BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL.
Last Stand in the Great Retreat--Strength of McClellan's Position--The
Confederates make Poor Use of their Artillery--A Mistake and Defeat
for Lee's Army--The Campaign as a Whole a Great Success, but it should
have been far greater--McClellan's Retreat showed him well equipped in
the Science of War--Review of the Campaign--Jackson's and Magruder's
Misunderstanding--Moral Effect of the Gunboats on the James
River--"There should be a Gunboat in Every Family."
At Malvern Hill, hardly a league away from Frayser's, now left to silence
save for the moans of the unfortunate fallen, and standing south of the
line to Turkey Bridge, was Fitz-John Porter with the reserve artillery
massed, supported by the divisions of Sykes and Morell on the left and
Couch's on the right, from the Crew House to J. W. Binford's. The field
had been carefully selected and as judiciously guarded by well-posted
commands, holding the only way left which gave hope of successful passage
to cover under the gunboats. During the night of the 30th of June and
early morn of the 1st of July this position was reinforced by the
retreating Federals,--first by the Second and Third Corps, McCall's
division of the Fifth, and W. F. Smith's of the Sixth, and later by other
troops. Among the trains moving for the river was one of ten siege guns
under Colonel Tyler. These were dropped in Porter's rear and put in
battery, giving them a sweep of the avenues of approach and extensive rake
of the woodlands, and a great number of lighter batteries bristled upon
the brow and down the slopes of the hill. On either flank the plateau was
somewhat guarded by ravines and tangled marsh lands, while the front
approach was over ascending slopes, so broken as to make advancing
artillery combat slow and hazardous.
Early on the 1st, the columns under Huger, Jackson, and Magruder met at
the Charles City cross-roads, but the enemy had given up that position and
marched away, leaving to them the abandoned forest land. The
disappointment of the Confederate commander in the failure of combination
ordered for the 30th was noted by those who were near him, while the
composure with which it was borne indicated the grander elements of his
character, and drew those who knew his plans and purposes closer to him.
Jackson was ordered to follow on the direct line of the enemy's retreat;
Huger and Magruder marched to co-operate on his right; Longstreet's and A.
P. Hill's divisions were held in reserve. General Lee rode near Jackson's
column to view the army on that front. Feeling unwell and much fatigued,
he called me to temporary service near him. As he rode to the left, he
ordered me, with the columns of Huger and Magruder, to make reconnoissance
of the enemy's new position in that quarter, and to report of the
feasibility of aggressive battle.
I found some difference between General Lee's maps and General Magruder's
guides, but my authority was only for a reconnoissance, and posting the
divisions. An elevated point was found off the enemy's left front, as high
as the plateau upon which his army stood, from which a fair view was had
of his position and down along his front and the open as far as Jackson's
field, the latter just filing in by his batteries on much lower but open
ground.
Profound silence rested upon the field. Jackson's batteries, yet a little
beyond the point of range, marched to their places as quietly as if taking
positions for review. Porter's field seemed as little concerned at the
developments along his flank and front, indicating that there was to be no
waste of ammunition on that July day. His guns could not be counted, but
blocking them off by batteries there seemed to be eighty on his front,
besides the siege battery in rear. His guns were all trailed to
Jackson's front, thus presenting a flank towards the high point upon which
I stood. From the crest at this little ridge the ground dropped off
sharply some eighteen inches or two feet to a lower terrace, forming a
natural parapet and terre-plein for forty or sixty guns, massed. The
spacious open along Jackson's front appeared to offer a field for play of
a hundred or more guns, and although his lower ground was not inviting of
combat even by a hundred guns, it was yet judged that advancing combat by
eighty or a hundred guns, in combination with the forty-gun battery of
position, might justify assault, and the tremendous game at issue called
for adventure.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL]
I thought it probable that Porter's batteries, under the cross-fire of the
Confederates thus posted on his left and front, could be thrown into
disorder, and thus make way for combined assaults of the infantry. I so
reported, and General Lee ordered disposition accordingly, sending the
pioneer corps out to cut a road for the right batteries of position.
I suggested position to Magruder for his division, but he insisted that
the Quaker road was not correctly located on General Lee's maps, so I left
that part of the order to be looked after by General Lee's recognized
staff. General Chilton, chief of staff, was then sent by General Lee to
assist General Magruder in posting the troops, and I was ordered back to
locate the batteries.
But eight guns came in proper time and were posted. These General Magruder
proposed to supplement by thirty of his own under Colonel S. D. Lee, to be
reinforced by the others as they came up. With this understanding I
returned to head-quarters, made my report, and was permitted to go back to
my command proper.
