CHAPTER X

The outlook for the future--The consequences of trusting Germany--The

Entente's death sentence on Turkey--The social necessity for this

deliverance--Anatolia, the new Turkey after the war--Forecasts about

the Turkish race--The Turkish element in the lost territory--Russia

and Constantinople; international guarantees--Germany, at peace,

benefits too--Farewell to the German "World-politicians"--German

interests in a victorious and in an amputated Turkey--The

German-Turkish treaty--A paradise on earth--The Russian commercial

impetus--The new Armenia--Western Anatolia, the old Greek centre of

civilization--Great Arabia and Syria--The reconciliation of Germany.

We have come to the end of our sketches. The question before us now is:

What will become of Turkey? The Entente has pronounced formal sentence

of death on the Empire of the Sultan, and neither the slowly fading

military power of Turkey, nor the help of Germany, who is herself

already virtually conquered, will be able to arrest her fate.

On the high frost-bound uplands of Armenia the Russians hold a

strategic position from which it is impossible to dislodge them, and

which will probably very soon extend to the Gulf of Alexandretta. In

Mesopotamia, after that enormously important political event, the Fall

of Baghdad, the union was effected between the British troops and

the Russians, advancing steadily from Persia. The Suez Canal is now

no longer threatened, and the British troops have been removed from

there for a counter-offensive in Southern Palestine, and probably,

when the psychological moment arrives, an offensive against Syria,

now so sadly shattered politically. It is quite within the bounds of

possibility, too, that during this war a big new Front may be formed

in Western Anatolia, already completely broken up by the Pan-Hellenic

Irredenta, and the Turks will be hard put to it to find troops to meet

the new offensive. Arabia is finally and absolutely lost, and England,

by establishing an Arabian Caliphate, has already won the war against

Turkey. Meantime, on the far battlefields of Galicia and the Balkans,

whole Ottoman divisions are pouring out their life-blood, fighting for

that elusive German victory that never comes any nearer, while in every

nook and corner of their own land there is a terrible lack of troops.

Enver Pasha, at length grown anxious, has attempted to recall them, but

in vain.

That is a short résumé of the military situation. This is how the

Turkey of Enver and Talaat is atoning for the trust she has placed in

Germany.

To a German journalist who went out two years ago to a great Turkey,

striving for a "Greater Turkey," it does indeed seem a bitter irony of

fate to see his sphere of labour thus reduced to nothingness. The fall

of Turkey is the greatest blow that could have been dealt to German

"world-politics"; it is a disappointment that will have the gravest

consequences. But from the standpoint of culture, human civilisation,

ethics, the liberty of the peoples and justice, historical progress,

the economic development of wide tracts of land of the greatest

importance from their geographical position, it is one of the most

brilliant results of the war, and one to be hailed with unmixed joy.

When I look back on how wonderfully things have shaped in the last two

and a half years I am bound to admit that I am happy things have turned

out as they have. If perchance any Turk who knows me happens to read

these lines, I beg him not to think that my ideas are saturated with

hatred of Turkey. On the contrary, I love the country and the Turkish

race with those many attractive qualities that rightly appealed to a

poet like Loti.

I have asked myself thousands of times what would be the best political

solution of the problem, how to help this people--and the other races

inhabiting their country--to true and lasting happiness. From my many

journeys in tropical lands, I have grown accustomed to the sight of

autochthonous civilisations and semi-civilised peoples, and am as

interested in them as in the most perfectly civilised nations of

Europe. I have therefore, I think, been able to set aside entirely in

my own mind the territorial interests of the West in the development

of the Near East, and give my whole attention to Turkey's own good and

Turkey's own needs. But even then I have been obliged to subscribe

to the sentence of death passed on the Turkey of the Young Turks

and the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. It is with the fullest

consciousness of what I am doing that I agree to the only seemingly

cruel amputation of this State. It is merely the outer shell covering

a number of peoples who suffer cruelly under an unjust system, chief

among them the brave Turkish people who have been led by a criminal

Government to take the last step on the road to ruin. The point of view

I have adopted does not in any way detract from my personal sympathies,

and I still have hopes that the many personal friendships I made

in Constantinople will not be broken by the hard words I have been

obliged to utter in the cause of truth, in the interests of outraged

civilisation, and in the interests of a happier future for the Ottoman

people themselves.

