THE INDIANS AND THE BORDER WARFARE OF THE REVOLUTION.
BY ANDREW McFARLAND DAVIS,
_American Antiquarian Society._
THE peace which followed the quelling of the Pontiac war gave
opportunities for settlements to be pushed westward. The population
on the border, rendered lawless by environment, was not likely to
observe treaties. Fear of the Indians was more potent to restrain
these restless men than dread of punishment by colonial authorities.
Conflicts of colonial jurisdiction and disputed land claims added to
the chronic confusion of the situation.
It needed all the tact and discretion of which that remarkable man,
Sir William Johnson, was master to prevent outbreaks, and the danger
was not over until the boundaries were adjusted with the Six Nations
and other Indians, at Fort Stanwix, in 1768. There was far more cause
for complaint against the English on the part of the tribes whom Sir
William was able to control than on the part of the Senecas, who, in
September, 1763, had surprised and scalped a working party with their
guard. Encroachment upon their lands had also irritated the Mohawks,
who particularly resented an attempt of a Connecticut company to
colonize the valley of the Susquehanna. Early in the spring of 1763,
the Connecticut company sought to secure Sir William's influence with
the Indians in quieting the company's title, which was based upon the
Connecticut charter and upon alleged Indian deeds. The company failed
in this, as well as in an attempt to negotiate with the confederacy.
The Indians, instead of granting a deed, sent to Connecticut a
delegation of Mohawks, accompanied by Guy Johnson, to represent to
the governor of that colony the peril with which further attempts
at colonization would be attended.[1260] These efforts arrested the
movements of the company, and for the time immigration was checked.
They were not early enough, however, to prevent one of those horrible
attacks which stand out in our memories as types of Indian warfare
and which in the minds of many readers obscure all other conceptions
of Indian character. A number of families had already settled in this
region, under the auspices of the Connecticut company, and had built
themselves homes near the present site of Wilkesbarré. On October 15,
1763, they were suddenly attacked by Indians, and one woman and nine
men were killed and scalped. The rest of the inhabitants fled to the
mountains, and such as did not perish worked their way through the
wilderness to the nearest settlements. Their villages were destroyed,
their cattle killed, and their crops laid waste. Avenging expeditions
were promptly organized in Pennsylvania. One marched to the Delaware
town at Wyoming, but found it deserted. Another laid waste the Delaware
and Munsee towns on the west branch of the Susquehanna.
The Moravian Indians at Wyoming, who had taken no part in the massacre
of the Connecticut settlers, removed for safety to Gnadenhütten,
whence they were taken to Philadelphia for greater security. At
Paxton, Pennsylvania, the inhabitants assembled secretly, and attacked
a settlement of the harmless Conestogoes. The cause for this wicked
slaughter has never been clearly explained,[1261] but the subsequent
memorials of the rioters seem to indicate that it was part of a
general plan to exterminate the Indians. Whatever the motive, popular
approval was strong enough to shield the perpetrators of such shameless
deeds.[1262] The entire band of the Conestogoes was exterminated,[1263]
and their town was destroyed. The first attack was made on them on the
night of the 14th of December, when this band of murderers surrounding
the town, killed all who happened to be there. Those Indians who were
absent took refuge in Lancaster, where they were lodged in a public
building, spoken of by some as the workhouse, by some as the jail. On
the 27th, their enemies followed them to this refuge, and in cold blood
slaughtered them all, men, women, and children, indiscriminately.
The Moravian Indians, who had taken refuge at Philadelphia, were next
threatened by the rioters, who marched towards that place with the
avowed intention of killing them also. The provincial authorities
appealed to General Gage for help, but before his reply reached
them they sought to throw the Indians upon New York for protection.
It happened that a company of regulars was about to march from
Philadelphia for New York, and under their escort the Indians were
dispatched, with intention to place them under charge of Sir William
Johnson. The New York authorities refused, however, to permit the
Indians to enter that province. Meantime General Gage placed troops
at the disposal of Governor Penn. The Indians were conducted back to
Philadelphia, and orders were given to repel by force any attack. The
rioters again approached Philadelphia, but were dissuaded from attack,
and Pennsylvania was spared the shame of further atrocities by the
"Paxton Boys."
After this excitement was over the labors of Sir William Johnson to
prevent renewed conflict were still constant. He complained, in his
correspondence,[1264] of murders, robberies, and encroachments on
the rights and possessions of the natives. The frontier inhabitants,
according to him, thought themselves at liberty to make settlements
where they pleased. He lost heart, while on the other hand the settlers
openly bade defiance to authority. In 1766 he wrote: "Murders are now
daily committed on the frontiers, and I fear that an Indian war is
inevitable." In January, 1767, he announced that Colonel Cresap, of
Maryland, himself held a treaty some time during the last year with
several warriors of the Six Nations, who passed that way, and who were
persuaded to grant to him a considerable tract of land down the Ohio
toward Green-Brier. With prophetic instinct, Sir William added: "If
this be true, it will be productive of dangerous consequences." A large
part of Johnson's time was spent in protecting the Indians from such
fraudulent conveyances of their land as were made through transfers
where there was but a shadow of title, through forgeries, and through
deeds executed without proper formalities, under circumstances which
would prevent recognition of the transaction by the tribes. Many
deeds, which upon the face seemed properly executed, were secured from
the signers when they were so completely intoxicated that they were
ignorant what they were doing. Others conveyed by metes and bounds an
extent of territory far exceeding the intention of the grantors. No
transfer of land made by a band of warriors, on the war-path or on a
hunting expedition, would have been recognized by the confederacy. Sir
William himself said: "A sachem of each tribe is a necessary party to a
fair conveyance, and such sachem affixes the mark of the tribe thereto,
as a public seal of a corporation." The title to the land was supposed
to be in all. Even the women had a voice in transfers by bargain and
sale.[1265] It was one of the principal occupations of Sir William
Johnson's life to adjust difficulties arising out of transfers, such as
the one to Cresap, of which he had heard, and in which he saw the seeds
of future trouble, if it should prove to be true. In his review of the
trade and affairs of the Indians in the northern district of America,
he recapitulates the wrongs of the Indian.[1266]
Life in the midst of such impending dangers bred contempt for
authority, even on the part of men who were well disposed. The strong
arm of the government was but feebly felt in the distant bottoms in the
western parts of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, which settlers
were beginning to appropriate to their own use. The inhabitants of
the frontiers were a law unto themselves, and sometimes unto the
authorities. Men who diligently read their Bibles and pondered over
the teachings of the gospels could tear scalps from the heads of
Indians. The government was powerless to protect the frontiers except
through the agency of volunteers, and they in turn were able at any
moment seriously to complicate the situation. In the organization of
companies of rangers the weakness of the government was exposed, and
through them the independence of the settlers was developed. Such
companies frequently adopted Indian costumes, painted their faces,
and manœuvred by Indian tactics. The habits of the Indian more than
the civilization they had left, influenced their modes of life. They
attacked for revenge, and were barbarous because the savages were. In
the case of the Indians such methods in warfare came by inheritance.
They were modified somewhat by the spirit of the missionaries, and
however cruel they may have been, they were at any rate absolutely free
from assaults on woman's chastity. In the case of the settlers, the
promptings of civilization were disregarded, and it would seem as if
the system of bounties for scalps had taught them to regard the Indian
as on the level of a brute. Nevertheless, the rule had exceptions; and
it would not be just to paint all the settlers along the borders in
these repulsive colors, or to believe that there was a universal desire
for the extermination of the Indians.
[Illustration:
NOTE.—This map was found in MS. among a collection of maps and charts
which were presented to the New York State library by Obadiah Rich, of
London. It had been sent to Lord Hillsborough in 1771, accompanying a
memorial concerning the Iroquois, prepared by the Rev. Charles Inglis,
of Trinity Church, New York city, who had endeavored to christianize
them. This paper was subsequently recovered from the descendants of
Dr. Inglis in Nova Scotia, and is printed in the _Doc. Hist. N. Y._
(quarto), iv. p. 661, accompanied by an engraved copy of Johnson's
map, of which a reduction is given herewith. The map is also given in
Pearson's _Schenectady Patent_, 1883, p. 433; in Hough's edition of
Pouchot, ii. 148.
In _N. Y. Col. Docs._, viii. 136, Guy Johnson's map, showing the line
fixed at Fort Stanwix, Nov., 1768, is given as copied from the original
in Sir William Johnson's letter, Nov. 18, 1768, to Hillsborough,
preserved in the State Paper Office. In _Ibid._ viii. 31, is a copy of
the map annexed to the Report and Representation of the Board of Trade,
March 7, 1768, showing the line of the bounds with the Indians. Cf. on
this line _Doc. Hist. N. Y._, i. 587; _N. Y. Col. Docs._, viii. 110;
_New Jersey Archives_, x. 55, 95; Mill's _Bounds of Ontario_, p. 21;
_Olden Time_, i. 399; Schweinitz's _Zeisberger_, ch. xviii.; _View of
the title to Indiana_ (1776; see Hildeburn's _Bibliog._, no. 3,490).
Respecting the territory of the Oneidas, see _Magazine of American
History_, Oct., 1885, p. 387, where the accuracy of the map in Morgan's
_League of the Iroquois_ is questioned.—ED.]
This hazardous contact of Indian and border settler stretched along a
doubtful line which extended from Oneida Lake to the central part of
the valley of the Ohio. In 1768 the boundaries were adjusted at Fort
Stanwix, between representatives of the English government, on the one
part, and the Six Nations, the Delawares, the Shawanese, the Mingoes
of Ohio, and other dependent tribes, on the other. A deed of the land
to the east and south of a line which ran from a point just west of
Fort Stanwix south to the Susquehanna, thence up the West Branch and
across to Kittanning on the Alleghany, thence down that river and the
Ohio to the mouth of the Tennessee, was then duly executed to the king
of England. An exception from its terms was made of the land occupied
by the Mohawks, whose settlements were all to the east of the agreed
boundary line. The hunting-grounds comprised within the limits of
the States of Kentucky and Tennessee were claimed by the Six Nations
as conquered territory, and they paid no regard to the claims of the
Cherokees, who had arranged a boundary with Stuart, the Indian agent,
to a part at least of the same region, the northern termination of
which was the mouth of the Kanawha River. It was understood by the
Indians that no white man was to settle to the west of the line agreed
upon.[1267]
The far-reaching influence of the Indian superintendents restrained
this aboriginal population from violent outbreak from 1764 until
the collision at Point Pleasant, Virginia, in 1774. This was
undoubtedly precipitated by atrocities committed upon the Indians in
the Ohio Valley, near Wheeling. Underlying the immediate causes for
irritation during this period were reasons for complaint, revealed
in the correspondence of Sir William Johnson, which would probably
have led to warfare at an early date. Among these was the influx of
settlers upon the hunting-grounds of the Indians, where, regardless
of treaties, the land across the Ohio was parcelled out in "tomahawk
improvements", as the squatter rights of the day were denominated.