The most convenient point for observing the effect of the artillery fire
was occupied by General Armistead's brigade. That officer was designated
by General Lee to give notice, if the combat was successful, by advancing
his brigade, under the shouts of infantry charge, as the signal for
general assault.
The eight guns for the right battery were all that got into position on
time, and Jackson failed to open fire by advancing all of the batteries
along his front, so that the practice from those quarters was not forcibly
executed. When the eight guns finally opened, Porter shifted his aim from
his proper front, which Jackson failed to combat, and put in the fire of
forty guns against the eight-gun battery of our right. The gunboat
batteries also came into that practice, but it was found that they damaged
friends almost as much as the enemy, and were ordered to discontinue.
Jackson's cross-fire, feeble at best and at long range, was finally drawn
off by other batteries far on the enemy's right, so that the eight guns
were soon piled a heterogeneous mass of caissons, guns, limbers, and
horses. Some other batteries got into action at the same point, eight or
ten at a time, but suffered like disaster.
So the plan for battle and order of the day were given over by the
Confederate commander, who sent for me to ride with him over to his left
in search of a route by which the enemy's right might be turned. This
seemed feasible under the hasty reconnoissance, and he ordered the
reserves on that move. As we started on the march the noise of battle
reached us and the march was arrested. Under the impression that his
officers realized the failure and abandonment of his original plan,
General Lee failed to issue orders specifically recalling the appointed
battle.
It seems that just as the troops marched to the left under the last order,
information was received by some of the officers at the front that the
enemy was getting away from us.
To ascertain as to this matter, and anxious to atone for lost
opportunities of the day before, part of the troops near our right moved
forward, and soon encountered the enemy's infantry, as well as the
formidable artillery. This impact burst into the noise of battle, and was
taken as the signal for assault under the original order of the day. From
the right to the left, as far as and including D. H. Hill's division, the
Confederates attacked in splendid style, making repeated brave charges,
but they were as firmly met by the enemy, and their dead and wounded were
mingled on the same lines. The Confederate ranks thinning rapidly,
Magruder called on me for reinforcements, and Jackson was sent to
reinforce D. H. Hill's left, but night closed in upon us before the
reinforcements could get into action.
As the order for battle had been given about noon, and had been abandoned
some hours before the opening, upon receiving Magruder's call, I supposed
the conflict had been brought on by the enemy to force our right back and
better clear the route of his retreat. I ordered A. P. Hill direct to
Magruder, and my own division for support on our extreme right. The result
of the battle was a repulse of the Confederates along the entire line and
the sacrifice of several thousand brave officers and men, though some of
our troops held ground nearer the enemy than at the onset of the battle.
During the night the enemy resumed his march for the river, leaving his
dead, some of his wounded, and exhibiting other marks of the precipitate
character of his retreat.
Stuart's cavalry had been recalled from north of the Chickahominy on the
30th to join us on the south side, and reached Jackson's left Tuesday
night after the battle.
The morning of the 2d opened heavy and oppressive. The storm front of
bursting cannon and bristling bayonets was changed to a wide sweep of
heavy clouds that covered the dead that had grappled and fallen together
on Malvern Hill. The enemy was gone, and reached his lodgement at
Harrison's Landing on James River, the old seat of that family which has
given our country two Presidents. Jackson stood on the direct route of
the enemy's retreat, and was ordered to follow it; Magruder's and Huger's
commands to follow Jackson. General Lee rode with them. D. H. Hill's
division was left to care for the wounded and dead of Malvern Hill. To
obviate pressure upon a single track, the reserve divisions were ordered
by Nance's Store, but the heavy clouds soon began to let down a pelting
rain that became more severe and delayed all movements.
The reports of Jackson and Stuart of the operations of the 3d are
conflicting. The former claimed that he was near the landing on the
morning of the 3d, and advanced his line of skirmishers. The latter
reported that he found during the night of the 2d a fine position on
Erlington Heights, from which the enemy could be shelled out of his new
position by artillery; that he occupied and held that position by a
squadron and howitzer until driven from it by the enemy at two o'clock in
the afternoon of the 3d; that he reported of that position to Generals Lee
and Jackson during the night of the 2d. Other accounts go with that of
Stuart. It seems that the "foot cavalry"[38] and the reserve divisions met
at the landing late in the afternoon of the 3d. The troops from the Valley
district had not been engaged in the battles of the march except that of
Gaines's Mill.
