have to consider Dogmatism and Scepticism—the Dogmatism which separates
itself into the two philosophies, the Stoic and the Epicurean; and the
third philosophy, of which both partake and which yet differs from them
both, Scepticism. Along with this last we would take the New Academy,
which has entirely merged in it—while in the Older Academy, Plato’s
philosophy indubitably still maintained its purity. We saw at the
close of the previous period the consciousness of the Idea, or of the
Universal, which is an end in itself—a principle, universal indeed,
but at the same time determined in itself, which is thus capable of
subsuming the particular, and of being applied thereto. The application
of universal to particular is here the relationship that prevails, for
the reflection that from the universal itself the separation of the
totality is developed, is not yet present. There always is in such a
relationship the necessity of a system and of systematization; that
is to say, one determinate principle must consistently be applied to
the particular, so that the truth of all that is particular should be
determined according to this abstract principle, and be at the same
time likewise recognized. Now since this is what we have in so-called
Dogmatism, it is a philosophizing of the understanding, in which
Plato’s and Aristotle’s speculative greatness is no longer present.
In respect of this relationship, the task of Philosophy now comes to
be summed up in the twofold question which we spoke of earlier (Vol.
I. pp. 474, 475), and which has regard to a criterion of truth and to
the wise man. At this point we may better than before, and also from a
different point of view, explain the necessity for this phenomenon. For
because truth has now become conceived as the harmony of thought and
reality, or rather as the identity of the Notion, as the subjective,
with the objective, the first question is what the universal principle
for judging and determining this harmony is; but a principle through
which the true is judged (κρίνεται) to be true, is simply the
criterion. Yet because this question had only been formally and
dogmatically answered, the dialectic of Scepticism, or the knowledge of
the one-sidedness of this principle as a dogmatic principle, at once
appeared. A further result of this mode of philosophizing is that the
principle, as formal, is subjective, and consequently it has taken the
real significance of the subjectivity of self-consciousness. Because
of the external manner in which the manifold is received, the highest
point, that in which thought finds itself in its most determinate
form, is self-consciousness. The pure relation of self-consciousness
to itself is thus the principle in all these philosophies, since in it
alone does the Idea find satisfaction, just as the formalism of the
understanding of the present so-called philosophizing seeks to find its
fulfilment, the concrete which is opposed to this formalism, in the
subjective heart, in the inward feelings and beliefs. Nature and the
political world are certainly also concrete, but externally concrete;
the arbitrary concrete is, on the other hand, not in the determinate
universal Idea, but only in self-consciousness and as being personal.
The second ruling determination is consequently that of the wise men.
Not reason alone, but everything must be something thought, that is,
subjectively speaking, my thought; that which is thought, on the
contrary, is only implicit, that is to say, it is itself objective
in so far as it appears in the form of the formal identity of thought
with itself. The thought of the criterion as of the one principle
is, in its immediate actuality, the subject itself; thought and the
thinker are thus immediately connected. Because the principle of this
philosophy is not objective but dogmatic, and rests on the impulse of
self-consciousness towards self-satisfaction, it is the subject whose
interests are to be considered. The subject seeks on its own account a
principle for its freedom, namely, immovability in itself; it must be
conformable to the criterion, _i.e._ to this quite universal principle,
in order to be able to raise itself into this abstract independence.
Self-consciousness lives in the solitude of its thought, and finds
therein its satisfaction. These are the fundamental determinations in
the following philosophies: the exposition of their main principles
will come next, but to go into details is not advisable.
