but an aspect of interest is given it by the fact that it is still
peculiarly the method of our times; his thoughts on particular aspects
of Nature are, however, in themselves feeble and of little weight,
containing nothing but an ill-considered medley of all manner of loose
conceptions. Going further, the principle of the manner in which
Epicurus looks on nature, lies in the conceptions he forms, which we
have already had before us (pp. 282, 285). That is to say, the general
representations which we receive through the repetition of several
perceptions, and to which we relate such perceptions in forming an
opinion, must be then applied to that which is not exactly matter of
perception, but yet has something in common with what we can perceive.
In this way it comes about that by such images we can apprehend the
unknown which does not lend itself immediately to perception; for from
what is known we must argue to what is unknown. This is nothing else
but saying that Epicurus judged by analogy, or that he makes so-called
evidence the principle of his view of Nature; and this is the principle
which to this day has authority in ordinary physical science. We go
through experiences and make observations, these arising from the
sensuous perceptions which are apt to be overlooked. Thus we reach
general concepts, laws, forces, and so on, electricity and magnetism,
for instance, and these are then applied by us to such objects and
activities as we cannot ourselves directly perceive. As an example, we
know about the nerves and their connection with the brain; in order
that there may be feeling and so on, it is said that a transmission
from the finger-tips to the brain takes place. But how can we represent
this to ourselves? We cannot make it a matter of observation. By
anatomy we can lay bare the nerves, it is true, but not the manner
of their working. We represent these to ourselves on the analogy of
other phenomena of transmission, for instance as the vibration of a
tense string that passes through the nerves to the brain. As in the
well-known phenomenon of a number of billiard balls set close together
in a row, the last of which rolls away when the first is struck, while
those in the middle, through each of which the effect of the stroke has
been communicated to the next, scarcely seem to move, so we represent
to ourselves the nerves as consisting of tiny balls which are invisible
even through the strongest magnifying glass, and fancy that at every
touch, &c., the last springs off and strikes the soul. In the same way
light is represented as filaments, rays, or as vibrations of the ether,
or as globules of ether, each of which strikes on the other. This is an
analogy quite in the manner of Epicurus.
In giving such explanations as those above, Epicurus professed to
be most liberal, fair and tolerant, saying that all the different
conceptions which occur to us in relation to sensuous objects—at our
pleasure, we may say,—can be referred to that which we cannot ourselves
directly observe; we should not assert any one way to be the right one,
for many ways may be so. In so saying, Epicurus is talking idly; his
words fall on the ear and the fancy, but looked on more narrowly they
disappear. So, for instance, we see the moon shine, without being able
to have any nearer experience of it. On this subject Epicurus says:
“The moon may have its own light, or a light borrowed from the sun; for
even on earth we see things which shine of themselves, and many which
are illuminated by others. Nothing hinders us from observing heavenly
things in the light of various previous experiences, and from adopting
hypotheses and explanations in accordance with these. The waxing and
waning of the moon may also be caused by the revolution of this body,
or through changes in the air” (according as vapour is modified in one
way or another), “or also by means of adding and taking away somewhat:
in short, in all the ways whereby that which has a certain appearance
to us is caused to show such appearance.” Thus there are to be found in
Epicurus all these trivialities of friction, concussion, &c., as when
he gives his opinion of lightning on the analogy of how we see fire of
other kinds kindled: “Lightning is explained by quite a large number
of possible conceptions; for instance, that through the friction and
collision of clouds the figuration of fire is emitted, and lightning
is produced.” In precisely the same way modern physicists transfer the
production of an electric spark, when glass and silk are rubbed against
each other, to the clouds. For, as we see a spark both in lightning and
electricity, we conclude from this circumstance common to both that the
two are analogical; therefore, we come to the conclusion that lightning
also is an electric phenomenon. But clouds are not hard bodies, and
by moisture electricity is more likely to be dispersed; therefore,
such talk has just as little truth in it as the fancy of Epicurus. He
goes on to say: “Or lightning may also be produced by being expelled
from the clouds by means of the airy bodies which form lightning—by
being struck out when the clouds are pressed together either by each
other or by the wind,” &c. With the Stoics things are not much better.
