Even so huge and conservative a country as Brazil could not start out
upon the pathway of republican freedom without some unrest; but the
political experience gained under a regime of limited monarchy had a
steadying effect. Besides, the Revolution of 1889 had been effected by a
combination of army officers and civilian enthusiasts who knew that the
provinces were ready for a radical change in the form of government,
but who were wise enough to make haste slowly. If a motto could mean
anything, the adoption of the positivist device, "Order and Progress,"
displayed on the national flag seemed a happy augury.
The constitution promulgated in 1891 set up a federal union broadly
similar to that of the United States, except that the powers of the
general Government were somewhat more restricted. Qualifications for
the suffrage were directly fixed in the fundamental law itself, but the
educational tests imposed excluded the great bulk of the population
from the right to vote. In the constitution, also, Church and State were
declared absolutely separate, and civil marriage was prescribed.
Well adapted as the constitution was to the particular needs of Brazil,
the Government erected under it had to contend awhile with political
disturbances. Though conflicts occurred between the president and the
Congress, between the federal authority and the States, and between
the civil administration and naval and military officials, none were
so constant, so prolonged, or so disastrous as in the Spanish American
republics. Even when elected by the connivance of government officials,
the chief magistrate governed in accordance with republican forms.
Presidential power, in fact, was restrained both by the huge size of the
country and by the spirit of local autonomy upheld by the States.
Ever since the war with Paraguay the financial credit of Brazil had been
impaired. The chronic deficit in the treasury had been further increased
by a serious lowering in the rate of exchange, which was due to an
excessive issue of paper money. In order to save the nation from
bankruptcy Manoel Ferraz de Campos Salles, a distinguished jurist, was
commissioned to effect an adjustment with the British creditors. As a
result of his negotiations a "funding loan" was obtained, in return
for which an equivalent amount in paper money was to be turned over
for cancellation at a fixed rate of exchange. Under this arrangement
depreciation ceased for awhile and the financial outlook became
brighter.
The election of Campos Salles to the presidency in 1898, as a reward for
his success, was accompanied by the rise of definite political
parties. Among them the Radicals or Progressists favored a policy of
centralization under military auspices and exhibited certain antiforeign
tendencies. The Moderates or Republicans, on the contrary, with Campos
Salles as their candidate, declared for the existing constitution and
advocated a gradual adoption of such reforms as reason and time might
suggest. When the latter party won the election, confidence in the
stability of Brazil returned.
As if Uruguay had not already suffered enough from internal discords,
two more serious conflicts demonstrated once again that this little
country, in which political power had been held substantially by one
party alone since 1865, could not hope for permanent peace until either
the excluded and apparently irreconcilable party had been finally and
utterly crushed, or, far better still, until the two factions could
manage to agree upon some satisfactory arrangement for rotation in
office. The struggle of 1897 ended in the assassination of the president
and in a division of the republic into two practically separate areas,
one ruled by the Colorados at Montevideo, the other by the Blancos.
A renewal of civil war in 1904 seemed altogether preferable to an
indefinite continuance of this dualism in government, even at the risk
of friction with Argentina, which was charged with not having observed
strict neutrality. This second struggle came to a close with the death
of the insurgent leader; but it cost the lives of thousands and did
irreparable damage to the commerce and industry of the country.
Uruguay then enjoyed a respite from party upheavals until 1910,
when Jose Batlle, the able, resolute, and radical-minded head of the
Colorados, announced that he would be a candidate for the presidency.
As he had held the office before and had never ceased to wield a strong
personal influence over the administration of his successor, the
Blancos decided that now was the time to attempt once more to oust
their opponents from the control which they had monopolized for half a
century. Accusing the Government of an unconstitutional centralization
of power in the executive, of preventing free elections, and of
crippling the pastoral industries of the country, they started a revolt,
which ran a brief course. Batlle proved himself equal to the situation
and quickly suppressed the insurrection. Though he did make a wide use
of his authority, the President refrained from indulging in political
persecution and allowed the press all the liberty it desired in so far
as was consistent with the law. It was under his direction that Uruguay
entered upon a remarkable series of experiments in the nationalization
of business enterprises. Further, more or less at the suggestion of
Battle, a new constitution was ratified by popular vote in 1917. It
provided for a division of the executive power between the President
and a National Council of Administration, forbade the election of
administrative and military officials to the Congress, granted to that
body a considerable increase of power, and enlarged the facilities for
local self-government. In addition, it established the principle of
minority representation and of secrecy of the ballot, permitted the
Congress to extend the right of suffrage to women, and dissolved the
union between Church and State. If the terms of the new instrument are
faithfully observed, the old struggle between Blancos and Colorados will
have been brought definitely to a close.
