The great service that the barbarians rendered was a service

Produced by V-M Osterman, Juliet Sutherland, Charles Franks

and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team.

HOME UNIVERSITY LIBRARY OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE

No. 13

Editors:

HERBERT FISHER, M.A., F.B.A. PROF. GILBERT MURRAY, Litt.D., LL.D.,

F.B.A. PROF. J. ARTHUR THOMSON, M.A. PROF. WILLIAM T. BREWSTER, M.A.

MEDIEVAL EUROPE

BY H. W. C. DAVIS, M.A.

FELLOW AND TUTOR OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD AUTHOR OF "CHARLEMAGNE,"

"ENGLAND UNDER THE NORMANS AND ANGEVINS" ETC.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

I THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

II THE BARBARIAN KINGDOMS

III THE EMPIRE AND THE NEW MONARCHIES (800-1000 A.D.)

IV FEUDALISM

V THE PAPACY BEFORE GREGORY VII

VI THE HILDEBRANDINE CHURCH

VII THE MEDIEVAL STATE

VIII THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE--THE CRUSADES

IX THE FREE TOWNS

NOTE ON BOOKS

MAP OF THE BARBARIAN KINGDOMS AND FRANKISH EMPIRE

MAP OF FRANCE

MAP OF HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

MAP OF THE CRUSADES

MAP OF THE ALPS AND NORTH ITALY

MEDIEVAL EUROPE

INTRODUCTION

All divisions of history into periods are artificial in proportion as

they are precise. In history there is, strictly speaking, no end and no

beginning. Each event is the product of an infinite series of causes,

the starting-point of an infinite series of effects. Language and

thought, government and manners, transform themselves by imperceptible

degrees; with the result that every age is an age of transition, not

fully intelligible unless regarded as the child of a past and the parent

of a future. Even so the species of the animal and vegetable kingdoms

shade off one into another until, if we only observe the marginal cases,

we are inclined to doubt whether the species is more than a figment of

the mind. Yet the biologist is prepared to defend the idea of species;

and in like manner the historian holds that the distinction between one

phase of culture and another is real enough to justify, and, indeed, to

demand, the use of distinguishing names. In the development of single

communities and groups of communities there occurs now and again a

moment of equilibrium, when institutions are stable and adapted to the

needs of those who live under them; when the minds of men are filled

with ideas which they find completely satisfying; when the statesman,

the artist, and the poet feel that they are best fulfilling their

several missions if they express in deed and work and language the

aspirations common to the whole society. Then for a while man appears to

be the master of his fate; and then the prevailing temper is one of

reasoned optimism, of noble exaltation, of content allied with hope. The

spectator feels that he is face to face with the maturity of a social

system and a creed. These moments are rare indeed; but it is for the

sake of understanding them that we read history. All the rest of human

fortunes is in the nature of an introduction or an epilogue. Now by a

period of history we mean the tract of years in which this balance of

harmonious activities, this reconciliation of the real with the ideal,

is in course of preparing, is actually subsisting, and is vanishing

away.

Such a period were the Middle Ages--the centuries that separate the

ancient from the modern world. They were something more than centuries

of transition, though the genius of a Gibbon has represented them as a

long night of ignorance and force, only redeemed from utter squalor by

some lingering rays of ancient culture. It is true that they began with

an involuntary secession from the power which represented, in the fifth

century, the wisdom of Greece and the majesty of Rome; and that they

ended with a jubilant return to the Promised Land of ancient art and

literature. But the interval had been no mere sojourning in Egypt. The

scholars of the Renaissance destroyed as much as they created. They

overthrew one civilisation to clear the ground for another. It was

imperative that the old canons of thought and conduct should be

reconsidered. The time comes in the history of all half-truths when they

form the great obstacles to the pursuit of truth. But this should not

prevent us from recognising the value of the half-truth as a guide to

those who first discover it; nor should we fall into the error, common

to all reformers, of supposing that they comprehend the whole when they

assert the importance of the neglected half. Erasmus had reason on his

side; but so, too, had Aquinas. Luther was in his rough way a prophet;

but St. Bernard also had a message for humanity.

Medieval culture was imperfect, was restricted to a narrow circle of

superior minds, offered no satisfaction to some of the higher faculties

and instincts. Measure it, however, by the memories and the achievements

that it has bequeathed to the modern world, and it will be found not

unworthy to rank with those of earlier and later Golden Ages. It

flourished in the midst of rude surroundings, fierce passions, and

material ambitions. The volcanic fires of primitive human nature

smouldered near the surface of medieval life; the events chronicled in

medieval history are too often those of sordid and relentless strife, of

religious persecutions, of crimes and conquests mendaciously excused by

the affectation of a moral aim. The truth is that every civilisation has

a seamy side, which it is easy to expose and to denounce. We should not,

however, judge an age by its crimes and scandals. We do not think of the

Athenians solely or chiefly as the people who turned against Pericles,

who tried to enslave Sicily, who executed Socrates. We appraise them

rather by their most heroic exploits and their most enduring work. We

must apply the same test to the medieval nations; we must judge of them

by their philosophy and law, by their poetry and architecture, by the

examples that they afford of statesmanship and saintship. In these

fields we shall not find that we are dealing with the spasmodic and

irreflective heroisms which illuminate a barbarous age. The highest

medieval achievements are the fruit of deep reflection, of persevering

and concentrated effort, of a self forgetting self in the service of

humanity and God. In other words, they spring from the soil, and have

ripened in the atmosphere, of a civilised society.

