REVIEW OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.
Confederate Expectations--General Lee's Salutatory to the People of
Maryland--The "Lost Despatch"--McClellan's Movements--Turn in the Tide
of War--A Miracle great as the throwing down of the Walls of
Jericho--In Contempt of the Enemy the Confederate Army was
dispersed--Harper's Ferry a "Man-Trap"--It diverted the Army from the
Main Issue--Lee and McClellan compared and contrasted--Tribute to the
Confederate Private Soldier.
For conveying to the reader a comprehensive view of the military zodiac at
the time we crossed the quiet Potomac, the 5th day of September, 1862, and
an understanding of the logical sequence of the events following,
something should be added here to the plain narrative of occurrences, and
so I undertake a review of the Maryland campaign.
The Army of Northern Virginia was afield without a foe. Its once grand
adversary, discomfited under two commanders, had crept into cover of the
bulwarks about the national capital. The commercial, social, and blood
ties of Maryland inclined her people to the Southern cause. A little way
north of the Potomac were inviting fields of food and supplies more
plentiful than on the southern side; and the fields for march and
manoeuvre, strategy and tactics, were even more inviting than the broad
fields of grain and comfortable pasture-lands. Propitious also was the
prospect of swelling our ranks by Maryland recruits.
At the head of the army of sixty thousand men encouraged, matured, and
disciplined by victory stood the Confederate chief, challenging on its own
soil the army that had marched to conquer the Southern capital. On the 7th
he pitched his bivouac about Frederick City. On the 8th he made his
salutatory to the people in these words:
"HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
"NEAR FREDERICKTOWN, MD., September 8, 1862.
"TO THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND:
"It is right that you should know the purpose that brought the army
under my command within the limits of your State, so far as that
purpose concerns yourselves. The people of the Confederate States have
long watched with the deepest sympathy the wrongs and outrages that
have been inflicted upon the citizens of a commonwealth allied to the
States of the South by the strongest social, political, and commercial
ties. They have seen with profound indignation their sister State
deprived of every right and reduced to the condition of a conquered
province. Under the pretence of supporting the Constitution, but in
violation of its most valuable provisions, your citizens have been
arrested and imprisoned upon no charge and contrary to all forms of
law. The faithful and manly protest against this outrage made by the
venerable and illustrious Marylander, to whom in better days no
citizen appealed for right in vain, was treated with scorn and
contempt; the government of your chief city has been usurped by armed
strangers; your legislature has been dissolved by the unlawful arrest
of its members; freedom of the press and of speech has been
suppressed; words have been declared offences by an arbitrary decree
of the Federal Executive, and citizens ordered to be tried by a
military commission for what they may dare to speak. Believing that
the people of Maryland possessed a spirit too lofty to submit to such
a government, the people of the South have long wished to aid you in
throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the
inalienable rights of freemen, and to restore independence and
sovereignty to your State. In obedience to this wish, our army has
come among you, and is prepared to assist you with the power of its
arms in regaining the rights of which you have been despoiled.
"This, citizens of Maryland, is our mission, so far as you are
concerned. No constraint upon your free will is intended; no
intimidation will be allowed within the limits of this army, at least.
Marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought and
speech. We know no enemies among you, and will protect all, of every
opinion. It is for you to decide your destiny freely and without
constraint. This army will respect your choice, whatever it may be;
and while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your
natural position among them, they will only welcome you when you come
of your own free will.
"R. E. LEE,
"_General, Commanding_."
At this very time the recently displaced commander, General McClellan,
reinstated in command, was marching for an opportunity to recover his good
name, and the Union cavalry was active and aggressive in work against the
Confederates at Poolesville.