Paraguay lapsed after 1898 into the earlier sins of Spanish America.
Upon a comparatively placid presidential regime followed a series
of barrack uprisings or attacks by Congress on the executive. The
constitution became a farce. No longer, to be sure, an abode of Arcadian
seclusion as in colonial times, or a sort of territorial cobweb from the
center of which a spiderlike Francia hung motionless or darted upon his
hapless prey, or even a battle ground on which fanatical warriors might
fight and die at the behest of a savage Lopez, Paraguay now took on
the aspect of an arena in which petty political gamecocks might try out
their spurs. Happily, the opposing parties spent their energies in high
words and vehement gestures rather than in blows and bloodshed. The
credit of the country sank lower and lower until its paper money stood
at a discount of several hundred per cent compared with gold.
European bankers had begun to view the financial future of Argentina
also with great alarm. In 1890 the mad careering of private speculation
and public expenditure along the roseate pathway of limitless credit
reached a veritable "crisis of progress." A frightful panic ensued.
Paper money fell to less than a quarter of its former value in gold.
Many a firm became bankrupt, and many a fortune shriveled. As is usual
in such cases, the Government had to shoulder the blame. A four-day
revolution broke out in Buenos Aires, and the President became the
scapegoat; but the panic went on, nevertheless, until gold stood at
nearly five to one. Most of the banks suspended payment; the national
debt underwent a huge increase; and immigration practically ceased.
By 1895, however, the country had more or less resumed its normal
condition. A new census showed that the population had risen to four
million, about a sixth of whom resided in the capital. The importance
which agriculture had attained was attested by the establishment of a
separate ministry in the presidential cabinet. Industry, too, made such
rapid strides at this time that organized labor began to take a hand
in politics. The short-lived "revolution" of 1905, for example, was
not primarily the work of politicians but of strikers organized into
a workingmen's federation. For three months civil guarantees were
suspended, and by a so-called "law of residence," enacted some years
before and now put into effect, the Government was authorized to expel
summarily any foreigner guilty of fomenting strikes or of disturbing
public order in any other fashion.
Political agitation soon assumed a new form. Since the
Autonomist-National party had been in control for thirty years or more,
it seemed to the Civic-Nationalists, now known as Republicans, to the
Autonomists proper, and to various other factions, that they ought to do
something to break the hold of that powerful organization. Accordingly
in 1906 the President, supported by a coalition of these factions,
started what was termed an "upward-downward revolution"--in other
words, a series of interventions by which local governors and members
of legislatures suspected of Autonomist-National leanings were to
be replaced by individuals who enjoyed the confidence of the
Administration. Pretexts for such action were not hard to find under
the terms of the constitution; but their political interests suffered so
much in the effort that the promoters had to abandon it.
Owing to persistent obstruction on the part of Congress, which took the
form of a refusal either to sanction his appointments or to approve the
budget, the President suspended the sessions of that body in 1908 and
decreed a continuance of the estimates for the preceding year. The
antagonism between the chief executive and the legislature became so
violent that, if his opponents had not been split up into factions,
civil war might have ensued in Argentina.
To remedy a situation made worse by the absence--usual in most of the
Hispanic republics--of a secret ballot and by the refusal of political
malcontents to take part in elections, voting was made both obligatory
and secret in 1911, and the principle of minority representation was
introduced. Legislation of this sort was designed to check bribery and
intimidation and to enable the radical-minded to do their duty at the
polls. Its effect was shown five years later, when the secret ballot
was used substantially for the first time. The radicals won both the
presidency and a majority in the Congress.
One of the secrets of the prosperity of Argentina, as of Brazil, in
recent years has been its abstention from warlike ventures beyond its
borders and its endeavor to adjust boundary conflicts by arbitration.