Although, as no doubt is the case, these philosophies, as regards
their origin, pertain to Greece, and their great teachers were
always Greeks, they were yet transferred to the Roman world; thus
Philosophy passed into the Roman world and these systems in particular
constituted under Roman rule the philosophy of the Roman world, in
opposition to which world, unsuited as it was to the rational practical
self-consciousness, this last, driven back into itself from external
actuality, could only seek for reason in itself and could only care
for its individuality—just as abstract Christians only care for their
own salvation. In the bright Grecian world the individual attached
himself more to his state or to his world, and was more at home in
it. The concrete morality, the impulse towards the introduction of
the principle into the world through the constitution of the state,
which we see in Plato, the concrete science that we find in Aristotle,
here disappear. In the wave of adversity which came across the Roman
world, everything beautiful and noble in spiritual individuality
was rudely swept away. In this condition of disunion in the world,
when man is driven within his inmost self, he has to seek the unity
and satisfaction, no longer to be found in the world, in an abstract
way. The Roman world is thus the world of abstraction, where one
cold rule was extended over all the civilized world. The living
individualities of national spirit in the nations have been stifled
and killed; a foreign power, as an abstract universal, has pressed
hard upon individuals. In such a condition of dismemberment it was
necessary to fly to this abstraction as to the thought of an existent
subject, that is, to this inward freedom of the subject as such. As
what was held in estimation was the abstract will of the individual
ruler of the world, the inward principle of thought also had to be an
abstraction which could bring forth a formal, subjective reconciliation
only. A dogmatism erected on a principle made effectual through the
form of the understanding could alone satisfy the Roman mind. These
philosophies are thus conformable to the spirit of the Roman world,
as indeed Philosophy in general ever stands in close connection with
the world in its ordinary aspect (Vol. I. pp. 53, 54). The Roman world
has, indeed, produced a formal patriotism and corresponding virtue, as
also a developed system of law; but speculative philosophy could not
proceed from such dead material—we could only expect good advocates
and the morality of a Tacitus. These philosophies, always excepting
Stoicism, also arose amongst the Romans in opposition to their ancient
superstitions, just as now Philosophy comes forward in the place of
religion.
The three principles of Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism are
necessary; in the first there is the principle of thought or of
universality itself, but yet determined in itself; the abstract
thought is here the determining criterion of the truth. There is
opposed to thought, in the second place, the determinate as such, the
principle of individuality, feeling generally, sensuous perception and
observation. These two form the principles of the Stoic and Epicurean
philosophies. Both principles are one-sided and, as positive, become
sciences of the understanding; just because this thought is not in
itself concrete but abstract, the determinateness falls outside of
thought and must be made a principle for itself; for it has an absolute
right as against abstract thought. Besides Stoicism and Epicureanism,
there is, in the third place, Scepticism, the negation of these two
one-sided philosophies which must be recognized as such. The principle
of Scepticism is thus the active negation of every criterion, of all
determinate principles of whatever kind they be, whether knowledge
derived from the senses, or from reflection on ordinary conceptions, or
from thought. Thus the next result arrived at is that nothing can be
known. Yet the imperturbability and uniformity of mind in itself, which
suffers through nothing, and which is affected neither by enjoyment,
pain, nor any other bond, is the common standpoint and the common
end of all these philosophies. Thus however gloomy men may consider
Scepticism, and however low a view they take of Epicureanism, all these
have in this way been philosophies.
A. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE STOICS.
We must, first of all, and in a general way, remark of Stoicism, as
also of Epicureanism, that they came in the place of the philosophy
of the Cynics and Cyrenaics as their counterpart, just as Scepticism
took the place of the Academy. But in adopting the principle of these
philosophies, they at the same time perfected it and elevated it
more into the form of scientific thought. Yet because in them, just
as in the others, the content is a fixed and definite one, since
self-consciousness therein sets itself apart, this circumstance really
puts an end to speculation, which knows nothing of any such rigidity,
which rather abolishes it and treats the object as absolute Notion,
as in its difference an unseparated whole. Hence with the Stoics, as
also really with the Epicureans, instead of genuine speculation, we
only meet with an application of the one-sided, limited principle,
and thus we require in both to enter merely upon a general view of
their principle. Now if Cynicism made reality for consciousness the
fact of being immediately natural (where immediate naturalness was
the simplicity of the individual, so that he is independent and,
in the manifold movement of desire, of enjoyment, of holding many
things to be reality, and of working for the same, really keeps up
the external simple life) the Stoic elevation of this simplicity into
thought consists in the assertion, not that immediate naturalness
and spontaneity is the content and the form of the true Being of
consciousness, but that the rationality of nature is grasped through
thought, so that everything is true or good in the simplicity of
thought. But while with Aristotle what underlies everything is the
absolute Idea as unlimited and not set forth in a determinate character
and with a difference—and its deficiency is only the deficiency which
is present in realization, the not being united into one Notion—here
the one Notion is undoubtedly set forth as real existence, and
everything is related to it, and hence the requisite relation is
undoubtedly present; but that in which everything is one is not the
true. With Aristotle each conception is considered absolutely in its
determination and as separate from any other; here the conception
certainly is in this relation and is not absolute, but at the same
time it is not in and for itself. Because thus the individual is not
considered absolutely but only relatively, the whole working out is
not interesting, for it is only an external relation. Likewise with
Aristotle the individual only is taken into consideration, but this
consideration is lost sight of by the speculative treatment adopted:
here, however, the individual is taken up and the treatment is likewise
external. This relation is not even consistent, if, as also happens,
something such as nature is considered in itself; for the absolute
falls outside of it, since its consideration is only a system of
reasoning from indeterminate principles, or from principles which are
only the first that come to hand.