Application of sensuous conceptions according to analogy is often
termed comprehension or explanation, but in reality there is in such
a process not the faintest approach to thought or comprehension. “One
man,” adds Epicurus, “may select; one of these modes, and reject the
others, not considering what is possible for man to know, and what is
impossible, and therefore striving to attain to a knowledge of the
unknowable.”[158]
This application of sensuous images to what has a certain similarity
to them, is pronounced to be the basis and the knowledge of the
cause, because, in his opinion, a transference such as this cannot
be corroborated by the testimony of mere immediate sensation; thus
the Stoic method of seeking a basis in thought is excluded, and in
this respect the mode of explanation adopted by Epicurus is directly
opposed to that of the Stoics. One circumstance which strikes us at
once in Epicurus is the lack of observation and experience with regard
to the mutual relations of bodies: but the kernel of the matter, the
principle, is nothing else than the principle of modern physics. This
method of Epicurus has been attacked and derided, but on this score no
one need be ashamed of or fight shy of it, if he is a physicist; for
what Epicurus says is not a whit worse than what the moderns assert.
Indeed, in the case of Epicurus the satisfactory assurance is likewise
always present of his emphasizing the fact most strongly that just
because the evidence of the senses is found to be lacking, we must
not take our stand on any one analogy. Elsewhere he in the same way
makes light of analogy, and when one person accepts this possibility
and another that other possibility, he admires the cleverness of the
second and troubles himself little about the explanation given by
the first; it may be so, or it may not be so.[159] This is a method
devoid of reason, which reaches no further than to general conceptions.
Nevertheless, if Physical Science is considered to relate to immediate
experience on the one hand, and, on the other hand—in respect of that
which cannot be immediately experienced—to relate to the application
of the above according to a resemblance existing between it and that
which is not matter of experience, in that case Epicurus may well be
looked on as the chief promoter, if not the originator of this method,
and also as having asserted that it is identical with knowledge. Of the
Epicurean method in philosophy we may say this, that it likewise has
a side on which it possesses value, and we may in some measure assent
when we hear, as we frequently do, the Epicurean physics favourably
spoken of. Aristotle and the earlier philosophers took their start in
natural philosophy from universal thought _a priori_, and from this
developed the Notion; this is the one side. The other side, which is
just as necessary, demands that experience should be worked up into
universality, that laws should be found out; that is to say, that the
result which follows from the abstract Idea should coincide with the
general conception to which experience and observation have led up.
The _a priori_ is with Aristotle, for instance, most excellent but not
sufficient, because to it there is lacking connection with and relation
to experience and observation. This leading up of the particular to the
universal is the finding out of laws, natural forces, and so on. It may
thus be said that Epicurus is the inventor of empiric Natural Science,
of empiric Psychology. In contrast to the Stoic ends, conceptions of
the understanding, experience is the present as it appears to the
senses: there we have abstract limited understanding, without truth
in itself, and therefore without the present in time and the reality
of Nature; here we have this sense of Nature, which is more true than
these other hypotheses.
The same effect which followed the rise of a knowledge of natural laws,
&c., in the modern world was produced by the Epicurean philosophy in
its own sphere, that is to say, in so far as it is directed against
the arbitrary invention of causes. The more, in later times, men
made acquaintance with the laws of Nature, the more superstition,
miracles, astrology, &c. disappeared; all this fades away owing to
the contradiction offered to it by the knowledge of natural laws. The
method of Epicurus was directed more especially against the senseless
superstition of astrology, &c., in whose methods there is neither
reason nor thought, for it is quite a thing of the imagination,
downright fabrication being resorted to, or what we may even term
lying. In contrast with this, the way in which Epicurus works, when
the conceptions and not thought are concerned, accords with truth. For
it does not go beyond what is perceived by the sight, and hearing,
and the other senses, but keeps to what is present and not alien to
the mind, not speaking of certain things as if they could be seen and
heard, when that is quite impossible, seeing that the things are pure
inventions. The effect of the Epicurean philosophy in its own time was
therefore this, that it set itself against the superstition of the
Greeks and Romans, and elevated men above it.[160] All the nonsense
about birds flying to right or to left, or a hare running across the
path, or men deciding how they are to act according to the entrails of
animals, or according as chickens are lively or dull—all that kind of
superstition the Epicurean philosophy made short work of, by permitting
that only to be accepted as truth which is counted as true by sense
perception through the instrumentality of anticipations; and from it
more than anything those conceptions which have altogether denied the
supersensuous have proceeded. The physics of Epicurus were therefore
famous for the reason that they introduced more enlightened views
in regard to what is physical, and banished the fear of the gods.