The amputation of Turkey is a stern social necessity. Someone has

said: "The greatest enemy of Turkey is the Turk." I have too much love

for the Turkish people, too much sympathy for them, to adopt this

pessimistic attitude without great inward opposition; but unfortunately

it is only too true. We have seen how the Turkey of Enver and Talaat

has reacted sharply against the Western-minded, liberal era of the

1876 and 1908 constitutions, and has turned again to Asia and her newly

discovered ideal, Turanism. To the Turks of to-day, European culture

and civilisation are at best but a technical means; they are no longer

an end in themselves. Their dream is no longer Western Europe, but a

nationally awakened and strengthened Asiatentum.

In face of this intellectual development, how can we hope that in the

new Turkey there will be a radical alteration of what, in the whole

course of Ottoman history, has always been the one characteristic,

unchangeable, momentous fact, of what has always shattered the most

honest efforts at reform, and always will shatter every attempt at

improvement within a sovereign Turkey--I refer to the relationship

of the Turk to the "_Rajah_" (the "herd"), the Christian subjects of

the Padishah. The Ottoman, the Mohammedan conqueror, lives by the

"herd" he has found in the land he has conquered; the "herd" are the

"unbelievers," and rooted deep in the mind of this sovereign people,

who have never quite lost their nomadic instincts, is the conviction

that they have the right to live by the sweat of the brow of their

Christian subjects and on the fruits of their labour. That we

Europeans think this unjust the Turk will never be able to grasp.

A Wali of Erzerum once said: "The Turkish Government and the Armenian

people stand in the relationship of man and wife, and any third persons

who feel sympathy for the wife and anger at the wife-beating husband

will do better not to meddle in this domestic strife." This quotation

has become famous, for it exactly characterises the relationship of

the Turk to the "Rajah," not to the Armenians. In this phrase alone

there lies, quite apart from all the crimes committed by the present

Turkish Government, a sufficient moral and political foundation for

the sentence of death passed on the sovereignty of the present Turkish

State. For so long as the Turks cling to Islam, from which springs that

opposition between Moslem rulers and "Giaur" subjects so detrimental

to all social progress, it is Europe's sacred duty not to give Turkey

sovereignty over any territory with a strong Christian element. That

is why Turkey must at all costs be confined to Inner Anatolia; that is

why complete amputation is necessary; and why the outlying districts

of Turkey, the Straits, the Anatolian coast, the whole of Armenia must

be rescued and, part of it at any rate, placed under formal European

protection.

Even in Inner Anatolia, which will probably still be left to the

Ottomans after the war, the strongest European influence must be

brought to bear--which will probably not be difficult in view of

Turkey's financial bankruptcy; European customs and civilisation must

be introduced; in a word, Europe must exercise sufficient control

to be in a position to prevent the numerous non-Turks resident even

in Anatolia from being exposed to the old system of exploiting the

"Rajah." Discerning Turks themselves have admitted that it would be

best for Europe to put the whole of Turkey for a generation under

curatorship and general European supervision.

I, personally, should not be satisfied with this system for the

districts occupied more by non-Turks than by Turks; but, on the other

hand, I should not go so far in the case of Inner Anatolia. I trust

that strong European influence will make it possible to make Inner

Anatolia a sovereign territory. I have pinned my faith on the Ottoman

race being given another and final opportunity on her own ground of

showing how she will develop now after the wonderful intellectual

improvement that has taken place during the war. I hope at the same

time that even in a sovereign Turkish Inner Anatolia Europe will have

enough say to prevent any outgrowths of the "Rajah principle."

The Turks must not be deprived of the opportunity to bring their

new-found abilities, which even we must praise, to bear on the

production of a new, modern, but thoroughly Turkish civilisation

of their own on their own ground. Anatolia, beautiful and capable

of development, is, even if we confine it to those interior parts

chiefly inhabited by Ottomans, still quite a big enough field for the

production of such a civilisation; it is quite big enough too for the

terribly reduced numbers now belonging to the Osmanic race.