These proceedings attracted the attention of General Gage, and on the
8th of August, 1772, he issued a proclamation, calling attention to
the fact that some persons had "undertaken to make settlements beyond
the boundaries fixed by treaties made with the Indian nations", "where
they lead a wandering life, without government and without laws",
"causing infinite disturbance." Such persons were ordered to "quit
these countries instantly and without delay, and to retire at their
choice into some one of the colonies of his majesty." The peace which
was negotiated by Lord Dunmore brought but little quiet to the settlers
on the border. Indian raids were frequent, and the details of their
horrors are sickening, but the loss of life by these raids has been
greatly exaggerated. The Indians seldom ventured beyond the region
which was scantily peopled. The watchfulness of the settlers, and their
promptness to assemble and pursue, averted many disasters. At such a
time Virginia and Pennsylvania were wrangling over the right to grant
patents for land, the settlement of which had so much to do with the
uneasiness of the Indians.[1268]
In New York, settlements were more compact. Rights of territory were
better defined and better understood. Indian lands had been better
protected there from direct invasion and from fraudulent transfer.
Danger from trespass was better appreciated. The Indians themselves,
being under the personal oversight of their superintendent, were
better controlled. His immediate presence made him more useful in the
adjustment of disputes without resort to the tomahawk. The frontier
patriots of Tryon County, "unlike the rude inhabitants of most frontier
settlements", are stated by a careful student of the records to have
been "scrupulous in their devotion to the supremacy of the laws." The
confederacy of the Six Nations, as a whole, had not participated in the
events in the valley of the Ohio, but they shared with their dependants
and allies in the uneasiness caused by such aggressions upon Indian
territory. Some of their warriors had taken part in the Virginia war,
and the "temper of the whole Indian race, with the exception of the
Oneidas, was soured by these occurrences of the year 1774." The first
official labors of importance which devolved upon Colonel Guy Johnson,
who, after the death of Sir William Johnson in 1774, had been appointed
to the office of superintendent, were to check the resentment of the
Six Nations.[1269] His success in those labors showed that he had
inherited, by virtue of his office, some of the respect and affection
which the natives had lavished upon his predecessor.
Such was the condition of affairs when Washington took command of
the army, in July, 1775, with instructions not to disband any of the
forces already raised, until further directions from Congress. It is
not probable that all the members of the Congress were aware of the
full meaning of these instructions. There were among the men whom
Washington was thus instructed not to discharge a number of Indians
regularly enlisted as minute-men. Had the question of employing
Indians been submitted to Congress at that time, it would probably
have been answered in the negative; but it had already been settled by
the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts Bay when they accepted the
services of Indians.[1270]
On the first day of April, 1775, the Committee on the State of
the Province reported to that congress a resolve beginning with
these words: "Whereas a number of Indians, natives of the town of
Stockbridge, have enlisted as minute-men." A committee was next
appointed to draft a letter to the Rev. Mr. Kirkland,[1271] and to
frame an address to the chief of the Mohawk tribes. The letter requests
Mr. Kirkland to use his influence with the Six Nations "to join with
us in the defence of our rights;" but if he could not "prevail with
them to take an active part in this glorious cause", he was "at least
to engage them to stand neuter." The address calls upon the Indians to
"whet their hatchet, and be prepared to defend our liberties and lives."
It is evident that the Stockbridge Indians were further
importuned,[1272] for on the 11th of April their chief sachem answered
a communication from the President of the Provincial Congress (the
contents of which can only be conjectured) by offering to visit the
Six Nations and find out how they stood. "If I find that they are
against you", he said, "I will try and turn their minds."... "One thing
I ask of you, if you send for me to fight, that you will let me fight
in my own Indian way." The Massachusetts Congress also tried to draw
recruits from the Indians of Nova Scotia, and addressed them on the
15th of May, 1775,[1273] as their "friends and good brothers;" adding
as an inducement for their enlistment that "the Indians at Stockbridge
all join with us, and some of their men have enlisted as soldiers."
Captain John Lane was sent down among these Eastern Indians to raise
one company of their men, "to join with us in the war with your and
our enemies." Nothing, however, resulted from this, except the arrival
in June of Captain Lane with one chief and three young men, and at a
later date the execution of a barren treaty.[1274] In addition to these
efforts put forth by the Provincial Congress, attempts were early made
in the same direction by provincial officers;[1275] and thus by general
or special effort at the very beginning of the war, the Americans
secured the services of such Indians as were willing to enlist, and the
English followed so close in their steps as to confound, to the casual
observer of their mutual criminations, the evidence of priority. The
Indians engaged upon the American side produced no material influence
upon military movements. Their presence in camp has been ignored by
many writers. The responsibility for the intention is the same as if
the effort had been successful. It must, however, be remembered that
small bodies of Indians, serving with whites, were controllable and
easily restrained from excesses. After the evacuation of Boston, the
tide of events changed the field of war, and altered the composition of
the troops. The army began to assume a national aspect. The voice of
Massachusetts was no longer pre-eminent in military affairs.
The Continental Congress contained representatives of other colonies
who keenly felt the dangers from the use of Indians by the enemy.
The expressions of opinion in that body were, therefore, much more
conservative than in the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts Bay. On
the 18th of May it appears by the _Journals_ that indubitable evidence
of a design formed by the British ministry of making an invasion
had been received. In June, according to the _Secret Journals_,
Governor Carleton was making preparation to invade the colonies, and
was "instigating the Indian nations to take up the hatchet against
them." On the 30th the Committee on Indian Affairs was instructed "to
prepare proper talks to the several tribes of Indians for engaging the
continuance of their friendship to us, and neutrality in our present
unhappy dispute with Great Britain." On the 1st of July there is a hint
of a possible change of position shown in the passage of a resolution,
"that in case any agent of the ministry shall induce any Indian tribes,
or any of them, to commit actual hostilities against these colonies, or
to enter into an offensive alliance with the British troops, thereupon
the colonies ought to avail themselves of an alliance with such Indian
nations as will enter into the same, to oppose such British troops
and their allies." The statement that Carleton was instigating the
Indians to "fall upon us" was repeated July 6th.[1276] On July 12th the
Committee on Indian Affairs recommended that the country be divided
into three Indian departments, and that commissioners be appointed,
with power to "treat with the Indians in their respective departments,
in the name and on behalf of the United Colonies, in order to preserve
peace and friendship with the said Indians, and to prevent their taking
any part in the present commotion." This recommendation was adopted.
On July 13th, a formal speech was addressed to the Six Confederate
Nations, urging them to keep peace. On the 17th the commissioners were
recommended to employ Mr. Kirkland, in order to secure the friendship
of the Indians and continue them in a state of neutrality. On July 21st
a plan of confederation was submitted to Congress by Franklin, in which
"a perpetual alliance, offensive and defensive", was proposed, "to
be entered into as soon as may be with the Six Nations." On December
2d it was resolved that the Indians of the St. Francis, Penobscot,
Stockbridge, and St. John and other tribes may be called on in case of
real necessity, and that giving them presents is suitable and proper.
On March 8, 1776, the growing disposition to make use of Indians found
expression in a resolve "that Indians be not employed as soldiers in
the armies of the United Colonies, before the tribes to which they
belong shall, in a national council, held in the customary manner, have
consented thereto, nor then without express approbation of Congress."
On May 25th the opposition seems to have been completely overcome, when
Congress resolved "that it is highly expedient to engage the Indians
in the service of the United Colonies."[1277] On June 3d authority
was conferred upon General Washington to employ in Canada a number
of Indians, not exceeding two thousand; and on the 6th instructions
were given to the standing Committee on Indian Affairs to devise
ways and means for carrying into effect the resolution of the 3d.
Meantime the news of the disaster at the Cedars was received, and its
circumstances impelled Congress to special efforts in behalf of the
colonies. On June 14th the commissioners of the Northern Department
were instructed to "engage the Six Nations in our interest, on the
best terms that can be procured." On the 17th, the restriction in the
resolution of the 3d, which limited to Canada the use of the Indians
to be raised, was removed, and the general was permitted to employ
them in any place where he should judge they would be most useful.
He was further authorized "to offer a reward of one hundred dollars
for every commissioned officer, and thirty dollars for every private
soldier of the king's troops, that they should take prisoners in the
Indian country, or on the frontiers of these colonies." The days of
irresolution were over. Congress was now irrevocably committed to
the proposition of permitting the general commanding the armies to
take what advantage he could of Indian auxiliaries, and to offer them
bounties for prisoners. The next utterance of Congress on this subject
is to be found in the Declaration of Independence, in which the king
is arraigned because "he has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants
of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of
warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and
conditions." This was closely followed by a resolution on July 8th,
authorizing Washington to call forth and engage the Indians of the St.
John, Nova Scotia, and Penobscot tribes. The address to the people of
Great Britain was adopted the same day. The address to the people of
Ireland, in which it is asserted that "the wild and barbarous savages
of the wilderness have been solicited by gifts to take up the hatchet
against us, and instigated to deluge our settlements with the blood of
defenceless women and children", was agreed to July 28, 1776.[1278]
After this, the acts and resolutions of Congress were consistent with
the resolution in which they declared that it was highly expedient
to employ the Indians. Instructions were given from time to time to
secure the greatest advantage out of the services of the Indians, in
behalf of the country which was now struggling for independence; and
in 1779 it was resolved that twelve blank commissions be furnished the
commissioners of the Northern Department for the appointment of as many
Indians, the name and the rank of each commission to be filled at the
discretion of the commissioners.[1279]
The English approached the question differently; and there can be
but little doubt that the proposition to use Indian warriors was
more shocking to the cultivated Englishman, who was in no danger
from their barbarous excesses, than to the American of corresponding
attainments, whose life had been spent in close contact with men
to whom such incidents had been every-day experiences. The fierce
invectives of Chatham,[1280] in 1777, against the ministry for having
enlisted the services of Indians, were founded on a proper estimate of
the responsibilities of an invading army. Lord North recognized this
distinction when, in 1775, he said that Carleton raised Indians only
for purposes of defence. Military men knew that the natives, who had
taken part in every war in America between the French and the English,
must inevitably be drawn into any protracted contest between Great
Britain and the colonies. It could be foreseen that, if the English
retained Canada and Detroit, operations would be conducted by way of
Lake Champlain, Oswego, and Detroit, which would involve the use of
Indian territory. If any inference could be drawn from the past, no
armed occupation of strategic positions within Indian territory, and
no use of the rivers and natural highways of the back country for
military purposes during a time of actual war, could be made without
collision with the natives, unless such occupation and use was by their
consent. Such consent could only be gained by alliance. General Gage
and Lord Dunmore, both in close contact with the situation, placed
their opinions on record soon after hostilities broke out. On June,
12, 1775, Gage wrote to Lord Dartmouth: "I hear that the rebels, after
surprising Ticonderoga, made incursions and commenced hostilities upon
the frontier of the province of Quebec, which will justify General
Carleton to raise bodies of Canadians and Indians to attack them in
return; and we need not be tender of calling on the savages, as the
rebels here have shown us the example, by bringing as many Indians
down here as they could collect." Lord Dunmore, whose indiscretions
and brutality were so serviceable in stamping out loyalty among men of
wealth and intelligence in Virginia, sought no justification in the
example of the rebels. He wrote to the Earl of Dartmouth, on May 1st,
that he hoped "to be able to collect from among Indians, negroes, and
other persons a force sufficient, if not to subdue rebellion, at least
to defend government;" and in the fall of the same year he endeavored
to carry out his policy.[1281] Carleton was apparently averse to the
employment of Indians in aggressive movements. At any rate, he took
refuge behind his orders, which did not permit him "to act out of the
line of the province."
