CHAPTER VII

Young Turkish nationalism--One-sided abolition of

capitulations--Anti-foreign efforts at emancipation--Abolition of

foreign languages--German simplicity--The Turkification of commercial

life--Unmistakable intellectual improvement as a result of the

war--Trade policy and customs tariff--National production--The

founding of new businesses in Turkey--Germany supplanted--German

starvation--Capitulations or full European control?--The colonisation

and forcible Turkification of Anatolia--"The properties of people who

have been dispatched elsewhere"--The "Mohadjirs"--Greek persecutions

just before the Great War--The "discovery" of Anatolia, the nucleus

of the Ottoman Empire--Turkey finds herself at last--Anatolian

dirt and decay--The "Greater Turkey" and the purely Turkish

Turkey--Cleavage or concentration?

From the Germans we now turn again to the Turks, to try to fathom

the exact mentality of the Young Turks during the great war, and

to discover what were the intellectual sources for their various

activities.

To give a better idea of the whole position I will just preface my

remarks by stating a few of the outstanding features of the present

Young Turkish Government and their dependents. Their first and chief

characteristic is _hostility to foreigners_, but this does not prevent

them from making every possible use of their ally Germany, or from

appropriating in every walk of life anything European, be it a matter

of technical skill, government, civilisation, that they consider might

be profitable. Secondly they are possessed of an unbounded store of

_jingoism_, which has its origin in _Pan-Turkism_ with its ruling idea

of "Turanism." Pan-Turkism, which seems to be the governing passion of

all the leading men of the day, finds expression in two directions.

Outwardly it is a constant striving for a "Greater Turkey," a movement

that for a large part in its essence, and certainly in its territorial

aims, runs parallel with the "Holy War"; inwardly it is a fanatical

desire for a general Turkification which finds outlet in political

nationalistic measures, some of criminal barbarity, others partaking of

the nature of modern reforms, beginning with the language regulations

and "internal colonisation" and ending in the Armenian persecutions.

It is worthy of note that of the two intellectual sources of the "Holy

War," namely Turanism--which one might reverse and call an extended

form of Old-Turkism--and Pan-Islamism, the men of the "Committee for

Unity and Progress" have only made logical though unsuccessful use

of the former, although theoretically speaking they recognise the

value of the latter as well. While Turkish race-fanaticism, which

finds practical outlet in Turanistic ideas, is still the intellectual

backbone of official Turkey to-day and has to be broken by the present

war, the Young Turkish Islam policy is already completely bankrupt and

can therefore be studied here dispassionately in all its aspects. We

propose to treat the matter in some detail.

All New-Turkish Nationalistic efforts at emancipation had as first

principle the abolition of Capitulations. The whole Young Turkish

period we have here under review is therefore to be dated from that

day, shortly before Turkey's entry into the war, when that injunction

was flung overboard which Europe had anxiously placed for the

protection of the interests of Europeans on a State but too little

civilised. It was Turkey herself that did this after having curtly

refused the Entente offer to remove the Capitulations as a reward for

Turkey's remaining neutral. Germany, who was equally interested in

the existence or non-existence of Capitulations, never mentioned this

painful subject to her ally for a very long time, and it was 1916

before she formally recognised the abolition of Capitulations, long

after she had lost all hold on Turkey in that direction.

As early as summer 1915 there were clear outward indications in the

streets of Constantinople of a smouldering Nationalism ready to break

out at any moment. Turkey, under the leadership of Talaat Bey, pursued

her course along the well-trodden paths, and the first sphere in which

there was evidence of an attempt at forcible Turkification was the

language. Somewhere toward the end of 1915 Talaat suddenly ordered the

removal of all French and English inscriptions, shop signs, etc., even

in the middle of European Pera. In tramcars and at stopping-places the

French text was blocked out; boards with public police warnings in

French were either removed altogether or replaced by unreadable Turkish

scrawls; the street indications were simply abolished. The authorities

apparently thought it preferable that the Levantine public should get

into the wrong tramcar, should break their legs getting out, pick

flowers in the parks and wander round helplessly in a maze of unnamed

streets rather than that the spirit of forcible Turkification should

make even the least sacrifice to comfort.

Of the thousand inhabitants of Pera, not ten can read Turkish; but

under the pressure of the official order and for fear of brutal assault

or some kind of underhand treatment in case of non-compliance, the

inhabitants really surpassed themselves, and before one could turn,

all the names over the shops had been painted over and replaced by

wonderful Turkish characters that looked like decorative shields or

something of the kind painted in the red and white of the national

colours. If one had not noted the entrance to the shop and the look of

the window very carefully, one might wander helplessly up and down the

Grand Rue de Péra if one wanted to buy something in a particular shop.

