LONGSTREET MOVES TO GEORGIA.
The Author reverts to the Perils and Opportunities in the
West--Proposes to the Secretary of War to reinforce against Rosecrans
from the Army of Northern Virginia--Makes Plan known to General
Lee--The Move finally effected--Difficulties of Transportation--A
Roundabout Route--General Longstreet narrowly escapes capture when
seeking Bragg's Head-quarters--General Bragg assigns Longstreet to
Command of the Left--Instructions for the Battle of Chickamauga--The
Armies in Position--Federals in Command of Generals Rosecrans,
Crittenden, McCook, and George H. Thomas.
While the army was lying idle on the south bank of the Rapidan my mind
reverted to affairs in the West, and especially to the progressive work of
the Union army in Tennessee towards the northern borders of Georgia. Other
armies of the South were, apparently, spectators, viewing those tremendous
threatenings without thought of turning minds or forces to arrest the
march of Rosecrans.
To me the emergency seemed so grave that I decided to write the Honorable
Secretary of War (excusing the informality under the privilege given in
his request in May) expressing my opinion of affairs in that military
zone. I said that the successful march of General Rosecrans's army through
Georgia would virtually be the finishing stroke of the war; that in the
fall of Vicksburg and the free flow of the Mississippi River the lungs of
the Confederacy were lost; that the impending march would cut through the
heart of the South, and leave but little time for the dissolution; that to
my mind the remedy was to order the Army of Northern Virginia to defensive
work, and send detachments to reinforce the army in Tennessee; to call
detachments of other commands to the same service, and strike a crushing
blow against General Rosecrans before he could receive reinforcing help;
that our interior lines gave the opportunity, and it was only by the
skilful use of them that we could reasonably hope to equalize our power to
that of the better-equipped adversary; that the subject had not been
mentioned to my commander, because like all others he was opposed to
having important detachments of his army so far beyond his reach; that all
must realize that our affairs were languishing, and that the only hope of
reviving the waning cause was through the advantage of interior lines.
A few days after the letter was despatched the subject happened up while
discussing affairs with General Lee, when I felt warranted in expressing
my views and relieving my mind of the serious apprehensions that haunted
me. He inquired if I was willing to go West and take charge there. To that
I consented, provided the change could be so arranged as to give me an
opportunity, by careful handling of the troops before accepting battle, to
gain their confidence; providing, at the same time, that means could be
arranged for further aggressive march in case of success.
At that time the railway passing our camps on the Rapidan through Virginia
and East Tennessee to Chattanooga was open and in good working order.
General Bragg's army was near Chattanooga, General Buckner's in East
Tennessee, near Knoxville, General Samuel Jones's army, or parts of an
army, in Southwest Virginia. There was but one railway,--from Cincinnati
_via_ Louisville and Nashville to Chattanooga. On that road General
Rosecrans was marching against General Bragg. On the direct route to East
Tennessee over the Cumberland Mountains General Burnside was moving into
East Tennessee against General Buckner's forces.
A few days after the conversation with General Lee, he was called down to
Richmond. In the course of a week he wrote, viz.:
"[Confidential.]
"RICHMOND, August 31, 1863.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. LONGSTREET,
"_Head-quarters Army of Northern Virginia_:
"GENERAL,--I have wished for several days past to return to the army,
but have been detained by the President. He will not listen to my
proposition to leave to-morrow. I hope you will use every exertion to
prepare the army for offensive operations, and improve the condition
of our men and animals. I can see nothing better to be done than to
endeavor to bring General Meade out and use our efforts to crush his
army while in its present condition.
* * * * *
"Very respectfully and truly yours,
"R. E. LEE,
"_General_."
REPLY.
"HEAD-QUARTERS, September 2, 1863.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE,
"_Commanding_:
"GENERAL,--Your letter of the 31st is received. I have expressed to
Generals Ewell and Hill your wishes, and am doing all that can be done
to be well prepared with my own command. Our greatest difficulty will
be in preparing our animals. I do not see that we can reasonably hope
to accomplish much by offensive operations, unless you are strong
enough to cross the Potomac. If we advance to meet the enemy on this
side he will in all probability go into one of his many fortified
positions. These we cannot afford to attack.
"I know but little of the condition of our affairs in the West, but am
inclined to the opinion that our best opportunity for great results is
in Tennessee. If we could hold the defensive here with two corps and
send the other to operate in Tennessee with that army, I think that we
could accomplish more than by an advance from here.