Colonel Guy Johnson was the object of much suspicion during the
months of May and June, 1775. He repudiated with vigor the position
which these suspicions attributed to him, and said that he could not
sufficiently express his surprise at those who had, either through
malice or ignorance, misconstrued his intentions, and supposed him
capable of setting Indians on the peaceable inhabitants of Tryon
County. He was a servant of the king and an ardent loyalist. From the
mere performance of his official duties he was necessarily an object
of suspicion to the Americans. He was the person who furnished the
natives with supplies. "We get our things from the superintendent.
If our ammunition is stopped we shall distrust you", said an Indian
speaker to the delegates from Albany and Tryon counties. These supplies
were furnished by the king to those whom he termed his allies. It was
evident that the king would not continue to furnish supplies, if their
only effect was to keep the neighboring Indians on good terms with
colonists who, while claiming to be loyal subjects, were actually in
arms against his government. As the distributer of supplies, the safety
of the superintendent was of great importance to the natives, and a
rumor that the "Bostonians" contemplated seizing his person[1282]
caused the Indians much alarm. Whether Johnson believed this rumor or
not, he fortified his house. This act, as well as his sudden removal
to Fort Stanwix, and thence to Oswego,—at both of which places he
held conferences with Indians,—increased the numbers who doubted the
sincerity of his statements. Yet even here, after these suspicious
movements, he protested to the Provincial Congress of New York against
the charges brought against him: "I trust I shall always manifest more
humanity than to promote the destruction of the innocent inhabitants of
a colony to which I have been always warmly attached." The conference
at Oswego caused alarm to the inhabitants of Tryon County, and the air
was filled with rumors of Indian invasion. Colonel Johnson reported
to Dartmouth that he left home the last of May, "having received
secret instructions from General Gage", and that he "assembled 1,458
Indians at Ontario,[1283] and adjusted matters with them in such
a manner that they agreed to defend the communications and assist
his majesty's troops in their operations." At the Albany conference
the Indians were interrogated about the proceedings at Oswego, and
repeatedly asserted that the superintendent's advice to them was to
preserve neutrality.[1284] The statements made by the Indians at the
conferences were generally to be relied upon. Johnson's language has
perhaps been misunderstood. The assistance "to his majesty's troops in
their operations" may have been limited to the agreement to defend the
communications, the military value of which Johnson appreciated, but
the full effect of an agreement to defend which the Indians did not
comprehend. In the middle of July, Johnson arrived at Montreal, and
another conference was held with 1,664 Indians, at which their services
were secured for the king. Brant, who was present, afterwards said: "We
immediately commenced in good earnest, and did our utmost during the
war."
In the South, John Stuart, the Indian superintendent of that
department, was also an object of suspicion. At a hint from friends
he fled from Charleston to Savannah, and in turn to St. Augustine.
From this spot, on July 18th, he wrote to the Committee of Safety
of Charleston, asserting that he had never received any orders
from his superiors "which, by the most tortured suspicion, could
be interpreted to stir up or employ the Indians to fall upon the
frontier inhabitants, or to take any part in the disputes between
Great Britain and the colonies."[1285] A few weeks later he received
from Gage a letter written just before that officer left Boston, the
vindictiveness of which was probably prompted by anger. This letter
contained instructions to "improve a correspondence with the Indians
to the greatest advantage, and even when opportunity offers make them
take arms against his majesty's enemies, and distress them all in your
power; for no terms are now to be kept with them; they have brought
down all the savages they could against us here, who, with their
riflemen, are continually firing on our advanced sentries;[1286] in
short, no time should be lost to distress a set of people so wantonly
rebellious."[1287] Stuart apparently proceeded to carry out what he
conceived to be the desires of his superior officer, and, in a letter
of October 3d, reported progress.
From England instructions were forwarded on July 5, 1775, by Lord
Dartmouth to Colonel Johnson, "to keep the Indians in such a state
of affection and attachment to the king as that his majesty may rely
upon their assistance in any case in which it may be necessary." On
the 24th Dartmouth wrote: "The intelligence his majesty has received
of the rebels having excited the Indians to take a part, and of
their having actually engaged a body of them in arms to support
their rebellion, justifies the resolution his majesty has taken of
requiring the assistance of his faithful adherents, the Six Nations.
It is, therefore, his majesty's pleasure that you do lose no time in
taking such steps as may induce them to take up the hatchet against
his majesty's rebellious subjects in America, and to engage them
in his majesty's service, upon such plan as shall be suggested by
General Gage." This work Johnson had already accomplished even before
the instructions of July 24th were written. In the fall of the same
year that Dartmouth thus placed the British government on record as
willing to employ Indians in the war, without other restrictions than
such as were to be suggested by General Gage, the Earl of Shelburne,
on information received, attacked the administration. "The Indians
had been tampered with", he said. "A trial of skill had been made to
let the savages on the back settlements loose on provincial subjects.
Barbarous as was the measure and cowardly as was the attempt, it had
failed." This was on November 10th. Ten days later Lord North asserted
that, "as to the means of conducting the war, there was never any idea
of employing the negroes or the Indians, until the Americans themselves
had first applied to them; that General Carleton did then apply to
them; and even then it was only for the defence of his own province."
Lord North was not well informed on proceedings in the colonies.
The attitude assumed by the British government in the order of July
24th represented the position which was retained during the remainder
of the war. From Halifax, on June 7, 1776, General Howe assured
Lord George Germain that his best endeavors would be used to engage
the Indians of the Six Nations, and he hoped by the influence of
Colonel Guy Johnson to make them useful. Notwithstanding the fact
that the intercepted correspondence between General Gage and John
Stuart, the superintendent, had been in possession of the Americans
for some months, Henry Stuart, a deputy of his brother, on May 18,
1776, asserted that it was not the design of his majesty "to set his
friends and allies on his liege subjects." This was probably true, but
there were a number of inhabitants of the Southern colonies who could
hardly have been classified as "liege subjects" at that time, to whom
this announcement could not have conveyed much satisfaction. From an
intercepted letter from the same source a scheme for co-operating with
the fleet when it should appear on the coast, by marching troops from
Florida in concert with a force composed of Creeks and Cherokees, to
the frontiers of North and South Carolina, was made public. In the
fall of 1776 Lord George Germain forwarded a supply of presents to the
Indians, and called the attention of the generals in command to the
necessity of securing their services. In November, 1777, the Earl of
Suffolk justified the alliance with the Indians on two grounds: "one as
necessary in fact, the other as allowable on principle; for, first, the
Americans endeavored to raise them on their side, and would gain them
if we did not; and next, it was allowable, and perfectly justifiable,
to use every means that God and nature had put in our hands."[1288]
This avowal called forth from the Earl of Chatham a fierce denunciation
of its author.
In the review which has been submitted of the acts and opinions,
official and personal, on both sides the ocean, concerning the
employment of the Indians in the Revolutionary War, the actors have
been allowed to speak for themselves as nearly as possible. If we
follow the order of events, we can see that the flaming rhetoric of the
address of the Continental Congress to the people of Ireland, and the
caustic arraignment of the king of Great Britain in the Declaration of
Independence, were calculated to produce an erroneous impression as to
the American position upon the subject. With the publication, which
afterwards took place, of the correspondence of prominent men of the
times, and of official documents from state and national archives, this
became evident. Sparks, in his _Washington_,[1289] says: "It has been
usual in America to represent the English as much the most censurable
on this score in the Revolutionary War; and if we estimate the amount
of deserved censure by the effect produced, this opinion is no doubt
correct. But such is not the equitable mode of judging on the subject,
since the principle and intention are chiefly concerned, and not the
policy of the measure nor the success of the execution. Taken on this
ground, historical justice must award the Americans a due share of the
blame." We may complain of the brutal eagerness of Lord Dunmore to
sustain his official position at any expense to his people; we may hold
up for abhorrence the vindictive nature of the orders transmitted by
General Gage; we may point out the disingenuous evasions or downright
falsehoods of Colonel Guy Johnson; but we must accept responsibility
for the enlistment, before the battle of Lexington, of the Stockbridge
Indians by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts Bay. We may claim
with apparent justice that the Continental Congress was reluctant to
employ Indians; yet we cannot undertake to reconcile the resolutions
of that Congress on May 25 and on June 17, 1776, with the indignation
against Great Britain, expressed so shortly afterward in the
Declaration of Independence and the Address to the people of Ireland,
for doing what Congress, by resolutions of previous date, had first
declared to be highly expedient, and then had specifically ordered to
be done.
The examination which has heretofore been made of the position of the
colonies on the question of the employment of Indians as soldiers has
already brought to light some of the events requiring notice which took
place in the Northern Department. The few Mohegans, whose unfortunate
enlistment as minute-men furnished argument for Gage "that the colonies
were collecting all the Indians that they could", were practically
the only Indians the colonies found ready to take up arms in their
behalf. During the summer and autumn of 1775 Washington was much
encouraged by reports of the friendly disposition of the Eastern and
Canadian Indians. He was visited at Cambridge by delegations from the
Penobscot, the St. Francis, and the Caughnawaga tribes, who in friendly
talks conveyed the impression that they favored the colonies. The Six
Nations were sorely perplexed and divided in their councils.[1290]
The residence of the superintendent among them, his power as the
distributer of gifts, the traditional respect and affection that they
had for his predecessor, and, above all, the active agency of Joseph
Brant, the Mohawk chief, whom the superintendent adroitly engaged as
his private secretary, all conspired to take them over to the enemy.
[Illustration: JOSEPH THAYENDANEGEA.
This portrait of Brant, "from an original drawing in the possession of
James Boswell, Esq.", is engraved in the _London Mag._, July, 1776. It
is reëngraved in the _N. E. Hist. and Geneal. Reg._, ii. 345.—ED.]