But the German, as simple-minded as ever where political matters

were concerned, was highly delighted in spite of the extraordinary

difficulty of communal life. "Away with French and English," he would

shout. "God punish England; hurrah, our Turkish brothers are helping us

and favouring the extension of the German language!"

The answer to these pan-German expansion politicians and language

fanatics, whose spiritual home was round the beer-tables of the

"Teutonia," was provided by a second decree of Talaat's some weeks

later when all German notices had to disappear. A few, who would not

believe the order, held out obstinately, and the signs remained in

German till they were either supplemented in 1916, on a very clear

hint from Stamboul, by the obligatory Turkish language or later

quite supplanted. It was not till some time after the German had

disappeared--and this is worthy of note--that the Greek signs ceased to

exist. Greek had been up to that time the most used tongue and was the

commercial language of the Armenians.

Then came the famous language regulations, which even went so far--with

a year of grace granted owing to the extraordinary difficulties of

the Turkish script--as to decree that in the offices of all trade

undertakings of any public interest whatsoever, such as banks,

newspapers, transport agencies, etc., the Turkish language should be

used exclusively for book-keeping and any written communication with

customers. One can imagine the "Osmanic Lloyd" and the "German Bank"

with Turkish book-keeping and Turkish letters written to an exclusively

European clientèle! Old and trusty employees suddenly found themselves

faced with the choice of learning the difficult Turkish script or being

turned out in a year's time. The possibility--indeed, the necessity--of

employing Turkish hands in European businesses suddenly came within

the range of practical politics--and that was exactly what the Turkish

Government wanted.

The arrangement had not yet come into operation when I left

Constantinople, but it was hanging like the sword of Damocles over

commercial undertakings that had hitherto been purely German. Optimists

still hoped it never would come to this pass and would have welcomed

any political-military blow that would put a damper on Turkey's

arrogance. Others, believing firmly in a final Turkish victory, began

to learn Turkish feverishly. Be that as it may, the new arrangements

were hung up on the walls of all offices in the summer of 1916 and

created confusion enough.

Many other measures for the systematic Turkification of commercial life

and public intercourse followed hard on this first bold step, which I

need scarcely mention here. And in spite of the ever-growing number of

German officials in the different ministries, partly foisted on the

Turkish Government by the German authorities, partly gladly accepted

for the moment because the Turks had still much to learn from German

organisation and could profit from employing Germans, in spite of the

appointment of a number of German professors to the Turkish University

of Stamboul (who, however, as a matter of fact, like the German

Government officials, had to wear the fez and learn Turkish within a

year, and besides roused most unfavourable and anti-German comment

in the newspapers), it was soon perfectly evident to every unbiased

witness that Germany would find no place in a victorious Turkey after

the war if the "Committee for Union and Progress" did not need her.

Some sort of light must surely have broken over the last blind optimism

of the Germans in the course of the summer of 1916.

Hand in hand with the nationalistic attempt to coerce European

businesses into using the Turkish language there went more practical

attempts to turkify all the important branches of commerce by the

founding of indigenous organisations and the introduction of reforms

of more material content than those language decrees. These efforts,

in spite of the enormous absorption of all intellectual capabilities

and energies in war and the clash of arms, were expressed with a truly

marvellous directness of aim, and, from the national standpoint, a

truly commendable magnificence of conception.

This latter has indeed never been lacking as a progressive ethnic

factor in Turkish politics. The Turks have a wonderful understanding,

too, of the importance of social problems, or at least, as a sovereign

people, they feel instinctively what in a social connection will

further their sovereignty. The war with its enormous intellectual

activity has certainly brought all the political and economic resources

of the Turks--including the Young Turkish Government--to the highest

possible stage of development, and we ought not to be surprised if

we often find that measures, whether of a beneficent or injurious

character, are not lacking in modern exactness, clever technicality,

and thoroughness of conception. Without anticipating, I should just

like to note here how this change appears to affect the war. No one

can doubt that it will enormously intensify zeal in the fight for

the existence of the Turkey of the future, freed from its jingoistic

outgrowths, once more come to its senses and confined to its own proper

sphere of activity, Anatolia, the core of the Empire. But, on the other

hand, iron might and determined warfare against this misguided State

are needed to root out false and harmful ideas.

If, after this slight digression, we glance for a moment at the

practical measures for a complete Turkification of Turkey, the

economic efforts at emancipation and the civic reforms carried

through, we find first of all that the new Turkey, when she had thrown

the Capitulations overboard, then proceeded to emancipate herself

completely from European supervision in the realm of trade and commerce.