* * * * *
"I remain, general, very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"JAMES LONGSTREET,
"_Lieutenant-General_."
General Lee next wrote to inquire as to the time necessary for the
movement of my corps into Tennessee. As there were but two divisions,
McLaws's and Hood's, and Alexander's batteries, two days was supposed to
be ample time. The transportation was ordered by the quartermaster's
department at Richmond, and the divisions were made ready to board the
trains as soon as they could reach us.
The success of the plan was thought from the first to depend upon its
prompt and vigorous execution, and it was under those conditions that
General Lee agreed to reinforce the army in Tennessee, together with the
assurance that vigorous pursuit, even to the Ohio River, should follow
success. The onward march was repeatedly urged, not only in return for the
use of part of the army, but to relieve General Lee of apprehension from
the army in front of him; but it was not until the 9th of September that
the first train came to Orange Court-House to start with its load of
troops. Meanwhile, General Buckner had left his post in East Tennessee and
marched south to draw nearer the army under General Bragg about
Chattanooga, leaving nothing of his command in East Tennessee except two
thousand men at Cumberland Gap, under General Frazer, partially fortified.
General Burnside had crossed the mountains, and was not only in East
Tennessee, but on that very day General Frazer surrendered to him his
command at Cumberland Gap without a fight.
These facts were known to the Richmond authorities at the time of our
movements, but not to General Lee or myself until the move was so far
advanced as to prevent recall. So that we were obliged to make the circuit
through the Carolinas to Augusta, Georgia, and up by the railroad, thence
through Atlanta to Dalton and Ringgold. It was the only route of transit
left us. There were two routes between Richmond and Augusta, one _via_
Wilmington, the other through Charlotte, North Carolina, but only a single
track from Augusta to Chattanooga. The gauges of the roads were not
uniform, nor did the roads connect at the cities (except by drays and
other such conveyances). The roads had not been heavily worked before the
war, so that their rolling stock was light and limited.
Instead of two days of moving, it was not until the 25th that our
artillery joined us near Chattanooga. Hood's division was first shipped,
and three brigades, or the greater part of three, were landed at the
railroad station, and joined General Bragg's army on the 18th and 19th of
September, but that army had been manoeuvred and flanked out of
Chattanooga, Buckner's out of East Tennessee, and both were together down
below the borders of Georgia.
As I left General Lee's tent, after bidding him good-by, he walked out
with me to my horse. As my foot was in the stirrup he said again, "Now,
general, you must beat those people out in the West." Withdrawing my foot
to respectful position I promised, "If I live; but I would not give a
single man of my command for a fruitless victory." He promised again that
it should be so; said that arrangements had been made that any success
that we had would be followed; that orders to that effect had been given;
that transportation was also ordered to be prepared, and the orders would
be repeated.
While the troops were in transit, Jenkins's South Carolina brigade was
transferred to Hood's division, so that we had two South Carolina and four
Georgia brigades of the two divisions, which gave us some little trouble
in keeping our men on the cars passing by their homes. The people crowded
every station to give us their all in most acceptable rations, and to
cheer us with wishes for a happy issue.
The train upon which I rode reached Catoosa about two o'clock of the
afternoon of the 19th of September. That upon which our horses were came
up at four o'clock. Only part of the staff of the corps was with me, and
General Alexander was with his batteries far away in South Carolina. As
soon as our horses could be saddled we started, Lieutenant-Colonels Sorrel
and Manning and myself, to find the head-quarters of the commanding
general. We were told to follow the main road, and did so, though there
were many men coming into that road from our right bearing the wounded of
the day's battle; the firing was still heard off to the right, and wagons
were going and coming, indicating our nearness to the field. Nothing else
occurring to suggest a change of the directions given us, we followed the
main road.
It was a bright moonlight night, and the woodlands on the sides of the
broad highway were quite open, so that we could see and be seen. After a
time we were challenged by an outlying guard, "Who comes there?" We
answered, "Friends." The answer was not altogether satisfying to the
guard, and after a very short parley we asked what troops they were, when
the answer gave the number of the brigade and of the division. As Southern
brigades were called for their commanders more than by their numbers, we
concluded that these friends were the enemy. There were, too, some
suspicious obstructions across the road in front of us, and altogether the
situation did not look inviting. The moon was so bright that it did not
seem prudent to turn and ride back under the fire that we knew would be
opened on us, so I said, loudly, so that the guard could hear, "Let us
ride down a little way to find a better crossing." Riding a few rods
brought us under cover and protection of large trees, sufficiently shading
our retreat to enable us to ride quietly to the rear and take the road
over which we had seen so many men and vehicles passing while on our first
ride.
