The course of events in certain of the republics in and around the
Caribbean Sea warned the Hispanic nations that independence was a
relative condition and that it might vary in direct ratio with nearness
to the United States. After 1906 this powerful northern neighbor showed
an unmistakable tendency to extend its influence in various ways. Here
fiscal and police control was established; there official recognition
was withheld from a President who had secured office by unconstitutional
methods. Nonrecognition promised to be an effective way of maintaining
a regime of law and order, as the United States understood those terms.
Assurances from the United States of the full political equality of all
republics, big or little, in the western hemisphere did not always carry
conviction to Spanish American ears. The smaller countries in and around
the Caribbean Sea, at least, seemed likely to become virtually American
protectorates.
Like their Hispanic neighbor on the north, the little republics of
Central America were also scenes of political disturbance. None of them
except Panama escaped revolutionary uprisings, though the loss of life
and property was insignificant. On the other hand, in these early years
of the century the five countries north of Panama made substantial
progress toward federation. As a South American writer has expressed
it, their previous efforts in that direction "amid sumptuous festivals,
banquets and other solemn public acts" at which they "intoned in
lyric accents daily hymns for the imperishable reunion of the isthmian
republics," had been as illusory as they were frequent. Despite the
mediation of the United States and Mexico in 1906, while the latter
was still ruled by Diaz, the struggle in which Nicaragua, Honduras,
Guatemala, and Salvador had been engaged was soon renewed between
the first two belligerents. Since diplomatic interposition no longer
availed, American marines were landed in Nicaragua, and the bumptious
Zelaya was induced to have his country meet its neighbors in a
conference at Washington. Under the auspices of the United States and
Mexico, in December, 1907, representatives of the five republics signed
a series of conventions providing for peace and cooperation. An arbitral
court of justice, to be erected in Costa Rica and composed of one judge
from each nation, was to decide all matters of dispute which could not
be adjusted through ordinary diplomatic means. Here, also, an institute
for the training of Central American teachers was to be established.
Annual conferences were to discuss, and an office in Guatemala was to
record, measures designed to secure uniformity in financial, commercial,
industrial, sanitary, and educational regulations. Honduras, the storm
center of weakness, was to be neutralized. None of the States was
thereafter to recognize in any of them a government which had been set
up in an illegal fashion. A "Constitutional Act of Central American
Fraternity," moreover, was adopted on behalf of peace, harmony, and
progress. Toward a realization of the several objects of the conference,
the Presidents of the five republics were to invite their colleagues
of the United States and Mexico, whenever needful, to appoint
representatives, to "lend their good offices in a purely friendly way."
Though most of these agencies were promptly put into operation, the
results were not altogether satisfactory. Some discords, to be sure,
were removed by treaties settling boundary questions and providing for
reciprocal trade advantages; but it is doubtful whether the arrangements
devised at Washington would have worked at all if the United States had
not kept the little countries under a certain amount of observation.
What the Central Americans apparently preferred was to be left alone,
some of them to mind their own business, others to mind their neighbor's
affairs.
Of all the Central American countries Honduras was, perhaps, the one
most afflicted with pecuniary misfortunes. In 1909 its foreign debt,
along with arrears of interest unpaid for thirty-seven years, was
estimated at upwards of $110,000,000. Of this amount a large part
consisted of loans obtained from foreign capitalists, at more or less
extortionate rates, for the construction of a short railway, of which
less than half had been built. That revolutions should be rather
chronic in a land where so much money could be squandered and where
the temperaments of Presidents and ex-Presidents were so bellicose,
was natural enough. When the United States could not induce the warring
rivals to abide by fair elections, it sent a force of marines to overawe
them and gave warning that further disturbances would not be allowed.