A very considerable step in advance in the way of Turkish sovereignty

and Turkish economic patriotism was the organisation and--since

September 1916--execution of the neo-Turkish autonomic customs tariff,

which with one blow gives Turkish finances what the Government formerly

managed to extract painfully from the Great Powers bit by bit, by

fair means or foul, at intervals of many years, and which with its

hard-and-fast scale of taxes--which there appears to be no inclination

in political circles at the moment to modify by trade treaties!--means

an exceedingly adequate protection of Turkey's national productions,

without any reference whatever to the export interests of her allies,

and is a very strong inducement to the renaissance of at any rate the

most important national industries. The far-flung net of the "Djemiet"

(whose acquaintance we have already made in another connection),

that purely Turkish commercial undertaking with Talaat Bey at its

head, regulating everything as it did, taking everything into its own

hands, from the realising of the products of the Anatolian farmers

(and incidentally bringing it about that their ally Germany had to pay

heavily and always in cash, even although the Government itself owed

millions, to Germany and got everything on credit from flour out of

Roumania to paper for their journals) to the most difficult rationing

of towns, forms a foundation for the nationalising of economic life of

the very greatest importance.

The establishment of purely Turkish trade and transport companies,

often with pensioned Ministers as directors and principal shareholders,

and the new language regulations and other privileges will soon cut the

ground away from under the feet of European concerns. Able assistance

is given in this direction by the _Tanin_ and the _Hilal_ (the

"Crescent"), the newly founded "Committee" paper in the French language

(when it is a question of the official influencing of public opinion

in European and Levantine quarters, exceptions can be made even in

language fanaticism!) in which a series of articles invariably appear

at the founding of each new company praising the patriotic zeal of the

founders.

Then again there are the increasingly thinly veiled efforts to

establish a purely Turkish national banking system. Quite lately there

has been a movement in favour of founding a Turkish National Bank with

the object of supplanting the much-hated "Deutsche Bank" in spite of

the credit it always gives, and that international and preponderatingly

French institution, the "Banque Impériale Ottomane," which had already

simply been sequestrated without more ado.

The Turks have decided, too, that the mines are to be nationalised, and

Turkish companies have already been formed, without capital it is true,

to work the mines after the war. The same applies to the railways--in

spite of the fine German plans for the Baghdad Railway.

All these wonderful efforts at emancipation are perfectly justified

from the patriotic point of view, and are so many blows dealt at

Germany, who, quite apart from Rohrbach's _Welt_-_politik_, had at

least hoped to find a lucrative field of privileged commercial activity

in the country of her close and devoted allies the Turks. It is of

supreme significance that while the war is still at its height, while

the Empire of the Sultan is defending its very existence at the gates

of the capital with German arms and German money, there is manifested

with the most startling clearness the failure of German policy, the

endangering of all these German "vital interests" in Turkey which

according to Pan-German and Imperialistic views were one of the most

important stakes to be won by wantonly letting loose this criminal war

on Europe.

No doubt many a German was only too well aware of the fact that in

this Turkey suddenly roused by the war all the ground had been lost

that he had built on with such profit before, and many an anxious face

did one see in German circles in Constantinople. I need not tarry here

over the drastic comments I heard from so many German merchants on

this subject. They show a most curious state of mind on the part of

those who had formerly, in their quest for gain and nothing but gain,

profited in true parasitical fashion from the financial benefits of

the Capitulations and had seen nothing but the money side of this

arrangement which was, after all, entered into for other purposes. It

was no rare thing and no paradox to find a German company director say,

as I heard one say: "If things went against Turkey to-day, I would

willingly shoulder my gun, old man as I am."

No thinking man will expend too much grief over the ruthless abolition

of the Capitulations, for they were unmoral and gave too much

opportunity to parasites and rogues, while they were quite inadequate

to protect the interests of civilisation. They may have sufficed in

the time of Abdul-Hamid, who was easily frightened off and was always

sensible and polite in his dealings with Europe. For the Turkey of

Enver and Talaat quite other measures are needed. One must, according

to one's political standpoint, either recognise and accept their

nationalistic programme of emancipation or combat it forcibly by

introducing full European control. And however willing one may be

to let foreign nations develop in their own particular way and work

out their own salvation, one's standpoint with regard to a State so

behindhand, so fanatical, so misguided as Turkey can be but one: the

introduction and continuation at all costs of whatever guarantees

the best protection to European civilisation in this land of such

importance culturally and historically.

Not only were Europeans, but the natives themselves, affected by the

series of measures that one might class together under the heading of

Turkish Internal Colonisation and the Nationalising of Anatolia. The

programme of the Young Turks was not only a "Greater Turkey," but above

all a purely Turkish Turkey; and if the former showed signs of failing

because they had over-estimated their powers and their chances in the

war or had employed wrong methods, there was nothing at all to hinder

a sovereign Government from striving all the more ruthlessly to gain

their second point.

The way this Turkification of Anatolia was carried on was certainly

not lacking in thoroughness, like all their nationalistic efforts. The

best means that lay to hand were the frightful Armenian persecutions

which affected a wonderful clearance among the population. "The

properties of persons who have been dispatched elsewhere" within the

meaning of the Provisory Bill were either distributed free or sold

for a mere song to anyone who applied to the Committee for them and

proved themselves of the same political persuasion or of pure Turkish

or preponderatingly Turkish nationality. The rent was often fixed

as low as 30 piastres a month (about 5_s._ 8_d._) for officials and

retired military men. In the case of the latter, Enver Pasha thought

this an excellent opportunity for getting rid, through the medium of a

kindly invitation to settle in the Interior, of those who worried him

by their dissatisfaction with his system and who might have prepared

difficulties for him. This "settling" was carried out with the greatest

zeal in the exceptionally flourishing and fruitful districts of Brussa,

Smyrna-Aidin, Eskishehir, Adabazar, Angora, and Adana, where Armenians

and Greeks had played such a great, and, to the Turks, unpopular part

as pioneers of civilisation.

The semi-official articles in the _Tanin_ were perfectly right in

praising the local authorities who in contrast with their former

indifference and ignorance "had now fully recognised the great national

importance of internal colonisation and the settling of Mohadjirs

(emigrants from the lost Turkish territory in Bosnia, Macedonia,

Thrace, etc.) in the country." There is nothing to be said in favour

of the stupid, unprogressive character of the Anatolian as contrasted

with the strength, physical endurance, intelligence, and mobility of

these emigrants. The latter had also, generally speaking, lived in more

highly developed districts.

The great drawback of the Mohadjirs, however, is their instability,

their idleness and love of wandering, their frivolity, and their

extraordinary fanaticism. As faithful Mohammedans following the

standard of their Padishah and leaving the parts of the country

that had fallen under Christian rule, they seemed to think they

were justified in behaving like spoilt children towards the native

population. They treated them with ruthless disregard, they were

bumptious, and, if their new neighbours were Greek or Armenian, they

inclined to use force, a proceeding which was always possible because

the Government did not take away _their_ firearms and were even known

to have doled them out to stir up unrest. It has occurred more than

once that Mohadjirs have crossed swords even with Turkish Anatolians

living peacefully in their own villages. One can then easily imagine

how much more the heretic _giaurs_ ("Christian dogs," "unclean men")

had to suffer at their hands.

I should like to say a word here about these Greek persecutions in

Thrace and Western Anatolia that have become notorious throughout the

whole of Europe. They took place just before the outbreak of war, and

cost thousands of peaceful Greeks--men, women, and children-their

lives, and reduced to ashes dozens of flourishing villages and towns.

At the time of the murder of Sarajevo, I happened to be staying in

the vilajet of Aidin, in Smyrna and the _Hinterland_, and saw with

my own eyes such shameful deeds as must infuriate anyone against the

Turkish Government that aids and abets such barbarity--from old women

being driven along by a dozen Mohadjirs and dissipated soldiers to the

smoking ruins of Phocæa.

Everyone at that time, at any rate in Smyrna, expected the immediate

outbreak of a new Græco-Turkish war, and perhaps the only thing

that prevented it was the method of procrastination adopted by both

sides, for both were waiting for the Dreadnoughts they had ordered,

until finally these smaller clouds were swallowed up in the mighty

thunder-cloud gathering on the European horizon. Only the extreme speed

with which one dramatic event followed another, and my own mobilisation

which precluded my writing anything of a political nature, prevented me

on that occasion from giving my sinister impressions of Young Turkish

jingoism and Mohadjir brutality. Even if I had been able to write what

I thought it is extremely doubtful if it would ever have seen the

light of day, for the German papers were but little inclined, as I had

opportunity of discovering personally, to say anything unpleasant about

the Young Turkish Government, whose help they were already reckoning

on, and preferred rather to behave in a most un-neutral manner and keep

absolutely silent about all the ill-treatment and abuse that had been

meted out to Greece. But I remembered these scenes most opportunely

later, and that visit of mine to Western Anatolia was certainly most

useful in increasing my knowledge of Young Turkish methods of "internal

colonisation."

