[_From the "Evening Post," Dec. 23, 1848._]
"When we wrote our former articles on the bill of Mr. Douglass we had
not seen the letter from Mr. Greeley which was published in Saturday's
_Tribune_ (Dec. 16, 1848). The intimation contained in that letter of
his sentiments and probable course in regard to that bill if presented
in its original form, would not have been allowed to pass without the
animadversion which its extraordinary nature calls for, and which we
shall now briefly make, not upon the impersonality which edits the
_Tribune_, but upon Mr. Greeley, the legislator, who represents in part
the people of this city in the highest councils of the nation.
"When, after having professed to consider the extension of slavery to
free Territories as the question of questions involved in the late
election--after having for months exhorted all to treat it as far above
the other objects of party association, and reproached those who did
not so treat it as false to freedom--after having at first distrusted
the noble band of Democrats who proclaimed their determination to
maintain throughout the canvass and at the polls the sentiments which
they had before professed, taunted them with the prediction that
they would ultimately surrender principles to a slavish subserviency
to party, and at length applauded their constancy when it could no
longer be disputed; after having stigmatized as recreant to principle
and duty all who should support a candidate for the Presidency not
avowedly in favor of the Wilmot proviso; after having denounced General
Taylor as identified in interest and association with the slave power,
and probably unsound in principle on the greatest of issues; when,
after having done all this, the editor of the _Tribune_, on the eve
of election, announced his intention to support General Taylor, to
vote for a man because he was available, whom he had denounced for
that very reason when nominated as an available; to vote for a man
because he would beat Gen. Cass, whom he had denounced when nominated
on that express ground; to vote for a man whom, after three months of
nice balancing, he found to be a shade less objectionable than another
candidate, because it was necessary to make a choice of evils between
the nominees of the two old party organizations, no matter how wrong
and dangerous the principles of both might be; thus surrendering the
great question of freedom in the Territories, in the same manner and
for the same reasons, for which most of the supporters of Taylor and
Cass at the North professed to surrender it, and uniting with them in
presenting the miserable spectacle of a number of electors sufficient
to choose the President, all voting for men not representing their
sentiments on a question professedly regarded by them as the most
important, because there was _no chance_ of electing one who did
represent those sentiments; when, in a word, after all his former
professions, Mr. Greeley ended in doing precisely what the original
Taylor men and the Cass men of the North did, and for precisely the
same reasons, and addressed to others precisely the same arguments
which had been so long addressed to him in vain, and which he had
been so long refuting, he shook deeply--very deeply--the confidence
in his sincerity which his apparent zeal in behalf of freedom had
inspired. For our part, we were inclined to take a charitable view of
his conduct. We thought we saw him struggling in the meshes of party
association, and yielding not until he had half satisfied his own
conscience that he could vote for Taylor as not so certainly declared
as Cass, and therefore not quite so objectionable on the great issue,
and at last reconciled to himself by the general sense that it was
a little better that Taylor should be elected than Cass. We thought
we saw a painful conflict with his self-respect and his sense of
consistency--a consciousness that he had not chosen the nobler, even
if the more expedient, part--that he was doing at best a doubtful act
against which his better nature revolted. We are disposed always to
respect, in silence, such manifestations, and not to reproach.
"But what shall we think, what shall we say, of the spirit exhibited
and the sentiments expressed in the following passage of Mr. Greeley's
letter, which we have read with astonishment and regret:
"'... And now to revert to the main question--the organization
of the new Territories, and the allowance or disallowance of
slavery therein--I have been confidently hoping for an _early and
peaceful adjustment of the whole vexation_. The bills of which Mr.
Douglass, in Senate, gave notice on reaching this city--to provide
for the organization of California as a State and New Mexico as a
Territory--were _signs of promise_. Upon the basis here suggested,
it _seemed to me practicable to settle the whole difficulty without
farther excitement or peril_. I thought we should ultimately agree to
permit _New Mexico_, as well as California, to take the requisite steps
for organizing as a State, and _bring them both into the Union in the
course of the next two years_, leaving them _free_ to frame _their
own institutions_. This done, the North would be morally certain that
slavery would not be tolerated in either State, and the South would
_save the point of honor by the almost certain defeat_ (in Senate) _of
the Wilmot proviso_, which, to an established and admitted State, is
confessedly inapplicable. And thus would _close the grave of agitation_
with regard to slave territory.'