It is surprising that any influences could have overcome, even
partially, this combination of circumstances in favor of the English;
but, as it proved, the personal attachment of the Oneidas and
Tuscaroras for Kirkland the missionary, and Dean the interpreter, was
powerful enough, when exerted in favor of neutrality, to prevent the
greater part of those tribes from following their brethren. Various
conferences were held during the summer between delegations of whites
and representatives of the Eastern tribes of the confederacy, in all
of which those Indians who participated professed their willingness to
remain neutral.[1291] In the autumn of 1775 the Indian commissioners
of the Northern Department held a preliminary conference at German
Flats, and thereafter a formal conference at Albany, at which the
peace-speech of Congress was presented to the Six Nations, or
rather to that part of the confederacy which was represented at the
conference.[1292] An agreement of neutrality was entered into, but
its value was greatly diminished by the fact that in the preliminary
speeches the Indians insisted upon the necessity of keeping open their
communications. This meant that they would regard the occupation
of Fort Stanwix as an invasion of their rights.[1293] While these
proceedings were going on, some of the Indians who had accompanied
Guy Johnson to Montreal returned to their homes. When Dean, under
orders from the commissioners, went out to explain to the tribes the
nature of the Albany treaty, he met these Indians from Montreal. He
says they were members of the Cayuga, Mohawk, and Seneca tribes, and
they informed their brethren that they had taken up the hatchet at
Montreal against the colonies. The Indians who had been at Albany were
displeased at this, and their influence so far prevailed that the
famous war-belt delivered by Guy Johnson was surrendered to General
Schuyler on the 12th of December at Albany.[1294]
In the Mohawk Valley, the departure of Guy Johnson, in the summer of
1775, left Sir John Johnson the most prominent royalist, and at the
same time the most conspicuous friend of the Indians, in that region.
He was surrounded by several hundred Scotch Highlanders, who were
devoted to him personally, and followed his lead in politics. Early
in January, 1776, General Schuyler received orders to proceed to
Johnstown, apprehend Sir John, and disarm his followers. In carrying
out these orders the jealousy of the Indians had to be considered.
Conferences were held with them. They tried to dissuade the general
from invading the valley with an armed force, but he carefully
explained to them the situation, and insisted upon advancing.
[Illustration: BRANT.
Stone gives two portraits of Brant: one in his younger days, after a
picture belonging to the Earl of Warwick, and painted by G. Romney; the
other after a painting by Catlin, following an original by E. Ames, and
representing him at a later age.
[Illustration]
The younger of these two is herewith given. (Cf. J. C. Smith's _Brit.
Mez. Portraits_, iii. 1306; and McKenney and Hall's _Indian Tribes_,
vol. ii.) Cf. also J. N. Hubbard's _Sa-go-ye-wat-ha_ (Albany, 1886), p.
88.—ED.]
The Indians were, however, invited to be present at the conference with
Sir John. As a result of the expedition, the Highlanders were disarmed
and Sir John was arrested and paroled. In May, it being reported
that Sir John was not observing his parole, a second expedition was
dispatched to Johnson Hall.[1295] Without waiting to be arrested, Sir
John fled to Canada with a numerous body of followers, and shortly
thereafter entered the English army. It was in this same month that
the affair of the Cedars took place. Here, for the first time, Joseph
Brant—_Tha-yen-dan-e-gea_—appeared in the field against the colonies.
As a youth he had been placed at the school for the instruction of
Indians, which was conducted by the Rev. Eleazer Wheelock, afterwards
president of Dartmouth College. Brant is said to have been a man of
good personal appearance and of great physical courage. Enough of
his life had been spent among the whites to make him feel at ease in
European costume, and to fit him to enter society without fear of
transgressing ordinary rules of etiquette. As the private secretary
of Guy Johnson, he had followed the superintendent to Montreal.
From that point he went to England, where he was received with
consideration. After a brief stay he returned to Canada, arriving in
time to participate, while his memory of British adulation was still
fresh,[1296] in the joint attack of the British troops and Indians on
the Americans at the Cedars.[1297]
The necessity for occupying Fort Stanwix became early apparent to the
Americans, and was the subject of frequent correspondence. This fort
was at the carrying-place between Lake Ontario and the Mohawk,[1298]
and from this post, on September 23, 1776, Colonel Dayton wrote
that "Indian rumors report Colonel Johnson at Oswego with a large
force."[1299] The alarm was, however, premature.
In the spring of 1777[1300] intelligence reached the Tryon County
committee of the march of Brant, with a large body of warriors, across
the country from Canada to the region where the Susquehanna River
crosses the line between New York and Pennsylvania. Considerable
restlessness was also noted at this time among the Tories. The presence
of this large force of Indians under Brant caused great uneasiness to
the settlers, and in June General Herkimer, with about three hundred
of the militia, marched to Unadilla. Then followed one of the most
singular incidents, as the story is generally told, of the whole border
war. Herkimer's whole proceedings up to this point were aggressive.
He had ventured with an armed force into Indian country. Upon his
application, a co-operative force under Colonel Van Schaick was
dispatched to Cherry Valley. The presence of Brant in the vicinity with
a large body of followers was known, and Brant had already avowed his
loyalty to the king. Yet after a conference, to which Brant came with
evident reluctance, and at which he made a display of the force with
him in such a way as to make Herkimer's followers uneasy, the meeting
terminated without apparent result, unless Brant's renewed assertion of
loyalty may be so regarded.[1301] Very soon after this a conference was
held at Oswego between the officers of the British Indian Department
and the Six Nations, at which the greater part of the latter were
secured for the service of the king, and the lines were finally drawn
between them and those members of the confederacy who were disposed
either to maintain neutrality or who actually favored the American side.
While these events were occurring, Burgoyne had started upon his
march by way of Lake Champlain, confident that he could without
difficulty effect a junction with the British force from New York.
Lieutenant Hadden mentions that Burgoyne said at an early date in the
campaign that "a thousand savages brought into the field cost more
than twenty thousand men." What confidence he had in his allies at
the start diminished as he advanced. On the 11th of July he wrote
to the secretary of state "Confidentially to your lordship, I may
acknowledge that in several instances I have found the Indians little
more than a name",—a name which he sought by a proclamation to make a
terror; but in doing so he gave his adversaries ground for holding him
responsible for such enormities as the murder of Miss McCrea,[1302]
and for refusing to believe his indignant denials. His doubts of the
value of the Indians as soldiers were soon verified. They could scout
and forage, but at Bennington they were useless. They, in turn, finding
that Burgoyne endeavored to restrain them in their customary methods of
warfare, and that there was but little opportunity for plunder, began
to drop away. At the most critical period of the campaign they deserted
in large numbers, and could not be prevailed upon to return. Their
presence, far from proving a terror to the provincials, consolidated
and thus strengthened them, while on the other hand it undoubtedly led
the English to overestimate their own strength.[1303]
By orders from London, dated March 26, 1777, the advance of Burgoyne
was supported by a simultaneous movement by way of the St. Lawrence and
Lake Ontario. Lieutenant-Colonel Barry St. Leger, made a brigadier for
the purpose, led a force of about 650 regulars, Hessians, Canadians,
and Tories, with upwards of 800 Indians, as stated by Colonel Claus,
who had charge of them.
[Illustration: ST. LEGER'S ORDER OF MARCH.
After the cut in Stone's _Brant_, i. 219, following the original draft
found in St. Leger's baggage. Cf. Lossing's _Field-Book_, i. 241.—ED.]
This command, bearing a few six-pounders, three-pounders, and cohorns,
marched from Oswego, in the latter part of July, for the valley of
the Mohawk. Unusual precautions were taken to protect the flanks by
Indians, and the way was led by scouts. The Oneidas gave the Americans
ample warning. Fort Stanwix was at the time under the command of
Colonel Gansevoort, with Colonel Marinus Willett as second,—both
excellent officers. The regular garrison consisted of 550 men, who
were poorly supplied with provisions and munitions of war. Indians
infested the woods during the summer, and several atrocious murders
were committed, even near the fort. On August 2d, a reinforcement of
200 men reached the garrison, with two bateaux loaded with stores. The
supplies had been barely taken into the fort when St. Leger's advanced
guard appeared. The increased garrison had now six weeks' provisions
and an abundance of ammunition for small arms, but only nine rounds a
day for the cannon for the same period. During the summer the garrison
had partly repaired the fort, and had felled trees along the banks of
Wood Creek, so as to impede navigation.
News was conveyed to St. Leger of the approach of the reinforcement,
convoying supplies for the garrison. In the hopes of intercepting
them he authorized Lieutenant Bird to invest the place with the
advanced guard, at the same time adding to Bird's command a body of
Indians under Brant. Thinking perhaps that the garrison might offer
to surrender upon the approach of the investing force, he instructed
Lieutenant Bird not to accept a capitulation, but to await the approach
of the main body of troops; saying, "This is not to take any honor
out of a young soldier's hands, but by the presence of the troops to
prevent the barbarity and carnage which will ever obtain where Indians
make so superior a part of a detachment." On the 3d of August, St.
Leger arrived with the greater part of his force, himself taking charge
of operations which had been begun by Lieutenant Bird on the 2d. Wood
Creek had been "most effectually choaked up", as St. Leger termed it,
by the garrison of the fort; consequently he could not at once bring
forward his artillery and stores. He forwarded to the garrison copies
of a proclamation similar in tenor to that issued by Burgoyne, and on
the 4th completely invested the fort and began the siege. Instead of
the unfinished work which he says he had been led to expect, he found
it "a respectable fortress, strongly garrisoned with 700 men, and
demanding for its speedy subjection a train of artillery of which he
was not master."
[Illustration: PETER GANSEVOORT.
After a picture by Stuart as engraved by Prud'homme. Cf. Stone's
_Brant_, i. 209; and his _Campaign of Burgoyne_, p. 221; Lossing's
_Field-Book_, i. 240.—ED.]
The torpor of the inhabitants of Tryon County had excited indignation
at Kingston and at Albany. Under the pressure of an invading force,
the people responded to the call of General Herkimer, and that officer
soon found himself at the head of about 700 men.[1304] Among them were
a small number of Oneida Indians. On the 4th of August this assemblage
of men from the frontier moved forward from Fort Dayton at German
Flats, where they had gathered together, and on the 5th encamped near
Oriskany. From this point a message was sent to Colonel Gansevoort
reporting their approach, and asking him to announce his knowledge of
the fact by three rapid discharges of cannon. The messengers did not
succeed in entering the fort until the morning of the 6th between ten
and eleven o'clock. The three guns which were intended to communicate
to Herkimer the intelligence that the garrison knew of his approach,
were then fired at the fort. Herkimer's men were, however, too
impatient to wait for co-operation on the part of the garrison. At that
hour they had already advanced between two and three miles from their
camp, and were engaged with the enemy. In justice to Herkimer, it must
be said that he endeavored to prevent the advance, but it was evident
from the temper of his men that if he had not consented to move he
would have lost their confidence.
At the time of Herkimer's approach, St. Leger was but poorly prepared
for an engagement. The garrison and the relief column together were
equal in number to St. Leger's total force. The passage of the creek
had been so completely blocked that 110 men were nine days in freeing
it from obstruction. To get his artillery and stores forward, St.