As a contribution to the history of the philosophy of the Stoics, we
first of all desire to mention the more eminent Stoics. The founder of
the Stoic School is Zeno (who must be distinguished from the Eleatic);
he belonged to Cittium, a town in Cyprus, and was born about the 109th
Olympiad. His father was a merchant who, from his business visits to
Athens, then, and for long afterwards, the home of Philosophy and of
a large number of philosophers, brought with him books, particularly
those of the Socratics, whereby a love and craving for knowledge was
awakened in his son. Zeno himself travelled to Athens, and, according
to some, he found a further motive to live for Philosophy, in that he
lost all his possessions by a shipwreck. What he did not lose was the
cultured nobility of his mind and his love of rational understanding.
Zeno visited several sections of the Socratics, and particularly
Xenocrates, a man belonging to the Platonic School, who, on account
of the strictness of his morality and the austerity of his whole
demeanour, was very celebrated. Thus he underwent the same ordeals
as those to which the holy Francis of Assisi subjected himself, and
succumbed to them just as little. This may be seen by the fact that
while no testimony was given without oath in Athens, the oath was in
his case dispensed with, and his simple word believed—and his teacher
Plato is said often to have remarked to him that he might sacrifice to
the Graces. Then Zeno also visited Stilpo, a Megaric, whom we already
know about (Vol. I. p. 464), and with whom he studied dialectic for
ten years. Philosophy was considered as the business of his life,
and of his whole life, and not studied as it is by a student who
hurries through his lectures on Philosophy in order to hasten on to
something else. But although Zeno principally cultivated dialectic
and practical philosophy, he did not, like other Socratics, neglect
physical philosophy, for he studied very specially Heraclitus’ work on
Nature, and finally came forward as an independent teacher in a porch
called Poecile (στοὰ ποικίλη), which was decorated with the paintings
of Polygnotus. From this his school received the name of Stoic. Like
Aristotle his principal endeavour was to unite Philosophy into one
whole. As his method was characterized by special dialectic skill and
training, and by the acuteness of his argumentation, so he himself was
distinguished, in respect of his personality, by stern morality, which
resembles somewhat that of the Cynics, though he did not, like the
Cynics, try to attract attention. Hence with less vanity his temperance
in the satisfaction of his absolute wants was almost as great, for he
lived on nothing but water, bread, figs and honey. Thus amongst his
contemporaries Zeno was accorded general respect; even King Antigonus
of Macedonia often visited him and dined with him, and he invited
him to come to him in a letter quoted by Diogenes: this invitation,
however, Zeno in his reply refused, because he was now eighty years of
age. But the circumstance that the Athenians trusted to him the key of
their fortress, speaks for the greatness of their confidence in him;
indeed, according to Diogenes, the following resolution was passed at
a meeting of the people: “Because Zeno, the son of Mnaseas, has lived
for many years in our town as a philosopher, and, for the rest, has
proved himself to be a good man, and has kept the youths who followed
him in paths of virtue and of temperance, having led the way thereto
with his own excellent example, the citizens decide to confer on him
a public eulogy, and to present him with a golden crown, on account
both of his virtue and his temperance. In addition to this he shall be
publicly buried in the Ceramicus. And for the crown and the building
of the tomb, a commission of five men shall be appointed.” Zeno
flourished about the 120th Olympiad (about 300 B.C.) at the same time
as Epicurus, Arcesilaus of the New Academy, and others. He died at a
great age, being ninety-eight years of age (though some say he was only
seventy-two), in the 129th Olympiad; for being tired of life, he put an
end to it himself either by strangulation or by starvation—just because
he had broken his toe.[121]
Amongst the succeeding Stoics Cleanthes must be specially singled out;
he was a disciple and the successor of Zeno in the Stoa, and author