"And the letter then proceeds to say that 'the bright sky has been
overcast' by the modification by which it is proposed to annex the
portion of New Mexico east of the Rio Grande to Texas, which is _stated
as the only objection to the bill_.
"The first remarkable thing in this letter is the spirit in which it
speaks of the question of extending slavery to the Territories now
free. If the only thing to be done was to get rid of a troublesome
question, Mr. Greeley's mind would seem to be directed exactly to the
object. If the writer were one of the conservatives of the Syracuse
convention of 1847, who laid the Wilmot proviso on the table, or one
of the Whig Dough Faces of the Philadelphia convention, who 'kicked it
out' of that body, the terms in which the measure is spoken of would
be very characteristic. To adjust 'the whole _vexation_'--'to settle
the whole difficulty _without farther excitement or peril_'--'to _close
the grave_ of the _agitation_,' was precisely what _they_ desired to
do. But if there is something more to be done than to evade this great
question in order to save party arrangements from embarrassment--if
it is of any importance to make freedom in the Territories _certain_
instead of leaving it to chance--if the opinion, which has been so
frequently and earnestly maintained by Mr. Greeley, as well as all who
profess to be friends of freedom, that for this purpose an express
enactment by Congress ought to be made, be not an utter imposture and
fraud, then we submit that the spirit manifested in this letter is not
that in which this great question should be treated.
"The second remarkable thing in the letter--and by far the most
remarkable--is the _mode_ in which it purposes to adjust 'the whole
vexation.' A Territory extensive enough to make thirteen States as
large as New York has been acquired; it is wholly unoccupied, except by
a small population in a few localities. The question is, shall slavery
be allowed to be established in it during its territorial condition?
Neither party to the controversy regards as of practical moment the
territorial condition, except as it will influence and practically
control the conditions, in this respect, of the States which are to
be formed out of the Territory. And it is gravely proposed at once to
declare this Territory, which is in no proper situation to be formed
into States, and which nobody would think of forming into a State
now except for the purpose of getting rid of the necessity of acting
on this subject, to be a State. And this is called by Mr. Greeley
'_settling_,' instead of _dodging_, the question!
"Gen. Cass proposed, in his Nicholson letter, to leave to the
scattered inhabitants who are to be found in some small portions of
this vast region to decide the question by a territorial legislature.
Mr. Greeley, in _his_ letter, proposes to leave it to precisely the
same individuals 'free to frame their own institutions' by a State
legislature.
"What essential difference is there between the two plans, so far as
the extension or restriction of slavery is concerned?
"Suppose that on the 3rd of March next, at the close of the session,
Mr. Greeley's plan should be adopted; that on the 3rd of July a
territorial legislature should be elected; and that on the 3rd of
September it should meet and adjust the 'whole vexation.' Or suppose
that on the 3rd of March Gen. Cass's plan should be adopted; that on
the 3rd of July a State legislature should be elected; and that on the
3rd of September it should meet and decide the question.
"Would it be important whether the government were called 'State' or
'territorial,' so long as it had equal power to act on this subject,
and constituents and representatives were the same, assumed their
functions at the same time, in the one case as in the other? Would it
affect in the slightest degree the actual extension or restriction of
slavery which should be decreed by them?
"But Mr. Greeley evidently thinks that this little change of names gets
him over the whole difficulty. And he touches what he obviously regards
as the point of the case when he adds that 'the Wilmot proviso' is 'to
an established and admitted State' confessedly inapplicable.
"Without discussing the authority of Congress to insert a restriction
against slavery in the act of admission, which was done with most of
the Northwestern States, it is true that _after_ a State has been
established and admitted the Federal legislation has no power to apply
to that State the 'Wilmot proviso'; and that by the unconditional
conversion of a territory into a State Congress divests itself of that
power. But it is not easy for anybody--except Mr. Greeley--to see
how the reference of the question, even when confessedly within its
jurisdiction to a territorial legislature, as proposed by Gen. Cass,
is more objectionable in a moral point of view than the voluntary
divestment of that jurisdiction for the very purpose of shirking off
the question upon the same legislature called by a different name. Gen.
