longstreet at present. Give your men
and animals all the rest you can preparatory to early operations in
the spring. Furlough all the veterans you deem it prudent to let go.
"U. S. GRANT,
"_Major-General_."
"MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD,
"_Knoxville, Tenn._:
"You need not attempt the raid with the cavalry you now have. If that
in Kentucky can recruit up it may do hereafter to send it on such an
expedition. I have asked so often for a co-operative movement from the
troops in West Virginia that I hardly expect to see anything to help
us from there. General Halleck says they have not got men enough.
Crook, however, has gone there, and may undertake to strike the road
about New River.
"U. S. GRANT,
"_Major-General_."
"MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
"_General-in-Chief, Washington_:
"GENERAL,--I have got General Thomas ready to move a force of about
fourteen thousand infantry into East Tennessee to aid the force there
in expelling Longstreet from the State. He would have started on
Monday night if I had not revoked the order. My reasons for doing this
are these: General Foster, who is now here (or left this morning),
says that our possession of the portion of East Tennessee is perfectly
secure against all danger. The condition of the people within the
rebel lines cannot be improved now after losing all they had.
Longstreet, where he is, makes more secure other parts of our
possessions. Our men, from scanty clothing and short rations, are not
in good condition for an advance. There are but very few animals in
East Tennessee in condition to move artillery or other stores. If we
move against Longstreet with an overwhelming force he will simply fall
back towards Virginia until he can be reinforced or take up an
impregnable position. The country being exhausted, all our supplies
will have to be carried from Knoxville the whole distance advanced. We
would be obliged to advance rapidly and return soon whether the object
of the expedition was accomplished or not. Longstreet could return
with impunity on the heels of our returning column, at least as far
down the valley as he can supply himself from the road in his rear.
Schofield telegraphs to the same effect. All these seem to be good
reasons for abandoning the movement, and I have therefore suspended
it. Now that our men are ready for an advance, however, I have
directed it to be made on Dalton, and hope to get possession of that
place and hold it as a step towards a spring campaign. Our troops in
East Tennessee are now clothed; rations are also accumulating. When
Foster left most of the troops had ten days' supplies, with five
hundred barrels of flour and forty days' meat in store, and the
quantity increasing daily.
"I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"U. S. GRANT,
"_Major-General_."
Later despatches from General Grant and Commander-in-Chief Halleck were as
follows:
"NASHVILLE, TENN., February 13, 1864.
"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK,
"_General-in-Chief_:
"Despatches just received from General Schofield and conversation with
General Foster, who is now here, have determined me against moving
immediately against Longstreet. I will write more fully. No danger
whatever to be apprehended in East Tennessee.
"U. S. GRANT,
"_Major-General_."
"KNOXVILLE, February 15, 1864, 6.30 P.M.
"MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS:
"In consequence of Longstreet's movement in this direction I have
ordered one division of Granger's corps to this place. I think Stanley
should move up as far as Athens and Sweet Water so as to protect the
railroad. Longstreet has not advanced farther than Strawberry Plains.
No further news from him to-day.
"J. M. SCHOFIELD,
"_Major-General_."
"[Confidential.]
"WASHINGTON, D. C., February 17, 1864.
"MAJOR-GENERAL GRANT,
"_Nashville, Tenn._:
"GENERAL,--Your letter of the 12th instant is just received. I fully
concur with you in regard to the present condition of affairs in East
Tennessee. It certainly is very much to be regretted that the fatal
mistake of General Burnside has permitted Longstreet's army to winter
in Tennessee. It is due to yourself that a full report of this matter
should be placed on file, so that the responsibility may rest where it
properly belongs.
"H. W. HALLECK,
"_General-in-Chief_."
The raids ordered north and south of us were now given over. General
Thomas made his advance towards Dalton, and retired, unsuccessful.
General Halleck was right in his estimate of East Tennessee as a strategic
field essential to the Union service, the gate-way to Kentucky, to the
Union line of communication, and the Ohio River; but General Grant found
it so far from his lines of active operations that it could not be worked
without interrupting plans of campaigns for the summer, and giving his
adversary opportunity to dictate the work of the year. He thought it
better to depend upon the conservative spirit that controlled at the
South, to draw the army in East Tennessee off to meet threatenings in
Virginia and Georgia, when he was prepared for them.
