to one nation, is to be regarded as not, perhaps, suitable for every
nation. Thus, when it is said that a true constitution does not do
for men as they now are, we must no doubt keep in mind that the more
excellent a nation’s constitution is, it renders the nation also so
much the more excellent; but, on the other hand, since the morals
commonly practised form the living constitution, the constitution in
its abstraction is nothing at all in its independence; it must relate
itself to the common morality, and be filled with the living spirit
of the people. It can, therefore, certainly not be said that a true
constitution suits any and every nation; and it is quite the case that
for men as they are—for instance, as they are Iroquois, Russians,
French—not every constitution is adapted. For the nation has its place
in history. But as the individual man is trained in the state, that
is, as individuality is raised into universality, and the child grows
into a man, so is every nation trained; or barbarism, the condition in
which the nation is a child, passes over into a rational condition.
Men do not remain at a standstill, they alter, as likewise do their
constitutions. And the question here is, What is the true constitution
which the nation must advance towards; just as it is a question which
is the true science of mathematics or of anything else, but not
whether children or boys should possess this science, as they must
rather be first so educated that they may be capable of understanding
it. Thus the true constitution stands before the nation of history,
so that it may advance towards it. Every nation in course of time
makes such alterations in its existing constitution as will bring it
nearer to the true constitution. The nation’s mind itself shakes off
its leading-strings, and the constitution expresses the consciousness
of what it is in itself,—the form of truth, of self-knowledge. If a
nation can no longer accept as implicitly true what its constitution
expresses to it as the truth, if its consciousness or Notion and its
actuality are not at one, then the nation’s mind is torn asunder.
Two things may then occur. First, the nation may either by a supreme
internal effort dash into fragments this law which still claims
authority, or it may more quietly and slowly effect changes on the yet
operative law, which is, however, no longer true morality, but which
the mind has already passed beyond. In the second place, a nation’s
intelligence and strength may not suffice for this, and it may hold
to the lower law; or it may happen that another nation has reached
its higher constitution, thereby rising in the scale, and the first
gives up its nationality and becomes subject to the other. Therefore
it is of essential importance to know what the true constitution is;
for what is in opposition to it has no stability, no truth, and passes
away. It has a temporary existence, but cannot hold its ground; it
has been accepted, but cannot secure permanent acceptance; that it
must be cast aside, lies in the very nature of the constitution. This
insight can be reached through Philosophy alone. Revolutions take place
in a state without the slightest violence when the insight becomes
universal; institutions, somehow or other, crumble and disappear, each
man agrees to give up his right. A government must, however, recognize
that the time for this has come; should it, on the contrary, knowing
not the truth, cling to temporary institutions, taking what—though
recognized—is unessential, to be a bulwark guarding it from the
essential (and the essential is what is contained in the Idea), that
government will fall, along with its institutions, before the force of
mind. The breaking up of its government breaks up the nation itself;
a new government arises,—or it may be that the government and the
unessential retain the upper hand.
Thus the main thought which forms the groundwork of Plato’s Republic is
the same which is to be regarded as the principle of the common Greek
morality, namely, that established morality has in general the relation
of the substantial, and therefore is maintained as divine. This is
without question the fundamental determination. The determination which
stands in contrast to this substantial relation of the individual
to established morality, is the subjective will of the individual,
reflective morality. This exists when individuals, instead of being
moved to action by respect and reverence for the institutions of the
state and of the fatherland, from their own convictions, and after
moral deliberation, come of themselves to a decision, and determine
their actions accordingly. This principle of subjective freedom is
a later growth, it is the principle of our modern days of culture:
it, however, entered also into the Greek world, but as the principle
of the destruction of Greek state-life. It was looked on as a crime,
because the spirit, political constitution, and laws of the Greeks
were not, and could not be calculated to admit of the rise of this
principle within them. Because these two elements were not homogeneous,
traditional and conventional morality in Greece was overthrown. Plato
recognized and caught up the true spirit of his times, and brought it
forward in a more definite way, in that he desired to make this new
principle an impossibility in his Republic. It is thus a substantial
position on which Plato takes his stand, seeing that the substantial
of his time forms his basis, but this standpoint is at the same time
relative only, in so far as it is but a Greek standpoint, and the later
principle is consciously banished. This is the universal of Plato’s
ideal of the state, and it is from this point of view that we must
regard it. Investigations as to whether such a state is possible, and
the best possible, which start from quite modern points of view, can
only lead us astray. In modern states we have freedom of conscience,
according to which every individual may demand the right of following
out his own interests; but this is excluded from the Platonic idea.