of a celebrated Hymn to God, which Stobæus has preserved. He is well
known by an anecdote told respecting him. It is said that he was called
in accordance with the law before a court of justice in Athens to
give an account of the means by which he maintained himself. He then
proved that at night he carried water for a gardener, and by means of
this occupation, earned as much as he required in order in the day to
be in Zeno’s company—as to which the only point which is not quite
comprehensible to us is how, even in such a way, philosophy, of all
things, could be studied. And when for this a gratuity was voted to him
from the public treasury, he refused it at Zeno’s instigation. Like his
teacher, Cleanthes also died voluntarily, in his eighty-first year, by
abstaining from food.[122]
Of the later Stoics there were many more who could be named as having
been famous. More distinguished in science than Cleanthes was his
disciple, Chrysippus of Cilicia, born Ol. 125, 1 (474 A.U.C.; 280
B.C.), who likewise lived in Athens, and who was specially active
in promoting the wide cultivation and extension of the philosophy
of the Stoics. His logic and dialectic were what contributed most
largely to his fame, and hence it was said that if the gods made use
of dialectic, they would use none other than that of Chrysippus. His
literary activity is likewise admired, for the number of his works, as
Diogenes Laërtius tells us, amounted to seven hundred and five. It is
said of him in this regard that he wrote five hundred lines every day.
But the manner in which his writings were composed detracts very much
from our wonder at this facility in writing, and shows that most of his
works consisted of compilations and repetitions. He often wrote over
again respecting the very same thing; whatever occurred to him he put
down on paper, dragging in a great variety of evidence. Thus he quoted
almost entire books by other writers; and someone gave expression to
the belief that if all that belonged to others were taken away from his
books, only white paper would be left. But of course it is not so bad
as all this, as we may see by all the quotations from the Stoics, where
the name of Chrysippus is placed at the head, as it always is, and his
conclusions and explanations are used by preference. His writings,
of which Diogenes Laërtius mentions a long list, have, however, all
been lost to us; so much is nevertheless correct, that he was the main
constructor of the Stoic logic. While it is to be regretted that some
of his best works have not come down to us, it is, perhaps, a good
thing that all are not preserved; if we had to choose between having
all or none, the decision would be a hard one. He died in the 143rd
Olympiad (212 B.C.).[123]
In the period immediately following, Diogenes of Seleucia in Babylonia
is a distinguished figure; Carneades, the celebrated Academic, is said
to have learned dialectic from him, and he is also noteworthy because
with this Carneades and Critolaus, a Peripatetic thinker, in Olympiad
156, 2 (598 A.U.C., or 156 B.C.) and in the time of the elder Cato, he
was sent as Athenian ambassador to Rome—an embassy which first caused
the Romans to make acquaintance with Greek philosophy, dialectic and
rhetoric, in Rome itself. For those philosophers there gave lectures
and discourses.[124]
Besides these, Panaetius is well known as having been Cicero’s
instructor; the latter wrote his treatise, _De Officiis_, after
Panaetius. Finally, we have Posidonius, another equally famous teacher,
who lived for long in Rome in the time of Cicero.[125]
Later on we see the philosophy of the Stoics pass over to the Romans,
that is to say, it became the philosophy of many Romans, though this
philosophy did not gain anything as a science by so doing. On the
contrary, as in the case of Seneca and the later Stoics, in Epictetus
or Antoninus, all speculative interest was really lost, and a
rhetorical and hortatory disposition shown, of which mention cannot be
made in a history of Philosophy any more than of our sermons. Epictetus
of Hierapolis in Phrygia, born at the end of the first century after
Christ, was first of all the slave of Epaphroditus, who, however, freed
him, after which he betook himself to Rome. When Domitian banished
the philosophers, poisoners and astrologers from Rome (94 A.D.),
Epictetus went to Nicopolis, in Epirus, and taught there publicly.
