* * * * *
Bride does not remember to what officer he delivered this message.
By the time the _Titanic_ reached the position of the collision (11.40
p. m.) she had gone about 50 miles to the westward of the indicated
position of the ice mentioned in this fourth message. Thus it would
appear that before the collision she had gone clear of the indicated
positions of ice contained in the messages from the _Baltic_ and
_Californian_. As to the ice advised by the _Caronia_ message, so far as
it consisted of small bergs and field ice, it had before the time of the
collision possibly drifted with the Gulf Stream to the eastward; and so
far as it consisted of large bergs (which would be deep enough in the
water to reach the Labrador current) it had probably gone to the
southward. It was urged by Sir Robert Finlay, who appeared for the
owners, that this is strong evidence that the _Titanic_ had been
carefully and successfully navigated so as to avoid the ice of which she
had received warning. Mr. Ismay, however, stated that he understood from
the _Baltic_ message that "we would get up to the ice that night."
There was a fifth message received in the Marconi room of the _Titanic_
at 9.40 p. m. This was from a steamer called the _Mesaba_. It was in the
following terms:
_From "Mesaba" to "Titanic" and all east-bound ships_:
Ice report in latitude 42° N. to 41° 25´ N., longitude 49° to
longitude 50° 30´ W. Saw much heavy pack ice and great number large
icebergs. Also field ice. Weather good, clear.
This message clearly indicated the presence of ice in the immediate
vicinity of the _Titanic_, and if it had reached the bridge would
perhaps have affected the navigation of the vessel. Unfortunately, it
does not appear to have been delivered to the master or to any of the
officers. The Marconi operator was very busy from 8 o'clock onward
transmitting messages via Cape Race for passengers on board the
_Titanic_, and the probability is that he failed to grasp the
significance and importance of the message, and put it aside until he
should be less busy. It was never acknowledged by Capt. Smith, and I am
satisfied that it was not received by him. But, assuming Sir Robert
Finlay's contentions to be well founded that the Titanic had been
navigated so as to avoid the _Baltic_ and the _Californian_ ice, and
that the _Caronia_ ice had drifted to the eastward and to the southward,
still there can be no doubt, if the evidence of Mr. Lightoller, the
second officer, is to be believed, that both he and the master knew that
the danger of meeting ice still existed. Mr. Lightoller says that the
master showed him the _Caronia_ message about 12.45 p. m. on April 14,
when he was on the bridge. He was about to go off watch, and he says he
made a rough calculation in his head which satisfied him that the
_Titanic_ would not reach the position mentioned in the message until he
came on watch again at 6 p. m. At 6 p. m. Mr. Lightoller came on the
bridge again to take over the ship from Mr. Wilde, the chief officer
(dead). He does not remember being told anything about the _Baltic_
message, which had been received at 1.42 p. m. Mr. Lightoller then
requested Mr. Moody, the sixth officer (dead), to let him know "at what
time we should reach the vicinity of ice," and says that he thinks Mr.
Moody reported "about 11 o'clock." Mr. Lightoller says that 11 o'clock
did not agree with a mental calculation he himself had made and which
showed 9.30 as the time. This mental calculation he at first said he had
made before Mr. Moody gave him 11 o'clock as the time, but later on he
corrected this, and said his mental calculation was made between 7 and 8
o'clock, and after Mr. Moody had mentioned 11. He did not point out the
difference to him, and thought that perhaps Mr. Moody had made his
calculations on the basis of some "other" message. Mr. Lightoller
excuses himself for not pointing out the difference by saying that Mr.