At daylight of the 4th I rode to the front, and ordered General Jackson to
drive in the enemy's skirmishers and prepare to attack. D. R. Jones's
division of Magruder's command, coming up, was ordered on Jackson's left,
A. P. Hill's on his right; my own division to support Jackson's direct
move for Erlington Heights. After pushing the skirmish line back, Jackson
reported his troops not in condition for the work, and asked delay until
the commanding general was up. As General Lee was reported near, attack
was delayed, and a note was sent asking him to ride forward as soon as
convenient. He rode up in about half an hour, and, after mature
deliberation, decided that the attack should not be made. He reinforced
his cavalry and horse artillery by a number of his choicest field
batteries, and ordered General Stuart to use them against the enemy's
transports on the lower James. This expedition did some damage, but the
superior batteries of the gun-boats, convoys of the transports, enabled
them to maintain safe-conduct along the line of supplies and
reinforcements. On the 8th he withdrew his army to points more convenient
to supplies, and towards the open highway to Washington City.
Passing in critical review the events of the campaign, they fail to
disclose a flaw as it was projected by the Confederate chief. It even
opened up grander possibilities than came within his most hopeful
anticipations at the period of projection.
The Union commander left his Fifth Corps engaged at Beaver Dam Creek while
Jackson's column marched by it as far as Hundley's Corner and went into
camp. The object and instructions of Jackson's advanced echelon were to
have him file in against any force that he might pass and attack it in
flank and rear. If, instead of going into camp at Hundley's Corner on the
afternoon of the 26th of June, he had filed to his right behind the Fifth
Corps, he would have had it surrounded by fifty thousand men beyond the
reach of succor.
He was troubled by conflicting orders. The general order for the campaign
and verbal instructions were intended to supersede all others, but General
Lee's letter of the 11th was not recalled, so he marched with the two
orders in his pocket, which made not a little trouble.
Before Jackson's army was called from the Valley, it was reinforced and
organized for our working column. On the morning of the 27th of June it
was further augmented by the division under D. H. Hill and Stuart's
cavalry. His line of march during the day led him around Porter's position
near Gaines's Mill to the enemy's right, the most favorable point for
attack. He partially engaged by D. H. Hill's division, then withdrew it,
and posted his troops in a position selected to catch the Federals in
their flight from A. P. Hill's division. Finally, when Porter's defence
developed too much strength for A. P. Hill, he deployed into line of
battle from left to right, overspreading the enemy's entire front.
On the morning of the 28th of June, General Lee thought to draw McClellan
out from his works, force him to defend his base on the Pamunkey, and to
so cripple him on his retreat as to warrant strong detachments from his
army in the direction of Washington, and thus force him to defend his own
capital.
Before marching to the opening of the campaign, he ordered a detachment of
cavalry to the south side of White Oak Swamp, under careful watch for the
enemy's movements by vedettes, even as far as Chickahominy River, so that
on the night of the 27th he had a cordon of troops and vedettes extending
completely around McClellan's army. Notwithstanding precautions so
carefully laid, McClellan started to march for his new base on the night
of the 27th, continued his preparations and movements through the day and
night of the 28th, and the first reliable information of the move towards
James River came from Major Meade and Lieutenant Johnson, engineers. The
information, though coming from a source least looked for, was more than
gratifying to General Lee, for he thought the enemy had essayed a move not
practicable; that General McClellan's army was in his power and must be
our prize, never to reach the new base.
Just as he was mapping out orders of pursuit, a staff-officer of General
Magruder's came from the other side of the river to report the Federal
army in retreat, and that General Magruder was preparing to assault the
fort in his immediate front. General Lee said,--
"My compliments to General Magruder, and ask him not to hurt my young
friends, Major Meade and Lieutenant Johnson, who are occupying that
fort."
Uniformly military, but courteous in his bearing, it was very rare that he
became facetious when on parade service, but anticipations that General
McClellan was soon to be his prisoner excused the giving way to impulse
born of this unexpected adventure.
Within an hour his troops on the east side were on the march for their
crossings of the Chickahominy. He then rode across, gave orders to General
Magruder, rode with him some distance, and repeated the orders before
leaving him.
