In the articles contributed to our pages, we do not always exact a
precise conformity to our own views. If we are satisfied with the
general scope and tendency of thought presented by respectable writers
who appear in their own names, we do not care to make known any minor
differences of opinion, or to criticise what we consider the errors of
their productions. Nevertheless, we suppose that a calm and friendly
expression of our own thoughts, on any subject discussed in our pages,
will not be out of place or unkindly received in any quarter.
In the very able and interesting article in our last number, by Mr.
Freeland, that writer announced the doctrine that 'the social,
political, religious, and scientific development of the world proceeds
under the operation of two grand antagonistic principles,' which he
calls respectively, 'Unity,' and 'Individuality.' 'The first of these,'
he says, 'tends to bring about coöperation, consolidation, convergence,
dependence; the second to produce separation, isolation, divergence, and
independence. Unity is the principle which tends to order; Individuality
to freedom.'
We are prepared to admit the existence and operation of these principles
as stated. They constitute the active tendencies of society, and they
perform in the social world precisely what the antagonistic forces of
attraction and repulsion do in the physical. They are the principles of
aggregation and organization, as well as of agitation, conflict, and all
revolutionary or progressive activity. In a more perfect state of
development, they will exhibit themselves as the centripetal and
centrifugal forces of a beautiful system arrived at that stage of
regulated motion which constitutes a stable equilibrium.
But while we admit the universal operation of these two principles, we
think Mr. Freeland has made a serious mistake in the application of
them,--a mistake which seems to run through his entire essay, and to
pervade the whole system of his philosophy. We shall venture upon a
brief criticism, solely with the view of eliminating truth. The
question, though somewhat abstract in its nature, is to us of the
highest interest; and we shall ever be ready to yield our position, when
convinced that it is erroneous and untenable.
We find what we consider the exceptionable doctrine in the following
passage: 'Unity is allied to the affections, which are synthetic in
their character; Individuality, to the intellect, which is mainly
analytical and disruptive in its tendency. Unity is predominant in
religion, which is static in its nature; Individuality to science, which
is primarily disturbing. In the distribution of the mental faculties,
Unity relates to the moral powers, and Individuality to the
intellectual; the former being, as both Mr. Buckle and Professor Draper
have shown, more stationary in their character than the latter. As in
this paragraph the 'affections' are placed in contrast with the
'intellect,' we suppose that by the former the writer intends to
designate the emotions or passions, thus making that most obvious
analysis of the mind into halves--the active impulses and moral
principles on the one hand, and the perceptive and reflective faculties
on the other. There is some little confusion of statement, in afterward
contrasting the 'moral powers' with the 'intellectual;' but we imagine
that the same general classification is intended, although not quite
defined with philosophical accuracy.
If we are correct in this interpretation of the language quoted, we do
not see how the emotional part of human nature can, in any general
sense, be said to be allied to unity. The passions are the basis of all
human agitation and conflict, and have been the cause of all the wars
which have engaged mankind during the past ages of the world. In the
early periods of history the selfish emotions have preponderated over
the benevolent. Hatred, ambition, avarice, have been superior to love,
humility, and charity. It is more than doubtful whether, even now, the
selfish passions of the human race are not still in the ascendant.
It may be said that, in the long run, the emotions tend to harmony, and
that the coöperative and benevolent feelings are continually approaching
their final and complete triumph. This is undoubtedly true; but it is
wholly attributable to the progress of the human intellect, which, day
by day, is demonstrating that man's emotional and moral nature can find
its highest enjoyment and its most perfect development only in the
complete subordination of the selfish and unsocial passions, to those
which promote universal toleration and brotherhood.