Superstition passes straightway from immediate appearances to God,
angels, demons; or it expects from finite things other effects than the
conditions admit of, phenomena of a higher kind. To this the Epicurean
natural philosophy is utterly opposed, because in the sphere of the
finite it refuses to go beyond the finite, and admits finite causes
alone; for the so-called enlightenment is the fact of remaining in the
sphere of the finite. There connection is sought for in other finite
things, in conditions which are themselves conditioned; superstition,
on the contrary, rightly or wrongly, passes at once to what is above
us. However correct the Epicurean method may be in the sphere of
the conditioned, it is not so in other spheres. Thus if I say that
electricity comes from God, I am right and yet wrong. For if I ask for
a cause in this same sphere of the conditioned, and give God as answer,
I say too much; though this answer fits all questions, since God is
the cause of everything, what I would know here is the particular
connection of the phenomenon. On the other hand, in this sphere even
the Notion is already something higher; but this loftier way of looking
at things which we met with in the earlier philosophers, was quite put
an end to by Epicurus, since with superstition there also passed away
self-dependent connection and the world of the Ideal.
To the natural philosophy of Epicurus there also belongs his conception
of the soul, which he looks on as having the nature of a thing, just
as the theories of our own day regard it as nerve-filaments, cords
in tension, or rows of minute balls (p. 294). His description of the
soul has therefore but little meaning, since here also he draws his
conclusion by analogy, and connects therewith the metaphysical theory
of atoms: “The soul consists of the finest and roundest atoms, which
are something quite different from fire, being a fine spirit which
is distributed through the whole aggregate of the body, and partakes
of its warmth.” Epicurus has consequently established a quantitative
difference only, since these finest atoms are surrounded by a mass of
coarser atoms and dispersed through this larger aggregate. “The part
which is devoid of reason is dispersed in the body” as the principle
of life, “but the self-conscious part (τὸ λογικόν) is in the breast,
as may be perceived from joy and sadness. The soul is capable of much
change in itself, owing to the fineness of its parts, which can move
very rapidly: it sympathizes with the rest of the aggregate, as we see
by the thoughts, emotions and so on; but when it is taken away from us
we die. But the soul, on its part, has also the greatest sympathy with
sensuous perception; yet it would have nothing in common with it, were
it not in a certain measure covered by the rest of the aggregate” (the
body)—an utterly illogical conception. “The rest of this aggregate,
which this principle provides for the soul, is thereby also partaker,
on its part, of a like condition” (sensuous perception), “yet not of
all that the former possesses; therefore, when the soul escapes,
sensuous perception exists no more for it. The aggregate spoken of
above has not this power in itself, but derives it from the other which
is brought into union with it, and the sentient movement comes to pass
through the flow of sympathy which they have in common.”[161] Of such
conceptions it is impossible to make anything. The above-mentioned
(p. 287) interruption of the streaming together of images of external
things with our organs, as the ground of error, is now explained by
the theory that the soul consists of peculiar atoms, and the atoms
are separated from one another by vacuum. With such empty words and
meaningless conceptions we shall no longer detain ourselves; we can
have no respect for the philosophic thoughts of Epicurus, or rather he
has no thoughts for us to respect.
4. ETHICS.
Besides this description of the soul the philosophy of mind contains
the ethics of Epicurus, which of all his doctrines are the most
decried, and therefore the most interesting; they may, however,
also be said to constitute the best part of that philosophy. The
practical philosophy of Epicurus depends on the individuality of
self-consciousness, just as much as does that of the Stoics; and the
end of his ethics is in a measure the same, the unshaken tranquillity
of the soul, and more particularly an undisturbed pure enjoyment of
itself. Of course, if we regard the abstract principle involved in
the ethics of Epicurus, our verdict cannot be other than exceedingly
unfavourable. For if sensation, the feeling of pain and pleasure, is
the criterion for the right, good, true, for that which man should
make his aim in life, morality is really abrogated, or the moral
principle is in fact not moral; at least we hold that the way is
thereby opened up to all manner of arbitrariness in action. If it is
now alleged that feeling is the ground of action, and that because I
find a certain impulse in myself it is for that reason right—this is
Epicurean reasoning. Everyone may have different feelings, and the
same person, may feel differently at different times; in the same way
with Epicurus it may be left to the subjectivity of the individual to
determine the course of action. But it is of importance to notice this,
that when Epicurus sets tip pleasure as the end, he concedes this only
so far as its enjoyment is the result of philosophy. We have before now
remarked (vol. i., p. 470) that even with the Cyrenaics, while on the
one hand sensation was certainly made the principle, on the other hand
it was essential that thought should be in intimate connection with
it. Similarly it is the case with Epicurus that while he designated
pleasure as the criterion of the good, he demanded a highly cultured
consciousness, a power of reflection, which weighs pleasure to see if
it is not combined with a greater degree of pain, and in this way forms
a correct estimate of what it is. Diogenes Laërtius (X. 144) quotes
from him with regard to this point of view: “The wise man owes but
little to chance; Reason attains what is of the greatest consequence,
and both directs it and will direct it his whole life long.” The
particular pleasure is therefore regarded only with reference to the
whole, and sensuous perception is not the one and only principle of
the Epicureans; but while they made pleasure the principle, they made
a principle at the same time of that happiness which is attained,
and only attainable by reason; so that this happiness is to be
sought in such a way that it may be free and independent of external
contingencies, the contingencies of sensation. The true Epicureans were
therefore, just as much as the Stoics, raised above all particular
ties, for Epicurus, too, made his aim the undisturbed tranquillity of
the wise man. In order to be free from superstition Epicurus specially
requires physical science, as it sets men free from all the opinions
which most disturb their rest—opinions regarding the gods, and their
punishments, and more particularly from the thought of death.[162]
Freed from all this fear, and from the imaginings of the men who make
any particular object their end and aim, the wise man seeks pleasure
only as something universal, and holds this alone to be positive. Here
the universal and the particular meet; or the particular, regarded only
in its bearings to the whole, is raised into the form of universality.