The amputation and limitation of Turkey, even if they do not succeed

in altering the real Turkish point of view--and this, so far as the

relationship to the Christians is concerned, is the same, from the

Pasha down to the poorest Anatolian peasant--will at least have a

tremendously beneficial effect. The possibilities in the Turkish race

will come to flower. "The worst patriots," I once dared to say in one

of my articles in spite of the censorship, "are not those who look for

the future of the nation in concentrated cultural work in the Turkish

nucleus-land of Anatolia, instead of gaping over the Caucasus and down

into the sands of the African desert in their search for a 'Greater

Turkey.'" And in connection with the series of lectures I have already

mentioned about Anatolian hygiene and social politics, I said, with

quite unmistakable meaning: "Turkey will have a wonderful opportunity

on her own original ground, in the nucleus-land of the Ottomans, of

proving her capability and showing that she has become a really modern,

civilised State."

My earnest wish is that all the Turks' high intellectual abilities,

brought to the front by this war, may be concentrated on this beautiful

and repaying task. Intensive labour and the concentration of all forces

on positive work in the direction of civilisation will have to take the

place of corrupt rule, boundless neglect, waste, the strangulation of

all progressive movements, political illusions, the unquenchable desire

for conquest and oppression. This is what we pray for for Anatolia,

the real New Turkey after the war. In other districts, also, now fully

under European control, the pure Turkish element will flourish much

more exceedingly than ever before under the beneficent protection of

modern, civilised Governments. Frankly, the dream of Turkish Power has

vanished. But new life springs out of ruin and decay; the history of

mankind is a continual change.

Russia, too, after war, will no longer be what she seemed to terrified

Turkish eyes and jealous German eyes dazzled by "world-politics": a

colossal creature, stretching forth enormous suckers to swallow up her

smaller neighbours; a country ruled by a dull, unthinking despotism.

From the standpoint of universal civilisation it is to be hoped that

the solution of the problem of the Near East will be to transform

the Straits between the Black Sea and Aegea, together with the city

of Constantinople, uniquely situated as it is, into a completely

international stretch with open harbours. Then we need no longer oppose

Russian aspirations. If England, the stronghold of Free Trade and of

all principles of freedom of intercourse, and France, the land of

culture, interested in Turkey to the extent of millions, were content

to leave Russia a free hand in the Straits; if Roumania, shut in in

the Black Sea, did not fear for her trade, but was willing to become

an ally of Russia in full knowledge of the Entente agreement about

the Straits, it is of course sufficiently evident what guarantee

with regard to international freedom modern Russia will have to give

after the war, and even the Germans have nothing to fear. Of course

the German anti-European "Antwerp-Baghdad" dream will be shattered.

But once Germany is at peace, she will probably find that even the

Russian solution of the Straits question benefits her not a little. The

final realisation of Russia's efforts, justifiable both historically

and geographically, to reach the Mediterranean at this one eminently

suitable spot, will certainly contribute in an extraordinary degree to

remove the unbearable political pressure from Europe and ensure peace

for the world.

Just a few parting words to the German "World-politicians." Very often,

as I have said, I heard during my stay in Constantinople expressions

of anxiety on the part of Germans that all German interests, even

purely commercial ones, would be gravely endangered in the victorious

New Turkey, which would spring to life again with renewed jingoistic

passions and renewed efforts at emancipation. And more than once--all

honour to the feelings of justice and the sound common sense of those

who dared to utter such opinions--I was told by Germans, in the middle

of the war, and with no attempt at concealment, that they fully agreed

it was an absolute necessity for Russia to have the control of the

only outlet for her enormous trade to the Mediterranean, and that

commercially at any rate the fight for Constantinople and the Straits

was a fight for a just cause.