I

THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

Medieval history begins with the dissolution of the Western Empire, with

the abandonment of the Latin world to German conquerors. Of the

provinces affected by the catastrophe the youngest was Britain; and even

Britain had then been Roman soil for more than three hundred years. For

Italy, Spain, and Gaul, the change of masters meant the atrophy of

institutions which, at first reluctantly accepted, had come by lapse of

time to be accepted as part of the natural order. Large tracts of Europe

lay outside the evacuated provinces; for the Romans never entered

Ireland or Scandinavia or Russia, and had failed to subjugate Scotland

and the greater part of modern Germany. But the Romanised provinces long

remained the dominant force in European history; the hearth-fire of

medieval culture was kindled on the ruins of the Empire. How far the

victorious Teuton borrowed from the conquered provincial is a question

still debated; the degree and the nature of Rome's influence on the new

rulers varied in every province, indeed in different parts of the same

province. The fact of the debt remains, suggesting a doubt whether in

this case it was indeed the fittest who survived. The flaws in a social

order which has collapsed under the stress of adverse fortunes are

painfully apparent. It is natural to speak of the final overthrow as the

judgment of heaven or the verdict of events. But it has still to be

proved that war is an unfailing test of worth; we have banished the

judicial combat from our law courts, and we should be rash in assuming

that a process obviously absurd when applied to the disputes of

individuals ought to determine the judgments of history on nationalities

or empires.

The immediate and obvious causes which ruined the Western Empire were

military and political--the shortcomings of a professional army and

professional administrators. If asked whether these shortcomings were

symptomatic of evils more generally diffused through other ranks and

classes of society, we must go deeper in the analysis of facts. No _a

priori_ answer would be satisfactory.

The beginning and the end of the disaster were successful raids on

Italy. Alaric and his Visigoths (401-410 A.D.) shattered the prestige

and destroyed the efficiency of the government which ruled in the name

of the feeble Honorius. The Ostrogoths under Theodoric destroyed the

last simulacrum of an imperial power rooted in Italy (489-493 A.D.).

After Theodoric had vanquished Odoacer, it was clear that the western

provinces would not again acknowledge an Emperor acclaimed at Ravenna;

although the chance remained that they might be reconquered and

reorganised from Constantinople. This chance disappeared when the

Lombards crossed the Alps (568 A.D.) and descended on the Po valley.

From first to last Italy was the key to the West. And these successive

shocks to imperial power in Italy were all due to one cause. All three

of the invading hordes came from the Danube. The Roman bank of the great

river was inadequately garrisoned, and a mistaken policy had colonised

the Danubian provinces with Teutonic peoples, none the less dangerous

for being the nominal allies (_foederati_) of the Empire. The

Visigothic raids, which were in fact decisive, succeeded because the

military defences of the Western Empire were already strained to

breaking-point; and because the Roman armies were not only outnumbered,

but also paralysed by the jealousies of rival statesmen, and divided by

the mutinies of generals aspiring to the purple. The initial disasters

were irreparable, because the whole machine of Roman officialdom came to

a standstill when the guiding hand of Ravenna failed. Hitherto dependent

on Italy, the other provinces were now like limbs amputated from the

trunk. Here and there a local leader raised the standard of resistance

to the barbarians. But a large proportion of the provincials made peace

on the best terms they could obtain. Such are the essential facts.

Evidently the original error of the Romans was the undue extension of

their power. This was recognised by no less a statesman than Augustus,

the founder of the Empire; but even in his time it was too late to sound

a retreat; he could only register a protest against further annexations.

Embracing the whole of the Mediterranean littoral and a large part of

the territories to the south, east, and north, the Empire was encumbered

with three land frontiers of enormous length. Two of these, the European

and the Asiatic, were perpetual sources of anxiety, and called for

separate military establishments. That neither might be neglected in the

interest of the other it was reasonable to put the imperial power in

commission between two colleagues. Diocletian (284-305 A.D.) was the

first to adopt this plan; from his time projects of partition were in

the air and would have been more regularly carried out, had not

experience shown that partitions led naturally to civil wars between

rival Emperors. In 395, on the death of the great Theodosius, the

hazardous expedient was given a last trial. His youthful sons, Arcadius

and Honorius, were allowed to divide the Empire; but the line of

partition was drawn with more regard to racial jealousies than military

considerations. It extended from the middle Danube (near Belgrade) to a

point near Durazzo on the Adriatic coast, and thence to the Gulf of

Sidra. East of this line lay the sphere of Greek civilisation, the

provinces which looked to Alexandria and Antioch and Constantinople as

their natural capitals. West of it the prevailing language was Latin,

and the higher classes of society modelled themselves upon the Italian

aristocracy.