On the 10th of February, General Jenkins was ordered with his division at
Strawberry Plains to use the pontoon and flat-boats in bridging the
Holston River. Other columns were ordered to approximate concentration,
including Wharton's brigade from Bull's Gap, and Hodges's brigade coming
from the Department of West Virginia. Rucker's cavalry was ordered to
Blain's Cross-roads on the west bank, and outlying forces were advised of
the advance. General Jenkins was ordered to put some of the cavalry over
to be in observation towards Knoxville, and a brigade of infantry as
supporting force; batteries on the hither bank to cover the troops and the
bridge in case the enemy was disposed to dispute our crossing, and await
my arrival and further orders. The army being ready for the crossing and
move for Knoxville, inquiry was made of General Johnston as to the
condition of affairs with the enemy at Chattanooga. In answer he said,--
"Our scouts report that troops have been sent from Chattanooga to
Loudon. They could not learn the number."
On the 17th I asked the Richmond authorities for ten thousand additional
men, and General Lee, approving our work, asked to have Pickett's division
sent, and other detachments to make up the number.
On the 19th I was informed from General Johnston's head-quarters that
"eight trains loaded with troops went up from Chattanooga on the night of
the 17th." A telegram came on the 19th from Richmond to say that the
additional troops called for could not be sent, and on the same day a
telegram from the President ordered me to send General Martin with his
cavalry to General Johnston. In reply I reported that the order depriving
me of the cavalry would force me to abandon the move, then in progress,
against Knoxville, and draw the troops back towards Bristol. Then came
other despatches from General Johnston that the enemy was still drawing
forces from Chattanooga, but no authority came from Richmond authorizing
me to retain the cavalry, so we were obliged to draw back to fields that
could be guarded by smaller commands.
Referring to the proposed advance, General Grant said, "Longstreet cannot
afford to place his force between Knoxville and the Tennessee." It was not
so intended, but to put the army alongside of Knoxville to hold the enemy
to his intrenched lines, while the troops asked for would be employed in
breaking the railroad and bridges between that point and Chattanooga. It
was thought that the army at Chattanooga could not afford sufficient
detachments to drive me from that work without exposing that position to
danger from General Johnston at Dalton, but upon inquiry of General
Johnston if he could avail himself of such opportunity, he replied that he
was ordered to reinforce General Polk, who was operating in Mississippi in
front of General Sherman. Instead of reinforcing General Polk, the latter
should have been ordered to General Johnston. That would have drawn
General Sherman to General Thomas, but Polk, having interior lines of
transit, could have been in time for Johnston to strike and break up the
road and bridge behind Thomas before Sherman could reach him. The break
could have forced Thomas to care for his own position, and the want of the
bridge behind him might have forced him to abandon it, in search of safe
communication with his supplies. But the authorities could not be induced
to abandon the policy of placing detachments to defend points to which the
enemy chose to call us. We had troops enough in Tennessee, Georgia,
Alabama, and Mississippi, if allowed to use them in co-operative
combination, to break the entire front of the Federal forces and force
them back into Kentucky before the opening of the spring campaign, when we
might have found opportunity to "dictate" their campaign. The enemy was in
no condition for backward move at the time of my advance upon Knoxville,
so simultaneous advance of our many columns could have given him serious
trouble, if not confusion.
The order for the return of Martin's cavalry to Georgia, and the notice
that other troops could not be sent me, called for the withdrawal of the
command east, where we could find safer lines of defence and good
foraging. The order to retire was issued, and the march was taken up on
the 22d of February, Jenkins's division and the cavalry to cover the
march. He was ordered to reship the pontoon-boats, destroy trestlings,
flat-boats, the railroad bridge, and march in advance of the cavalry. He
inquired if he should cut the wires and crossings of small streams, but
was ordered to leave them undisturbed, as the enemy would not be so
likely to trouble us when he found we were disposed to be accommodating.
The march was not seriously disturbed. The enemy's cavalry, reduced by
severe winter service, was in poor condition to follow, and the roads we
left behind us were too heavy for artillery. A good position was found
behind Bull's Gap, and the army was deployed to comfortable camps from the
Holston River on the right to the Nolachucky on the left.
The prime object of the second advance upon Knoxville was to show the
strategic strength of the field, and persuade the authorities that an army
of twenty thousand in that zone could be of greater service than double
that force on the enemy's front or elsewhere, but they could not or would
not hear of plans that proposed to take them from the settled policy of
meeting the enemy where he was prepared for us.