Now, let us take these two points of view together. From the purely

German standpoint, which is better?--a victorious and self-governing

Turkey imbued with jingoism and the desire for emancipation,

practically closed to us, even commercially, or an amputated Turkey,

compelled to appeal for European help and European capital to recover

from her state of complete exhaustion; a Turkey freed from those

Young Turkish jingoists who, in spite of all their fine phrases and

the German help they had to accept for all their inward distaste of

it, hate us from the very depths of their heart; a Turkey which, even

if Russia,--as a last resort!--is allowed to become mistress of the

Dardanelles with huge international guarantees, would, in the Anatolia

that is left to her, capable of development as it is, and rich in

national wealth, offer a very considerable field of activity for German

enterprise? The short-sighted Pan-Germans, who are now fighting for the

victory of anti-foreign neo-Pan-Turkism against the modern, civilised

States of the Entente, who had no wish at all that Germany should not

fare as well as the rest in the wide domains of Asiatic Turkey, can

perhaps answer my question. They should have asked themselves this,

and foreseen the consequences before they yielded weakly to Turkish

caprices and themselves stirred up the Turks against Europe.

As things stand now, however, the German Government has thought fit,

in her blind belief in ultimate victory, to enter on a formal treaty,

guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, at

a point in the war when no reasonable being even in Germany could

possibly still believe that a German victory would suffice to protect

Turkey after she has been solemnly condemned by the Entente for her

long list of crimes. Germany has thus given a negative answer to the

question passed from mouth to mouth in the international district of

Pera almost right from Turkey's entry into the war: "Will Germany, if

necessary, sacrifice Constantinople and the Dardanelles, if she can

thus secure peace with Russia?" She had already given the answer "No"

before the absurd illusions of a possible separate peace with Russia

at this price were finally and utterly dispelled by the speech of the

Russian Minister Trepoff, and the purposeful and cruelly clear refusal

of Germany's offer of peace. These events and the increasing excitement

about the war in Constantinople and elsewhere were not required to

show that in the Near East as well the fight must be fought "to the

bitter end."

Never, however--and that is German World-politics, and the ethics of

the World-politician--have I ever heard a single one of those Germans,

who thought it an impossibility to sacrifice their ally Turkey in order

to gain the desired peace, put forward as an argument for his opinion

the shame of a broken promise, but only the consideration that German

activity in the lands of Islam, and particularly in the valuable Near

East, would be over and done with for ever. I wonder if those who have

decided, with the phantom of a German-Turkish victory ever before them,

to go on with the struggle on the side of Turkey even after she had

committed such abominable crimes, and to drench Europe still further

with the blood of all the civilised nations of the world, ever have

any qualms as to how much of their once brilliant possibilities of

commercial activity in Turkey, now so lightly staked, would still exist

were Turkey victorious.

Luckily for mankind, history has decided otherwise. After the war, the

huge and flourishing trade of Southern Russia will be carried down to

the then open seaports between Europe and Asia; the wealth of Odessa

and the Pontus ports, enormously increased and free to develop, will

be concentrated on the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, and the whole

hitherto neglected city of Constantinople, from Pera and Galata to

Stamboul and Scutari and Haidar-Pasha, will become an earthly paradise

of pulsing life, well-being, and comfort. The luxury and elegance of

the Crimea will move southwards to these shores of unique natural

beauty and mild climate which form the bridge between two continents

and between two seas. Anyone who returns after a decade of peaceful

labour, when the Old World has recovered from its wounds, to the

Bosporus and the shores of the Sea of Marmora, which he knew before the

war, under Turkish régime, will be astonished at the marvellous changes

which will then have been wrought in that favoured corner of the earth.

Never, even after another hundred years of Turkish rule, would that

unique coast ever have become what it can be and what it must be--one

of the very greatest centres of international intercourse and the

Riviera of the East, not only in beauty of landscape, but in luxury

and wealth. The greatest stress in this connection is to be laid on

the lively Russian impetus that will spring from a modernised Russia,

untrammelled by restrictions in the Straits. Convinced as I am that

Russia after the war will no longer be the Russia of to-day, so feared

by Germany, the Balkan States, and Turkey, I am prepared to give this

impetus full play, as being the best possible means for the further

development of Constantinople.

In Asia Minor, from Brussa to the slopes of the Taurus and the foot

of the Armenian mountains, there will extend a modern Turkey which

has finally come to rest, to concentration, to peaceful labour, after

centuries of conflict, despotic extortion, the suicidal policy of

military adventurers, and superficial attempts at expansion coupled

with neglect of the most important internal duties. The inhabitants

of these lands will soon have forgotten that "Greater Turkey" has

collapsed. They will be really happy at last, these people whose

idea of happiness hitherto had been a veneer of material well-being

obtained by toadying, while the great bulk of the Empire pined in dirt,

ignorance, and poverty, consumed by an outworn militarism, oppressed

by a decaying administration. Then, but not till then, the world will

see what the Turkish people is capable of. Then there will be no need

for pessimism about this kindly and honourable race. Then we can become

honest "Pro-Turks" again.