Founded upon a principle which appeals to our modern respect for

nationality, this partition only gave a legal form to a schism which had

been long in preparation. But in one respect it was disastrous. The

defence of the Danube frontier was divided between the two governments;

and that of the East, rating the impoverished Balkan peninsula as of

secondary importance, and envisaging the problem from a wholly selfish

point of view, left unguarded the great highways leading from the Danube

into Italy. Stilicho, the great general who administered the West in the

name of Honorius, ventured to meet this danger by intervening in the

peninsula, and even in the political intrigues of Constantinople. He

only succeeded in winning a precarious alliance with the Visigoths and

the permanent ill-will of the Eastern Empire. He was left to deal

single-handed with the first invaders of Italy; and the estrangement of

the two imperial courts persisted after his untimely fall. The Western

Empire, betrayed by the one possible ally, collapsed under the strain

of simultaneous attacks along the whole line of the European frontier.

It has been alleged that the Roman armies were neither so robust nor so

well disciplined in the fifth century as they had been in an earlier

age. However this may be, they could still give a good account of

themselves when matched on equal terms with the most warlike of the

barbarians. It was in patriotism and in numbers, rather than in

professional efficiency, that they failed when put to the supreme test.

The armies were now largely recruited with barbarians, who numbered more

than half the fighting strength and were esteemed the flower of the

Roman soldiery. Many of these hirelings showed an open contempt for

their employers, and sympathised with the enemies whom they were paid to

fight. Furthermore, each army, whatever its constituent elements, tended

to be a hereditary caste, with a strong corporate spirit, respecting no

authority but that of the general. The soldiers had no civic interests;

but they had standing grievances against the Empire. Any political

crisis suggested to them the idea of a mutiny led by the general,

sometimes to obtain arrears of pay and donatives, sometimes to put their

nominee upon the throne. The evil was an old one, dating from the latter

days of the Republic, when Marius, in the interests of efficiency, had

made military service a profession. But it was aggravated under the

successors of Diocletian, as the barbarian element in the armies

increased and the Roman element diminished. Its worst effects appeared

in the years 406-407. The German inroads upon Italy and Gaul were then

followed by the proclamation of military usurpers in Britain and on the

Rhine; the Roman West was divided by civil war at the very moment when

union was supremely important. Hence the strange spectacle of the

Visigoths, still laden with the spoils of Rome, entering Gaul by

invitation of the Empire to fight against imperial armies.

The problem of numbers had been earlier recognised, but not more

adequately met. Diocletian is said to have quadrupled the armies, and in

the fourth century they were far larger than they had been under Julius

and Augustus; Constantine had revised the scheme of frontier-defence to

secure the greatest possible economy of men. Still, under Honorius, we

find that one vital point could only be defended by withdrawing troops

from another. The difficulty of increasing the numbers was twofold.

First, the army was mercenary, and taxation was already strained to the

point of diminishing returns. Secondly, it was difficult to raise

recruits among the provincials. The old principle of universal service

had been abandoned by Valentinian I (364-375); and although compulsory

levies were still made from certain classes, the Government had thought

fit to prohibit the enlistment of those who contributed most to

taxation. Every citizen was legally liable for the defence of local

strongholds; but the use of arms was so unfamiliar, the idea of military

service as a national duty was so far forgotten, that Stilicho, when the

barbarians were actually in Italy, preferred the desperate measure of

enlisting slaves to the obvious resource of a general call to arms.

We find ourselves here confronted with a social malady which was more

than an economic weakness. The Empire was, no doubt, a complex and

expensive form of government superimposed upon a society which stood at

a rudimentary stage of economic development. Barbarous methods of

taxation and corrupt practices among the ruling classes had aggravated

the burden to such a degree that the municipalities of the provinces

were bankrupt, and the middle-class capitalist was taxed out of

existence. For this and other reasons the population of the older

provinces was stationary or declining. But there was still much wealth

in the Empire; and the great landowners of the provinces could raise

considerable armies among their dependants when they saw fit to do so.

The real evil was a moral evil, the decay of civic virtue.

We do not mean that the ethics of private life had deteriorated from the

standard of the past. This is incredible when we remember that

Christianity was now the all but universal religion of the Empire; for

Christianity, at its worst and weakest, laid more stress upon ethical

duties, in the narrower sense, than any of the older religions. The

provincial was a more moral being than the Goth or the Vandal. It is a

mere superstition that every victorious race is chaste and frugal, just

and law-abiding; or that ill success in the struggle for existence is a

symptom of the contrary vices. In many respects the Greeks who submitted

to Philip and Alexander were morally superior to the victors of Salamis

and Plataea. Private and political morality may spring from the same

root; but the one has often flourished where the other has been stunted.