Leger was obliged to clear a path or roadway sixteen miles in length.
He had but 250 soldiers on duty at the camp when the news reached him
that the Americans were advancing. From these he could spare but 80
men to co-operate with 400 Indians in an ambuscade which was prepared
for Herkimer. Sir John Johnson commanded 50 of these, and was posted,
for the purpose of checking the column, on the road over which the
Americans were advancing. It was intended that the Indians and a small
party of rangers under Colonel Butler, who concealed themselves in the
woods by the sides of the road, should, when Sir John had performed
his part of the work, pour in their fire from all sides. At ten
o'clock on the morning of the 6th, the approach of the unsuspecting
and undisciplined American troops, with their wagons, was heard by
the Tories and Indians in their place of concealment. The presence of
the enemy was first revealed to the Americans by a volley from the
impetuous Indians, who could not restrain themselves long enough for
the perfect development of the plan, but opened fire before the head
of the column had reached Sir John Johnson's post, and before the
rear guard, with the wagons, had completely entered the fatal circle.
Had the regiment which composed the rear guard been made up of men
accustomed to warfare, they might even then have done good service
in behalf of the surprised column. Unfortunately, those who could
get away fled, leaving their companions to their fate. The returns
show that even this regiment suffered severely in the engagement. A
desultory combat followed, in which each of the entrapped Americans
fought for himself, taking advantage of whatever opportunities offered
for defence. The remnant of the surprised and disordered troops, thus
brought to bay, proved formidable opponents, and punished severely
the Indians, who bore the brunt of the fighting. Quite early in the
action several of the American officers were killed or wounded.
General Herkimer was shot through the leg, and his horse was killed.
The saddle was removed from the animal and placed at the foot of a
tree. Upon this the disabled general was seated by his men, and by
his coolness and indifference to suffering and to danger won their
respect. A heavy shower, which interrupted the progress of the battle,
afforded opportunity for the Americans to arrange for co-operation.
After the shower was over, the contest was renewed, and, according to
the American accounts, fresh troops from the English camp participated.
Local annals are filled with tales of feats of valor and vindictiveness
which characterized this portion of the combat. At length the Indians,
wearied with the protracted contest, and disheartened by the loss of
several of their warriors, left the field. The English troops closely
followed them. A diversion made by the garrison probably hastened the
retreat. During this action the American loss was, according to their
own accounts, about two hundred killed and nearly as many wounded and
prisoners. The British loss was stated by themselves to have been not
over six killed and four wounded. From the same source we learn that
the Indians lost thirty-three killed and about as many wounded.
[Illustration: THE BUTLER BADGE.
NOTE.—The above cut of a brass emblem worn by Butler's men follows
one in Simms's _Frontiersmen of New York_, ii. 68, drawn from a sample
ploughed up in Otsego County;—ED.]
After the shower which checked the battle at Oriskany was over, Colonel
Willett, at the head of two hundred and fifty men, with a three-pound
carronade, sallied forth from the fort. The camp was almost entirely
unprotected. Lieutenant Bird, who was in charge of the portion which
Willett attacked, had received information that Sir John Johnson needed
succor, and had abandoned his post and marched towards Oriskany.
Colonel Willett penetrated the camp, secured a large quantity of guns,
ammunition, Indian weapons, blankets, etc., captured nearly all the
books and papers of the expedition, evaded an attempt on the part of
St. Leger to cut off his retreat, and safely effected his return to the
fort with all his plunder, without losing a man.[1305] The Indians,
before going out to fight, had stripped themselves nearly naked. On
their return to camp they found neither clothing, tents, nor blankets.
Thus ended the day. The relief party under Herkimer was shattered.
The fort was still besieged, and the besiegers had now opportunity to
open their communications; but their camp had been rifled, and their
Indian allies, discouraged by their losses, had no further interest in
the siege, and began to think of home. St. Leger sought to secure a
capitulation on the ground of the defeat of Herkimer, and caused the
captured militia to write accounts setting forth the strength of his
force and the excellence of his artillery; but Gansevoort was firm.
The argument that the English would be unable to restrain the Indians
from barbarities if the siege were protracted was also spurned by the
garrison. Failing in this direct attempt upon their fears, an effort
was made to reach them through the people of the county. A proclamation
was put forth by Sir John Johnson, D. W. Claus, and John Butler as
superintendents. This also was of no effect. It being desirable to
communicate with Albany, Colonel Willett and Major Stockwell penetrated
through the enemy's camp by night, and proceeded on foot through the
woods to Fort Dayton. From that point Colonel Willett went to Albany.
He found that General Arnold had already been ordered to relieve the
fort. The siege, notwithstanding the fact that the artillery was of
little avail, was continued until the 23d of August. The garrison,
ignorant of the fate of Colonel Willett and Major Stockwell, were in
grave doubts as to how long they could hold out. On the 23d, the enemy
suddenly abandoned their camp, leaving a great quantity of material
behind. The retreat was precipitated by false intelligence which
Arnold caused to be conveyed to the English camp. St. Leger evidently
suspected the ruse, but was unable to prevent its effects.
The gallant Herkimer did not long survive the battle. A simple,
unlettered man, without experience in leading troops, he paid the
penalty of his mistakes at Oriskany with his life. His intrepidity
during the action and the coolness with which he faced death convinced
his followers of his dauntless courage, and his loss was deeply felt.
The Indians, in their resentment for the severe losses with which they
had met, murdered several of the American prisoners. They also burned
one of the Oneida settlements, destroyed the crops, and killed or drove
away the cattle belonging to the village. Colonel Butler, in his report
to Sir Guy Carleton concerning affairs at Fort Stanwix, coolly says,
"Many of the latter [prisoners] were, conformable to the Indian custom,
afterwards killed." On the retreat the Indians became uncontrollable,
and robbed the English officers. In the words of St. Leger, they
"became more formidable than the enemy we had to expect."
The failure of St. Leger and the capitulation of Burgoyne placed the
affairs of the colonies in such position that Congress deemed it worth
while to renew negotiations with the Indians. The time seemed opportune
for securing the services of the Six Nations, and the commissioners
were, on the 3d of December, 1777, instructed "to urge them to some
decisive enterprise which will effectually tie them to our cause."
On the 4th the commissioners were authorized to expend $15,000 as a
reward to the Indians for reducing Niagara. In February, 1778, they
were instructed to speak to the Indians "in language becoming the
representatives of free, sovereign, and independent States." "Whether
it would be prudent to insist upon the Indians taking an active part
in behalf of these States" would depend upon the temper in which they
should appear to be. Action upon that point was submitted to the
discretion of the commissioners. The temper of the Senecas was found to
be far from favorable; and instead of attending the conference, they
sent a message expressing surprise that while the tomahawk was still
sticking in their heads, and they were still grieving for the loss of
their friends at Oriskany, the commissioners should think of inviting
them to a treaty. On March 4th, Washington was empowered by Congress,
if he should think it prudent and proper, to employ in the service of
the United States a body of Indians, not exceeding five hundred. On the
7th, Colonel Nathaniel Gist was instructed to enlist Indians on the
borders of Virginia and North Carolina, not to exceed two hundred in
number. On June 11th, Congress recommended aggressive warfare, being
satisfied, from the presence of British agents among the Indians, that
the cruel war had been "industriously instigated" and was still being
"prosecuted with unrelenting perseverance by principal officers in the
service of the king of Great Britain."
In 1778, according to the plan of campaign as given by Guy Johnson in
his correspondence, the English forces on the western borders of New
York were divided into two bodies: one, consisting of Indians under
Brant, to operate in New York, while Deputy Superintendent Butler with
the other should penetrate the settled district on the Susquehanna.
Brant, who, according to Colonel Claus, "had shown himself to be the
most faithful and zealous subject his majesty could have in America",
did his work unsparingly, and ruin marked his track. In the valley of
the upper Mohawk and the Schoharie nothing but the garrison-houses
escaped, and labor was only possible in the field when muskets were
within easy reach. Occasionally blows were struck at the larger
settlements. In the last of May, Brant, with about three hundred and
fifty Indians, destroyed a number of houses in the Cobleskill Valley,
and routed, with severe loss, a militia company which attempted to
pursue him.[1306] In June, the little town of Springfield, at the head
of Otsego Lake, was burned. Such of the men as did not take flight were
seized as prisoners. The women and children were not injured. During
the same month, Sir John Johnson, with a company of loyalists, made a
sudden descent upon the Mohawk Valley, the scene of their former homes,
and took a number of citizens prisoners.
In July, 1778, the threatened attack on Wyoming took place. This region
was at that time formally incorporated as the county of Westmoreland
of the colony of Connecticut. This result had been accomplished by the
persistence of the emigrants, under most discouraging circumstances and
at the expense of some bloodshed. In the fall of 1776, two companies,
on the Continental establishment, had been raised in the valley, in
pursuance of a resolution of Congress, and were shortly thereafter
ordered to join General Washington.[1307] Several stockaded forts had
been built during the summer at different points. The withdrawal of so
large a proportion of the able-bodied men as had been enlisted in the
Continental service threw upon the old men who were left behind the
duty of guarding the forts. Repeated alarms, during the summer of 1777,
compelled the young men to scour the woods, but their vigilance did
not prevent some prisoners being taken by the Indians. In March, 1778,
another military company was organized, by authority of Congress, to be
employed for home defence. In May, attacks were made upon the scouting
parties by Indians, who were the forerunners of an invading army. The
exposed situation of the settlement, the prosperity of the inhabitants,
and the loyalty with which they had responded to the call for troops,
demanded consideration from Connecticut, to whose quota the companies
had been credited, and from Congress, in whose armies they had been
incorporated; but no help came. On June 30th, an armed labor party of
eight men, which went out from the upper fort, was attacked by Major
Butler, who with a force estimated by the American commander in his
report at eight hundred men, Tories and Indians in equal numbers, had
arrived in the valley. This estimate was not far from correct; but if
we may judge from other raiding forces during the war, the proportion
of whites is too large, for only a few local Tories had joined Butler.
The little forts at the upper end of the valley offered no resistance
to the invaders.
On July 3d, there were collected at "Forty Fort", on the banks of
the river, about three miles above Wilkesbarré, two hundred and
thirty Americans, organized in six companies (one of them being the
company authorized by Congress for home defence), and commanded by
Colonel Zebulon Butler, a resident in the valley and an officer in
the Continental army. It was determined, after deliberation, to give
battle. In the afternoon of that day, this body of volunteers, their
number being swelled to nearly three hundred by the addition of old
men and boys, marched up the valley. The invaders had set fire to the
forts of which they were in possession. This perplexed the Americans,
as was intended, and they pressed on towards the spot selected by the
English officer for giving battle. This was reached about four in the
afternoon, and the attack was at once made by the Americans, who fired
rapidly in platoons. The British line wavered, but a flanking fire
from a body of Indians concealed in the woods settled the fate of the
day against the Americans. They were thrown into confusion. No efforts
of their officers could rally them while exposed to a fire which in a
short time brought down every captain in the band. The Indians now cut
off the retreat of the panic-stricken men, and pressed them towards the
river. All who could saved their lives by flight. Of the three hundred
who went out that morning from Forty Fort, the names are recorded of
one hundred and sixty-two officers and men killed in the action or
in the massacre which followed. Major Butler, the British officer in
command, reported the taking of "two hundred and twenty-seven scalps"
"and only five prisoners." Such was the exasperation of the Indians,
according to him, that it was with difficulty he saved these few.