In Western Asia Minor, Europe will not forget that the whole shore,

where once stood Troy, Ephesus, and Milet, is an out-and-out Hellenic

centre of civilisation. Quite independently of all political feelings

towards present-day Greece, this historical fact must be taken into

consideration in the final ruling. It is to be hoped that the Greek

people will not have to atone for ever for the faults of their

non-Greek king who has forgotten that it is his sacred duty to be a

Greek and nothing but a Greek, and who has betrayed the honour and the

future of the nation.

The Armenian mountain-land, laid waste by war, and emptied of men

by Talaat's passion for persecution, will obtain autonomy from her

conqueror, Russia, and will perhaps be linked up with all the other

parts of the east, inhabited by the last remnants of the Armenian

people. Armenia, with its central position and divided into three among

Turkey, Russia, and Persia, may from its geographical position, its

unfortunate history, and the endless sufferings it has been called

upon to bear, be called the Poland of Further Asia. Delivered from the

Turkish system, freed from all antagonistic Turko-Russian military

principles of obstruction, linked up by railways to the west as well as

the already well-developed region of Transcaucasia, with a big through

trade from the Black Sea via Trapezunt to Persia and Mesopotamia,

it will once more offer an excellent field of activity to the high

intellectual and commercial abilities of its people, now, alas!

scattered to the four winds of heaven. But they will return to their

old home, bringing with them European ideas, European technique, and

the most modern methods from America.

If men are lacking, they can be obtained from the near Caucasus with

its narrow, over-filled valleys, inhabited by a most superior race

of men, who have always had strong emigrating instincts. Even this

most unfortunate country in the whole world, which the Turks of the

Old Régime and of the New have systematically mutilated and at last

bequeathed to Russia with practically not a man left, is going to have

its spring-time.

In the south, Great Arabia and Syria will have autonomy under the

protection of England and France with their skilful Islam policy; they

will have the benefit of the approved methods of progressive work in

Egypt, the Soudan, and India as well as the Atlas lands; they will be

exposed to the influences and incitements of the rest of civilised

Europe; they will probably be enriched with capital from America,

where thousands of Arab and Syrian, as well as Armenian, refugees have

found a home; they will provide the first opportunity in history of

showing how the Arab race accommodates itself to modern civilisation

on its own ground and with its own sovereign administration. The final

deliverance of the Arabs from the oppressive and harmful supremacy of

the Turks, now happily accomplished by the war, was one of the most

urgent demands for a race that can look back on centuries of brilliant

civilisation. The civilised world will watch with the keenest interest

the self-development of the Arabian lands.

Even Germany, once she is at peace, will have no need to grumble at

these arrangements, however diametrically opposed they may be to the

now sadly shattered plans of the Pan-German and Expansion politicians.

Germany will not lose the countless millions she has invested in

Turkey. She will have her full and sufficient share in the European

work and commercial activity that will soon revive again in the Near

East. The Baghdad railway of "Rohrbach & Company" will never be

built, it is true; but the Baghdad Railway with a loyal international

marking off of the different zones of interest, the Baghdad Railway,

as a huge artery of peaceful intercourse linking up the whole of Asia

Minor and bringing peace and commercial prosperity, will all the more

surely rise from its ruins. And when once the German _Weltpolitik_

with its jealousy, its tactless, sword-rattling interference in the

time-honoured vital interests of other States, its political intrigues

disguised in commercial dress, is safely dead and buried, there will be

nothing whatever to hinder Germany from making use of this railway and

carrying her purely commercial energy and the products of her peaceful

labour to the shores of the Persian Gulf and receiving in return the

rich fruits of her cultural activity on the soil of Asia Minor.

