infinitely in size, in government, and in the ingredients of their
population. In one respect they are all alike; the most energetic and
influential, though not necessarily the greater number, of the
inhabitants are artisans or traders. But side by side with the
industrial colony stand older interests, which often struggle hard
against the ascendancy of commerce. In the town or near it there may be
an abbey or a castle or a cathedral or a royal palace, to which the very
existence of the burgess community is due. The townsmen, profiting by
the custom and the protection of the great, have grown rich and
independent; they have bought privileges or have usurped them. But they
have still to reckon with the servants, the retainers, and the other
partisans of a superior always on the watch to recover his lost rights
of property and jurisdiction; the forces of the common enemy are
permanently encamped within the walls. Again, if the town lies on a
frontier or in newly-conquered country, it will be as much a fortress as
a mart; a number of the residents will be knights or men-at-arms who
hold their lands by the tenure of defending the town; and these
burgesses will be naturally indifferent to the interests of the traders.
Finally, in the Mediterranean lands, with their long tradition of urban
society, we find the nobles of the neighbourhood resorting to the town,
building town-houses, and frequently caballing among themselves to
obtain control of the town's government. Often a long time elapses
before the class which conceived the idea of municipal liberty is able
to get the better of these hostile forces; and still more often the
hardly-won privileges are wrested from those for whom they were
intended, are cancelled, or are made the monopoly of an oligarchic ring.
Still, the aims of the medieval burgess are more uniform, from one place
to another and from one generation to another, than we might anticipate
in ages when information travelled slowly, and when the relations of
every town to its lord were settled by a separate treaty. In modern
Europe the town is an administrative district of the state, and is
organised upon a standard pattern. In medieval Europe the town-charter
was frequently a compromise with the caprices and the interests of a
petty seignor; and even kings were inclined to deal with the towns which
stood upon the royal demesne in a spirit of the frankest opportunism.
Moreover, the inclination of all lords was to meddle with their
burgesses no further than seemed necessary to ensure the full and
punctual discharge of all services and pecuniary dues. So long as these
were guaranteed, the internal affairs of the town might be left for the
residents to settle as seemed good to them. But, as to the main
conditions of the compact, each of the contracting parties holds
clear-cut and unwavering views. The lords are agreed that privileges of
trade and tenure may safely be granted if the chief magistrates are
nominated by, and accountable to themselves. The townsfolk, on the other
hand, assume that promises of free tenure and free trade will be worth
nothing unless accompanied by the permission to elect all magistrates
and councils.
Sometimes the victory rests with the lord, and sometimes with the
burgesses. Accordingly, there are two kinds of chartered town. The
larger class includes communities enjoying certain privileges under the
rule of seignorial functionaries. A smaller class consists of those
which are not only privileged but "free," that is, self-governing bodies
corporate. The distinction between the two classes is not precise enough
to satisfy a modern lawyer. Often a "free" town is obliged to allow the
lord some voice in the appointment of magistrates; while the humblest
body of traders may enjoy the right of doing justice in a market-court
without the interference of a bailiff. The one class shades off into the
other, if only for the reason that "freedom" is usually won by a gradual
process of bargaining or encroachment on the part of towns which are
already privileged. The higher type is simply a later stage in the
natural course of municipal development.
If we analyse the privileges of those towns which remain in
leading-strings, the first in order of time and of importance is the
town-peace, which only the king or his delegate can grant. Invested with
this peace the town becomes, like a royal palace or the shrine of a
saint, a sanctuary protected by special pains and penalties; the burgess
stands to the king in the same relation as the widow and the orphan; to
do him wrong is an outrage against the royal majesty. Next comes the
right of trade. The burgesses are allowed to commute their servile dues
and obligations for a fixed money-rent, that they may be at liberty for
pursuits more lucrative than agriculture. They also receive a licence to
hold a weekly market, and possibly a yearly fair as well; it is agreed
that all disputes of traders, which arise in fair or market, shall be
decided according to the law of merchants, the general usage of the
commercial world; and a safe-conduct is granted to all strangers who
resort to either gathering for lawful purposes. At first the tolls of
the fair and market are collected by the lord, and the law-merchant is
administered in the court of his bailiff. Often, however, he ends by
leasing both the tolls and the commercial jurisdiction to the townsmen.
When they are permitted (as in Flanders and in England) to form a
merchant-gild, it is with this body that such bargains are concluded;
and the gild usually purchases from the lord a quantity of other
privileges--the monopoly of certain staple industries in the town and
neighbourhood; rights of pre-emption over all imported wares; and the
power of making by-laws to regulate wages, prices, the hours of labour,
and the quality of manufactured goods. Where the lord is a sovereign
prince, he is often induced to make concessions of a wider scope:
freedom from inland tolls and from customs at the seaports; the right of
making reprisals upon native and foreign enemies who rob the merchants
or infringe the privileges of the town; immunity, in civil suits, from
every jurisdiction but that of the town-court.