Perhaps this is only natural. Human nature seldom develops equally in

all directions. Men who are intensely concerned with the right ordering

of their relations to neighbours, friends and family, may well forget

the larger community in which their private circle is contained. The

Roman provincial had exceptional excuses for remaining indifferent to a

state which claimed his loyalty, not in the name of nationality or

religion, but in that of reason and the common good. Loyalty for him

could only be an intellectual conviction. But, unless he could enter the

privileged ranks of the army or the higher civil service, he had no

opportunities of studying, still less of helping to decide, the

questions of policy and administration with which his welfare was

closely though indirectly linked. Political ideas only came before the

private citizen under the garb of literature. The most admired authors

only taught him to regret republican polities long out of date. The

antiquarian enthusiasms which he acquired by his studies were in no way

corrected by the experience of daily life. If a townsman, he was legally

prohibited from changing his residence and even from travelling about

the Empire, for fear that he might evade the tax-collector. If a rural

landowner, he lived in a community which was economically

self-sufficient, and consequently provincial to the last degree. The

types of character which developed under such conditions were not

wanting in amiable or admirable traits. The well-to-do provincial was

often a scholar, a connoisseur in art and literature, a polished

letter-writer and conversationalist, a shrewd observer of his little

world, an exemplary husband and father, courteous to inferiors,

warm-hearted to his friends. Sometimes he found in religion or

philosophy an antidote to the pettiness of daily life, and was roused

into rebellion against the materialism of his equals, the greed and the

injustice of his rulers. But he despaired of bridging the gulf between

the Empire, as he saw it, and the ideal commonwealth--City of God or

Republic of the Universe--which his teachers held up to him as the goal

of human aspirations. Rather he was inclined, like the just man of

Plato, to seek the nearest shelter, to veil his head, and to wait

patiently till the storm of violence and wrong should pass away.

It is hard to condemn such conduct when we remember the appalling

contrast between the weakness of the individual and the strength of a

social order coextensive with civilisation itself. But in this spirit of

reasonable submission to a state of things which appeared fundamentally

unreasonable, in this conviction that the bad could not be bettered by

reforms of detail, there was more danger to society than in the crass

indifference of the selfish and the unreflecting. When the natural

leaders of society avow that they despair of the future, fatalism

spreads like a contagious blight among the rank and file, until even

discontent is numbed into silence. Nor does the evil end here. The

idealists pay for their contempt of the real, not merely with their

fortunes and their lives, but, worse still, with their intellectual

patrimony. Just as a government deteriorates when it is no longer tested

by continual reference to principles of justice, so a Utopia, however

magnificent, fades from the mind of the believer when he ceases to

revise it by comparison with facts, when it is no longer a reply to the

problems suggested by workaday experience. Life and theory being once

divorced, the theorist becomes a vendor of commonplaces, and the plain

man is fortified in his conviction that he must take life as he finds

it.

This analysis helps us to understand why the Western Empire, on the eve

of dissolution, had already assumed the appearance of a semi-barbarian

state. In those districts which had been lately settled with Teutonic

colonists the phenomenon may be explained as resulting from

over-sanguine attempts to civilise an intractable stock. But even in the

heart of the oldest provinces the conditions were little better. Law and

custom had conspired to sap the ideas and principles that we regard as

essentially Roman. The civil was now subjected to the military power.

The authority of the state was impaired by the growth of private

jurisdictions and defied by the quasi-feudal retinues of the great. For

civic equality had been substituted an irrational system of

class-privileges and class-burdens. Law was ceasing to be the orderly

development of general principles, and was becoming an accumulation of

ill-considered, inconsistent edicts. So far had decay advanced through

the negligence of those most vitally concerned that, if Europe was ever

to learn again the highest lessons which Rome had existed to teach, the

first step must be to sweep away the hybrid government which still

claimed allegiance in the name of Rome. The provincials of the fifth

century possessed the writings in which those lessons were recorded, but

possessed them only as symbols of an unintelligible past. A long

training in new schools of thought, under new forms of government, was

necessary before the European mind could again be brought into touch

with the old Roman spirit.

The great service that the barbarians rendered was a service of

destruction. In doing so they prepared the way for a return to the past.

Their first efforts in reconstruction were also valuable, since the

difficulty of the work and the clumsiness of the product revived the

respect of men for the superior skill of Rome. In the end the barbarians

succeeded in that branch of constructive statesmanship where Rome had

failed most signally. The new states which they founded were smaller and

feebler than the Western Empire, but furnished new opportunities for the

development of individuality, and made it possible to endow citizenship

with active functions and moral responsibilities. That these states

laboured under manifold defects was obvious to those who made them and

lived under them. The ideal of the world-wide Empire, maintaining

universal peace and the brotherhood of men, continued to haunt the

imagination of the Middle Ages as a lost possibility. But in this case,

as so often, what passed for a memory was in truth an aspiration; and

Europe was advancing towards a higher form of unity than that which had

been destroyed.