He gives the English loss at two whites killed and eight Indians
wounded.[1308]
During the night the worst passions of the Indians seem to have been
aroused in revenge for Oriskany. Incredible tales are told of the
inhumanity of the Tories. These measures of vengeance fell exclusively
upon those who participated in the battle, for all women and children
were spared.
As soon as the extent of the disaster was made known, the inhabitants
of the lower part of the valley deserted their homes, and fled in
the direction of the nearest settlements. Few stayed behind who had
strength and opportunity to escape. In their flight many of the
fugitives neglected to provide themselves with provisions, and much
suffering and some loss of life ensued. The fugitives from the field
of battle took refuge in the forts lower down the valley. The next
day, Colonel Zebulon Butler, with the remnants of the company for home
defence, consisting of only fourteen men, escaped from the valley.
Colonel Denison, in charge of Forty Fort, negotiated with Major Butler
the terms of capitulation which were ultimately signed. In these it
was agreed that the inhabitants should occupy their farms peaceably,
and their lives should be preserved "intire and unhurt." With the
exception that Butler executed a British deserter whom he found among
the prisoners, no lives were taken at that time. Shortly thereafter,
the Indians began to plunder, and the English commander, to his
chagrin, found himself unable to check them. Miner even goes so far as
to say that he promised to pay for the property thus lost. Finding his
commands disregarded, Butler mustered his forces and withdrew, without
visiting the lower part of the valley. The greater part of the Indians
went with him, but enough remained to continue the devastation, while
a few murders committed by straggling parties of Indians ended the
tragedy. The whole valley was left a scene of desolation. In August the
American forces returned, and a few settlers came back and endeavored
to save some of their crops, but occasional surprises by Indians warned
them that the region was still unsafe. In September, Colonel Hartley
marched with one hundred and thirty men against the Indian towns of
Tioga and Sheshequin, and broke up those settlements.
* * * * *
Brant, meanwhile, had not been idle. On July 18th he burned a little
settlement about six miles from German Flats, called Andrustown. In
the latter part of August, German Flats, a settlement containing
thirty-four houses, was destroyed and the cattle were driven away.
Only two lives were lost, the inhabitants having taken refuge in Fort
Dayton. The rapine was not, however, all on one side. From Schoharie
an American expedition under Colonel William Butler threaded its way
through the woods, forded the flooded streams, and destroyed the Indian
town of Oquaga, and on their return burned the Tory settlement and the
grist and saw mills at Unadilla.
In the spring of 1778, General Lafayette ordered a fort to be built
at Cherry Valley, and this post was afterwards garrisoned by the
Continental regiment under Colonel Ichabod Alden. During the fall,
information of a positive character was conveyed to Colonel Alden that
the place was threatened. Some of the officers of the garrison were
accustomed to sleep outside the fort, and notwithstanding the warning,
this practice was continued. Neither Alden nor his men were familiar
with Indian warfare. The citizens wished to move their effects into the
fort, but Colonel Alden quieted them by saying that he had good scouts
out, who would give timely warning. One of these scouting parties,
through carelessness, was captured on the night of November 10th,
and by this means the enemy learned the exact condition of affairs.
The invading force is said to have consisted of two hundred whites
and about five hundred Indians, the whole under command of Captain
Walter N. Butler. This officer had been arrested as a spy near Fort
Stanwix during the siege, and had been condemned to death, but had been
reprieved, and had escaped from custody. He had with him a body of
Senecas, besides Brant and his Mohawks. The night after the capture of
the scouting party, the enemy encamped near the village. On the morning
of the 11th, under cover of a heavy rain, they penetrated a swamp
in the rear of the house used as headquarters, where they concealed
themselves, awaiting a favorable opportunity for attack. Chance favored
the garrison, and gave them a brief warning. A resident of the valley,
on the way to the village, at about half past eleven o'clock discovered
two Indians, and was fired upon by them.
[Illustration:
From the _Gesch. der Kriege in und ausser Europa, Dreyzehnter Theil_,
Nürnberg, 1778. The original of this design was a print published in
London, Aug. 22, 1776. Reproductions of it will be found in Irving's
_Washington_, quarto ed., vol. iii.; E. M. Stone's _Our French Allies_,
p.76; T. C. Amory's _Sullivan_. Cf. also Murray's _Impartial History_,
p. 241; Jones's _Campaign for the Conquest of Canada_, p. 88; Lossing's
_Field-Book_, i. 272.
For a view of Gen. Sullivan's house at Durham, N. H., with a paper on
its associations, see _Granite Monthly_, v. 18, 80. For his family, see
_N. E. H. and Gen. Reg._, 1865, p. 304.—ED.]
Although wounded, he was able to reach headquarters in advance of the
enemy, and give the alarm. The regimental officers hastened towards
the fort, and some of them succeeded in reaching it before the Indians
surrounded it. Colonel Alden was one of the first victims of his own
infatuation, having been shot while trying to reach the fort. For
three hours and a half the enemy protracted their efforts to capture
the post. Sixteen Continental soldiers were killed during the attack
on the village, and thirty-two of the inhabitants, principally women
and children, were massacred. Some of the murders were committed under
circumstances of peculiar barbarism, in which whites competed with
Indians. The houses, barns, and out-houses of the settlement were
burned. The garrison, although too weak to attack the enemy, was strong
enough to defend the fort. The enemy having completed the work of
destruction as far as they could, retired, but made a feeble renewal
of the attack on the 12th. This was easily repelled, and they then
devoted themselves to collecting the cattle belonging to the villagers.
The greater part of the prisoners who had been captured were liberated
on the 12th, and permitted to return to the settlement. In setting
them free, Captain Butler entered into a correspondence with General
Schuyler, in which he endeavored to relieve himself from responsibility
for the massacre. Brant also denied responsibility for it. Butler in
his letter asserted that at Wyoming "not a man, woman, or child was
hurt after capitulation, or a woman or child before it." If we admit
the disclaimers of the Butlers, father and son, the fact still remains
that they headed raiding parties, where plunder and destruction of
property were the main purposes of the expeditions, and where the
massacre of the inhabitants was one of the possibilities of success.
Strip from the stories of Wyoming the exaggerations of the frightened
refugees, the brutal massacre of the prisoners remains. The mercy which
was extended to the prisoners at Cherry Valley merely reduces the
number of horrors which were committed there. The massacre still stands
out conspicuously as the most shocking in its details of any event in
this region during the Revolution. Fortunately for the memory of Sir
John Johnson, notwithstanding his prominence as the scourge of the
Mohawk Valley during the war, his name is not associated with either of
these events.
* * * * *
On March 6, 1779, Washington, acting under instructions from Congress,
"to take effectual measures for the protection of the inhabitants
and the chastisement of the Indians", tendered to General Gates the
command of an expedition "to carry war into the heart of the country
of the Six Nations, to cut off their settlements, destroy their next
year's crops, and do every other mischief which time and circumstances
will permit." This offer Gates declined, and on March 31st General
Sullivan was appointed to the command. He was to lay waste all the
Indian settlements in the most effectual manner, "that the country
may not be merely overrun, but destroyed." Sullivan was to assemble
his forces in Pennsylvania. General James Clinton was to assemble a
force in the Mohawk Valley. In all the preliminary discussions of the
campaign it was contemplated to make the main advance by way of the
Mohawk. This idea was, however, abandoned, and it was arranged that
Clinton should cross over to the Susquehanna River, and by that route
effect a junction with Sullivan. As a preliminary to the campaign,
Colonel Van Schaick, on the 18th of April, left Fort Stanwix at the
head of five hundred and fifty-eight men, including officers, and
made a sudden descent upon the Onondaga towns. The expedition was
completely successful, and on the 24th Van Schaick was back at the
fort, and able to report that this work of destruction and plunder
had been accomplished, with the loss of only one man. On June 16th,
General Clinton arrived at Canajoharie, where he found about fifteen
hundred troops. From that point over two hundred boats and three
months' provisions for the command were transported over the hills
to Lake Otsego. On June 30th, Clinton reported to Sullivan that this
transfer had been accomplished, and that he was now ready to come down
the river. Here he remained with his troops until August 9th, awaiting
orders. Meantime he constructed a dam across the outlet of the lake, by
means of which he raised the water about a foot.
By the latter part of June the troops which were under Sullivan's
immediate command had assembled in the Wyoming Valley. They numbered,
on the 21st of July, 2,312 rank and file. They remained in this valley,
awaiting the arrival of stores, until the last day of July, when
marching orders were issued. During this period of idleness the troops
at Wyoming and at Lake Otsego chafed at their inaction. The enemy
continued the policy of desultory attacks and devastating raids, some
of which were committed in close proximity to the American encampments.
In May, at Fantinekill and at Woodstock, in Ulster County, New York,
houses were destroyed, cattle killed, and prisoners taken. On the
night of July 19th, Brant, with a force one third white and two thirds
Indians, variously estimated at from ninety to one hundred and sixty
men, made a descent upon the Minisink settlement. The citizens and
militia of Goshen marched next day in pursuit, and were joined on the
21st by a small detachment of the Warwick militia, the whole number
being, according to Colonel Hathorn, who took command, one hundred and
twenty. On the 22d they overtook Brant, were completely outwitted by
him, and were defeated, with a loss of forty-four killed.
In Pennsylvania several outrages were committed in the immediate
vicinity of Sullivan's army. On July 28th Freeland's fort, on the
West Branch of the Susquehanna, was taken by the enemy, and a small
detachment sent from Northumberland for its relief was badly cut up.
Neither Clinton nor Sullivan were diverted from the purposes of the
campaign by these forays. The Oneidas had agreed to join Clinton,
but were prevented by a threatening message from General Haldimand.
They excused themselves to the American general on the ground that
they feared an attack on their castles, should they assist in the
campaign. Their defection had no influence upon operations. On the
13th Sullivan destroyed the Indian town of Chemung, and then fortified
a post at a narrow point on the peninsula, a short distance above
the junction of the Tioga and Susquehanna. Clinton, on receipt of
orders to advance, destroyed the dam at the foot of the lake on the
9th, and successfully embarked his bateaux on the flood of his own
creating. On the 22d the junction of the two columns was effected. On
the 26th the united forces moved forward, and on the 29th encountered
the enemy under the Butlers, McDonnell, and Brant at Newtown, five
miles from Elmira. Here the enemy had selected a spot on rising ground
which commanded the road, and had thrown up a rude breastwork of logs.