It would be easy to multiply examples of this type of town, but we can
only mention here a few whose history and customs are particularly
instructive. One of the oldest is St. Riquier in Ponthieu, a notable
instance of an industrial community dating from Carolingian times and
fostered by the policy of a great religious house. The second half of
the eleventh century is remarkable for the speculative acumen displayed
by lay and secular lords in fostering the development of new commercial
centres; the Norman _bourg_ of Breteuil, founded in 1060 by a
seneschal of William the Conqueror, deserves special consideration as a
model extensively imitated in England, Wales, and Ireland; the Suabian
towns of Allensbach and Radolfszell, chartered by the great Abbey of
Reichenau a few years later, are monuments of German seignorial
enterprise. Lorris en Gatinais, a town on the demesne of the French
monarchy, received from Louis VI a set of privileges which became the
standard for the numerous _villes de bourgeoisie_ founded under the
immediate sway of the Capetian dynasty.
But the charters thankfully accepted by new colonies or embryonic
market-centres were insufficient to satisfy the aspirations of older and
greater cities. At the very time when far-sighted seigneurs are
scattering commercial privileges broadcast, there begins among the urban
classes of North France, of Flanders, and of some Italian provinces, an
agitation for more extensive rights, for "free" municipal constitutions
of our second type. In these regions the popular cry is "Commune,"
_novum ac pessimum nomen;_ and it is blended with complaints of
feudal tyranny, which often develop, since the seigneur of the town is
commonly a bishop or an abbot, into complaints against the Church. The
commune is a sworn confederacy (_conjuratio_), which bears some
resemblance both to the fraternities established for the enforcement of
the Truce of God (_supra_, p. 103) and to the merchant-gilds. But
it has also new and striking features. It is formed in defiance of
authority, and for the purpose of seizing rights which are legally
vested in the seigneur or the Crown. It is hostile to the ruling classes
of society; and the object of the members is to establish a republican
form of government within their city. They are largely merchants or
artisans; but they concern themselves with wider interests than those of
trade, and often insist that no man, of whatever avocation, shall remain
in the city unless he joins the commune.
We should be glad to know more of the bold spirits who directed the
communal movement in this early stage. They startled contemporaries by
their radicalism, and their conduct gives the lie to our preconceived
idea that a townsman is a man of peace. These medieval burgesses were
accustomed to defend their rights by force; there is nothing abnormal in
the rule of the merchant-gild of Valenciennes that the gild-brethren
should always bring their weapons with them to the market, and should
ride in armed companies to distant fairs. The Milanese and the men of
Ghent are typical in their greed for empire, in their readiness to
strike a blow for their own profit whenever war is in the land. If the
seigneurs of such cities gave cause for dissatisfaction, they found that
they had brought a hornet's nest about their ears. In the struggle for
liberties the popular party displayed a high courage which rose superior
to defeat, though in the hour of triumph it was too often sullied by
ferocious acts of vengeance. They threw themselves with intelligence and
energy into the feuds of other interests and classes, backing the Church
against the State, the State against the baronage, or the weaker against
the stronger of two rival lords. The policy of the towns was often
double-faced, material and separatist; but it also embodied ideals of
justice and of citizenship which were destined to prevail in the
struggle for existence, and to produce a wholesome reformation in the
structure of society.
The communal programme was not realised in a day; the struggle for free
governments, which began in the eleventh century, was continued into the
thirteenth and fourteenth; and the forces of the movement were already
exhausted in North France and Italy before it reached a head in South
France or in Germany. Naturally, in a conflict waged over so wide an
area for several hundred years, the watchwords were often modified, and
many different patterns of town government were devised. In its later
stages the movement was more peaceful, and the purse was often found a
better argument than the sword; the communal parties ceased to be
democratic, though they never ceased to be republican; and power was
practically if not formally monopolised by a municipal patriciate. The
mass-meeting of the burgesses, all-powerful in the days when the commune
was an organised rebellion, gradually became insignificant in the older
communes, and in many of the late foundations was never recognised at
all, its powers being distributed among the craft-gilds meeting in their
separate assemblies. Concurrent with this diminution in the importance
of the ordinary burgess, there is a tendency to restrict the franchise
by demanding higher and higher qualifications from the candidates. The
commune, in fact, sinks almost to the level of a trades union or a
benefit society, and membership is valued chiefly as a title to
exclusive rights of trade and poor-relief. The political aspect of the
institution is almost forgotten in countries where the power of the
state gains ground upon the centrifugal forces of society; and, in those
communes which preserve the dignity of states, an internecine conflict
between the rich and poor, the rulers and the ruled, usually becomes the
main feature of domestic politics.