II

THE BARBARIAN KINGDOMS

The barbarian states which arose on the ruins of the Western Empire were

founded, under widely different circumstances of time and place, by

tribes and federations of tribes drawn from every part of Germany. We

expect to find, and we do find, infinite varieties of detail in their

laws, their social distinctions, their methods of government. But from a

broader point of view they may be grouped in two classes, not according

to affinities of race, but according to their relations with the social

order which they had invaded.

[Illustration: The Barbarian Kingdoms and Frankish Empire]

One group of kingdoms was founded under cover of a legal fiction; the

Visigoths, the Ostrogoths, and the Burgundians claimed to be the allies

of the Empire. At one time or another they obtained the recognition of

Constantinople for their settlements. Their kings accepted or usurped

the titles of imperial administrators, stamped their coins with the

effigies of the reigning Emperor, dated their proclamations by the names

of the consuls for the year, and in many other ways flaunted their

nominal subjection as the legal basis of their actual sovereignty. This

fiction did not prevent them from governing their new dominions in true

Teutonic fashion, through royal bailiffs, who administered the state

demesnes, and military officers (dukes, counts, etc.) who ruled with

autocratic sway over administrative districts. Nor did the most lenient

of them hesitate to provide for their armies by wholesale confiscations;

the ordinary rule was to take from the great proprietor one-third or

two-thirds of his estate for the benefit of the Teutonic immigrant.

Further, we have ample evidence that the provincials found existence

considerably more precarious under the new order. The rich were exposed

to the malice of the false informer and the venal judge; the cultivators

of the soil were often oppressed and often reduced from partial freedom

to absolute slavery. Yet in some respects the invaders of this type were

tolerant and adaptable. They left to the provincials the civil law of

Rome, and even codified it to guard against unauthorised innovations;

the _Lex Romana Burgundionum_ and the Visigothic _Breviarium Alarici_

are still extant as memorials of this policy. They realised the

necessity of compelling barbarians and provincials alike to respect

the elementary rights of person and property; Theodoric the Ostrogoth

and Gundobad the Burgundian were the authors of new criminal codes, in

the one case mainly, in the other partially, derived from Roman

jurisprudence. Such rulers were not content with professing an impartial

regard for both classes of their subjects; they frequently raised the

better-class provincials to posts of responsibility and confidence. By a

singular fatality the chief races of this group had embraced the Arian

heresy, which was repudiated and detested by their subjects. Yet their

great statesmen uniformly extended toleration to the rival creed, and

even patronised the orthodox bishops, by whom they were secretly

regarded as worse than the lowest of the heathen. This generosity was

little more than common prudence. Numerically the conquerors were much

inferior to the provincials; economically they had everything to lose by

needless ill-treatment of those whom they exploited. But the best of

them had studied the organisation of the Empire at close quarters,

sometimes as captains in the imperial service, sometimes as neighbours

of flourishing provinces in the years preceding the grand catastrophe;

and knowledge rarely failed to produce in them some respect or even

enthusiasm for the _Respublica Romana_. "When I was young," said

King Athaulf the Visigoth, "I desired to obliterate the Roman name and

to bring under the sway of the Goths all that once belonged to the

Romans. But I learned better by experience. The Goths were licentious

barbarians who would obey no laws; and to deprive the commonwealth of

laws would have been a crime. So for my part I chose the glory of

restoring the Roman name to its old estate." To such men the ideal of

the future was a federation of states owing a nominal allegiance to the

official head of the Empire, but cherishing an effective loyalty to all

that was best in Roman law and culture.

The second group comprises the kingdoms which were founded in outlying

provinces or comparatively late in time. The invaders of England, the

Franks in Northern Gaul, the Alemanni and the Bavarians on the Upper

Rhine and the Danube, the Lombards in Italy, the Vandals in Africa,

never came completely under the spell of the past. The Vandals might

have done so, but for their fanatical devotion to Arianism; for the

province of Africa, in which they settled, was one of those which Roman

statesmanship had most completely civilised. The Franks might have

imitated the Visigoths and the Burgundians, if fortune had laid the

cradle of their power in the valley of the Loire or the Rhone instead of

the forests and marshes of the Netherlands. The Lombards and the Saxons

showed no innate aversion to the ways and works of Rome; but they

entered upon provinces which had already been impoverished and

depopulated by the scourge of war. Such races proceeded rapidly with the

construction of a new social and political order, because the past was a

sealed book to them. Roman law vanished from England so completely as to

leave it doubtful whether the Saxons ever came to terms with the

provincials; it was tolerated but not encouraged by the Franks; it was

in great measure set aside by the Lombards; it seems to have been

unknown to the Alemanni and Bavarians. We shall see in the sequel the

importance of these facts. The future of Europe lay not with the Goths

or with the Burgundians, but with more ignorant or less impressionable

races who, rather by good fortune than by choice, escaped the vices in

missing the lessons of Roman civilisation. The Franks and the Saxons, as

we find them described by Gregory of Tours and the Venerable Bede, were

far from resembling the noble savage imagined by Tacitus and other

idealists. But they were trained for future empire in the hard school of

a northern climate.