But if Mr. Freeland is wrong in the position that the primary tendency
of the passions is to unity, he seems to us equally far from scientific
truth when he asserts that intellect is 'disrupting' in its tendency,
and that science is primarily 'disturbing.' It is true the intellect has
the analytical faculty; but it is equally true that the opposite faculty
of generalization is that which most strongly characterizes it and
distinguishes reason from instinct. So far from analysis being the
earliest predominant tendency of the intellect, almost all its most
familiar and ordinary acts are those of synthesis. In all the phenomena
of perception, the separate sensations are combined by an act of the
judgment into the concrete ideas of form and substance, while the
highest and most permanent characteristic of science is in the
comprehensive attainment of general laws.
The simple truth of the whole case is, that the affections or passions
of men are the motive powers which impel them to action in every field
of human affairs. The intellect, on the contrary, dominates these motive
powers by its faculty of unfolding truth, foreseeing consequences,
exploring the path of practicable progress, and illuminating the objects
of rational desire to humanity. In the passions of men we have the two
antagonistic forces--the attraction and repulsion--the centripetal and
centrifugal tendencies--which ever antagonize each other, and through
all the conflicts and agitations of mankind, are tending to eventual
harmony. The moral faculty is a mere standard of right and wrong, which,
of course, remains comparatively fixed and permanent through all the
ages. The changes of opinion and action, in the sense of morality, are
due wholly to the difference of knowledge at successive periods. Just as
the intellect is capable of determining the bearing and consequences of
human action, and of fixing the intention with reference to such
consequences, will the moral character of such action be pronounced,
more or less correctly, according to the degree of enlightenment of the
parties concerned.
From this analysis it will be plainly seen, that all the force is in the
passions or desires of men. These are enlightened, and therefore
regulated by the intellect, and judged by the moral faculty according to
the consequences foreseen and intended. Ideas alone have the power of
organization. The passions attend upon ideas as their ministers and
servants. Beliefs, which represent the ideas or knowledge prevalent at
successive periods in history, have controlled the destiny of men and
nations, and all human passions have been marshalled and arrayed in
conformity with them.
The error of Mr. Freeland, we respectfully submit, is in placing the
intellect and the passions in antagonism with each other, while, in
truth, it is one passion, or one class of passions, which antagonizes
another. The direction given to society by the predominating force of
all the individual propensities is retrogressive, stationary, or
progressive, revolutionary and destructive, or moderate and safe,
according to the knowledge of facts and the prevision of consequences
which may inform the judgments and enlighten the consciences of the
masses.
At periods of general ignorance and superstition, the announcement of a
great scientific or philosophic truth may produce commotion,
persecution, and discord. But it is evident that these are the results
of ignorance and not of knowledge--of unenlightened passion, and not of
the awakened intellect. Truth is attractive to all minds, and its
tendency is to invite universal assent. In so far, therefore, as the
intellect is capable of discovering truth, its tendency is to unify and
harmonize, and by no means to separate into disorder. In an age of
inquiry, the emancipation of thought may be attended with much
disturbance. The right of individual judgment will necessarily produce
conflict in the very act of emerging from the preceding state of
ignorance and restraint. The state of transition cannot be one of
tranquillity, although it is the inevitable path to a higher and more
complete harmony. But it is inaccurate and philosophically untrue, as we
think, to characterize the intellect as 'disturbing,' or 'disrupting.'
It is disturbing only to ignorance, and disrupting only to the systems
and organizations based upon falsehood.
We think these positions and brief discriminations are accurate, and not
to be overthrown by argument; and as they are fundamental, we have
thought it not improper to state them here, as the basis upon which we
accept the general reasoning of Mr. Freeland as to the law of human
development. Buckle and Draper are right as to the fixed character of
moral standards; but the progressive development of knowledge gives new
applications to moral principles, and requires their perpetual operation
and control. In this sense, morality keeps pace with knowledge, and
though dependent upon new truths for its own advancement, is
indispensable to the progress of mankind in the social benefits to be
derived from every intellectual acquisition.
* * * * *
A musical example of a rhythm rare and difficult of treatment in
English--the dactylic.--ED.