Even when its attitude toward its huge neighbor had become embittered
in consequence of a boundary decision rendered by the President of
the United States in 1895, it abated none of its enthusiasm for the
principle of a peaceful settlement of international disputes. Four
years later, in a treaty with Uruguay, the so-called "Argentine Formula"
appeared. To quote its language: "The contracting parties agree to
submit to arbitration all questions of any nature which may arise
between them, provided they do not affect provisions of the constitution
of either state, and cannot be adjusted by direct negotiation." This
Formula was soon put to the test in a serious dispute with Chile.
In the Treaty of 1881, in partitioning Patagonia, the crest of the
Andes had been assumed to be the true continental watershed between the
Atlantic and the Pacific and hence was made the boundary line between
Argentina and Chile. The entire Atlantic coast was to belong to
Argentina, the Pacific coast to Chile; the island of Tierra del Fuego
was to be divided between them. At the same time the Strait of Magellan
was declared a neutral waterway, open to the ships of all nations. Ere
long, however, it was ascertained that the crest of the Andes did not
actually coincide with the continental divide. Thereupon Argentina
insisted that the boundary line should be made to run along the crest,
while Chile demanded that it be traced along the watershed. Since the
mountainous area concerned was of little value, the question at bottom
was simply one of power and prestige between rival states.
As the dispute waxed warmer, a noisy press and populace clamored for
war. The Governments of the two nations spent large sums in increasing
their armaments; and Argentina, in imitation of its western neighbor,
made military service compulsory. But, as the conviction gradually
spread that a struggle would leave the victor as prostrate as the
vanquished, wiser counsels prevailed. In 1899, accordingly, the matter
was referred to the King of Great Britain for decision. Though the award
was a compromise, Chile was the actual gainer in territory.
By their treaties of 1902 both republics declared their intention to
uphold the principle of arbitration and to refrain from interfering in
each other's affairs along their respective coasts. They also agreed
upon a limitation of armaments--the sole example on record of a
realization of the purpose of the First Hague Conference. To commemorate
still further their international accord, in 1904 they erected on the
summit of the Uspallata Pass, over which San Martin had crossed with
his army of liberation in 1817, a bronze statue of Christ the Redeemer.
There, amid the snow-capped peaks of the giant Andes, one may read
inscribed upon the pedestal: "Sooner shall these mountains crumble to
dust than Argentinos and Chileans break the peace which at the feet of
Christ the Redeemer they have sworn to maintain!" Nor has the peace been
broken.
Though hostilities with Argentina had thus been averted, Chile had
experienced within its own frontiers the most serious revolution it had
known in sixty years. The struggle was not one of partisan chieftains
or political groups but a genuine contest to determine which of
two theories of government should prevail--the presidential or the
parliamentary, a presidential autocracy with the spread of real
democracy or a congressional oligarchy based on the existing order. The
sincerity and public spirit of both contestants helped to lend dignity
to the conflict.
Jose Manuel Balmaceda, a man of marked ability, who became President in
1886, had devoted much of his political life to urging an enlargement
of the executive power, a greater freedom to municipalities in the
management of their local affairs, and a broadening of the suffrage.
He had even advocated a separation of Church and State. Most of these
proposals so conservative a land as Chile was not prepared to accept.
Though civil marriage was authorized and ecclesiastical influence
was lessened in other respects, the Church stood firm. During his
administration Balmaceda introduced many reforms, both material and
educational. He gave a great impetus to the construction of public
works, enhanced the national credit by a favorable conversion of the
public debt, fostered immigration, and devoted especial attention to the
establishment of secondary schools. Excellent as the administration of
Balmaceda had been in other respects, he nevertheless failed to combine
the liberal factions into a party willing to support the plans of reform
which he had steadily favored. The parliamentary system made Cabinets
altogether unstable, as political groups in the lower house of the
Congress alternately cohered and fell apart. This defect, Balmaceda
thought, should be corrected by making the members of his official
family independent of the legislative branch. The Council of State, a
somewhat anomalous body placed between the President and Cabinet on the
one side and the Congress on the other, was an additional obstruction to
a smooth-running administration. For it he would substitute a tribunal
charged with the duty of resolving conflicts between the two chief
branches of government. Balmaceda believed, also, that greater liberty
should be given to the press and that existing taxes should be altered
as rarely as possible. On its side, the Congress felt that the President
was trying to establish a dictatorship and to replace the unitary system
by a federal union, the probable weakness of which would enable him to
retain his power more securely.