Following up the rear-guard, General Magruder came upon it in force at
Savage Station. The Second Corps and Franklin's division under W. F. Smith
of the Sixth, under General Sumner, were posted there to cover the
retreat. Magruder planned battling with his own six brigades against their
front, two brigades of Huger's division to come on the enemy's left down
the Williamsburg road, Jackson's twelve or fifteen brigades to attack
their right. But when Magruder thought his arrangements complete, he
received a message from General Huger "that his brigades would be
withdrawn."[39]
Then other information not anticipated came to him,--viz., that General
Jones, commanding on Magruder's left, called for co-operation in that
quarter. General Jackson sent word in reply that "he had other important
duty to perform."
Referring to Jackson's orders of the 29th, General Lee wrote General
Magruder:
"HEAD-QUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
"June 29, 1862.
"MAJOR-GENERAL J. B. MAGRUDER,
"_Commanding Division_:
"GENERAL,--I regret much that you have made so little progress to-day
in pursuit of the enemy. In order to reap the fruits of our victory
the pursuit should be most vigorous. I must urge you, then, again to
press on his rear rapidly and steadily. We must lose no time, or he
will escape us entirely.
"Very respectfully yours, etc.,
"R. E. LEE,
"_General_.
"P.S.--Since the order was written, I learn from Major Taylor that you
are under the impression that General Jackson has been ordered not to
support you. On the contrary, he has been directed to do so, and to
push the pursuit vigorously."[40]
Sumner, besides his greater force, having some advantage from the
earthworks previously constructed, repulsed Magruder's attack, and the
affair of cross-purposes failed of effect.
If Jackson could have joined against the right of Sumner with his
brigades, the latter could have been dislodged, the Confederates passing
the swamp with him, which would have marked the beginning of the end. The
occasion was especially propitious, for Heintzelman's corps, that had been
designated as part of the rear-guard with Sumner and Franklin, through
some misconception had marched over the swamp, to camp near Charles City
cross-roads, leaving easy work for Jackson and Magruder.
When, on the forenoon of the 30th, Jackson found his way across the swamp
blocked by Franklin, he had time to march to the head of and across it to
the Charles City road in season for the engagement contemplated at
Frayser's Farm, the distance being about four miles. General Wright, of
Huger's division, marched his brigade from the head of the swamp to
Jackson's line at the bridge, and returned, making several halts and
crossings to reconnoitre.
But little remains to be said of the engagements at Frayser's Farm and
Malvern Hill. The former was a halting failure of combination of forces;
the latter an accident resulting from the armies standing close abreast
many hours. Malvern Hill left out, the two armies would have mingled their
lines between that and Westover during the 3d and 4th of July.
The failure of concert of action by the Confederates should not discount
the conduct of McClellan's masterly retreat. In the emergency he showed
himself well equipped in the science of war, and prepared to cross swords
with his able adversary. At the opening of the campaign he had in hand one
hundred and five thousand men. General Lee's returns were not accurately
made, but a fair estimate puts his numbers between eighty and eighty-five
thousand.
The losses of the campaign were, on the Union side, 15,249; on the
Confederate side, greater; in the absence of complete returns, it is fair
to say that they were from 18,000 to 19,000. Up to the time of Malvern
Hill the casualties were about equally divided between the two armies, but
in that battle the Confederates lost not far from 5000 men, and the
Federals not more than one-third that number.
Upon reaching the gunboats, General McClellan's power was about doubled.
Although fire from the gun-boats was not very effective against a land
battle, the moral effect of fighting batteries that could not be reached
was most powerful. It was reported on the Confederate side that General
McClellan, on boarding one of the boats, where he spent most of the day of
battle, said, "There should be a gunboat in every family."
Some critics say that McClellan should have taken Richmond during the
campaign. The great Napoleon would have done so after the disaster at
Malvern Hill with his regularly organized army of veterans. They say, too,
that Lee should have captured McClellan and his army. So thought General
Lee, but some of his leaders were working at cross-purposes, and did not
have that close attention that the times called for.
We may now consider the probable result of the plan mapped out and ordered
by General Lee in his letter of June 11th to General Jackson had it been
followed,--_i.e._, Jackson to march down the right bank of the Pamunkey
with his troops from the Valley district and attack McClellan's rear east
of the Chickahominy, while Lee attacked from the Richmond side with his
army. On the Richmond side, McClellan had four army corps, well fortified,
supported by his powerful artillery. The battle of Gaines's Mill, where
the troops from the Valley were reinforced by four of Lee's choice
divisions and most of his cavalry,--more than doubling Jackson's
column,--may be significant of the result of Jackson's attack on that side
if it had been made as ordered. The battle of Malvern Hill, from an open
field, may tell the result of an attack upon the four corps in their
fortified position had the attack been made upon them from the Richmond
front.