Moody was busy at the time, probably with stellar observations. It is,
however, an odd circumstance that Mr. Lightoller, who believed that the
vicinity of ice would be reached before his watch ended at 10 p.m.,
should not have mentioned the fact to Mr. Moody, and it is also odd that
if he thought that Mr. Moody was working on the basis of some "other"
message, he did not ask what the other message was or where it came
from. The point, however, of Mr. Lightoller's evidence is that they both
thought that the vicinity of ice would be reached before midnight. When
he was examined as to whether he did not fear that on entering the
indicated ice region he might run foul of a growler (a low-lying berg)
he answers: "No, I judged I should see it with "sufficient distinctness"
and at a distance of a "mile and a half, more probably 2 miles." He then
adds:
In the event of meeting ice there are many things we look for. In
the first place, a slight breeze. Of course, the stronger the
breeze the more visible will the ice be, or, rather, the breakers
on the ice.
He is then asked whether there was any breeze on this night, and he
answers:
When I left the deck at 10 o'clock there was a slight breeze. Oh,
pardon me, no; I take that back. No, it was calm, perfectly calm--
And almost immediately afterwards he describes the sea as "absolutely
flat." It appeared, according to this witness, that about 9 o'clock the
master came on the bridge and that Mr. Lightoller had a conversation
with him which lasted half an hour. This conversation, so far as it is
material, is described by Mr. Lightoller in the following words:
We commenced to speak about the weather. He said, "there is not
much wind." I said, "No, it is a flat calm," as a matter of fact.
He repeated it, he said, "A flat calm." I said, "Quite flat; there
is no wind." I said something about it was rather a pity the breeze
had not kept up whilst we were going through the ice region. Of
course, my reason was obvious: he knew I meant the water ripples
breaking on the base of the berg * * * We then discussed the
indications of ice. I remember saying, "In any case, there will be
a certain amount of reflected light from the bergs." He said, "Oh,
yes, there will be a certain amount of reflected light." I said or
he said--blue was said between us--that even though the blue side
of the berg was towards us, probably the outline, the white
outline, would give us sufficient warning, that we should be able
to see it at a good distance, and as far as we could see, we should
be able to see it. Of course, it was just with regard to that
possibility of the blue side being toward us, and that if it did
happen to be turned with the purely blue side toward us, there
would still be the white outline.
Further on Mr. Lightoller says that he told the master nothing about his
own calculation as to coming up with the ice at 9.30 or about Mr.
Moody's calculation as to coming up with it at 11.
The conversation with the master ended with the master saying, "If it
becomes at all doubtful let me know at once; I will be just inside."
This remark Mr. Lightoller says undoubtedly referred to ice.
At 9.30 the master went to his room, and the first thing that Mr.
Lightoller did afterwards was to send a message to the crow's nest "to
keep a sharp lookout for ice, particularly small ice and growlers,"
until daylight. There seems to be no doubt that this message was in fact
sent, and that it was passed on to the next lookouts when they came on
watch. Hitchins, the quartermaster, says he heard Mr. Lightoller give
the message to Mr. Moody, and both the men in the crow's nest at the
time (Jewell and Symons) speak to having received it. From 9.30 to 10
o'clock, when his watch ended, Mr. Lightoller remained on the bridge
"looking out for ice." He also said that the night order book for the
14th had a footnote about keeping a sharp lookout for ice, and that this
note was "initialed by every officer." At 10 o'clock Mr. Lightoller
handed over the watch to Mr. Murdoch, the first officer (dead), telling
him that "we might be up around the ice any time now." That Mr. Murdoch
knew of the danger of meeting ice appears from the evidence of Hemming,
a lamp trimmer, who says that about 7.15 p. m. Mr. Murdoch told him to
go forward and see the forescuttle hatch closed--
as we are in the vicinity of ice and there is a glow coming from
that, and I want everything dark before the bridge.
The foregoing evidence establishes quite clearly that Capt. Smith, the
master; Mr. Murdoch, the first officer; Mr. Lightoller, the second
officer; and Mr. Moody, the sixth officer, all knew on the Sunday
evening that the vessel was entering a region where ice might be
expected; and this being so, it seems to me to be of little importance
to consider whether the master had by design or otherwise succeeded in
avoiding the particular ice indicated in the three messages received by
him.