On the 9th the Confederate commander organized his plans for the
surrounding and capture of Harper's Ferry, and put his army in motion on
the 10th. Close upon the heels of the march followed the Army of the
Potomac, only twenty-five miles behind the rear of the Confederate army,
with the cavalry of the armies in contact. The march of the former was as
cautious as that of the latter was venturesome. On the 10th the Union
commander was informed of the march of J. G. Walker's brigades up the
river from Cheek's Ford. On the 11th his signal service reported the camp
across the river at Point of Rocks. On the 12th, at Urbana, he was
informed of the combination against Harper's Ferry, and the march towards
the Cumberland Valley, and ordered pressing pursuit to force the
Confederates to a stand. Under that order General Pleasonton, the Federal
cavalry leader, hurried his troops and cleared the way to South Mountain
on the 13th. From day to day the Confederates marched their dispersing
columns, from day to day the Union columns converged in easy, cautious
marches. At noon of the 13th, General Lee's order distributing his forces
and a despatch from the Governor of Pennsylvania were handed General
McClellan,--the former the celebrated "lost despatch," given on a previous
page,--the latter reading as follows:
"HARRISBURG, PA., September 13, 1862.
"MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN:
"When may we expect General Reynolds here? Services needed
immediately. Longstreet's division is said to have reached Hagerstown
last night. Jackson crossed the Potomac at Williamsport to capture
Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry. We are assembling militia rapidly at
Chambersburg. Can we do anything to aid your movements?
"A. G. CURTIN,
"_Governor of Pennsylvania_."
This told of the change of march of my brigades from Turner's Pass to
Hagerstown, and, with the "lost despatch," revealed that Hill's five
brigades were the only troops at the former place.
The same afternoon General McClellan's signal service despatched him that
the Union signal station on Maryland Heights had gone down. General Lee's
signals failed to connect, so that General McClellan was better informed
of the progress of the Confederate movements than was the Confederate
commander. That afternoon the Union army was in hand for battle. The
Confederates were dispersed and divided by rivers, and drifting thirty and
forty and fifty miles apart. Under similar circumstances General Scott, or
General Taylor, or General Worth would have put the columns at the base of
South Mountain before night, and would have passed the unguarded gaps
before the sun's rays of next morning could have lighted their eastern
slopes.
The Union commander claims to have ordered more vigorous pursuit after the
"lost despatch" was handed him, but there is nothing to support the claim
except his call on General Franklin, and in that he only ordered
preparation at Crampton's to await events at Turner's Pass.
General Pleasonton was at Turner's Pass on the afternoon of the 13th, and
made a reconnoissance of the ways leading up the east side of the
mountain. He was not informed of the despatches received by his chief,
nor had he any information of Confederate movements except such as he had
gleaned in closely following their rear. At daylight of the 14th he led
General Cox and the Ninth Corps to attack, and in this manner the battle
was opened.
His orders to call the Confederates to a stand did not anticipate the
provocation of a general engagement, but a wait for his chief, who rode up
about one o'clock. He thought that he was battling against seventeen
brigades, while there were but five; and, had the battle been held in wait
for McClellan, his well-known habit of careful reconnoissance would have
consumed the balance of the day. His last orders for General Franklin
directed a wait for Couch's division, which joined him at eight o'clock in
the evening. It is difficult to find that a quicker move was given the
Union army in consequence of the "lost despatch;" but one may rather
concede General Hill's claim, that in consequence of that despatch the
Union army was so delayed as to give the Confederates time to make their
way back to the soil of "Old Virginia." Without it, the main column of the
Union forces could have marched through Crampton's Pass, and relieved
Harper's Ferry on the 14th, but, guided by it, their commander found it
important to first guard against the seventeen brigades that should be at
Turner's Pass, on the right rear of a column, moving against Crampton's.
The razing of the walls of Jericho by encircling marches of priests and
soldiers, at the signal of long-drawn blasts of sacred horns and shouts of
the multitude, was scarcely a greater miracle than the transformation of
the conquering army of the South into a horde of disordered fugitives
before an army that two weeks earlier was flying to cover under its
homeward ramparts.
