of their theory of judgments, which in part coincides with it, and in
part is a grammar and a rhetoric; by it no real scientific content
can be reached. For this logic is not, like Plato’s dialectic, the
speculative science of the absolute Idea; but, as formal logic, as we
saw above (p. 254), it is science as the firm, secure, unalterable
comprehension of reasons, and stops short at the perception of the
same. This logical element, whose essence consists pre-eminently in
escaping to the simplicity of the conception to that which is not in
opposition to itself nor falls into contradiction, obtains the upper
hand. This simplicity, which has not negativity and content in itself,
requires a given content which it may not abrogate—but consequently
it cannot thus attain to a genuine “other” through itself. The Stoics
have constituted their logic often in the most isolated fashion;
the principal point that is established here is that the objective
corresponds to thought, and they investigated this thought more
closely. If in a manner it is quite correct to say that the universal
is the true, and that thought has a definite content that must also
be concrete, the main difficulty, which is to deduce the particular
determination from the universal, so that in this self-determination it
may remain identical with itself, has not been solved by the Stoics:
and this the Sceptics brought to consciousness. This is the point of
view most important in the philosophy of the Stoics; it thus showed
itself in their physics also.
3. ETHICS.
Since the theory of mind, the doctrine of knowledge, came before us
in the investigation of the criterion, we have, in the third and
last place, to speak of the morality of the Stoics, to which is due
their greatest fame, but which does not rise above this formal element
any more than what precedes, although it cannot be denied that in
presenting it they have taken a course which seems very plausible to
the popular conception, but which in fact is to a great extent external
and empiric.
a. In order, in the first place, to find the definition of virtue,
Chrysippus gives some good expositions of practical ethics which
Diogenes Laërtius (VII. 85, 86) quotes at considerable length; they
are psychological in character and in them Chrysippus establishes his
formal harmony with himself. For according to him the Stoics say: “The
first desire (ὁρμή) of the animal is for self-preservation, because
nature from the beginning reconciled each existence with itself. This
first object innate in every animal” (immanent desire) “is thus the
harmony of the animal with itself, and the consciousness of the same,”
the self-consciousness through which “the animal is not alienated
from itself. Thus it repels what is injurious and accepts what is
serviceable to it.” This is Aristotle’s conception of the nature of
adaptation to an end, in which, as the principle of activity, both the
opposite and its sublation are contained. “Enjoyment is not the first
object, for it” (the sense of satisfaction) “is only for the first time
added when the nature of an animal that seeks itself through itself,
receives into itself that which is in conformity with its harmony with
itself.” This is likewise worthy of approbation: self-consciousness,
enjoyment, is just this return into self, the consciousness of this
unity in which I enjoy something and thereby have my unity as this
individual in the objective element. The case is similar in regard
to man; his end is self-preservation, but with a conscious end, with
consideration, according to reason. “In plants nature operates without
voluntary inclination (ὁρμῆς) or sense-perception, but some things in
us take place in the same manner as in plants.” For in the plant there
also is the seed-containing conception, but it is not in it as end, nor
as its object, for it knows nothing about it. “In animals inclination
comes in; in them nature makes their impulses conformable to their
first principle;” _i.e._ the end of inclination is simply the first
principle of their nature, and that through which they make for their
own preservation. “Rational creatures likewise make nature their end,
but this is to live according to reason, for reason becomes in them the
artist who produces inclination,” _i.e._ it makes a work of art in man
from what in the animal is desire merely. To live in accordance with
nature is thus, to the Stoics, to live rationally.
This now appears somewhat like certain receipts given by the Stoics for
the purpose of discovering right motive forces in regard to virtue. For
their principle put generally is this: “Men must live in conformity
with nature, _i.e._ with virtue; for to it” (rational) “nature leads
us.” That is the highest good, the end of everything—a most important
form in Stoic morality, which appears in Cicero as _finis bonorum_
or _summum bonum_. With the Stoics right reason and the securing of
it on its own account, is the highest principle. But here, too, we
immediately see that we are thereby merely led round in a circle in a
manner altogether formal, because virtue, conformity to nature, and
reason, are only determined through one another. Virtue consists in
living conformably with nature, and what is conformable to nature is
virtue. Likewise thought must further determine what is in conformity
with nature, but conformity with nature again is that alone which
is determined through reason. The Stoics further say, according to
Diogenes Laërtius (VII. 87, 88) “To live according to nature is to
live according to that which experience teaches us of the laws both
of universal nature and of our own nature, by doing nothing which
universal law forbids; and that law is the right reason which pervades
everything, being the same with Jupiter, the disposer (καθηγεμόνι) of
the existing system of things. The virtue of the happy man is when
everything occurs according to the harmony of the genius (δαίμονος)
of each individual with reference to the will of the disposer of all
things.” Thus everything remains as it was in a universal formalism.