a. I will now indicate more fully the main features, in so far as
they possess philosophic interest. Though Plato represents what the
state is in its truth, yet this state has a limit, which we shall learn
to know, namely, that the individual—in formal justice—is not opposed
to this universality, as in the dead constitution of the ideal states
founded on the theory of legal right. The content is but the whole;
the nature of the individual, no doubt, but as reflecting itself into
the universal, not unbending, or as having absolute validity; so that
practically the state and the individual are the same in essence.
Because Plato thus takes his start from that justice which implies
that the just man exists only as a moral member of the state, in
dealing with his subject in greater detail, in order to show how this
reality of the substantial mind is produced, he in the first place
opens up before us the organism of the moral commonwealth, _i.e._ the
differences which lie in the Notion of moral substance. Through the
development of these moments it becomes living and existing, but these
moments are not independent, for they are held in unity. Plato regards
these moments of the moral organism under three aspects, first, as
they exist in the state as classes; secondly, as virtues, or moments
in morality; thirdly, as moments of the individual subject, in the
empirical actions of the will. Plato does not preach the morality of
reflection, he shows how traditional morality has a living movement in
itself; he demonstrates its functions, its inward organism. For it is
inner systematization, as in organic life, and not solid, dead unity,
like that of metals, which comes to pass by means of the different
functions of the organs which go to make up this living, self-moving
unity.
α. Without classes, without this division into great masses, the state
has no organism; these great distinctions are the distinction of the
substantial. The opposition which first comes before us in the state
is that of the universal, in the form of state life and business, and
the individual, as life and work for the individual; these two fields
of activity are so distinct that one class is assigned to the one, and
another to the other. Plato further cites three systems of reality
in the moral, the functions (αα) of legislation, counsel, in short,
of diligence and foresight in the general behalf, in the interest
of the whole as such; (ββ) of defence of the commonwealth against
foes from without; (γγ) of care for the individual, the supplying of
wants, agriculture, cattle-rearing, the manufacture of clothing and
utensils, the building of houses, &c. Speaking generally, this is quite
as it should be, and yet it appears to be rather the satisfaction
of external necessities, because such wants are found without being
developed out of the Idea of mind itself. Further, these distinct
functions are allotted to different systems, being assigned to a
certain number of individuals specially set apart for the purpose,
and this brings about the separate classes of the state, as Plato is
altogether opposed to the superficial conception that one and the
same must be everything at one time. He accordingly represents three
classes, (αα) that of the governors, men of learning and wisdom, (ββ)
that of the warriors, (γγ) that of the producers of necessaries,
the husbandmen and handicraftsmen. The first he also speaks of as
guardians (φύλακας), who are really philosophically educated statesmen,
possessing true knowledge; they have the warriors to work on their
behalf (ἐπικούρους τε καὶ βοηθούς), but in such a way that there is no
line of separation between the civil and military classes, both being
united,[61] and the most advanced in years are the guardians.[62]
Although Plato does not deduce this division of the classes, they
follow from the constitution of the Platonic state, and every state is
necessarily a system within itself of these systems. Plato then passes
on to particular determinations, which are in some measure trifling,
and might with advantage have been dispensed with; for instance,
among other things, he goes so far as to settle for the highest rank
their special titles, and he states what should be the duties of the
nurses.[63]
β. Then Plato points out that the moments which are here realized in
the classes, are moral qualities which are present in individuals,
and form their true essence, the simple ethical Notion divided into
its universal determinations. For he states as the result of this
distinction of the classes that through such an organism all virtues
are present in the commonwealth; he distinguishes four of these,[64]
and they have been named cardinal virtues.