Some attempt had been made to conceal it by placing before it brush
and young trees. Here they were apparently prepared to make a stand.
General Poor was dispatched with his brigade to gain a hill to the
right, and from thence to attack the enemy's left flank. After allowing
some time for Poor to reach his destination, Sullivan opened with his
artillery. Poor met with resistance, but when he had forced his way
to a position which became threatening to the enemy, they abandoned
their whole line.[1309] On the 30th Sullivan proposed to his men, as
provisions were short, that they should go on half rations, trusting
to the country to furnish them the rest. This was readily agreed to.
The baggage and heavy guns were sent back, and on the 31st the column
advanced, taking for campaign artillery four light three-pounders and
a small howitzer. The main army marched down the east side of Seneca
Lake to its outlet, destroying villages, cornfields, and orchards on
the way. From the foot of the lake a party was sent down the Seneca
River towards Lake Cayuga to destroy a town, and another was sent a
short distance up Lake Seneca, on the west side, for the same purpose.
From the foot of this lake the main army moved westward, skirting
the northern ends of lakes Canandaigua, Honeyoye, and Hemlock,
destroying as it moved. Then it bore to the southwest, and passed
the southern end of Lake Conesus. On the 14th of September, about
sunset, the expedition arrived at the great castle of the Senecas,
on the west side of the Genessee River, and on the opposite side of
the valley from the site of Geneseo. On the evening of the 12th, as
the army approached this region, Sullivan ordered a scouting party to
be sent out. It was his intention that only five or six men should
go, but the officer in charge of the party, Lieutenant Thomas Boyd,
took with him twenty-six men, including the Indian guides. In the
darkness, Boyd unconsciously passed the encampment of Butler and his
force, who were ambushed near Lake Conesus, waiting for Sullivan. On
the morning of the 13th, Boyd, having reconnoitred an Indian town,
sent word to camp by two of his men, and halted where he intended
to await the approach of the army. While waiting here, some Indians
were discovered by the party, whom Boyd indiscreetly pursued. By this
means his force was led directly into the power of Butler, whose men
completely surrounded the Americans and opened fire upon them. Nerved
to desperation, a gallant attempt was made by the devoted band to break
through the enemy's lines. In this attempt eight of them succeeded.
Fifteen of the party were killed. Two, Boyd and his sergeant, were
captured. The two captives were taken to Seneca Castle, or "little
Beard's town", and honored for their brave defence with tortures of
unusual cruelty. The "western door of the Long House", as this place
was termed by the Indians, consisted of one hundred and twenty-eight
houses, some of which were well built. The gardens were filled with
corn and vegetables. All these were destroyed; and on the 15th the
army, having completed its work, began its return march. Sullivan had,
on the outward march, dispatched a messenger from Catharine's town to
the Oneidas, calling upon them to furnish him with some warriors. At
Kanadasaga, near the foot of Lake Seneca, on his return, he received a
message from them, explaining why their warriors had failed him, and
putting in a plea for mercy in behalf of the Cayugas. He accepted their
excuses, but paid no attention to their requests. From Kanadasaga he
sent Colonel Smith, with a command, to complete the destruction on the
west side of Lake Seneca. He also detached Colonel Gansevoort, with one
hundred and five men, with instructions to proceed to Albany, and on
the way to destroy the lower Mohawk Castle. Through motives of policy,
the latter part of this order was not carried out to the letter. A
detachment was also sent out to destroy the towns on the eastern side
of Lake Cayuga. On the 21st another detachment was dispatched, with
orders to lay waste the towns on the western side of Lake Cayuga, and
to intercept the Cayugas if they should attempt to escape the officer
who had gone up on the other side of the lake. The rest of the army
then marched south, between Seneca and Cayuga lakes. When they reached
the valley of the Tioga, an expedition was sent up that river on an
errand of destruction. On the 28th these several detachments, with the
exception of Gansevoort's, had all rejoined the main column, having
accomplished their work without resistance. They were then met by a
supply of provisions from Tioga. The work of destroying Indian towns
and crops was finished. Fort Sullivan, near the junction of the rivers,
was abandoned and razed. The army descended the Susquehanna to Wyoming,
which place they reached October 7th. By the route which they took,
the distance marched by the army, in going from Wyoming to Seneca
Castle, was two hundred and fifteen miles, all of it in Indian country,
without a road over which a wagon could be transported. Forty Indian
towns were destroyed. Some of them were insignificant. Several had from
twenty to thirty houses. One had one hundred and twenty-eight houses.
Colonel Gansevoort, speaking of the lower Mohawk Castle, said: "It is
remarked that these Indians live much better than most of the Mohawk
families. Their houses were well furnished with all necessary household
utensils, and a great plenty of grain." The excellent construction
of some of the houses of the Seneca and Cayuga villages was a source
of surprise to the invaders. They marvelled at the well-conditioned
orchards, the cultivated gardens, and the extensive cornfields. They
left behind them, on the sites of these villages, smoking ruins and
blighted vegetation. Notwithstanding the fact that the expedition
was delayed so long waiting for stores, it was undertaken with the
certainty that there was not enough on hand for the purpose, if the
army was to rely upon what was supplied. General Sullivan was compelled
to march thus or not at all. In numbers the troops fell short of what
had been counted on. They met with no opposition worthy of note. The
losses during the campaign, by accident, by sickness, and in the field,
amounted to only forty. They could not have foreseen that General
Haldimand would be so completely bewildered as to their intentions,
and that he would refuse to believe that they could purpose invading
this region, until too late to render the Indians assistance.[1310]
The greater part of the warriors of the Six Nations were in the field
on the side of the English. It was but reasonable to anticipate that
the Indians would receive aid from their allies in defence of the
Indian country. Everything militated against the probability of the
expedition being able to accomplish its work with such ease. The
expedition was too large to treat the question of supplies in the same
way that an ordinary raiding party would have done. Through the delays
in procuring supplies, it was prosecuted at a time when the army could
subsist partially upon the growing crops. Had Sullivan started when he
expected, he must have depended upon his train. Otherwise the Indians
could easily have destroyed their stores and impeded the progress of
the army.[1311]
As a part of the original scheme, a simultaneous movement from
Fort Pitt against the Indian towns on the Alleghany was ordered.
The difficulty of communication between the two forces led to the
abandonment of all idea of co-operation. Colonel Brodhead, who had
charge of the movement on the Alleghany, was left to pursue his own
course. On August 11th he left Pittsburgh at the head of six hundred
and five rank and file, with one month's provisions. With this force
he proceeded up the river by boat to Mahoning; there the stores were
loaded on pack-horses, and the march was begun. On the way to the
Indian towns the advance guard came in contact with a party of between
thirty and forty warriors, whom they put to flight. The detachment
marched for a distance of about two hundred miles from Pittsburgh,
and destroyed the Indian settlements along the Alleghany extending
for eight miles, and consisting of one hundred and thirty houses. The
growing crops and provisions were ruined. This extraordinary march was
made without the loss of a single man, and without meeting any warriors
except the party already mentioned.
On October 20, 1779, Washington wrote to the Marquis de Lafayette,
saying: "General Sullivan has completed the entire destruction of the
country of the Six Nations, driven all the inhabitants, men, women,
and children, out of it, and is at Easton on his return." He further
said that Colonel Brodhead had inflicted similar chastisement on the
"Mingo and Muncey tribes", living on the Alleghany, French Creek,
and other waters of the Ohio. Washington concluded with these words:
"These unexpected and severe strokes have disconcerted, humbled,
and distressed the Indians exceedingly, and will, I am persuaded,
be productive of great good; as they are undeniable proofs to them
that Great Britain cannot protect them, and that it is in our power
to chastise them whenever their hostile conduct deserves it."[1312]
The cruel steps taken against the Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas
were probably justifiable as war measures. War against these Indians
without the adoption of their own tactics could only be prosecuted at
a great disadvantage.[1313] The destruction of their homes and the
consequent removal of the natives to a point more distant from the
American settlements, together with the necessity thus thrown upon the
British government of providing for their allies, undoubtedly affected
the aggressive power of the Indians and diminished the value of their
alliance. But if it was expected that raids upon the border settlements
would be stopped by this campaign, then the authorities must have been
disappointed. The border knew no peace until the war was ended.
The Indians, driven out of their own country and left without shelter
and without food, took refuge at Niagara for the winter. The Oneidas
feared an attack, and abandoned their castles. About four hundred
of them placed themselves under the protection of the government
at Schenectady. In April, 1780, the settlement at Harpersfield was
destroyed, and a scouting party of Americans which happened to be
in the neighborhood was captured. Repeated blows were struck at the
scattered, poorly defended settlements along the border. The lower
Mohawk was invaded by a force under Sir John Johnson, and the local
histories, in their records of the work of the summer of 1780, have
a melancholy monotony of conflagration and plunder. In August the
settlement at Canajoharie was laid waste by Brant, and several small
settlements adjacent to Canajoharie, and at Norman's Kill, not far
from Albany, were ravaged. From the valley of the Mohawk the enemy
moved southward, destroying a number of houses and capturing prisoners
in Schoharie Valley. In October, 1780, Schoharie Valley was again
ravaged, this time from the south, by an invading force of about one
thousand in all, under Sir John Johnson, which consisted of Tories,
together with Brant and his Mohawks, and Cornplanter with a body of
Senecas. They had, by way of artillery, two small mortars and a brass
three-pounder.[1314] There were three forts in the valley, in which
the inhabitants took refuge. The invaders did not succeed in capturing
either of the forts, and the loss of life in them was small, but they
left scarcely a building standing in the whole valley.
After thoroughly completing the work of destruction in Schoharie
Valley, the invaders proceeded to the valley of the Mohawk, and ravaged
the country on the north side of the Mohawk from Caughnawaga to Stone
Arabia and Palatine. A little force from Stone Arabia, acting, it is
supposed, under a promise of support from General Van Rensselaer,
undertook to check them. The general had collected some of the militia,
and was to fall upon the rear of the enemy. The promised support was
not furnished. Colonel Brown, who led the attacking party, was killed,
and his followers were badly cut to pieces. After this encounter
Sir John's forces renewed their work of destroying property in the
neighborhood of Stone Arabia, and then moved slowly up the river,
ravaging the country as they went. The invaders were followed by the
Americans, whose numbers increased as they moved, until they were
numerically stronger than the enemy. There were some Oneidas with
the Americans, under command of one of their own number holding a
commission from the Continental Congress as lieutenant-colonel. On the
afternoon of October 20th, just at nightfall, a skirmish took place
between the two commands at the spot selected by Sir John for his
evening bivouac. It was soon terminated by the increasing darkness,
of which the Americans took advantage to withdraw to a camping place
about three miles back, and the invaders, availing themselves of the
opportunity, hurriedly sought the woods. During their flight the enemy
captured a party of Americans which had been dispatched to destroy
their boats.[1315] After this raid the upper Mohawk Valley and the
Schoharie Valley rivalled in their desolation the region of the lakes
which had been invaded by Sullivan the preceding year. Numbers of
prisoners had been carried off during these raids, some of whom were
liberated shortly after capture. Others were detained till the close of
the war. In one instance a child was returned by Brant, with a letter,
in which he said "I do not make war upon women and children. I am sorry
to say that I have those with me in the service who are more savage
than the savages themselves."