We must throughout allow to the Stoics that virtue consists in
following thought, _i.e._ the universal law, right reason; anything is
moral and right only in as far as a universal end is in it fulfilled
and brought into evidence. This last is the substantial, the essential
nature of a relationship, and in it we have that which is really in
thought alone. The universal which must be the ultimate determination
in action, is, however, not abstract, but the universal in this
relationship, just as, for example, in property the particular is
placed on one side. Because man, as a man of thought and culture, acts
according to his perception, he subordinates his impulses and desires
to the universal; for they are individual. There is in each human
action an individual and particular element; but there is a distinction
as to whether the particular as such is solely insisted upon or whether
in this particular the universal is secured. It is to the securing
of this universal that the energy of Stoicism is directed. But this
universal has still no content and is undetermined, and thereby the
Stoic doctrines of virtue are incomplete, empty, meaningless and
tedious. Virtue indeed is commended in a forcible, lively and edifying
manner, but as to what this universal law of virtue is, we have no
indications given us.
b. The other side as regards the good is external existence, and the
agreement of circumstances, of external nature, with the end aimed
at by man. For although the Stoics have expressed the good as being
conformity with law, in relation to the practical will, they yet
defined it, according to Diogenes Laërtius (VII. 94, 95), as being at
the same time the useful, “either absolutely and immediately useful or
not contrary to utility,” so that generally speaking the useful is,
as it were, the accident of virtue. “The Stoics likewise distinguished
manifold good into good having reference to the soul, and external
good; the former indicates virtues and their actions; the latter the
fact of pertaining to a noble country, having a virtuous friend, and
so on. In the third place it is neither external nor is it a matter
of self-consciousness alone, when the self-same man is virtuous and
happy.” These conclusions are quite good. Morality does not require
to look so coldly on what concerns utility, for every good action is
in fact useful, _i.e._ it has actuality and brings forth something
good. An action which is good without being useful is no action and
has no actuality. That which in itself is useless in the good is its
abstraction as being a non-reality. Men not only may, but must have
the consciousness of utility; for it is true that it is useful to know
the good. Utility means nothing else but that men have a consciousness
respecting their actions. If this consciousness is blameworthy, it
is still more so to know much of the good of one’s action and to
consider it less in the form of necessity. Thus the question was raised
as to how virtue and happiness are related to one another, a theme
of which the Epicureans have also treated. Here it was, as in more
recent times, regarded as the great problem to discover whether virtue
gives happiness, taken altogether by itself, whether the conception
of happiness is included in its conception. That union of virtue and
happiness, as the mean, is thus rightly represented as being perfect,
neither pertaining only to self-consciousness nor to externality.
α. In order to be able to give a general answer to this question,
we most recollect what was said above of the principle of
self-preservation, according to which virtue has to do with the
rational nature. The fulfilment of its end is happiness as finding
itself realized, and as the knowledge or intuitive perception of itself
as an external—a harmony of its Notion or its genius with its Being
or its reality. The harmony of virtue with happiness thus means that
the virtuous action realizes itself in and for itself, man becomes in
it an immediate object to himself, and he comes to the perception of
himself as objective, or of the objective as himself. This rests in
the conception of action and particularly of good action. For the bad
destroys reality and is opposed to self-preservation; but the good
is what makes for its self-preservation and effectuates it—the good
end is thus the content that realizes itself in action. But in this
general answer to that question, properly speaking, the consciousness
of the implicitly existent end has not sufficiently exactly the
signification of virtue, nor has action proceeding from the same
exactly the signification of virtuous action, neither has the reality
which it attains the signification of happiness. The distinction rests
in the fact that the Stoics have merely remained at this general
conception, and set it forth immediately as actuality; in it however,
the conception of virtuous action is merely expressed, and not reality.
β. A further point is that just because the Stoics have remained at
this position, the opposition between virtue and happiness immediately
enters in, or, in abstract form, that between thought and its
determination. These opposites are with Cicero _honestum_ and _utile_,
and their union is the question dealt with.[137] Virtue, which is
living in accordance with the universal law of nature, is confronted
by the satisfaction of the subject as such in his particularity.