Cass's plan has some advantages over that adopted by Mr. Greeley.
"It is less evasive and more manly, frank, and honest.
"It may afford some chance that the fate of the various parts of this
immense tract of unsettled lands shall be decided by the people who
shall at some future period inhabit them after they shall be organized
into distinct Territories, the more densely populated portions having
been admitted as States; which might be somewhat better than leaving
to a few thousand persons in Santa Fé and San Francisco to fix the
destinies of hundreds of thousands of square miles in which not one of
these persons ever trod.
"Above all, it would not, in the miserable attempt to avoid the
question of slavery in the Territories by admitting a State of
boundless dimensions, incur the great and perilous mischiefs which
we have pointed out in our two previous articles, to the safety and
permanency of the confederacy, and incur these evils without the least
necessity or any compensating benefit.
"But Mr. Greeley says that 'the North would be morally certain that
slavery would not be tolerated' in the States to be formed. So said
Gen. Cass in his Nicholson letter, when he proposed under a little
different name to leave the question to be settled by exactly the
same persons. So said Mr. Buchanan. So said Mr. Clayton. Yet nobody
denounced their contrivances with more indignation than Mr. Greeley.
Talk of the Cass 'juggle,' the Buchanan 'compromise,' the Clayton
'trap'--the Greeley and Douglass juggle is worse than any of them."
* * * * *
The prostration of the Democratic party--whether by the defeat of
General Cass or by the conditions which procured his nomination, it
is inopportune here to discuss--though a great disappointment to Mr.
Tilden, was, like most disappointments, good-fortune in disguise. It
gave him the opportunity and provocation to devote all his energies
and talents for the succeeding quarter of a century to his profession,
during which period of its service it rewarded him as the wisest of
Israel's kings was rewarded for his obedience--with fame and fortune.
In less time than he had spent in making himself a leader of his party
in New York, he placed himself in the front rank of the American bar.
It was not until the year 1850 that Mr. Tilden leased his first office
for professional purposes after his admission to the bar. It was on the
third floor of what was then known as Jauncey Court, now replaced by
majestic banking-houses, on the south side of Wall Street, a few doors
west of William street. His landlord was Alexander Hamilton, Jr., one
of the sons of President Washington's first Minister of Finance. Here
is a copy of their agreement, followed by a bill of Tilden's personal
taxes for the previous year:
"This is to certify that I have hired and taken from Alexander
Hamilton, Jr., the office, consisting of two rooms, on the 3rd floor of
the Jauncey Court Building, and marked on a plan of said building No.
1 (it being understood and agreed that if the above premises shall be
rendered untenantable by fire, the rent shall cease during the interval
occurring from the happening of said fire until the premises shall
have been repaired), for the term of three years from the first day of
May, 1850, at the yearly rent of four hundred and twenty-five dollars,
payable on the usual quarter days.
"And I hereby promise, in consideration thereof, to make punctual
payment of the rent in manner aforesaid, and quit and surrender the
premises at the expiration of the said term, in as good state and
condition as reasonable use and wear thereof will permit, damages by
the elements excepted, and not to assign, let or underlet the whole
or any part of the said premises, or occupy the same for any business
deemed extra-hazardous on account of fire, without the written consent
of the landlord, under the penalty of forfeiture and damages. And I do
hereby, for the consideration of aforesaid, waive the benefit of the
exemption specified in the first section of the act entitled 'An act
to extend the exemption of household furniture and working tools from
distress for rent and sale under execution,' passed April 11, 1842, and
agree that the property thereby exempted shall be liable to distress
for said rent; and also, that all property liable to distress for rent
shall be so liable, whether on or off the said premises, wheresoever
and whensoever the same may be found.
"Given _under my hand and seal this_ day of February, 1850,
in the presence of
"SAMUEL J. TILDEN." [Seal.]
This lease was renewed on the 12th of February, 1853, for three years,
to end May 1, 1856, for $550 a year, an increase of $125 a year.
The rent paid for these two rooms by Mr. Tilden does not contrast more
violently with the price of equal accommodations now, than his charges
for his professional service during his first year contrasts with the
rewards for similar work expected by his profession a half-century
later, as appears by some of his bills, which follow, at that period: