E. W. C.

* * * * *

The great question of the hour is, that of rebuilding the edifice of the

Republic, which has been rudely shaken and partly thrown down by the

rebellion. All patriotic hearts, in anticipation of the speedy close of

the war, are turned with intense interest to this important work.

Opinions divide upon this as upon all other great subjects, and we have

two antagonistic ideas, organizing their respective parties with

reference to it. One party maintains that the rebellious States have

forfeited all their rights, and can under no circumstances claim to be

recognized in their former relations, except on a re-admission into the

Union upon the terms prescribed by the Constitution for the admission of

new States. The other party denies that any of the States, as such, have

forfeited, or can forfeit any of their rights, and maintains the duty of

the Federal Government to protect all the States in their constitutional

integrity, to put down the rebellion within them, and to restore to them

the republican forms which have been violently overthrown.

In each of these positions, there seems to be a combination of truth and

error. So long as any State is in a belligerent and treasonable

attitude, disclaiming and repudiating her obligations under the

Constitution, she is obviously not entitled to the benefits of the

system which she thus assails and defies. The State being sustained in

rebellion by its whole people, it is vain to say the Government can only

regard the people as individuals, for these are the State, and must be

treated accordingly. But if, laying down her arms, or even after being

conquered, a State returns to her allegiance, to reject her demands

would be to admit that secession had been effectual. It would be a

recognition of the validity, if not of the rightfulness of the movement

which assumed to carry the State out of the Union.

On the other hand, to maintain that the State is still legally in the

Union, even at the moment of violent treason, and is still entitled to

claim her position and rights as such, would be equally, if not more

absurd and injurious to the nation. It is argued, that if there be any

true and loyal citizens in the State, however few, they are entitled to

the protection of the Federal Government, and the recognition of their

State as a member of the Union. This doctrine is unreasonable and

impracticable. Any theory which would carry us to the absurd extreme of

constituting a State of an inconsiderable number of men,--the paltry

minority of a large population--would not be more objectionable to the

good sense of the people, than irreconcilable with the fundamental

principles of our complex government. Such a minority, however small,

would be entitled to the protection and to the highest favor of the

Government; and if they could be built up into a power sufficiently

strong to maintain themselves in the State, then they would fairly be

entitled to claim full recognition. If, by the legitimate exercise of

its war powers, by the just restraint and punishment of treason, the

Federal Government can establish the real political ascendency of the

loyal part of the population, and thus actually restore the State

Government on a fair and substantial basis, even though it be placed in

the hands of a present minority, it would be fully justified in

recognizing this organization as a member of the old Union. But to set

up a mere sham, and pretend to rebuild a State on the basis of

inconsiderable numbers, against even the disloyal sentiments of the

great body of the people, would be unwise and unavailing. Such a

reconstruction would be hollow and deceptive, a danger and a snare,

forever threatening the tranquillity of the country.

The question is one of practical statesmanship; and the Government must

deal with it upon the principles of common sense, without embarrassing

itself by any mere theories which would be troublesome and inapplicable

in any emergency. How long after subjugation the Government will wait

for the return of any State to its allegiance, and what indications of

sincere loyalty will be accepted, as well as what fair and honorable

inducements will be held out to lure the erring population back into the

fold of the Union, are matters for the gravest consideration, and can

only be determined when the occasion for decision shall arise. To thrust

a State back into the Union, and clothe it with all its former

constitutional privileges, while the masses of its people are still

hostile to the Federal authority, would evince a degree of recklessness,

and even insanity, which, it is to be hoped, the Government will never

exhibit. But when a State is fit to return, and may properly and safely

be received, let her be welcomed cordially and heartily, without the

least reminiscence of her sad and disastrous error.

The true difficulty is not in the principle which is to control our

action in any given circumstances. That is sufficiently plain in itself;

it is only the application which is difficult. We cannot acknowledge the

equality and sisterhood of a State, which, though subdued, is still

hostile and not to be trusted in the Union: but we can and will receive

all those which truly accept the result of the war and honestly return

to their allegiance. We cannot create a State in the midst of a hostile

population, and maintain the sovereign right of an inconsiderable few

against the voice of the vast majority; but we can favor, encourage, and

build up the loyal minority when that is sufficiently important, so as

to make it the majority, and clothe it with the power of the

resuscitated State.

So long as there is no loyal State authority fairly representing the

people, the State must be considered as disabled, and its rights _in

abeyance_. There is no necessity of considering the State as

extinguished, while there is hope of a favorable change. To reduce the

States to the condition of territories would be an act of extreme

hostility, and could only be the ultimate result of incorrigible

treason, holding out against subjugation and against all the reasonable

inducements which can be offered to a rebellious people by a magnanimous

Government. We can never receive into the bosom of the Union a hostile

people, full of treason, and always ready for renewed mischief. Though

they be conquered in arms, we cannot compel their thoughts and

affections. Unless they yield these, force cannot win them; and we must

therefore hold the rein of control for our own security. The act of

recognition will be always determined by the will of the Federal

authorities. This right of decision necessarily places in their hands

the supreme control of those conditions which are necessary to our

future security.

The Continental Monthly, Vol. 4, No. 6, December 1863 Devoted to Literature and National Policy · 第 44 / 80 题