APPENDIX

For the better understanding of the fact that a German journalist, the

representative of a great national paper like the _Kölnische Zeitung_,

could publish such a book as this, and to ward off in advance all the

furious personal attacks which will result from its publication, and

which might, without an explanation, injuriously affect its value as

an independent and uninfluenced document, it is, I think, essential to

explain the rôle I filled in Constantinople, how I left Turkey, and how

I came to the decision to publish my experiences.

As far as my post on the _Kölnische Zeitung_ is concerned, I accepted

it and went to Turkey although I was from the very beginning against

German "World-politics" of the present-day style at any rate (not

against German commercial and cultural activity in foreign countries)

and against militarism--as was only to be expected from one who had

studied colonial politics and universal history unreservedly, and had

spent many years studying in the English, French, and German colonies

of Africa--and although I was quite convinced that Germany's was the

crime of setting the war in motion. Besides, my "anti-militarism" is

not of a dogmatic kind, but refers merely to the relations customary

between civilised nations--witness the fact that I took part in the

Colonial War of 1904-6 in German South-West Africa as a volunteer.

I hoped to find in Turkey some satisfaction for my extra-European

leanings, a sphere of labour less absorbed by German militarism, and

opportunity for independent study, and surely no one will take it amiss

that I seized such a chance, certainly unique in war-time, in spite of

my political views.

Once arrived in Turkey, I kept well in the background to begin with,

so as to be able to form my own opinion, of course doing my uttermost

at the same time to be loyal to the task I had undertaken. In spite

of everything I had to witness, it was quite easy to reconcile all

oppositions, until that famous day when my wife denounced Germany to

my face. From that moment I became an enemy of present-day Germany

and began to think of one day publishing the whole truth about the

system. Until then I had contented myself with never saying a good word

about the war, as one can easily find for oneself from a perusal of my

various articles in the _Kölnische Zeitung_ during 1915-16, dated from

Constantinople and marked (a small steamship).

That dramatic event which finally alienated me from the German cause

took place just after the end of a severe crisis in my relationship

with German-Turkish Headquarters. Some slight hints I had given of

Turkish mismanagement, cynicism, and jingoism in a series of articles

appearing from February 15th, 1916, onwards, under the title "Turkish

Economic Problems," so far as they were possible under existing

censorship conditions, was the occasion of the trouble. One can imagine

that Headquarters would certainly be furious with a journalist whose

articles appeared one fine day, literally translated, in the _Matin_

under the title: "_Situation insupportable en Turquie, décrite par un

journaliste allemand_" ("Insufferable situation in Turkey, described

by a German journalist"), and cropped up once more on June 1st, in

the _Journal des Balcans_, I was three times over threatened with

dismissal. My paper sent a confidential man to hold an inquiry, and

after a month he made a confidential report, which resulted in my being

allowed to remain. But the fact that the same journalist that wrote

such things was married to a Czech was too much for my colleagues,

who were in part in the pay of the Embassy, in part in the pay of the

Young Turkish Committee, whose politics they praised, regardless of

their own inward convictions, like the representative of the _Berliner

Tageblatt_, to get material benefit or make sure of their own jobs.

I gleaned many humorous details at a nightly sitting of my Press

colleagues in Pera, at which I myself was branded as a "dangerous

character that must be got rid of," and my wife (who was far too young

ever to worry about politics) as a "Russian spy"--perhaps because, with

the justifiable pride and reserve of her race, she did not attempt to

cultivate the society of the German colony. That began the period of

intrigues and ill-will, but my enemies did not succeed in damaging

me, although matters went so far as a denunciation of me before the

"Prevention of Espionage Department" of the General Staff in Berlin. My

paper, after they had given me the fullest moral satisfaction, and had

arranged for me to remain in Constantinople in spite of all that had

taken place, thought it was better to give me the chance of changing

and offered me a new post on the editorial staff elsewhere.

However, I was now quite finished with Germany, or rather with its

politics; it would have been a moral impossibility for me to write

another single word in the editorial line; so I refused the offer and

applied for sick-leave from October 1st, 1916, to the end of the war

(by telegram about the middle of August). It was granted me with an

expression of regret.

Arrived in Switzerland (February 7th, 1917), I severed all connection

with my paper by mutual consent from October 1st, 1916, onwards. After

my resignation, no special editorial representative of the _Kölnische

Zeitung_ was appointed to take my place, as the censorship made any

kind of satisfactory work impossible.