Toward the close of his term in January, 1891, when the Liberals
declined to support his candidate for the presidency, Balmaceda, furious
at the opposition which he had encountered, took matters into his own
hands. Since the Congress refused to pass the appropriation bills, he
declared that body dissolved and proceeded to levy the taxes by decree.
To this arbitrary and altogether unconstitutional performance the
Congress retorted by declaring the President deposed. Civil war broke
out forthwith, and a strange spectacle presented itself. The two chief
cities, Santiago and Valparaiso, and most of the army backed Balmaceda,
whereas the country districts, especially in the north, and practically
all the navy upheld the Congress.
These were, indeed, dark days for Chile. During a struggle of about
eight months the nation suffered more than it had done in years of
warfare with Peru and Bolivia. Though the bulk of the army stood by
Balmaceda, the Congress was able to raise and organize a much stronger
fighting force under a Prussian drillmaster. The tide of battle turned;
Santiago and Valparaiso capitulated; and the presidential cause was
lost. Balmaceda, who had taken refuge in the Argentina legation,
committed suicide. But the Balmacedists, who were included in a general
amnesty, still maintained themselves as a party to advocate in a
peaceful fashion the principles of their fallen leader.
Chile had its reputation for stability well tested in 1910 when
the executive changed four times without the slightest political
disturbance. According to the constitution, the officer who takes the
place of the President in case of the latter's death or disability,
though vested with full authority, has the title of Vice President only.
It so happened that after the death of the President two members of the
Cabinet in succession held the vice presidency, and they were followed
by the chief magistrate, who was duly elected and installed at the
close of the year. In 1915, for the first time since their leader
had committed suicide, one of the followers of Balmaceda was chosen
President--by a strange coalition of Liberal-Democrats, or Balmacedists,
Conservatives, and Nationalists, over the candidate of the Radicals,
Liberals, and Democrats. The maintenance of the parliamentary system,
however, continued to produce frequent alterations in the personnel of
the Cabinet.
In its foreign relations, apart from the adjustment reached with
Argentina, Chile managed to settle the difficulties with Bolivia arising
out of the War of the Pacific. By the terms of treaties concluded in
1895 and 1905, the region tentatively transferred by the armistice of
1884 was ceded outright to Chile in return for a seaport and a narrow
right of way to it through the former Peruvian province of Tarapaca.
With Peru, Chile was not so fortunate. Though the tension over the
ultimate disposal of the Tacna and Arica question was somewhat reduced,
it was far from being removed. Chile absolutely refused to submit the
matter to arbitration, on the ground that such a procedure could not
properly be applied to a question arising out of a war that had taken
place so many years before. Chile did not wish to give the region up,
lest by so doing it might expose Tarapaca to a possible attack from
Peru. The investment of large amounts of foreign capital in the
exploitation of the deposits of nitrate of soda had made that province
economically very valuable, and the export tax levied on the product was
the chief source of the national revenue. These were all potent
reasons why Chile wanted to keep its hold on Tacna and Arica. Besides,
possession was nine points in the law!
On the other hand, the original plan of having the question decided by a
vote of the inhabitants of the provinces concerned was not carried
into effect, partly because both claimants cherished a conviction that
whichever lost the election would deny its validity, and partly because
they could not agree upon the precise method of holding it. Chile
suggested that the international commission which was selected to
take charge of the plebiscite, and which was composed of a Chilean, a
Peruvian, and a neutral, should be presided over by the Chilean member
as representative of the country actually in possession, whereas Peru
insisted that the neutral should act as chairman. Chile proposed also
that Chileans, Peruvians, and foreigners resident in the area six months
before the date of the elections should vote, provided that they had
the right to do so under the terms of the constitutions of both states.