All that concerns us in the history of these kingdoms can be briefly

stated.

(1) Teutonic England hardly enters into European history before the year

800. In the fifth and sixth centuries a multitude of small colonies had

been founded on the soil of Roman Britain by the three tribes of the

Angles, Saxons and Jutes, who migrated thither from Jutland and

Schleswig-Holstein. A few considerable kingdoms had emerged from this

chaos by the time when the English received from Rome their first

Christian teacher, St. Augustine: Kent, Sussex, and Wessex in the south;

Mercia and East Anglia in the Midlands; Northumbria between the Humber

and the Forth. The efforts of every ruler were devoted to the

establishment of his personal ascendancy over the whole group. Such a

supremacy was obtained by AEthelbert of Kent, the first royal convert to

Christianity; by Edwin of Northumbria and his two immediate successors

in the seventh century; by Offa of Mercia (757-796); and by Egbert of

Wessex (802-839), whose power foreshadowed the later triumphs of the

house of Alfred.

(2) Southern Gaul was divided in the fifth century between the Visigoths

and the Burgundians. The former of these peoples entered the imperial

service in 410, after the death of Alaric I, who had led them into

Italy. His successors, Athaulf and Wallia, undertook to pacify Gaul and

to recover Spain for the rulers of Ravenna; the second of these

sovereigns was rewarded with a settlement, for himself and his

followers, between the Loire and the Garonne (419). In the terrible

battle of Troyes, against Attila the Hun (451), they did good service to

the Roman cause; but both before and after that event they were chiefly

occupied in extending their boundaries by force or fraud. At the close

of the fifth century their power in Gaul extended from the Loire to the

Pyrenees, from the Atlantic to the Rhone valley, and along the

Mediterranean seaboard farther east to the Alps. In Spain--which had

been, since 409, the prey of the Vandals, Alans and Suevi--they found a

more legitimate field for their ambitions. Between 466 and 484 they

annexed every part of the peninsula except the north-west corner, which

remained the last stronghold of their defeated competitors. The

Burgundians, from less auspicious beginnings, had built up a smaller but

yet a powerful kingdom. Transplanted by a victorious Roman general to

Savoy (443) from the lands between the Necker and the Main, they had

descended into the Rhone basin at the invitation of the provincials, to

protect that fertile land alike against Teutonic marauders and Roman

tax-collectors. By the year 500 they ruled from the Durance in the south

to the headwaters of the Doubs and the Saone in the north, from the Alps

and the Jura to the sources of the Loire.

(3) Italy was less fortunate than Gaul; in the fifth century she was

ravaged more persistently, since Rome and Ravenna were the most tempting

prizes that the West could offer to conquerors seeking a settlement or

to mere marauders; and for yet another two centuries her soil was in

dispute between the Eastern Empire and the Teutons. The strategic

importance of the peninsula, the magic of the name of Rome, the more

recent tradition that Ravenna was the natural headquarters of imperial

bureaucracy in the West, were three cogent reasons why the statesmen of

Constantinople should insist that Italy must be recovered whatever

outlying provinces of the West were abandoned. For sixty years after the

deposition of Romulus Augustulus (476) Italy was entirely ruled by

barbarians; then for more than two hundred years there was an Imperial

Italy or a Papal Italy continually at feud with an Ostrogothic or a

Lombard Italy. It would have been better for the Italians if either the

Ostrogoths or the Lombards had triumphed decisively and at an early

date.

The Ostrogoths entered Italy from the north-east in 489, under the lead

of Theodoric, the first and last statesman of their race. They came from

the Middle Danube, where they had settled, with the leave of the Empire,

after the death of Attila and the dissolution of his army. They were now

in search of a more kindly habitation, and brought with them their

wives, their children, and their household stuff on waggons. Their way

was barred by Odoacer the Patrician--general of the Italian army and

King of Italy in all but name. It cost them four years of hard fighting

to overthrow this self-constituted representative of the Empire. After

that they had no overt opposition to fear. To the Italians there was

little difference between Odoacer and Theodoric. The change of rulers

did not affect their material interests, since Theodoric merely

appropriated that proportion of the cultivated land (one-third) which

Odoacer had claimed for his followers. Nor was submission inconsistent

with the loyalty demanded by the Eastern Empire; since for the moment it

suited imperial policy to accept the Visigothic King as the successor of

Odoacer. Theodoric reigned over Italy for thirty-three years (493-526).