αα. Wisdom (σοφία) or knowledge appears as the first virtue; such a
state will be wise and good in counsel, not because of the various
kinds of knowledge therein present which have to do with the many
particular ordinary occupations falling to the multitude, such as the
trade of blacksmith, and the tillage of the soil (in short, what we
should call skill in the industrial arts, and in finance). The state is
called wise, by reason of the true knowledge which is realized in the
presiding and governing class, who advise regarding the whole state,
and decide upon the policy that is best, both at home and in relation
to foreign states. This faculty of perception is properly the peculiar
possession of the smallest class.[65]
ββ. The second virtue is courage (ἀνδρία) which Plato defines as a firm
opinion about what may justly and lawfully be considered an object
of fear, courage which, in its strength of purpose, remains unshaken
either by desires or pleasures. To this virtue corresponds the class of
the warriors.[66]
γγ. The third virtue is temperance (σωφροσύνη), the mastery over the
desires and passions, which like a harmony pervades the whole; so that,
whether understanding, or strength, or numbers, or wealth, or anything
else be regarded, the weaker and the stronger work together for one and
the same object, and are in agreement one with another. This virtue
therefore is not, like wisdom and courage, confined to one part of
the state, but like a harmony it is shared by governors and governed
alike, and is the virtue of all classes.[67] Notwithstanding that this
temperance is the harmony in which all work towards one end, it is yet
peculiarly the virtue of the third class, to whom it is allotted to
procure the necessaries of life by work, although at the first glance
the one does not appear to have much correspondence with the other.
But this virtue is present precisely when no moment, no determination
or particularity isolates itself; or, more closely viewed in a moral
aspect, it is when no want asserts its reality and thus becomes a
crime. Now work is just this moment of activity concentrating itself on
the particular, which nevertheless goes back into the universal, and
is for it. Therefore, if this virtue is universal, it yet has special
application to the third class, which at first is the only one to be
brought into harmony, as it has not the absolute harmony which the
other classes possess in themselves.
δδ. Finally, the fourth virtue is justice, which was what Plato began
by considering. This, as right-doing, is to be found in the state
when each individual does only one kind of work for the state, that
work for which by the original constitution of his nature he is best
fitted; so that in this way each man is not a jack-of-all-trades, but
all have their special work, young and old, women and children, bond
and free, handicraftsmen, rulers and subjects. The first remark we make
on this is, that Plato here places justice on a level with the other
moments, and it thus appears as one of the four determinations. But
he now retracts this statement and makes it justice which first gives
to wisdom, courage and temperance the power to exist at all, and when
they have once come into existence, the power to continue. This is the
reason of his also saying that justice will be met with independently,
if only the other virtues spoken of are forthcoming.[68] To express it
more definitely, the Notion of justice is the foundation, the Idea of
the whole, which falls into organic divisions, so that every part is
only, as it were, a moment in the whole, and the whole exists through
it. Thus the classes or qualities spoken of are nothing else than the
moments of this whole. Justice is only the general and all-pervading
quality; but at the same time it implies the independence of every
part, to which the state gives liberty of action.