Simultaneously with the operations in the Mohawk Valley, the enemy
ascended Lake Champlain and captured Forts Ann and George. Portions of
Kingsbury, Queensbury, and Fort Edward were burned. A branch of this
expedition destroyed the settlement at Ballston. At the same time, a
party of about two hundred, chiefly Indians, under Major Haughton of
the 53d, left Canada, and destroyed several houses in the upper part
of the Connecticut Valley, and carried off thirty-two inhabitants as
prisoners.[1316]
The work of retribution on the part of the Indians did not stop with
what has been recorded. Even during the succeeding winter Brant was
on the war-path, appearing now here and now there in the Mohawk
country cutting off stragglers and detached parties. Great difficulty
was experienced in furnishing the garrisons at the outposts with
provisions. Distress ensued, and there was serious danger that the
outlying defences could not be maintained. Fort Stanwix was badly
damaged in May, 1781, both by flood and by fire, and in consequence
the post was shortly afterward abandoned. The command of the Mohawk
Valley was this season assigned to Colonel Willett. He carefully
acquainted himself with its condition, and infused a portion of his
own active spirit into the management of affairs. Very shortly after
he assumed command, on June 30th, Currietown, a village near the mouth
of the Schoharie, was destroyed. With a small force, Willett pursued
the raiders, overtook them, and routed them with severe loss. In July,
Colonel Willett wrote that the number of men in Tryon County liable to
bear arms did not exceed eight hundred. At the beginning of the war the
enrolled militia numbered 2,500 men. He accounted for this reduction by
supposing that one third had been killed or made prisoners, one third
had gone over to the enemy, and one third had abandoned the country.
Indeed, life in the valley had become almost unendurable. The only
places of safety were within the walls of the stockaded forts which
were scattered through the region. All through the summer of 1781
detachments of the enemy struck blows at different points along the
border. The most conspicuous of these desultory acts of devastation was
the destruction of the little town of Wawarsing. Unsuccessful efforts
were made this season to seize the persons of both General Gansevoort
and General Schuyler. The active movements of the year closed with a
foray on the Mohawk by Sir John Johnson and Major Walter N. Butler, in
the latter part of October. When the Americans learned the approach
of the invaders, Colonel Willett gathered a force together, with
which, although inferior in numbers to the enemy, he attacked them at
Johnstown. The varying fortunes of the day were, on the whole, with the
Americans. The enemy fled, after dark, to the woods. Willett followed
them for some days, and had a collision with their rear guard, in which
the notorious Major Walter N. Butler was shot through the head and left
on the field.[1317] The difficulties of the military as well as the
political situation had been greatly complicated this summer by the
menacing aspect of the British forces on Lake Champlain, and doubts as
to the fidelity of certain of the leaders in Vermont, whose hostility
to the threatened extension of the authority of New York over the
inchoate State had been pronounced in terms of bitter earnest.
During the summer of 1782, although the frontiers of New York were
not altogether quiet, the scene of activity in border warfare was
transferred further west. There were none of the organized raids of
the enemy in the valleys of the Mohawk and Schoharie, with which the
inhabitants had become so familiar.
In February, 1783, the last movement of the war on the border took
place in this region. It was an attempt by Colonel Willett to surprise
the garrison at Oswego. A forced march of a night and a day was made
through the trackless forests, on the snow, from the Mohawk Valley to
the vicinity of the fort. Then preparations for the assault were made,
but when the column advanced the guide became confused and lost his
way. As surprise was essential for success, the attempt was abandoned.
Willett and his men found their way back as best they could, enduring
on the return march intense suffering from fatigue, cold, and exposure.
Colonel Willett then proceeded to Albany, at which place he arrived in
time to hear peace proclaimed.
The story of this chapter opened with the determination of a boundary
line between the king of Great Britain and his allies. It closes
with an assurance on the part of the Continental Congress, which is
intended to pacify the Indians, that, "as the country is large enough
to contain and support us all, and as we are disposed to be kind to
them, to supply their wants, and to partake of their trade, we, from
these considerations and from motives of compassion, draw a veil over
what is passed, and will establish a boundary line between them and us,
beyond which we will restrain our citizens from hunting and settling,
and within which the Indians shall not come, but for the purpose of
trading, treating, or other business equally unexceptionable."[1318]
The discussion of how far the kindly spirit which pervades these
promises has been maintained in subsequent dealings with the Indians
does not fall within the subject of this chapter.
CRITICAL ESSAY ON THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.
THE relations of the Indians to the British government and to the
colonies during the period immediately preceding the Revolutionary
War, is readily studied in _The life and times of Sir William Johnson,
Bart._, by William L. Stone (Albany, 1865, in 2 vols.[1319]), which was
intended to form a part of a history of the relations of the Iroquois
to current events. Stone completed but two volumes of the series, the
_Life of Brant_ and the _Life of Red Jacket_. The _Life of Sir William
Johnson_, being incomplete at the time of his death, was finished and
published by his son, of the same name.[1320] The book for awhile stood
alone in its detailed treatment of the official relations and dealings
of the superintendent with the Indians. Later publications have
infringed somewhat upon its monopoly.
The _Pennsylvania Archives_, and the _Minutes of the Provincial Council
of Pennsylvania_, commonly cited as "Colonial Records", lay bare the
secrets of the province, and furnish authentic information upon many
points which prior to their publication were obscure.[1321]
The documentary publications of the State of New York are for the
purposes of this chapter of even more value than those of Pennsylvania.
They contain many official papers from the hands of Sir William
Johnson, and letters from Guy Johnson, Daniel Claus, and Generals
Carleton and Haldimand, treating of Indian affairs. Some of these
documents help us materially in the study of the situation. The
history of the publications known as the _N. Y. Colonial Documents_
and _Documentary History of N. Y._ is told elsewhere;[1322] but
the _Journals of the Provincial Congress_ are of peculiar use in
the present inquiry.[1323] Such of the conferences, treaties, and
agreements with Indians on the part of the colonies, the Continental
Congress, and the government of the United States as have been printed,
are scattered through a variety of publications.[1324]
The literature of border life, from which the habits and methods of
life of the frontier inhabitants may be drawn, is too extensive to
permit any attempt at an exhaustive recapitulation of titles. Especial
use has been made in this chapter of Dr. Joseph Doddridge's _Notes
on the Settlements and Indian Wars_,[1325] perhaps the most valuable
of the many works upon this subject. Notwithstanding the sufferings
from Indian raids which Dr. Doddridge himself endured, he deals fairly
with the subject of border warfare, and candidly admits the terrible
responsibility of the whites for counter outrages. He draws a vivid
picture of the lack of law on the frontier, aggravated as it was by the
conflicts of colonies. "In the section of the country where my father
lived", he says, "there was for many years after the settlement of the
country neither law nor gospel. Our want of legal government was owing
to the uncertainty whether we belonged to Virginia or Pennsylvania."
"Thus it happened that during a long period we knew nothing of courts,
lawyers, magistrates, sheriffs, or constables." "Every one was,
therefore, at liberty to do whatever was right in his own eyes."
In _An Account of the remarkable occurrences in the life and travels
of Col. James Smith, etc., etc._,[1326] the author unconsciously gives
us a picture of the lawlessness of frontier life and the power of the
volunteers. The story is told in a simple manner, and the narrative is
full of interest. The rare _Chronicles of Border Warfare_, by Alexander
S. Withers (Clarksburg, Va., 1831), is a recognized authority, and is
frequently quoted. It was reproduced in substantial form in Pritt's
_Border Life of Olden Times_,[1327] a compilation of reprints of
volumes, narratives and statements relating to border life. The
relations of the Indians to current events are also to be traced in
Gale's _Upper Mississippi_, etc.,[1328] and in Ketchum's _History of
Buffalo_.[1329] The latter work covers much of the ground which Col.
Stone had preëmpted. The materials are well arranged, the views of
the author are clearly presented, and as a result the volumes form a
valuable contribution to the history of the Indians.[1330] Many details
will be found collected in Drake's _Book of the Indians_.[1331]
James Handasyd Perkins was a careful student of the early history of
the country, and contributed many articles to the periodical literature
of his day on the subject of Indian history and border warfare, which
have been collected.[1332] The compiler of _Annals of the West_,[1333]
in the preface to the third edition of that work, says: "The first
edition was issued at Cincinnati, where he (the compiler) was assisted
by the lamented James H. Perkins, a gentleman highly competent for
the task." In the second edition of the _Annals_ "the editor had
the valuable assistance of Rev. J. M. Peck, a gentleman whose long
residence in the far West, and familiarity with the history of those
portions of the work less elaborately treated of in the first edition,
rendered him admirably qualified for the undertaking." This work, in
its chronological arrangement of events, touches upon a portion of the
ground covered by this chapter. In 1791, J. Long published in London
a volume entitled _Voyages and Travels of an Indian Interpreter_,
etc. Long arrived at Montreal in 1768. His occupation for the next
seven years made him familiar with frontier life and Indian ways. He
volunteered in 1775 with the Indians who entered the English service,
and was at Isle au Noix with a few Mohawks on the occasion of their
collision with the Americans. He also served a short time with the
regulars. He states intelligently the value of the alliance of the Six
Nations to the English.
Wills de Haas, in his _Indian Wars of Western Virginia_,[1334] has
devoted one chapter to "Land Companies",[1335] and another to the
"Employment of Indians as Allies." His treatment of these topics is
brief, but the chapters contain much more information on the subjects
than can generally be obtained from American histories.
In _Fugitive Essays_, etc., by Charles Whittlesey (Hudson, Ohio, 1852),
an article is reproduced from the January number (1845) of the _Western
Literary Journal and Review_, entitled "Indian history: their relations
to us at the time of the American Revolution", which is well worth
examination.
The _Calendar of the Virginia State Papers and other Manuscripts_,
1652-1781 (Richmond, 1875),[1336] though meagre as a whole, is
particularly full on the subject of the encroachments of individuals
and companies on Indian lands. Among these papers is the deposition
of Patrick Henry, setting forth that he felt compelled to withdraw
from all connection with land schemes, when, as a member of Congress,
he found himself in a position where he might be called upon to act
as a judge in matters in which he was directly interested. It may be
inferred from what he says that there were among his associates some
who were not so scrupulous.