The two sides are, in the first place, this particularity of the
individual, which, in the most varied aspects has existence in me as
the abstract “this,” for example, in the pre-supposition of determinate
inclinations; and here we have pleasure and enjoyment in which my
existence harmonizes with the demands of my particularity. In the
second place, I, as the will that fulfils law, am only the formal
character which has to carry out the universal; and thus, as willing
the universal, I am in accord with myself as thinking. The two now
come into collision, and because I seek the one satisfaction or the
other, I am in collision with myself, because I am also individual.
As to this we may hear many trivial things said, such as that things
often go badly with the virtuous and well with the wicked, and that
the latter is happy, &c. By going well all external circumstances
are understood, and on the whole the content is quite uninteresting,
for it is constituted by the attainment of commonplace ends, points
of view and interests. Such at once show themselves, however, to be
merely contingent and external; hence we soon get past this standpoint
in the problem, and thus external enjoyment, riches, noble birth,
&c., do not accord with virtue or happiness. The Stoics indeed said:
“The implicitly good is the perfect” (that which fulfils its end) “in
accordance with the nature of the rational; now virtue is such, but
enjoyment, pleasure and such-like are its accessories”[138]—the end of
the satisfaction of the individual on his own account. Thus these may
be the concomitants of virtue, although it is a matter of indifference
whether they are so or not, for since this satisfaction is not end,
it is equally a matter of indifference if pain is the concomitant
of virtue. Conduct which is according to reason only, thus further
contains man’s abstract concentration within himself, and the fact that
the consciousness of the true enters into him, so that he renounces
everything that belongs to immediate desires, feelings, &c.
In this quite formal principle of holding oneself in a pure harmony
with oneself of a merely thinking nature, there now rests the power of
becoming indifferent to every particular enjoyment, desire, passion
and interest. Because this following of the determinations of reason
is in opposition to enjoyment, man should seek his end or satisfaction
in nothing else than in the satisfaction of his reason, in satisfying
himself in himself, but not in anything outwardly conditioned. Hence
much has been said by the Stoics in respect of that which pertains to
the passions being something that is contradictory. The writings of
Seneca and Antoninus contain much that is true in this regard, and
they may be most helpful to those who have not attained to the higher
degree of conviction. Seneca’s talent must be recognized, but we must
also be convinced that it does not suffice. Antoninus (VIII. 7) shows
psychologically that happiness or pleasure is not a good. “Regret is a
certain self-blame, because something useful has failed, the good must
be something useful, and the noble and good man must make the same his
interest. But no noble and good man will feel regret that he has fallen
short in pleasure; pleasure is thus neither useful nor good. The man
who has the desire for glory after his death does not recollect that
he who holds him in remembrance himself dies also, and again he who
follows this one, until all recollection through these admiring ones
who have passed away, has been extinguished.” Even if this independence
and freedom is merely formal, we must still recognize the greatness of
this principle. However, in this determination of the abstract inward
independence and freedom of the character in itself lies the power
which has made the Stoics famous; this Stoic force of character which
says that man has only to seek to remain like himself, thus coincides
with the formal element which I have already given (p. 254). For if
the consciousness of freedom is my end, in this universal end of the
pure consciousness of my independence all particular determinations of
freedom which are constituted by duties and laws, have disappeared. The
strength of will of Stoicism has therefore decided not to regard the
particular as its essence, but to withdraw itself therefrom; we see on
the one hand, that this is a true principle, but on the other, it is at
the same time abstract still.
Now because the principle of the Stoic morality professes to be the
harmony of mind with itself, what should be done is not to let this
remain formal, and therefore not to let what is not contained in
this self-contained be any longer shut out of it. That freedom which
the Stoics ascribe to man is not without relation to what is other
than himself; thus he is really dependent, and under this category
happiness really falls. My independence is only one side, to which
the other side, the particular side of my existence, hence does not
yet correspond. The old question, which at this time again came up,
thus concerns the harmony between virtue and happiness. We speak of
morality rather than virtue, because that according to which I ought
to direct my actions is not, as in virtue, my will, as it has become
custom. Morality really contains my subjective conviction that that
which I do is in conformity with rational determinations of will, with
universal duties. That question is a necessary one, a problem which
even in Kant’s time occupied men, and in endeavouring to solve it
we must begin by considering what is to be understood by happiness.