In the second place, it is clear from what he says, that Plato did not
understand by justice the rights of property, the meaning which the
term commonly bears in jurisprudence, but rather this, that the mind
in its totality makes for itself a law as evidence of the existence of
its freedom. In a highly abstract sense my personality, my altogether
abstract freedom, is present in property. To explain what comes under
this science of law, Plato considers on the whole superfluous (De
Republica, IV. p. 425 Steph.; p. 176 Bekk.). To be sure we find him
giving laws concerning property, police regulations, &c., “But,” he
says, “to impose laws about such matters on men of noble character does
not repay the trouble.” In truth, how can we expect to find divine laws
in what contains contingencies alone? Even in the Laws he considers
ethics chiefly, though he gives a certain amount of attention to the
rights of property. But as justice, according to Plato, is really
the entire being, which presents itself to the individual in such a
way that each man learns to do the work he is born to do as well as
it can be done, and does it, it is only as determined individuality
that man reaches what is law for him; only thus does he belong to the
universal spirit of the state, coming in it to the universal of himself
as a “this.” While law is a universal with a definite content, and
thus a formal universal only, the content in this case is the whole
determined individuality, not this or that thing which is mine by the
accident of possession; what I properly hold as my own is the perfected
possession and use of my nature. To each particular determination
justice gives its rights, and thus leads it back into the whole; in
this way it is by the particularity of an individual being of necessity
developed and brought into actuality, that each man is in his place
and fulfils his vocation. Justice, therefore, according to its true
conception, is in our eyes freedom in the subjective sense, because
it is the attainment of actuality by the reason, and seeing that this
right on the part of liberty to attain to actuality is universal,
Plato sets up justice as the determination of the whole, indicating
that rational freedom comes into existence through the organism of the
state,—an existence which is then, as necessary, a mode of nature.
γ. The particular subject, as subject, has in the same way these
qualities in himself; and these moments of the subject correspond with
the three real moments of the state. That there is thus one rhythm, one
type, in the Idea of the state, forms for Plato’s state a great and
grand basis. This third form, in which the above moments are exhibited,
Plato characterizes in the following manner. There manifest themselves
in the subject, first of all sundry wants and desires (ἐπιθυμίαι),
like hunger and thirst, each of which has something definite as its
one and only object. Work for the satisfaction of desires corresponds
to the calling of the third class. But, secondly there is also at
the same time to be found in the individual consciousness something
else which suspends and hinders the gratification of these desires,
and has the mastery over the temptation thus to gratify them; this is
reasonableness (λόγος). To this corresponds the class of rulers, the
wisdom of the state. Besides these two ideas of the soul there is a
third, anger (θυμός), which on one side is allied to the desires, but
of which it is just as true that it resists the desires and takes the
side of reason. “It may happen that a man has done wrong to another,
and suffers hunger and cold at the hands of him whom he considers
entitled to inflict them upon him; in this case, the nobler he is,
the less will his anger be excited. But it may also happen that he
suffers a wrong; if this is the case, he boils and chafes, and takes
the side of what he believes to be justice, and endures hunger and
cold and other hardships, and overcomes them, and will not desist from
the right until he conquers or dies, or is calmed down by reason, as
a shepherd quiets his dog.” Anger corresponds with the class of the
brave defenders in the state; as these grasp their weapons in behalf
of reason within the state, so does anger take the part of reason, if
it has not been perverted by an evil up-bringing. Therefore wisdom in
the state is the same as in the individual, and this is true of courage
also. For the rest, temperance is the harmony of the several moments
of what pertains to nature; and justice, as in external matters it
consists in each doing his own duty, so, in the inner life, it consists
in each moment of the mind obtaining its right, and not interfering in
the affairs of the others, but leaving them to do as they will.[69]
We have thus the deduction of three moments, where the middle place
between universality and particularity is filled by anger in its
independence and as directed against the objective: it is the freedom
which turns back within itself and acts negatively. Even here, where
Plato has no consciousness of his abstract ideas, as he has in the
Timæus, this of a truth is inwardly present to him, and everything is
moulded thereby. This is given as the plan according to which Plato
draws up the great whole. To fill up the outlines is a mere detail,
which in itself has no further interest.