Peru, on its part, objected to the length of residence, and wished to
limit carefully the number of Chilean voters, to exclude foreigners
altogether from the election, and to disregard qualifications for the
suffrage which required an ability to read and write. Both countries,
moreover, appeared to have a lurking suspicion that in any event
the other would try to secure a majority at the polls by supplying a
requisite number of voters drawn from their respective citizenry who
were not ordinarily resident in Tacna and Arica! Unable to overcome the
deadlock, Chile and Peru agreed in 1913 to postpone the settlement for
twenty years longer. At the expiration of this period, when Chile would
have held the provinces for half a century, the question should be
finally adjusted on bases mutually satisfactory. Officially amicable
relations were then restored.
While the political situation in Bolivia remained stable, so much could
not be said of that in Peru and Ecuador. If the troubles in the former
were more or less military, a persistence of the conflict between
clericals and radicals characterized the commotions in the latter,
because of certain liberal provisions in the Constitution of 1907.
Peru, on the other hand, in 1915 guaranteed its people the enjoyment of
religious liberty.
Next to the Tacna and Arica question, the dubious boundaries of Ecuador
constituted the most serious international problem in South America. The
so-called Oriente region, lying east of the Andes and claimed by Peru,
Brazil, and Colombia, appeared differently on different maps, according
as one claimant nation or another set forth its own case. Had all three
been satisfied, nothing would have been left of Ecuador but the strip
between the Andes and the Pacific coast, including the cities of Quito
and Guayaquil. The Ecuadorians, therefore, were bitterly sensitive on
the subject.
Protracted negotiations over the boundaries became alike tedious and
listless. But the moment that the respective diplomats had agreed upon
some knotty point, the Congress of one litigant or another was almost
sure to reject the decision and start the controversy all over again.
Even reference of the matter to the arbitral judgment of European
monarchs produced, so far as Ecuador and Peru were concerned, riotous
attacks upon the Peruvian legation and consulates, charges and
countercharges of invasion of each other's territory, and the suspension
of diplomatic relations. Though the United States, Argentina, and Brazil
had interposed to ward off an armed conflict between the two republics
and, in 1911, had urged that the dispute be submitted to the Hague
Tribunal, nothing would induce Ecuador to comply.
Colombia was even more unfortunate than its southern neighbor, for in
addition to political convulsions it suffered financial disaster and
an actual deprivation of territory. Struggles among factions, official
influence at the elections, dictatorships, and fighting between the
departments and the national Government plunged the country, in 1899,
into the worst civil war it had known for many a day. Paper money,
issued in unlimited amounts and given a forced circulation, made the
distress still more acute. Then came the hardest blow of all. Since
1830 Panama, as province or state, had tried many times to secede from
Colombia. In 1903 the opportunity it sought became altogether favorable.
The parent nation, just beginning to recover from the disasters of civil
strife, would probably be unable to prevent a new attempt at withdrawal.
The people of Panama, of course, knew how eager the United States was
to acquire the region of the proposed Canal Zone, since it had failed to
win it by negotiation with Colombia. Accordingly, if they were to
start a "revolution," they had reason to believe that it would not lack
support--or at least, connivance--from that quarter.
On the 3d of November the projected "revolution" occurred, on schedule
time, and the United States recognized the independence of the "Republic
of Panama" three days later! In return for a guarantee of independence,
however, the United States stipulated, in the convention concluded
on the 18th of November, that, besides authority to enforce sanitary
regulations in the Canal Zone, it should also have the right of
intervention to maintain order in the republic itself. More than
once, indeed, after Panama adopted its constitution in 1904, elections
threatened to become tumultuous; whereupon the United States saw to it
that they passed off quietly.
Having no wish to flout their huge neighbor to the northward, the
Hispanic nations at large hastened to acknowledge the independence of
the new republic, despite the indignation that prevailed in press and
public over what was regarded as an act of despoilment. In view of the
resentful attitude of Colombia and mindful also of the opinion of many
Americans that a gross injustice had been committed, the United States
eventually offered terms of settlement. It agreed to express regret for
the ill feeling between the two countries which had arisen out of the
Panama incident, provided that such expression were made mutual; and, as
a species of indemnity, it agreed to pay for canal rights to be acquired
in Colombian territory and for the lease of certain islands as naval
stations. But neither the terms nor the amount of the compensation
proved acceptable. Instead, Colombia urged that the whole matter be
referred to the judgment of the tribunal at The Hague.