We reached General Bragg's head-quarters at eleven o'clock, reported, and
received orders, which he had previously given other commanders, for
attack early in the morning. Our bivouac was made near the general
head-quarters, and we rode at daylight to find the troops. Hood's
brigades that had arrived before us had been at work with the left of the
army, which was assigned as my command. Lieutenant-General Polk was
commanding the right wing.
Two brigades of McLaws's division, Kershaw's and Humphreys's, came in the
afternoon, and marched during the night and across the Chickamauga River.
The army had forced its way across the Chickamauga under severe
skirmishes, little less than a battle, during the greater part of the
19th, and some of the commands had been engaged on the 18th working on the
same plan.
The written order giving the plan was issued on the 18th. In general
terms, it was to cross the Chickamauga, strike the enemy's left, and roll
it back on his right by a wheel to the left so as to come in between the
enemy and Chattanooga. The work had been so persistent and assiduous
during part of the 18th and all of the 19th, that General Rosecrans came
to understand the plan as well as his adversary, and to arrange
accordingly.
With my instructions for the 20th the commanding general gave me a map
showing prominent topographical features of the grounds from the
Chickamauga River to Mission Ridge, and beyond to the Lookout Mountain
range.
At early dawn I found the left wing. It was composed of Buckner's corps
(Stewart's and Preston's divisions), a new division under General Bushrod
R. Johnson, the division of General T. C. Hindman, and three of Hood's
brigades. Buckner's corps had been cut in two. His division on the right
of the left wing was under General Stewart, while Preston's division, on
the extreme left, on the bank of the Chickamauga, was assigned, by the
order for battle, as the pivot upon which the battle should wheel. The
commands stood: Stewart's, Johnson's, Hindman's, and Preston's divisions;
Hood's brigades in rear of Johnson's line. General Buckner reported his
artillery as amounting to about thirty guns. Three batteries were
reported, of four guns each, with Hindman's division, Johnson's and Hood's
commands being without artillery. The brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys
were ordered, with Hood's, to be used as a column of assault, by brigades,
at a hundred paces interval.
As the battle was ordered for daylight, it seemed too late to draw
Buckner's divisions into reciprocal relations, and we had yet to find the
right wing. As it was not in touch or sight, General Stewart was ordered
to find it. He marched about half a mile to his right and found that he
was nearly half a mile in advance of the right wing. His move made place
for Hood's column, which was called to the line, and General Stewart broke
his right to rear to guard that flank until the right wing could get to
the front. The divisions were formed in two lines, two brigades on the
front line, others of the second line in support, except Hood's five
brigades in column. General McLaws and two of his brigades, two of Hood's,
and Alexander's artillery were on the rails, speeding for the battle as
fast as steam could carry them, but failed to reach it. When organized for
battle the left wing stood about three hundred yards east of the
Lafayette-Chattanooga dirt road. As the battle was ordered for wheel to
the left on Preston's division as pivot, his (Trigg's) brigade was
echeloned on the left of Hindman's division. The purpose of the commander
in ordering the wheel on the left as pivot was to push in, from the start,
between the enemy and his new base at Chattanooga.
No chief of artillery for the command reported, and a brief search failed
to find one. The field, so far as it could be surveyed, however, was not a
field, proper, but a heavy woodland, not adapted to the practice of
artillery. The hour of battle was at hand, but the right wing was not yet
organized. Some of the troops were without rations, their wagons, having
lost the lines of march through the woodlands, failing to reach them until
after daylight, when they were further delayed cooking their food.
The right wing was formed of D. H. Hill's corps, Breckenridge's and
Cleburne's divisions, W. H. T. Walker's corps of Walker's and Liddell's
divisions, Cheatham's division of Polk's corps, artillery battalions of
Majors Melancthon Smith, T. R. Hotchkiss, and R. E. Groves, and batteries
of Lieutenant R. T. Beauregard, Captain E. P. Howell, Captain W. H.
Fowler, and Lieutenant Shannon.
As it formed it stood with D. H. Hill's corps on the right, Breckenridge's
and Cleburne's divisions from right to left, Cheatham's division on the
left of Cleburne's rear, and Walker's reserve corps behind Hill's corps;
but when arranged for battle it was about half a mile in rear of the line
upon which the left wing was established. The Confederate commander rode
early in the morning to hear the opening of the battle. As the sounds
failed to reach him, he became anxious, sent orders of inquiry for the
cause of delay, and repeated his orders for attack, and finally rode to
his right wing and gave peremptory orders.