In spite of these changes in principles and spirit, the organs of
communal government are almost everywhere the same. The executive power
is vested in a board or committee, called in Italy the _consules_, in
France the _echevins, jurati_, or _syndics_, in Germany the _Rath_
(council). Commonly this board has a president, known in France and
England as the mayor, in Germany as the burgomaster, who represents the
body-corporate in all negotiations with the seigneur or the Crown or
other communes. One or more councils (_sapientes, pares_, etc.) are
often found assisting the executive with their advice; and in the older
type of commune the mass-meeting plays a conspicuous part, not only
electing magistrates and councils, but also voting taxes, auditing the
accounts of expenditure, and deciding on all questions of exceptional
importance. Where the general assembly is non-existent or moribund,
offices are filled either by co-optation or by elections in the
assemblies of the craft-gilds, or are even allowed to descend by
hereditary right. As the popular control over the executive declines,
jealousy of the executive leads to some disastrous changes: to the
multiplication of offices, to the shortening of terms of office, to
the creation of innumerable checks and balances, to the organisation of
this or that powerful interest or party as a state within the state. But
the morbid pathology of the communes in their last stage of decline is a
subject with which we need not here concern ourselves. These intricate
expedients, which are best exemplified in the constitution of
fourteenth-century Florence, weakened the government but could not make
it more impartial or more tolerant. By the end of the Middle Ages, the
ordinary burgess was prepared to hail the advent of a royal bailiff or a
self-constituted despot, as the only cure for the inveterate disorders
incident to freedom.
It is refreshing to turn back from the period of disillusionment to that
of sanguine expectations, and to study the commune in the period of
infancy and growth, when no other refuge from anarchy and oppression was
open to the industrial classes, and when emancipated serfs were still
intoxicated with the dream of liberty.
Curiously enough, the communal revolution began most quietly in the land
where it was ultimately responsible for the fiercest conflicts. The
cities of North Italy gained their first instalments of freedom, at
different periods in the eleventh century, by bargains or by usurpations
of which few records have come down to us. At Pisa we hear of an
agreement between the bishop and the citizens (1080-1085) under which
the latter are permitted to form a peace-association, to hold
mass-meetings, and to elect _consules_ who shall co-operate with
the bishop in the government. At Genoa, on the other hand, the commune
appears (in 1122) after several earlier _conjurationes_ have been
successfully resisted and dispersed. Probably the case of Pisa is more
typical than that of Genoa, since we usually hear of a commune for the
first time when it is already a fully developed institution. In most of
the North Italian cities it was at the expense of a bishop that the
commune was established. Legally the change meant the transference, from
the bishop or another seigneur to the town, of powers derived by
delegation from the Emperor; and it took place in the course of the
Investitures contest, when the bishops, conscious of simony and other
offences which made their position insecure, were more concerned to
dissuade their citizens from siding with the party of ecclesiastical
reform than to fulfil their duties as officials of the Empire. The
Emperors themselves, hard-pressed in the struggle with the Papacy and
eager to purchase support at any price, contributed to the success of
the communal movement by the charters which they bestowed on some
important cities.
In Northern France the situation was less favourable to the towns. Often
indeed it suited the policy of the Capets to weaken an over-mighty
subject by protecting his rebellious serfs. But the bishops and the lay
seigneurs offered a pertinacious opposition to all demands for
enfranchisement; the King was a timid and vacillating ally, always
inclined to desert the cause of the townsfolk for a bribe, always in
fear that the movement might spread to his demesne. Whatever his
sympathies, he could do little, when it came to blows, but stand aside
and watch the conflict. Two examples will serve to illustrate the
general features of these feuds between municipalities and lords.
(1) In 1070 the men of Le Mans were driven to rebellion by the
lawlessness of the local baronage, and by the oppressions of the
governor whom an absentee count had put over them. They formed a
commune, and compelled the more timid of their enemies to swear that
they would recognise it. Others they caught and hanged or blinded; and
they made systematic war against the castles of the neighbourhood, which
they took one by one and burned to the ground--and this, says the
outraged chronicler, in Lent and even on Good Friday! The citizens
themselves thought no season too sacred for such a crusade against
anarchy; once, when their militia went out to attack a castle, the
bishop and his clergy were induced to lead the vanguard, bearing crosses
and consecrated banners. But after a time the fortune of war turned
against the commune; the militia were routed and the count's lieutenant
recovered the castle which dominated Le Mans. The citizens offered their
allegiance to the Count of Anjou, if he would deliver them. He came to
the rescue, the governor fled, the castle was surrendered by the
garrison and at once demolished. But, before the citizens had settled
their future relations with Anjou, an English army appeared, led by
William the Conqueror, their lawful suzerain. The Angevins effaced
themselves; the citizens, making a virtue of necessity, opened their
gates to the King; and since he would only confirm their ancient
liberties, the existence of the commune was abruptly terminated (1073).