From his lectures Arrian compiled the voluminous _Dissertationes
Epicteteæ_, which we still possess, and also the manual ἐγχειρίδιον of
Stoicism.[126] We still have the Meditations εἰς ἑαυτόν of the Emperor
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, in twelve books; he first of all ruled
along with Lucius Aurelius Verus from 161 to 169 A.D., and then from
169 to 180 alone and he conducted a war with the Marcomanni. In his
Meditations he always speaks to himself; these reflections are not,
however, speculative in nature, being admonitions, such as that man
should exercise himself in every virtue.
We have no other original works by the older Stoics. For the Stoic
Philosophy, too, the sources on which we formerly could count are cut
off. The sources from which a knowledge of the philosophy of the Stoics
is to be derived are, however, well known. There is Cicero, who was
himself a Stoic, though in his representation there is great difficulty
in discovering how, for instance, the principle of Stoic morality is
to be distinguished from that which constitutes the principle of the
morality of the Peripatetics. And, more particularly, we have Sextus
Empiricus, whose treatment is mainly theoretic, and is thus interesting
from a philosophic point of view. For Scepticism has had to do with
Stoicism more especially. But also Seneca, Antoninus, Arrian, the
manual of Epictetus, and Diogenes Laërtius must really be called into
council.
As regards the philosophy of the Stoics themselves, they definitely
separated it into those three parts which we have already met with
(Vol. I. p. 387, Vol. II. pp. 48, 49), and which will, generally
speaking, be always found. There is Logic in the first place; secondly,
Physics, or Natural Philosophy; and thirdly, Ethics, or the Philosophy
of Mind, on the practical side especially. The content of their
philosophy has, however, not much that is original or productive.
1. PHYSICS.
As regards the Physics of the Stoics, we may in the first place say
that it does not contain much that is peculiar to itself, since it is
rather a compendium of the Physics of older times, and more especially
of that of Heraclitus. However, each of the three schools now being
dealt with has had a very characteristic and definite terminology,
which is more than can be altogether said of the philosophy of Plato
and Aristotle. Thus we must now make ourselves familiar with the
particular expressions used and with their significance. The following
is the essence of the Physics of the Stoics: The determining reason
(λόγος) is the ruling, all-productive substance and activity, extended
throughout all, and constituting the basis of all natural forms; this
preponderating substance, in its rational effectuating activity, they
call God. It is a world-soul endowed with intelligence, and, since
they called it God, this is really Pantheism. But all Philosophy is
pantheistic, for it goes to prove that the rational Notion is in the
world. The hymn of Cleanthes is to this effect: “Nothing happens on
earth without thee, O Dæmon, neither in the ethereal pole of the
heavens, nor in the sea, excepting what the wicked do through their own
foolishness. But thou knowest how to make crooked things straight, and
thou orderest that which is without order, and the inimical is friendly
to thee. For thus hast thou united everything into one, the good to
the evil; thus one Notion (λόγος) is in everything that ever was, from
which those mortals who are evil flee. How unhappy are they, too, who,
ever longing to possess the good, do not perceive God’s universal law,
nor listen thereto, the which if they but obeyed with reason, (σὺν νῷ)
they would attain a good and happy life!”[127] The Stoics thus believed
the study of nature to be essential, in order to know in nature its
universal laws, which constitute the universal reason, in order that
we might also know therefrom our duties, the law for man, and live
conformably to the universal laws of nature. “Zeno,” according to
Cicero (De nat. Deor. I. 14), “holds this natural law to be divine, and
believes that it has the power to dictate the right and prohibit what
is wrong.” Thus the Stoics desired to know this rational Notion which
rules in nature not altogether on its own account; and the study of
nature was consequently to them rather a mere matter of utility.