b. In the second place Plato indicates the means of maintaining the
state. As, speaking generally, the whole commonwealth rests on common
morality as the minds of individuals grown into nature, this question
is asked: How does Plato arrange that everyone takes as his own that
form of activity for which he is specially marked out, and that it
presents itself as the moral acting and willing of the individual,—that
everyone, in harmony with temperance, submits to filling this his
post? The main point is to train the individuals thereto. Plato would
produce this ethical quality directly in the individuals, and first
and foremost in the guardians, whose education is therefore the most
important part of the whole, and constitutes the very foundation. For
as it is to the guardians themselves that the care is committed of
producing this ethical quality through maintenance of the laws, in
these laws special attention must be given to the guardians’ education;
after that also to the education of the warriors. The condition of
affairs in the industrial class causes the state but little anxiety,
“for though cobblers should prove poor and worthless, and should be
only in appearance what they ought to be, that is no great misfortune
for the state.”[70] The education of the presidents should, however,
be carried on chiefly by means of philosophic science, which is the
knowledge of the universal and absolute. Plato in this passes over the
particular means of education, religion, art, science. Further on he
speaks again and more in detail on the question of how far music and
gymnastic are to be permitted as means. But the poets Homer and Hesiod
he banishes from his state, because he thinks their representations
of God unworthy.[71] For then began in real earnest an inquiry into
the belief in Jupiter and the stories told by Homer, inasmuch as such
particular representations had been taken as universal maxims and
divine laws. At a certain stage of education childish tales do no harm;
but were they to be made the foundation of the truth of morality,
as present law, the case would be different. The extermination of
the nations which we read of in the writings of the Israelites, the
Old Testament, might for instance be taken as a standard of national
rights, or we might try to make a precedent of the numerous base
acts committed by David, the man of God, or of the horrors which
the priesthood, in the person of Samuel, practised and authorized
against Saul. Then it would be high time to place these records on a
lower level, as something past, something merely historical. Plato
would further have preambles to the laws, wherein citizens would be
admonished as to their duties, and convinced that these exist, &c.[72]
They also should be shown how to choose that which is most excellent,
in short, to choose morality.
But here we have a circle: the public life of the state subsists by
means of morality, and, conversely, morality subsists by means of
institutions. Morals cannot be independent of institutions, that is,
institutions cannot be brought to bear on morals through educational
establishments or religion only. For institutions must be looked on as
the very first condition of morality, for this is the manner in which
institutions are subjective. Plato himself gives us to understand
how much contradiction he expects to find. And even now his defect
is commonly considered to lie in his being too idealistic, while his
real deficiency consists in his not being ideal enough. For if reason
is the universal force, it is essentially spiritual; thus to the
realm of the spiritual belongs subjective freedom, which had already
been held up as a principle in the philosophy of Socrates. Therefore
reason ought to be the basis of law, and so it is, on the whole. But,
on the other hand, conscience, personal conviction,—in short, all the
forms of subjective freedom—are essentially therein contained. This
subjectivity at first, it is true, stands in opposition to the laws and
reason of the state-organism as to the absolute power which desires
to appropriate to itself—through the external necessity of wants, in
which, however, there is absolute reason—the individual of the family.
Individual conscience proceeds from the subjectivity of free-will,
connects itself with the whole, chooses a position for itself, and
thus makes itself a moral fact. But this moment, this movement of
the individual, this principle of subjective freedom, is sometimes
ignored by Plato, and sometimes even intentionally disparaged, because
it proved itself to be what had wrought the ruin of Greece; and he
considers only how the state may best be organized, and not subjective
individuality. In passing beyond the principle of Greek morality, which
in its substantial liberty cannot brook the rise of subjective liberty,
the Platonic philosophy at once grasps the above principle, and in so
doing proceeds still farther.
c. In the third place, in regard to the exclusion of the principle
of subjective freedom, this forms a chief feature in the Republic
of Plato, the spirit of which really consists in the fact, that all
aspects in which particularity as such has established its position,
are dissolved in the universal,—all men simply rank as man in general.