Much more is afterwards said of that in which satisfaction is to be
sought. However, from what is external and exposed to chance we must
at once break free. Happiness in general means nothing more than the
feeling of harmony with self. That which is pleasing to the senses is
pleasing because a harmony with ourselves is therein contained. The
contrary and unpleasing is, on the other hand, a negation, a lack of
correspondence with our desires. The Stoics have posited as the very
essence of enjoyment this harmony of our inner nature with itself,
but only as inward freedom and the consciousness, or even only the
feeling of this harmony, so that enjoyment such as this is contained in
virtue itself. Yet this enjoyment ever remains a secondary matter, a
consequence, which in so far as it is so cannot be made end, but should
only be considered as an accessory. The Stoics said in this regard
that virtue is alone to be sought, but with virtue happiness on its
own account is found, for it confers blessing explicitly as such. This
happiness is true and imperturbable even if man is in misfortune;[139]
thus the greatness of the Stoic philosophy consists in the fact that
if the will thus holds together within itself, nothing can break into
it, that everything else is kept outside of it, for even the removal
of pain cannot be an end. The Stoics have been laughed at because they
said that pain is no evil.[140] But toothache and the like are not in
question as regards this problem. We cannot but know we are subject
to such; pain like this, and unhappiness are, however, two different
things. Thus the problem throughout is only to be understood as the
demand for a harmony of the rational will with external reality. To
this reality there also belongs the sphere of particular existence, of
subjectivity, of personality, of particular interests. But of these
interests the universal alone truly pertains to this reality, for only
in so far as it is universal, can it harmonize with the rationality
of the will. It is thus quite right to say that suffering, pain, &c.,
are no evil, whereby the conformity with myself, my freedom, might be
destroyed; I am elevated over such in the union which is maintained
with myself, and even if I may feel them, they can still not make me
at variance with myself. This inward unity with myself as felt, is
happiness, and this is not destroyed by outward evil.
γ. Another opposition is that within virtue itself. Because the
universal law of right reason is alone to be taken as the standard of
action, there is no longer any really absolutely fixed determination,
for all duty is always, so to speak, a particular content, which
can plainly be grasped in universal form, without this, however, in
any way affecting the content. Because virtue is thus that which is
conformable to the real essence or law of things, in a general sense
the Stoics called virtue everything, in every department, which is
in conformity with law in that department. Hence, Diogenes tells us
(VII. 92), they also speak of logical and physical virtues, just as
their morality represents individual duties (τὰ καθήκοντα) by passing
in review the individual natural relationships in which man stands,
and showing what in them is rational.[141] But this is only a kind
of quibbling such as we have also seen in Cicero’s case. Thus in as
far as an ultimate deciding criterion of that which is good cannot be
set up, the principle being destitute of determination, the ultimate
decision rests with the subject, Just as before this it was the oracle
that decided, at the commencement of this profounder inwardness the
subject was given the power of deciding as to what is right. For since
Socrates’ time the determination of what was right by the standard of
customary morality had ceased in Athens to be ultimate; hence with the
Stoics all external determination falls away, and the power of decision
can only be placed in the subject as such, which in the last instance
determines from itself as conscience. Although much that is elevated
and edifying may find its support here, an actual determination
is still wanting; hence there is according to the Stoics only one
virtue,[142] and the wise man is the virtuous.
c. The Stoics have thus in the third place likewise been in the way of
representing an ideal of the wise man which, however, is nothing more
than the will of the subject which in itself only wills itself, remains
at the thought of the good, because it is good, allows itself in its
steadfastness to be moved by nothing different from itself, such as
desires, pain, &c., desires its freedom alone, and is prepared to give
up all else—which thus, if it experiences outward pain and misfortune,
yet separates these from the inwardness of its consciousness. The
question of why the expression of rel morality has with the Stoics
the form of the ideal of the wise man finds its answer, however,
in the fact that the mere conception of virtuous consciousness, of
action with respect to an implicitly existent end, finds in individual
consciousness alone the element of moral reality. For if the Stoics
had gone beyond the mere conception of action for the implicitly
existent end, and had reached to the knowledge of the content, they
would not have required to express this as a subject. To them rational
self-preservation is virtue. But if we ask what it is that is evolved
by virtue, the answer is to the effect that it is just rational
self-preservation; and thus they have not by this expression got beyond
that formal circle. Moral reality is not expressed as that which is
enduring, which is evolved and ever evolving itself. And moral reality
is just this, to exist; for as nature is an enduring and existent
system, the spiritual as such must be an objective world. To this
reality the Stoics have, however, not reached. Or we may understand
this thus. Their moral reality is only the wise man, an ideal and not a
reality—in fact the mere conception whose reality is not set forth.