Alluding to the use made of the liberties won in the struggle for
emancipation from Spain by the native land of Miranda, Bolivar, and
Sucre, on the part of the country which had been in the vanguard of
the fight for freedom from a foreign yoke, a writer of Venezuela once
declared that it had not elected legally a single President; had not put
democratic ideas or institutions into practice; had lived wholly under
dictatorships; had neglected public instruction; and had set up a large
number of oppressive commercial monopolies, including the navigation
of rivers, the coastwise trade, the pearl fisheries, and the sale of
tobacco, salt, sugar, liquor, matches, explosives, butter, grease,
cement, shoes, meat, and flour. Exaggerated as the indictment is and
applicable also, though in less degree, to some of the other backward
countries of Hispanic America, it contains unfortunately a large measure
of truth. Indeed, so far as Venezuela itself is concerned, this critic
might have added that every time a "restorer," "regenerator," or
"liberator" succumbed there, the old craze for federalism again broke
out and menaced the nation with piecemeal destruction. Obedient,
furthermore, to the whims of a presidential despot, Venezuela
perpetrated more outrages on foreigners and created more international
friction after 1899 than any other land in Spanish America had ever
done.
While the formidable Guzman Blanco was still alive, the various
Presidents acted cautiously. No sooner had he passed away than disorder
broke out afresh. Since a new dictator thought he needed a longer term
of office and divers other administrative advantages, a constitution
incorporating them was framed and published in the due and customary
manner. This had hardly gone into operation when, in 1895, a contest
arose with Great Britain about the boundaries between Venezuela and
British Guiana. Under pressure from the United States, however, the
matter was referred to arbitration, and Venezuela came out substantially
the loser.
In 1899 there appeared on the scene a personage compared with whom
Zelaya was the merest novice in the art of making trouble. This was
Cipriano Castro, the greatest international nuisance of the early
twentieth century. A rude, arrogant, fearless, energetic, capricious
mountaineer and cattleman, he regarded foreigners no less than his
own countryfolk, it would seem, as objects for his particular scorn,
displeasure, exploitation, or amusement, as the case might be. He was
greatly angered by the way in which foreigners in dispute with
local officials avoided a resort to Venezuelan courts and--still
worse--rejected their decisions and appealed instead to their diplomatic
representatives for protection. He declared such a procedure to be an
affront to the national dignity. Yet foreigners were usually correct in
arming that judges appointed by an arbitrary President were little more
than figureheads, incapable of dispensing justice, even were they so
inclined.
Jealous not only of his personal prestige but of what he imagined, or
pretended to imagine, were the rights of a small nation, Castro tried
throughout to portray the situation in such a light as to induce the
other Hispanic republics also to view foreign interference as a
dire peril to their own independence and sovereignty; and he further
endeavored to involve the United States in a struggle with European
powers as a means possibly of testing the efficacy of the Monroe
Doctrine or of laying bare before the world the evil nature of American
imperialistic designs.
By the year 1901, in which Venezuela adopted another constitution, the
revolutionary disturbances had materially diminished the revenues from
the customs. Furthermore Castro's regulations exacting military service
of all males between fourteen and sixty years of age had filled the
prisons to overflowing. Many foreigners who had suffered in consequence
resorted to measures of self-defense--among them representatives of
certain American and British asphalt companies which were working
concessions granted by Castro's predecessors. Though familiar with what
commonly happens to those who handle pitch, they had not scrupled to
aid some of Castro's enemies. Castro forthwith imposed on them enormous
fines which amounted practically to a confiscation of their rights.
While the United States and Great Britain were expostulating over this
behavior of the despot, France broke off diplomatic relations with
Venezuela because of Castro's refusal either to pay or to submit to
arbitration certain claims which had originated in previous revolutions.
Germany, aggrieved in similar fashion, contemplated a seizure of the
customs until its demands for redress were satisfied. And then came
Italy with like causes of complaint. As if these complications were not
sufficient, Venezuela came to blows with Colombia.