But all the methods used are by no means forcible. Attempts are now

being made--and this again is most significant for the spirit of the

newest Young Turkish era--to gain a footing in the world of science

as opposed to force, and so to be able to carry out their measures

more systematically and give them the appearance of beneficent modern

social reforms. So it comes about that the Turkish idea of penetrating

and "cleaning-up" Anatolia finds practical expression on the one hand

in exterminating and robbing the Christian population, while on the

other it inclines to efforts which in time may work out to be a real

blessing. The common principle underlying both is Nationalism.

Anatolia was suddenly "discovered." At long length the Young Turkish

Government, roused intellectually and patriotically by the war and

brought to their senses by the terrible loss of human life entailed,

suddenly realised the enormous national importance of Anatolia, that

hitherto much-neglected nucleus of the Ottoman Empire. Under the

spiritual inspiration of Mehmed Emin, the national poet of Anatolian

birth whose poems with their sympathy of outlook and noble simplicity

of form make such a warm-hearted and successful appeal to the best

kind of patriotism, men have begun since 1916, even in the circles of

the arrogant "Stambul Effendi," to take an interest in the _kaba türk_

(uncouth Turk), the Anatolian peasant, his needs and his standard of

civilisation. The real, needy, primitive Turk of the Interior has

suddenly become the general favourite.

A whole series of most remarkable lectures was delivered publicly in

the _Türk Odjaghi_, under the auspices of the Committee, by doctors,

social politicians, and political economists, and these were reported

and discussed at great length in all the Turkish newspapers. Their

subject was the incredible destitution in Anatolia, the devastation

wrought by syphilis, malaria, and other terrible dirt diseases,

abortions as a result of hopeless poverty, the lack of men as a result

of constant military service in many wars, and they called for

immediate and drastic reforms.

It is with the greatest pleasure that I acknowledge that this first

late step on the way of improvement, this self-knowledge, which

appeals to me more thoroughly than anything else I saw in Turkey, is

probably really the beginning of a happier era for that beautiful land

of Anatolia, so capable of development but so cruelly neglected. For

one can no longer doubt that the Government has the real intention of

carrying out actual reforms, for they must be only too well aware that

the strengthening and healing of Anatolia, the nucleus of the Turkish

race, is absolutely essential for any Turkish mastery, and is the very

first necessity for the successful carrying out of more far-reaching

national exertions. With truly modern realisation of the needs of

the case, directly after Dr. Behaeddin Shakir Bey's first compelling

lecture, different local government officials, especially the Vali

of the Vilajet of Kastamuni, which was notorious for its syphilis

epidemics, made unprecedented efforts to improve the terrible hygienic

conditions then reigning. Let us hope that such efforts will bear

fruit. But this will probably only be the case to any measurable extent

later, after the war, when Turkey will find herself really confined to

Anatolia, and will have time and strength for positive social work.

In the meantime I cannot get rid of the uneasy impression that this

"discovery" of Anatolia and zealous Turkish social politics are no more

than a cleverly worked excuse on the part of the Government for further

measures of Turkification, and the cloven hoof is unfortunately only

too apparent in all this seemingly noble effort on the part of the

Committee. One hears and sees daily the methods that go hand in hand

with this official pushing into the foreground of the great importance

of the purely Turkish elements in Anatolia--Armenian persecutions,

trickery, expropriations carried out against Greeks, the yielding up

of flourishing districts to quarrelsome Mohadjirs. So long as the

Turkish Government fancy themselves conquerors in the great war, so

long as they pursue the shadow of a "Greater Turkey," so long as Turkey

continues to dissipate her forces she will not accomplish much for

Anatolia, in spite of her awakening and her real desire for reform.

Finally, in this discovery of Anatolia, in this desire to put an end to

traditional destitution, this recognition of the real import of even

the poorest, most primitive, dullest peasant peoples in the undeveloped

Interior, so long as they are of Turkish race, in this sudden flood

of learned eloquence over the needs and the true inner worth of these

miserable neglected Turkish peasants, in this pressing demand for

thorough reforms for the economic and social strengthening of this

element--measures which with the present ruling spirit of jingoism

in the Government threaten to be carried through only at the expense

of the non-Turkish population of Anatolia--we see very clear proof

that the neo-Turkish movement is a pure race movement, is nothing but

Pan-Turkism both outwardly and inwardly, and has very little indeed to

do with religious questions or with Islam. The idea of Islam, or rather

Pan-Islamism, is a complete failure. This we shall try to show in the

following chapter.

Two war years in Constantinople · 第 7 / 10 章