I am advised that the _Titanic_ as constructed could not have remained
afloat long with such damage as she received. Her bulkheads were spaced
to enable her to remain afloat with any two compartments in
communication with the sea. She had a sufficient margin of safety with
any two of the compartments flooded which were actually damaged.
In fact, any three of the four forward compartments could have been
flooded by the damage received without sinking the ship to the top of
her bulkheads.
Even if the four forward compartments had been flooded the water would
not have got into any of the compartments abaft of them though it would
have been above the top of some of the forward bulkheads. But the ship,
even with these four compartments flooded, would have remained afloat.
But she could not remain afloat with the four compartments and the
forward boiler room (No. 6) also flooded.
The flooding of these five compartments alone would have sunk the ship
sufficiently deep to have caused the water to rise above the bulkhead at
the after end of the forward boiler room (No. 6) and to flow over into
the next boiler room (No. 5), and to fill it up until in turn its after
bulkhead would be overwhelmed and the water would thereby flow over and
fill No. 4 boiler room, and so on in succession to the other boiler
rooms till the ship would ultimately fill and sink.
It has been shown that water came into the five forward compartments to
a height of about 14 feet above the keel in the first 10 minutes. This
was at a rate of inflow with which the ship's pumps could not possibly
have coped, so that the damage done to these five compartments alone
inevitably sealed the doom of the ship.
The damage done in the boiler rooms Nos. 4 and 5 was too slight to have
hastened appreciably the sinking of the ship, for it was given in
evidence that no considerable amount of water was in either of these
compartments for an hour after the collision. The rate at which water
came into No. 6 boiler room makes it highly probable that the
compartment was filled in not more than an hour, after which the flow
over the top of the bulkhead between 5 and 6 began and continued till
No. 5 was filled.
It was shown that the leak in No. 5 boiler room was only about equal to
the flow of a deck hose pipe about 3 inches in diameter.
The leak in No. 4, supposing that there was one, was only enough to
admit about 3 feet of water in that compartment in 1 hour 40 minutes.
Hence the leaks in Nos. 4 and 5 boiler rooms did not appreciably hasten
the sinking of the vessel.
The evidence is very doubtful as to No. 4 being damaged. The pumps were
being worked in No. 5 soon after the collision. The 10-inch leather
special suction pipe which was carried from aft is more likely to have
been carried for use in No. 5 than No. 4 because the doors were ordered
to be opened probably soon after the collision when water was known to
be coming into No. 5. There is no evidence that the pumps were being
worked in No 4.
The only evidence possibly favorable to the view that the pipe was
required for No 4, and not for No. 5, is that Scott, a greaser, says
that he saw engineers dragging the suction pipe along one hour after the
collision. But even as late as this it may have been wanted for No. 5
only.
The importance of the question of the damage to No. 5 is small because
the ship as actually constructed was doomed as soon as the water in No.
6 boiler room and all compartments forward of it entered in the
quantities it actually did.
It is only of importance in dealing with the question of what would have
happened to the ship had she been more completely subdivided.
It was stated in evidence that if No. 4 had not been damaged or had only
been damaged to an extent within the powers of the pumps to keep under,
then, if the bulkheads had been carried to C deck, the ship might have
been saved. Further methods of increased subdivision and their effect
upon the fate of the ship are discussed later.
Evidence was given showing that after the water-tight doors in the
engine and boiler rooms had been all closed, except those forward of No.
4 group of boilers, they were opened again, and there is no evidence to
show that they were again closed. Though it is probable that the
engineers who remained below would have closed these doors as the water
rose in the compartments, yet it was not necessary for them to do this,
as each door had an automatic closing arrangement which would have come
into operation immediately a small amount of water came through the
door.
It is probable, however, that the life of the ship would have been
lengthened somewhat if these doors had been left open, for the water
would have flowed through them to the after part of the ship, and the
rate of flow of the water into the ship would have been for a time
reduced as the bow might have been kept up a little by the water which
flowed aft.
It is thus seen that the efficiency of the automatic arrangements for
the closing of the water-tight doors, which was questioned during the
inquiry, had no important bearing on the question of hastening the
sinking of the ship, except that, in the case of the doors not having
been closed by the engineers, it might have retarded the sinking of the
ship if they had not acted. The engineers would not have prevented the
doors from closing unless they had been convinced that the ship was
doomed. There is no evidence that they did prevent the doors from
closing.
The engineers were applying the pumps when Barrett, leading stoker, left
No. 5 boiler room, but even if they had succeeded in getting all the
pumps in the ship to work they could not have saved the ship or
prolonged her life to any appreciable extent.