In Nicaragua the conditions were similar. Here Zelaya, restive under the
limitations set by the conference at Washington, yearned to become the
"strong man" of Central America, who would teach the Yankees to stop
their meddling. But his downfall was imminent. In 1909, as the result of
his execution of two American soldiers of fortune who had taken part in
a recent insurrection, the United States resolved to tolerate Zelaya no
longer. Openly recognizing the insurgents, it forced the dictator out of
the country. Three years later, when a President-elect started to assume
office before the legally appointed time, a force of American marines
at the capital convinced him that such a procedure was undesirable. The
"corrupt and barbarous" conditions prevailing in Zelaya's time, he was
informed, could not be tolerated. The United States, in fact, notified
all parties in Nicaragua that, under the terms of the Washington
conventions, it had a "moral mandate to exert its influence for the
preservation of the general peace of Central America." Since those
agreements had vested no one with authority to enforce them, such an
interpretation of their language, aimed apparently at all disturbances,
foreign as well as domestic, was rather elastic! At all events, after
1912, when a new constitution was adopted, the country became relatively
quiet and somewhat progressive. Whenever a political flurry did take
place, American marines were employed to preserve the peace. Many
citizens, therefore, declined to vote, on the ground that the moral and
material support thus furnished by the great nation to the northward
rendered it futile for them to assume political responsibilities.
Meanwhile negotiations began which were ultimately to make Nicaragua a
fiscal protectorate of the United States. American officials were chosen
to act as financial advisers and collectors of customs, and favorable
arrangements were concluded with American bankers regarding the monetary
situation; but it was not until 1916 that a treaty covering this
situation was ratified. According to its provisions, in return for a
stipulated sum to be expended under American direction, Nicaragua was
to grant to the United States the exclusive privilege of constructing a
canal through the territory of the republic and to lease to it the Corn
Islands and a part of Fonseca Bay, on the Pacific coast, for use as
naval stations. The prospect of American intervention alarmed the
neighboring republics. Asserting that the treaty infringed upon their
respective boundaries, Costa Rica, and Salvador brought suit against
Nicaragua before the Central American Court. With the exception of
the Nicaraguan representative, the judges upheld the contention of the
plaintiffs that the defendant had no right to make any such concessions
without previous consultation with Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras,
since all three alike were affected by them. The Court observed,
however, that it could not declare the treaty void because the
United States, one of the parties concerned, was not subject to its
jurisdiction. Nicaragua declined to accept the decision; and the United
States, the country responsible for the existence of the Court and
presumably interested in helping to enforce its judgment, allowed it to
go out of existence in 1918 on the expiration of its ten-year term.
The economic situation of Costa Rica brought about a state of affairs
wholly unusual in Central American politics. The President, Alfredo
Gonzalez, wished to reform the system of taxation so that a fairer share
of the public burdens should fall on the great landholders who, like
most of their brethren in the Hispanic countries, were practically
exempt. This project, coupled with the fact that certain American
citizens seeking an oil concession had undermined the power of the
President by wholesale bribery, induced the Minister of War, in 1917,
to start a revolt against him. Rather than shed the blood of his fellow
citizens for mere personal advantages, Gonzalez sustained the good
reputation of Costa Rica for freedom from civil commotions by quietly
leaving the country and going to the United States to present his case.
In consequence, the American Government declined to recognize the de
facto ruler.
Police and fiscal supervision by the United States has characterized
the recent history of Panama. Not only has a proposed increase in the
customs duties been disallowed, but more than once the unrest attending
presidential elections has required the calming presence of American
officials. As a means of forestalling outbreaks, particularly in view
of the cosmopolitan population resident on the Isthmus, the republic
enacted a law in 1914 which forbade foreigners to mix in local politics
and authorized the expulsion of naturalized citizens who attacked the
Government through the press or otherwise. With the approval of the
United States, Panama entered into an agreement with American financiers
providing for the creation of a national bank, one-fourth of the
directors of which should be named by the Government of the republic.
The second period of American rule in Cuba lasted till 1909. Control of
the Government was then formally transferred to Jose Miguel Gomez, the
President who had been chosen by the Liberals at the elections held in
the previous year; but the United States did not cease to watch over its
chief Caribbean ward. A bitter controversy soon developed in the Cuban
Congress over measures to forbid the further purchase of land by aliens,
and to insure that a certain percentage of the public offices should
be held by colored citizens. Though both projects were defeated, they
revealed a strong antiforeign sentiment and much dissatisfaction on the
part of the negro population. It was clear also that Gomez, intended to
oust all conservatives from office, for an obedient Congress passed a
bill suspending the civil service rules.