A tolerant and enlightened ruler, he spared no effort to give his rule a

legal character, and to protect the Italians against oppression. Two

eminent Romans, Liberius and Cassiodorus, acted successively as his

confidential advisers and interpreted his policy to their countrymen. No

attempt was made to fuse the Ostrogoths with the Italians. The invaders

remained, an army quartered on the soil, subject for most purposes to

their own law. But the law of the Italians was similarly respected;

Theodoric applied the Roman law of crime impartially to both races; and

he rigourously interdicted the prosecution of private wars and feuds.

Unfortunately his subordinates were less scrupulous than himself. The

Ostrogothic soldiery maintained the national character for lawlessness;

the royal officers and judges were corrupt; men of means were harassed

by blackmailers and false informers; the poor and helpless were

frequently enslaved by force or fraud. The Italians could not forgive

the Arian tenets of their new rulers, even though the orthodox were

tolerated and protected. Naturally the clergy and the remnants of the

Roman aristocracy sighed for an imperial restoration. And Theodoric,

rightly or wrongly, came to suspect them all of treason. In his later

years he meted out a terrible and barbarous justice to the supposed

authors of conspiracy--notably to the Senator Boethius, who was beaten

to death with clubs after a long period of rigourous imprisonment.

Boethius has vindicated his own fair name, and blackened for ever that

of Theodoric, by his immortal treatise, the _Consolation of Philosophy_,

composed in hourly expectation of death. A Christian it would seem, but

certainly nurtured on the precepts of Plato and the Stoics, Boethius

turned in his extremity to these teachers for reassurance on the doubts

which must always afflict the just man enmeshed in undeserved

misfortune. Himself a philosopher only in his sublime optimism and his

resolve to treat the inevitable as immaterial, Boethius rivets the

attention by his absolute honesty. His book, revered in the Middle Ages

as all but inspired, will be read with interest and sympathy so long as

honest men are vexed by human oppression and the dispensations of a

seemingly capricious destiny. But the footprints of the Ostrogoths are

effaced from the soil of Italy; the name of Theodoric is scantily

commemorated by some mosaics and a rifled mausoleum at Ravenna. Here at

least Time has done justice in the end; from all that age of violent

deeds and half-sincere ideals nothing has passed into the spiritual

heritage of mankind but the communings of one undaunted sufferer with

his soul and God.

Theodoric died in 526, bequeathing his crown to his only daughter's son.

Eight years afterwards the boy king, worn out by premature excess, was

laid in the grave; his mother was murdered to clear the path of an

ambitious kinsman; and, while the succession was still in doubt, the

Emperor Justinian launched upon Italy the still invincible armies of the

Empire, led by Belisarius, the greatest general of the time and already

famous as the deliverer of Africa from the Vandals (536). The intrigues

of his court rivals, rather than the resources of the divided

Ostrogoths, robbed Belisarius of a decisive victory, and prolonged the

struggle for years after he had been superseded. But in 553 the last

embers of resistance were quenched in blood. Italy, devastated and

depopulated, was reorganised as an imperial province with an elaborate

hierarchy of civil and military officials. The change was welcome to the

orthodox clergy, the more so because Justinian gave large powers in

local administration to their bishops. Of outward pomp there was enough

to gild corruption and inefficiency with a deceptive splendour; but in

fact the restored Empire was little more civilised, in the true sense of

the word, than the barbarian states of the past and future. Upon the

Italians the Emperor conferred the boon of his famous _Corpus Juris_, a

compendium of that legal wisdom which constitutes the best title of Rome

to the world's gratitude. For the future it was momentous that Italy

learned, at this early date, to regard the _Corpus_ as the perfection of

legal wisdom. Through the Italian schools of later times (Ravenna,

Bologna, etc.) the _Corpus_ has influenced the law of every European

state and has dictated the principles of scientific jurisprudence. But

in the sixth century good laws availed nothing for want of good

government.

In 568, only fifteen years after the restoration, the Lombards descended

upon Italy from the Middle Danube, following the track of Theodoric and

inspirited by the fame of his success. A few years made them masters of

the North Italian plain still known as Lombardy. Within three-quarters

of a century they had demonstrated the hollowness of the Byzantine

power. The power of their kings, whose capital was Pavia, extended on

the one side into Liguria and Tuscany, on the other into Emilia and

Friuli; far away in the south, behind the line of fortresses which

linked Rome with Ravenna, the semi-independent dukes of Spoleto and

Benevento were masters of the land on both sides of the Apennines,

excepting Naples and the toe of the Bruttian peninsula. Apart from these

districts there remained in the imperial allegiance only the fisher-folk

of the Venetian lagoons and the lands which afterwards were to be known

as the Papal States. What the Byzantines achieved by the maintenance of

this precarious foothold was nothing less than the political disruption

of Italy. The Lombard duchies of the south were kept separate from the

parent state; with the result that their ruins were built long

afterwards into the fabric of a South Italian monarchy which was

irreconcilably hostile to the political heirs of the Lombard kings. In

many respects the Lombards showed capacity for governing a subject

population. They adopted the Latin language; they forsook Arianism for

Catholicism; they accommodated themselves to city life; they were

liberal patrons of Italian art and industry. Although they introduced a

strictly Teutonic form of administration, their rule compared not

unfavourably with the makeshift methods of Byzantine statesmanship. In

Imperial Italy we see the strange spectacle of a military despotism

tempered by the usurped privileges and jurisdictions of the great

proprietors, or by the ill-defined temporal pretensions of the bishops.