As the foreign pressure on Castro steadily increased, Luis Maria Drago,
the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, formulated in 1902 the
doctrine with which his name has been associated. It stated in substance
that force should never be employed between nations for the collection
of contractual debts. Encouraged by this apparent token of support from
a sister republic, Castro defied his array of foreign adversaries more
vigorously than ever, declaring that he might find it needful to invade
the United States, by way of New Orleans, to teach it the lesson it
deserved! But when he attempted, in the following year, to close the
ports of Venezuela as a means of bringing his native antagonists to
terms, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy seized his warships, blockaded
the coast, and bombarded some of his forts. Thereupon the United States
interposed with a suggestion that the dispute be laid before the Hague
Tribunal. Although Castro yielded, he did not fail to have a clause
inserted in a new "constitution" requiring foreigners who might wish
to enter the republic to show certificates of good character from the
Governments of their respective countries.
These incidents gave much food for thought to Castro as well as to
his soberer compatriots. The European powers had displayed an apparent
willingness to have the United States, if it chose to do so, assume the
role of a New World policeman and financial guarantor. Were it to assume
these duties, backward republics in the Caribbean and its vicinity were
likely to have their affairs, internal as well as external, supervised
by the big nation in order to ward off European intervention. At
this moment, indeed, the United States was intervening in Panama. The
prospect aroused in many Hispanic countries the fear of a "Yankee peril"
greater even than that emanating from Europe. Instead of being a kindly
and disinterested protector of small neighbors, the "Colossus of the
North" appeared rather to resemble a political and commercial ogre bent
upon swallowing them to satisfy "manifest destiny."
Having succeeded in putting around his head an aureole of local
popularity, Castro in 1905 picked a new set of partially justified
quarrels with the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Colombia,
and even with the Netherlands, arising out of the depredations of
revolutionists; but an armed menace from the United States induced him
to desist from his plans. He contented himself accordingly with issuing
a decree of amnesty for all political offenders except the leaders. When
"reelected," he carried his magnanimity so far as to resign awhile in
favor of the Vice President, stating that, if his retirement were to
bring peace and concord, he would make it permanent. But as he saw to it
that his temporary withdrawal should not have this happy result, he came
back again to his firmer position a few months later.
Venting his wrath upon the Netherlands because its minister had reported
to his Government an outbreak of cholera at La Guaira, the chief seaport
of Venezuela, the dictator laid an embargo on Dutch commerce, seized
its ships, and denounced the Dutch for their alleged failure to check
filibustering from their islands off the coast. When the minister
protested, Castro expelled him. Thereupon the Netherlands instituted a
blockade of the Venezuelan ports. What might have happened if Castro
had remained much longer in charge, may be guessed. Toward the close
of 1908, however, he departed for Europe to undergo a course of medical
treatment. Hardly had he left Venezuelan shores when Juan Vicente Gomez,
the able, astute, and vigorous Vice President, managed to secure his
own election to the presidency and an immediate recognition from
foreign states. Under his direction all of the international tangles of
Venezuela were straightened out.
In 1914 the country adopted its eleventh constitution and thereby
lengthened the presidential term to seven years, shortened that
of members of the lower house of the Congress to four, determined
definitely the number of States in the union, altered the apportionment
of their congressional representation, and enlarged the powers of the
federal Government--or, rather, those of its executive branch! In 1914
Gomez resigned office in favor of the Vice President, and secured an
appointment instead as commander in chief of the army. This procedure
was promptly denounced as a trick to evade the constitutional
prohibition of two consecutive terms. A year later he was unanimously
elected President, though he never formally took the oath of office.
Whatever may be thought of the political ways and means of this
new Guzmin Blanco to maintain himself as a power behind or on the
presidential throne, Gomez gave Venezuela an administration of a sort
very different from that of his immediate predecessor. He suppressed
various government monopolies, removed other obstacles to the material
advancement of the country, and reduced the national debt. He did much
also to improve the sanitary conditions at La Guaira, and he promoted
education, especially the teaching of foreign languages.
Gomez nevertheless had to keep a watchful eye on the partisans of
Castro, who broke out in revolt whenever they had an opportunity. The
United States, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Cuba,
and Colombia eyed the movements of the ex-dictator nervously, as
European powers long ago were wont to do in the case of a certain Man
of Destiny, and barred him out of both their possessions and Venezuela
itself. International patience, never Job-like, had been too sorely
vexed to permit his return. Nevertheless, after the manner of the
ancient persecutor of the Biblical martyr, Castro did not refrain from
going to and fro in the earth. In fact he still "walketh about" seeking
to recover his hold upon Venezuela!