(2) At Laon in the next generation there was a wilder and more
calamitous rising against the misrule of the bishop. His name was
Waldric; he had been Chancellor to Henry I of England, and was elected
by the chapter of Laon (1106) because of the great wealth which he had
accumulated, none too honestly, in the course of his short official
career. Much of his private fortune was expended in procuring the Pope's
approval of his very irregular election. The remainder was soon
squandered in extravagant and riotous living; and the bishop then began
to exploit his seignorial rights in Laon. His extortions were the more
resented since he kept no order; the environs of the city swarmed with
brigands and footpads, and kidnappers were allowed to work their will
inside the city. At length the burgesses seized an opportunity, when the
bishop was away in England, to set up a commune. On his return he was
obliged to accept the situation and to recognise the commune in return
for a substantial payment. But he further recouped himself by debasing
the local currency, till it was practically worthless; and he gratified
his spite against the citizens by an atrocious crime. Professing to have
discovered a conspiracy against his life, he arrested the Mayor and
caused the unhappy man to be blinded by a black slave, whom he employed
as his bodyguard and executioner. The friends of the Mayor complained to
the Pope; but the bishop got before them with his own version of the
story, and by the help of bribery secured an honourable acquittal. By
the same arguments he induced the King to quash the charter of the
commune, and then seemed master of the situation. But the men of Laon
conspired to kill him as he was going in state to the cathedral; he was
with difficulty rescued by his knights, and found it necessary to
garrison the episcopal palace with villeins from his country estates.
Arrogant as ever, he boasted of his power and the satisfaction that he
would exact; the time was coming, he said, when his black slave should
pull the noses of the most respected citizens, and the fellows would not
dare to grunt. He was soon undeceived. The mob of Laon stormed the
palace and massacred the defenders; they found the bishop in the
cellars, disguised as a peasant and hiding in an empty cask; they
dragged him forth by the hair of his head, and hacked him to pieces in
the street (1112). When a calmer mood returned, the citizens were
appalled at the prospect of the King's indignation. Those who were
conscious of guilt fled from the city, which was left half-deserted. The
barons and the serfs of the surrounding country swooped like vultures
upon Laon, pillaged the empty houses and fought with one another for the
spoil. For the next sixteen years the remnant of the citizens lived a
miserable existence as the mere serfs of Waldric's successors. In 1128
the King permitted them to associate under a Mayor, for the better
maintenance of the public peace; but they were denied the title of a
commune, and continued to be subject to the jurisdiction of the bishop.
These dramas of oppression and retaliation, though characteristic in the
sense that they reveal the worst faults and the best excuses of the
communal movement, were happily exceptional in Northern France; not
because oppression was rare, but because rebellions defeated their own
object. No seignorial concessions were worth the parchment on which they
were inscribed, without a confirmation from the King; and it was not the
King's interest to condone sacrilege or overt treason against a feudal
lord. Hence the founders of a North French commune preferred to keep
their agitation within the bounds of law. They invoked the King's help,
and he, for an adequate consideration, destroyed seignorial rights by a
few strokes of the pen; which he did the more readily since his lawyers
had formulated the doctrine that communes were tenants of the Crown,
liable to military service and to taxation at the royal pleasure. From
the close of the twelfth century there was a firm alliance between the
Third Estate and the French monarchy. On the whole it was more
advantageous to the King than to the communes. Under St. Louis and his
successors, when the power of the feudatories was broken, the commune
presented itself as an obstacle in the path of central government. On
one pretext or another, here because of faction-fights and there for
mismanagement of the communal finances, the cities lost their charters
and passed under the rule of royal commissioners. It was a poor
compensation that the Third Estate obtained the right of sending
delegates to the States General of the Kingdom. Representation brought
new liabilities without corresponding rights. The Third Estate, holding
jealously aloof from the estates of the nobles and the clergy, was
powerless against a determined sovereign.
The French commune, in fact, was a special expedient for the cure of a
transitory evil. Republican institutions were in France an exotic
growth, inconsistent with national traditions, and only welcome to
classes which had neither the political intelligence nor the material
resources to maintain their own ideals in the face of persistent
opposition. It is significant that the charters of the French communes
were frequently cancelled with the approval of the citizen assemblies.
The situation was different in Flanders and North Italy, where the city
was the natural unit of society, and the burgher class, enriched by
foreign trade, were strong enough to negotiate on equal terms with their
nominal superiors. Cities such as Ghent and Milan were shielded from
contact with the great monarchies until the habit of self-government was
firmly rooted in the citizens. When at last they were confronted with
the absolutist claims of the Capets or the Hohenstauffen, these cities
did not shrink from a direct appeal to arms; and the wars which they
waged for independence are not the least interesting chapter of medieval
history.