In Lombard Italy matters were at least no worse. The Lombards were

aliens; but so were the Greeks. The Greeks treated the Italians as

inferiors. But the Lombards intermarried freely with their subjects, and

the Lombard legislators (Rotharis, Luitprand) recognised no invidious

privileges of race.

(4) Northern Gaul remains to be considered. It was here that the

Frankish monarchy developed; and we deal last with the Franks because

they were destined to harvest the chief fruits of barbarian conquest and

colonisation. By the close of the eighth century Africa, Spain, and

Britain were the only western provinces of the Empire in which they had

failed to establish themselves as the sole or the dominant power; and

moreover they had penetrated by that time farther into Central Europe

than any Roman statesman, since Tiberius, had extended his schemes of

conquest. The expansion of the Franks was a slow process, interrupted by

periods of stagnation or relapse; and we can only trace it in the barest

outline.

Known from an early date to the Romans as vagrant marauders, the Franks

had been heavily chastised by most of the soldier emperors from Probus

to Julian. Some of them were forcibly settled as serf-colonists on the

left bank of the Rhine; others (the _Salian_ Franks) appropriated

to themselves a large part of Batavia, the marsh country at the mouths

of the Scheldt and Rhine; a third group (the _Ripuarians_) occupied

the lands between the Rhine and the Meuse, in the neighbourhood of Koln

and Bonn. The Salians and Ripuarians counted as allies (_foederati_) of

the Empire, at least from the time of Aetius; under whom, like the

Visigoths, they fought against the Huns at Troyes (451). Their

aggressions were checked on the West by the Roman governors of the

country lying between the Somme and the Loire; and their power

was impaired by the partition of the Salian people among a swarm of

petty kings. But in 481, with the accession of Clovis to the throne of

Tournai, there began a period of consolidation and advance. In 486

Clovis overthrew the Roman governor Syagrius and usurped his power. In

496 he annexed the purely Teutonic principality which the Alemanni had

recently established in the country now known as Suabia. This victory

was the occasion of his conversion to Christianity. The legend goes

that, in the crisis of the final battle, Clovis appealed to the God of

his pious wife: "I have called on my gods and they have forsaken me. To

Thee I turn, in Thee will I believe, if Thou wilt deliver me." He kept

his word, and was baptised by St. Remi, the Bishop of Rheims, thus

becoming a member of the orthodox communion, and the hope of all the

Gallic clergy, who had hitherto submitted with an ill grace to the

heretical rulers of the Visigoths and the Burgundians. A crafty and

ambitious savage, the King of Tournai quickly realised the advantage of

alliance with the native Church. In the year 500 he turned upon the

Burgundians in the hope of making them his tributaries. He failed in his

object, for the Burgundian King made a timely feint of conversion to

orthodoxy and otherwise conciliated the Gallo-Roman population. But over

Alaric II the Visigoth, who had been so impolitic as to persecute

orthodox bishops, the Franks secured an easy and dramatic triumph. "It

irks me," said Clovis to his army, "that these Arians should rule in

Gaul." The Aquitanians welcomed him as a Crusader; Alaric, after a

single defeat, took refuge in his Spanish dominions, where he was left

to rule in peace. At one stroke the power of the Franks had advanced

from the Loire to the Pyrenees (507). The latter days of Clovis were

prosperously occupied in exterminating rival Frankish dynasties and the

more dangerous of his own kindred. He died, after a reign of thirty

years, in the odour of sanctity: "God increased his kingdom every day,

because he walked with an upright heart and did what was pleasing in the

eyes of God." He was buried in the Gallo-Roman part of his dominions, at

Paris, which he had chosen as his capital. The province of Syagrius,

later known as Neustria or Western Francia, was the natural centre of

the Frankish state, nor was Clovis indifferent to the traditions and the

luxury of an older civilisation. In Aquitaine he posed as the

representative of the Empire, and he rode through the streets of Tours

in the purple robe of a consul, which he had received from the Emperor

Anastasius. The hope at Constantinople was that he would treat Theodoric

the Ostrogoth as he had already treated Alaric; this was the first of

many occasions on which the network of imperial diplomacy was woven

round a Frankish king. Church and Empire conspired to inflame the

ambitions and enlarge the schemes of Merovingian and Carolingian

conquerors.

Medieval Europe · 第 1 / 13 段