Providence helps those who can avail themselves of His tender care, but
permits those who will to turn from Him to their own arrogance. That His
gracious hand was with the Confederates in their struggles on the
Chickahominy, and even through the errors of the Bull Run campaign, cannot
be questioned. When, however, in self-confidence, they lost sight of His
helping hand, and in contempt of the enemy dispersed the army, they were
given up to the reward of vainglory. That the disaster was not
overwhelming they have to thank the plodding methods of the Union
commander. With as much faith as Captain Joshua, his success would have
been as complete.
But for the proper solution of the campaign we must turn again to the
condition of the Confederate army when it crossed into Maryland. It was
then all that its leaders could ask, and its claim as master of the field
was established, but it was worn by severe marches and battles, and in
need of rest. Its record before and after shows that, held in hand and
refreshed by easy marchings and comfortable supplies, it would have been
prepared to maintain its supremacy. The first necessity was a little time
to refresh, while the grand object was to draw the enemy from his
intrenched lines to free and open battle. These facts carefully observed,
the Confederate army would have been assured of its claim and prestige.
In the confusion about Washington incident to the Bull Run campaign,
General McClellan was ordered to receive the retreating columns and post
them to defend and hold their fortified lines. He had not emerged from the
clouds that hung about his untoward campaign in Virginia, but, familiar
with the provisions that had been made for defence, he was most available
for the service. He had hardly posted the troops and arranged the garrison
when he found that the Confederates, instead of moving against his
fortifications, had turned the head of their columns north, and were
marching to invade Union territory. He was quick to discover his
opportunity, and, after posting guards for the works about the capital,
assumed command of the army and took the field, lest another commander
should be assigned. His clouded fame and assumption of authority committed
him to early aggressive work. He had nothing to lose, but the world to
gain, and that upon the field of battle.
All that the Confederates had to do was to hold the army in hand and draw
the enemy to a field wide enough for manoeuvre; then call him to his
battle. It is possible that ragged affairs about the mountain passes might
have given him safe retreat to his capital, leaving the army of the South
afield, a free lance.
It had been arranged that the Southern President should join the troops,
and from the head of his victorious army call for recognition. Maryland
would have put out some of her resources, and her gallant youth would have
helped swell the Southern ranks,--the twenty thousand soldiers who had
dropped from the Confederate ranks during the severe marches of the summer
would have been with us. Volunteers from all parts of the South would have
come, swimming the Potomac to find their President and his field-marshal,
while Union troops would have been called from Kentucky and Tennessee, and
would have left easy march for the Confederate armies of the West to the
Ohio River.
Even though the Confederates were not successful, the fall elections were
against the Federal administration. With the Southern armies victorious,
the results of the contest at the polls would have been so pronounced as
to have called for recognition of the Confederacy.
General McClellan wrote General Halleck of the effect, in case of defeat
of his army,--
"But if we should be so unfortunate as to meet with defeat, our
country is at their mercy."
So much has been said and written about Harper's Ferry and the surrender
of the garrison, that it seems difficult to pass it without notice. In
more than one report General McClellan mentioned it as a "shameful"
surrender. He had disapproved the position as false, and asked if it could
not be given up. Colonel Miles, the commander, who gave his life in its
defence, was acting under the following order from the department
commander,--viz.:
"BALTIMORE, September 5, 1862.
"COLONEL MILES, HARPER'S FERRY:
"The position on the heights ought to enable you to punish the enemy
passing up the road in the direction of Harper's Ferry. Have your wits
about you, and do all you can to annoy the rebels should they advance
on you. Activity, energy, and decision must be used. You will not
abandon Harper's Ferry without defending it to the last extremity.
"JOHN E. WOOL,
"_Major-General_."[107]
The simple truth is, it was defended to the last extremity. The nearer the
approach of the succoring army, the more imperative would have been the
demand for action on the part of the Confederate columns, and had battle
been forced it could not possibly have resulted in any save one
way,--Confederate victory, and an overwhelming one at that.