I should like to emphasise the fact that the intrigues against me,

the crisis with Headquarters I have just mentioned, and my departure

from Constantinople did not injure me in any way either morally

or financially, and have nothing whatever to do with the present

publication. It is certainly not any petty annoyance that could bring

me to such an action, which will probably entail more than enough

unpleasant consequences for me. The reproaches levelled against me by

my pushing, jingoistic colleagues were as impotent as their attempts to

get rid of me as "dangerous to the German Cause"; I have written proof

of this from my paper in my hand, and also of the fact that it was of

my own free-will that I retired. I can therefore look forward quite

calmly to all the personal invective that is sure to be showered on me

for political reasons.

I had sufficient independent means not to feel the loss of my post

in Constantinople too keenly; and if I still kept my post after the

beginning of the crisis with Headquarters, it was simply and solely so

that as a newspaper correspondent I might be in possession of fuller

information, and able to follow up as long as possible the developments

that were taking place on that most interesting soil of Turkey.

When that was no longer possible, I refused the post offered me in

Cologne--in fact twice, once by letter and once by telegram--for I

could not pretend to opinions I directly opposed. I therefore remained

as a free-lance in the Turkish capital. I was extremely glad that the

difference of opinion ended as it did, for I had at last a free hand to

say and write what I thought and felt.

My stay in Constantinople for a further three months as a silent

observer naturally did not escape the notice of the German authorities,

and after they had reported to the Foreign Office that a "satisfactory

co-operation between me and the German representatives was not longer

possible," they had of course to discover some excuse for putting an

end to my prolonged stay in Turkey. They finally attempted to get rid

of me by calling me up for military duty again. But this was useless in

my case, for my health had been badly shaken by my spell at the Front

at the beginning of the war, and besides I had the doctor's word for it

that I should never be able to stand the German climate after having

lived so long in the Tropics.

Whether they liked it or not, the authorities had to find some

other means of getting me out of Constantinople. The Consul-General

approached me, after he had discussed the matter with the Ambassador,

to see if I would not like to go to Switzerland to get properly cured;

otherwise he was sure I would be turned out by the Turks. They were

evidently afraid, for I was getting more and more into bad odour

with the German authorities for my ill-concealed opinions, that I

would publish my impressions, with documentary support, as soon as

ever there was a change of government in Turkey, or as soon as the

German censorship was removed and anything of the kind was possible.

They apparently thought that the frontier regulations would be quite

sufficient to prevent my taking any documentary evidence with me to

Switzerland.

As a matter of fact this was the case, and the day before my departure

from Constantinople I carefully burned the whole of my many notes,

which would have produced a much more effective indictment against the

moral sordidness of the German-Young Turkish system than these very

general sketches. But the strictest frontier regulations could not

prevent me from taking with me, free of all censorship, the impressions

I had received in Turkey, and the opinions I had arrived at after a

painful battle for loyalty to myself as a German and to the duties I

had undertaken. Even then I had considerable difficulty in getting

across the frontier, and I had to wait seventeen whole days at the

frontier before I was finally allowed into Switzerland. It was only

owing to the fact that I sent a telegram to the Chancellor, on the

authority of the Consul-General in Constantinople, begging that no

difficulties of a political kind might be placed in the way of my

going to Switzerland, as I had been permitted to do so by medical

certificate, the passport authorities and the local command, that I

finally won my point with the frontier authorities and was permitted to

cross into Switzerland.

To tell the truth, I must admit that the high civil authorities, and

particularly the Foreign Office, treated me throughout most kindly and

courteously. For this one reason I had a hard fight with myself, right

up to the very last, even after I arrived in Switzerland, before I

sat down and wrote out my impressions and opinions of German-Turkish

politics. And if I have now finally decided to make them public, I can

only do so with an expression of the most honest regret that my private

and political conscience has not allowed me to requite the kindness of

the authorities by keeping silent about what I saw of the German and

Turkish system.

End of Project Gutenberg's Two War Years in Constantinople, by Harry Stuermer

Two war years in Constantinople · 第 10 / 10 章