Marching through the woods to line up on the left wing, the left of the
right wing was found to overlap my division on the right, yet our extreme
right was found to overreach the left of the enemy's field-works by two
brigades, and reconnoissance found the road between the enemy and
Chattanooga open and free of obstructions or troops to defend it. On the
right of Breckenridge's division was Armstrong's division of cavalry
dismounted, and beyond his right was Forrest's other division of cavalry,
Pegram's. Some miles off from our left was Wheeler's division of cavalry,
under Wharton and Martin.
The Union army from left to right was: first the Fourteenth Corps, General
George H. Thomas commanding, four divisions,--Baird's division on the
left, then Reynolds's and Brannan's, the latter retired to position of
reserve, and Negley's. (The last named had been left, on the night of the
19th, on guard near the Glen House, but was ordered early on the 20th to
join General Thomas, and one of the brigades did move promptly under the
order; the other brigades (two) failed to receive the order.) Then the
Twentieth Corps, three divisions,--Jefferson C. Davis's, R. W. Johnson's,
and P. H. Sheridan's,--on the right, General A. McD. McCook commanding the
corps. Next was the Twenty-first Corps, three divisions,--T. J. Wood's, J.
M. Palmer's, and H. P. Van Cleve's,--General T. L. Crittenden commanding
the corps. It was in position on the east slope of Mission Ridge, ordered
to be prepared to support the corps of the right or left, or both; one of
its brigades had been left to occupy Chattanooga. Wilder's mounted
infantry, on the right of the Twentieth Corps, was ordered to report to
the commander of that corps for the day's work. A reserve corps under
General Gordon Granger was off the left of the Union army to cover the gap
in Mission Ridge at Rossville and the road from the Union left to that
gap. Minty's cavalry was with this corps, and posted at Mission Mills.
General Granger had Steedman's division of two brigades and a brigade
under Colonel D. McCook. General R. B. Mitchell, commanding Union cavalry,
was on their right at Crawfish Springs, with orders to hold the crossings
of the Chickamauga against the Confederate cavalry.
It seems that parts of the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps, Johnson's and
Van Cleve's divisions, were under General Thomas in the fight of his left
on the 19th, and remained with him on the 20th. The purpose of the posting
of the Union army was to hold open its routes for Chattanooga by the
Rossville and Dry Valley roads. As before stated, the Confederate
commander's design was to push in between the Union army and Chattanooga,
recover his lost ground, and cut the enemy's line of supplies.
The commanders of the armies were on the field early on the 20th. The
failure of the opening of the Confederates at daylight gave opportunity
for a reconnoissance by light of day, by which it was learned that the
road from the Union left was open, not guarded nor under close
observation; but the commander ordered direct assault under the original
plan,--his back to the river, the Union army backing on Mission Ridge. The
Chickamauga River, rising from the mountains south, flows in its general
course a little east of north to conflux with the Tennessee River. The
Ridge runs nearly parallel with the river, and opens up a valley a mile
wide. It is a bold outcropping of limestone about one hundred feet above
the valley, with occasional passes, or gaps, that are strong points of
guard for defence. Four miles northwest from the Union left was the gap at
Rossville, called for the old Cherokee chief. On its right was the pass of
the Dry Valley road, and immediately in its rear was the McFarland Gap.
The line of the Lafayette road lies about parallel with the Ridge to
within a mile of the Union left, when it bends westward and leads to the
Rossville Gap. The Dry Valley road crosses the Chickamauga at Glass's
Mills, courses along the east slope of the Ridge, crosses it, and joins on
the west the road that crosses at the McFarland Gap.
The Union left was east of the Chattanooga-Rossville road, but crossed the
road to the west and formed in broken front. The left and right of
Thomas's line was retired or broken to the rear. The Union commander rode
over his lines on the afternoon of the 19th and ordered his front covered
by such field-works as could be constructed during the night.
General Thomas covered his lines by log and rail obstructions. The corps
of Rosecrans's right formed two lines of rail defences for infantry. The
batteries had the ascending slopes of the Ridge for positions, and their
field was more favorable otherwise for artillery practice than was that
of the Confederates advancing from the valley and more densely timbered
forests. They had two hundred and forty-six guns. The records do not give
satisfactory accounts of the number of Confederate guns, but they probably
numbered not less than two hundred.