Thus it happens that, while materially, or as to content, Epicurus
makes individuality a principle, on the other hand he requires the
universality of thinking, and his philosophy is thus in accordance with
that of the Stoics.
Seneca, who is known as a thorough-going and uncompromising Stoic, when
in his treatise _De Vita Beata_ (c. 12, 13) he happens to speak of the
Epicureans, gives testimony which is above suspicion to the ethical
system of Epicurus: “My verdict is, however—and in thus speaking I
go, to some extent, against many of my own countrymen—that the moral
precepts of Epicurus prescribe a way of life that is holy and just,
and, when closely considered, even sorrowful. For every pleasure of
Epicurus turns on something very paltry and poor, and we scarcely know
how restricted it is, and how insipid. The self-same law which we lay
down for virtue he prescribes for pleasure; he requires that Nature be
obeyed; but very little in the way of luxury is required to satisfy
Nature. What have we then here? He who calls a lazy, self-indulgent,
and dissolute life happiness merely seeks a good authority for a thing
that is evil, and while, drawn on by a dazzling name, he turns in the
direction where he hears the praise of pleasure sounding, he does not
follow the pleasures to which he is invited by Epicurus, but those
which he himself brings with him. Men who thus abandon themselves
to crime seek only to hide their wickedness under the mantle of
philosophy, and to furnish for their excesses a pretext and an excuse.
Thus it is by no means permitted that youth should hold up its head
again for the reason that to the laxity of its morality an honourable
title has been affixed.” By the employment of our reflective powers,
which keep guard over pleasure and consider whether there can be any
enjoyment in that which is fraught with dangers, fear, anxiety and
other troubles, the possibility of our obtaining pleasure pure and
unalloyed is reduced to a minimum. The principle of Epicurus is to live
in freedom and ease, and with the mind at rest, and to this end it is
needful to renounce much of that which men allow to sway them, and in
which they find their pleasure. The life of a Stoic is therefore but
little different from that of an Epicurean who keeps well before his
eyes what Epicurus enjoins.
It might perhaps occur to us that the Cyrenaics had the same moral
principle as the Epicureans, but Diogenes Laërtius (X. 139, 136, 137)
shows us the difference that there was between them. The Cyrenaics
rather made pleasure as a particular thing their end, while Epicurus,
on the contrary, regarded it as a means, since he asserted painlessness
to be pleasure, and allowed of no intermediate state. “Neither do the
Cyrenaics recognize pleasure in rest (καταστηματικήν), but only in the
determination of motion,” or as something affirmative, that consists
in the enjoyment of the pleasant; “Epicurus, on the contrary, admits
both—the pleasure of the body as well as that of the soul.” He meant
by this that pleasure in rest is negative, as the absence of the
unpleasant, and also an inward contentment, whereby rest is maintained
within the mind. Epicurus explained these two kinds of pleasure more
clearly as follows: “Freedom from fear and desire (ἀταραξία) and from
pain and trouble (ἀπονία) are the passive pleasures (καταστηματικὶα
ἡδοναί),”—the setting of our affections on nothing which we may run the
risk of losing; pleasures of the senses, on the other hand, like “joy
and mirth (χαρὰ δὲ καὶ εὐφροσύνη), are pleasures involving movement
(κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.9)” The former pleasures Epicurus held
to be the truest and highest. “Besides this, pain of the body was held
by the Cyrenaics to be worse than sorrow of the soul, while with the
Epicureans this is reversed.”