The partisanship of Gomez, and his supporters, together with the
constant interference of military veterans in political affairs,
provoked numerous outbreaks, which led the United States, in 1912, to
warn Cuba that it might again be compelled to intervene. Eventually,
when a negro insurrection in the eastern part of the island menaced the
safety of foreigners, American marines were landed. Another instance
of intervention was the objection by the United States to an employers'
liability law that would have given a monopoly of the insurance business
to a Cuban company to the detriment of American firms.
After the election of Mario Menocal, the Conservative candidate, to the
presidency in 1912, another occasion for intervention presented itself.
An amnesty bill, originally drafted for the purpose of freeing the
colored insurgents and other offenders, was amended so as to empower
the retiring President to grant pardon before trial to persons whom
his successor wished to prosecute for wholesale corruption in financial
transactions. Before the bill passed, however, notice was sent from
Washington that, since the American Government had the authority to
supervise the finances of the republic, Gomez would better veto the
bill, and this he accordingly did.
A sharp struggle arose when it became known that Menocal would be a
candidate for reelection. The Liberal majority in the Congress passed
a bill requiring that a President who sought to succeed himself should
resign two months before the elections. When Menocal vetoed this
measure, his opponents demanded that the United States supervise the
elections. As the result of the elections was doubtful, Gomez and his
followers resorted in 1917 to the usual insurrection; whereupon the
American Government warned the rebels that it would not recognize their
claims if they won by force. Active aid from that quarter, as well as
the capture of the insurgent leader, caused the movement to collapse
after the electoral college had decided in favor of Menocal.
In the Dominican Republic disturbances were frequent, notwithstanding
the fact that American officials were in charge of the customhouses and
by their presence were expected to exert a quieting influence. Even
the adoption, in 1908, of a new constitution which provided for the
prolongation of the presidential term to six years and for the abolition
of the office of Vice President--two stabilizing devices quite common
in Hispanic countries where personal ambition is prone to be a source of
political trouble--did not help much to restore order. The assassination
of the President and the persistence of age-long quarrels with Haiti
over boundaries made matters worse. Thereupon, in 1913, the United
States served formal notice on the rebellious parties that it would
not only refuse to recognize any Government set up by force but would
withhold any share in the receipts from the customs. As this procedure
did not prevent a revolutionary leader from demanding half a million
dollars as a financial sedative for his political nerves and from
creating more trouble when the President failed to dispense it, the
heavy hand of an American naval force administered another kind
of specific, until commissioners from Porto Rico could arrive to
superintend the selection of a new chief magistrate. Notwithstanding the
protest of the Dominican Government, the "fairest and freest" elections
ever known in the country were held under the direction of those
officials--as a "body of friendly observers"!
However amicable this arrangement seemed, it did not smother the flames
of discord. In 1916, when an American naval commander suggested that a
rebellious Minister of War leave the capital, he agreed to do so if the
"fairest and freest" of chosen Presidents would resign. Even after both
of them had complied with the suggestions, the individuals who assumed
their respective offices were soon at loggerheads. Accordingly the
United States placed the republic under military rule, until a President
could be elected who might be able to retain his post without too much
"friendly observation" from Washington, and a Minister of War could be
appointed who would refrain from making war on the President! Then the
organization of a new party to combat the previous inordinate display
of personalities in politics created some hope that the republic would
accomplish its own redemption.
Only because of its relation to the wars of emancipation and to the
Dominican Republic, need the negro state of Haiti, occupying the western
part of the Caribbean island, be mentioned in connection with the story
of the Hispanic nations. Suffice it to say that the fact that their
color was different and that they spoke a variant of French instead of
Spanish did not prevent the inhabitants of this state from offering a
far worse spectacle of political and financial demoralization than
did their neighbors to the eastward. Perpetual commotions and repeated
interventions by American and European naval forces on behalf of the
foreign residents, eventually made it imperative for the United States
to take direct charge of the republic. In 1916, by a convention
which placed the finances under American control, created a native
constabulary under American officers, and imposed a number of other
restraints, the United States converted Haiti into what is practically a
protectorate.