The position was denounced as a "man-trap," and so it proved to Colonel
Miles and his eleven thousand troops, but it was in fact a far more
formidable trap for the Confederates, who to seize it sacrificed the
fruits of heavy war,--victory in the main battle of the campaign,--and
were forced to draw their crippled ranks to homeward defence. General
Jackson wanted it till he got possession; then gave it up. General
McClellan wanted to give it up before it was taken. After it had been
taken and given up, he reoccupied it. It was left severely alone in the
Gettysburg campaign,--an admission by both sides of its uselessness as a
_point d'appui_.
A word in closing about the chiefs opposed in this great campaign. General
Lee and General McClellan were both graduates of the United States
Military Academy at West Point. The former took the second honor of the
class of 1829, the latter the second honor of the class of 1846. Their
service in the United States army was as military engineers. In 1854 they
were both selected by Secretary of War Jefferson Davis for promotion to
the new cavalry regiments as lieutenant-colonel and captain respectively.
Their early opportunities, social and educational, were superior. They
studiously improved them in youth, and applied them with diligence in
after-life. Aspirations leading to the higher walks of social and
professional life seem to have been alike controlling forces in the
character and career of each. They were not unmindful that physical
development was important in support of mental improvement. In moral tone
and habits they may be called exemplars. In his service, General Lee's
pride was duty to his government and to the army under his command. He
loved admiration of the outside world, but these duties better. General
McClellan's ambition was not so limited.
In stature General Lee stood five feet ten inches, was of well-developed
muscular figure, as trim as a youth, and weighed one hundred and seventy
pounds. In features he was a model of manly beauty. His teeth were of
ivory whiteness; his mouth handsome and expressive of frankness, kindness,
and generosity. His nose and chin were full, regular, strong, and gave his
face force and character. 'Twas seldom that he allowed his mind to wander
to the days of his childhood, and talk of his father and his early
associates, but when he did, he was far more charming than he thought. As
a commander he was much of the Wellington "Up-and-at-'em" style. He found
it hard, the enemy in sight, to withhold his blows. With McClellan it was
more difficult to strike than to march for the enemy.
General McClellan was of short, stout figure, but was of soldierly
presence, graceful, and handsome-featured.
In their mounts neither of the great commanders lost anything of his
admirable presence. Both were masters of the science but not of the art of
war. Lee was successful in Virginia; McClellan in Maryland.
Unjust criticism has been passed upon the Confederate soldiers in the
Maryland campaign, based principally upon the great number of absentees.
To those who have spent their lives near the ranks of soldiers and learned
from experience that there is a limit to physical endurance, explanation
is not called for; to those who look upon the soldier as a machine, not
even needing oil to facilitate motive power, I will say, try to put
yourselves in the soldiers' places. Another point to be noted was, that in
the Confederate ranks there were thousands of soldiers who had been
wounded once, twice, and in some instances three times, who in any other
service would have been on the pension-rolls at their comfortable homes.
Sickness and weakness that creep into an army from irregular food,
collected in the stress of march, were no trifling impediments to the
maintenance of our ranks in vigorous form.
When, in mature judgment, the historian builds monuments of words for the
leaders of the campaign in Maryland, there will be flowers left for the
private soldiers, and for the private soldiers' graves.
The full significance of Sharpsburg to the Federal authorities lay in the
fact that they needed a victory on which to issue the Emancipation
Proclamation, which President Lincoln had prepared two months before and
had held in abeyance under advice of members of his Cabinet until the
Union arms should win a success. Although this battle was by no means so
complete a victory as the President wished, and he was sorely vexed with
General McClellan for not pushing it to completion, it was made the most
of as a victory, and his Emancipation Proclamation was issued on the 22d
of September, five days after the battle. This was one of the decisive
political events of the war, and at once put the great struggle outwardly
and openly upon the basis where it had before only rested by tacit and
covert understanding. If the Southern army had been carefully held in
hand, refreshed by easy marches and comfortable supplies, the proclamation
could not have found its place in history. On the other hand, the Southern
President would have been in Maryland at the head of his army with his
manifesto for peace and independence.