Meanwhile, in Bengal, when September, 1767, arrived, these last

orders having not yet been received, nor indeed written, another

year was allowed by Mr. Verelst, the new Governor, and his Council,

to the Society of Trade, to collect their debts, and realise their

capital. It was not till September, 1768, that it ceased; and the

Court of Directors having, in December, 1769[86], by a sudden and

singular departure from their opinions, so strongly announced, sent

out instructions to lay open the inland trade to all persons, as well

natives as Europeans, a proclamation to that effect was published

at Calcutta, on the 12th of December, 1770. The effect of this

essential change in the Company's plans on the future prosperity of

the provinces, it is no part of the present Memoir to investigate; but

it is very plain, that, by admitting Europeans into the inland trade,

in the state in which the country then was, they really did away with

all the benefit that could in any way have been expected to arise from

abolishing the monopoly.

But whether Lord Clive's opinions regarding the trade in salt were

sound or not, one thing at least is evident,--he was perfectly

conscientious in the advice he gave, and on the measures he adopted,

on that subject. This is plain from his whole conduct, and from his

correspondence, public and private, with numerous persons, while

in India. Nor did his anxiety on the subject cease, even after he

had reached England, when all private interest in the subject,

if he can be supposed ever to have had any, must have been over.

Finding accidentally, some months after his arrival, that the plan

of abolishing the Salt Society continued to be entertained, he

explained his views on the subject to the Committee of Treasury and

Correspondence of the Directors, in a detailed and laboured letter.[87]

He pointed out the advantages of the trade as then regulated, as

the best fund that the Company could appropriate for the payment,

without grudging or envy, of their superior servants: that it enabled

them to regulate the emoluments of their servants, according to their

own wishes; that by it, their servants had the appearance of being

paid, not by the Company, but by the profits of their own trade,--an

advantage not attending any payment by a percentage on the revenue. "If

you grant a commission upon the revenue," says he, "the sum will not

only be large, but known to the world; the allowance being publicly

ascertained, every man's proportion will at times be the occasion of

much discourse, envy, and jealousy; the great will interfere in your

appointments, and noblemen will perpetually solicit you to provide

for the younger branches of their families." It is evident, that his

views originated not in principles of political economy, but of policy,

forced upon him by the circumstances in which India was placed. His

efforts were directed to insure a desirable object, in what he deemed,

not certainly the best, but the only practicable mode.

In spite of this remonstrance, the Committee came to the resolution

of throwing the trade open, imposing only a duty of 10 rupees on the

hundred maunds of salt. Lord Clive again addressed them[88], showing

that they were in reality giving up 300,000_l._ per annum, for a tax

of only 31,500_l._; and pointed out that, even on their plan, the trade

would continue in some degree a monopoly, and that the servants would

still be concerned in it to what extent they pleased, under their

banyans and black merchants. His expressions in writing the same day

to Mr. Verelst, show how sincere and deep-rooted his opinions on the

subject were. Sending him a copy of his letter to the Committee, he

adds, "What attention they will pay to my representations I know not:

but I have such confidence in your honour and zeal for the Company's

welfare, that I cannot help hoping you will take care that the Company

be not deprived of 300,000_l._ per annum, however peremptory the orders

of the Directors may be."

The letter of the 20th of November, 1767, already mentioned, was

written soon after. The only effect of this remonstrance was a change

by which the duty was to be advanced to a sum not exceeding 120,000_l._

Lord Clive points out, in several confidential letters to Mr. Verelst,

the want of information of the Directors on this occasion, and the

pernicious consequences likely to result from the change. That he

was sincere, admits not of a doubt. His opinions on the subject he

maintained uniformly to the last hour of his life, and the events seem

to have justified his foresight.

The tax, as regulated by him, certainly was a monopoly, and so far was

exceptionable; but he might justly maintain that the real question was,

Are the evils arising from this monopoly, or from the licentiousness

of the rulers of the country, if penuriously paid, most to be dreaded?

and of this he had no doubt. Even from the question of the comparative

merits of a monopoly and free trade, political considerations,

unfortunately, could not be altogether excluded. The society of trade

was abolished under pretence of being a monopoly. This was not,

however, the real cause. That society excluded from the salt trade a

body of powerful and wealthy Europeans, who raised a clamour, in name

of the natives, but solely for their own private views. On the plan,

as reformed by Lord Clive, the natives were restored to their former

employment, and Europeans excluded. But when the trade was thrown open

to all indiscriminately, natives and Europeans, the change, though in

form the result of sound principles of government and of political

economy, was really, in substance, quite the reverse. The two parties

did not come into the field on equal terms; the society of trade had a

direct interest that no oppression should be exercised on the natives

in their dealings over the country; and being composed of the leading

men of the government, had the means of affording them protection. But

when the trade was reduced to a scramble between Europeans having the

whole authority of the country, and natives who had none; when redress

was to be sought by the natives from their very rivals and competitors;

their condition became hopeless; and that fact sufficiently accounts

for the melancholy nature of the history of the inland trade in

succeeding years.

Two charges connected with this transaction of the salt trade were

afterwards brought against Lord Clive: the first, that he obstinately

persisted in disobeying the orders of the Company for its abolition;

the other, that by having a share in it as Governor, he in some measure

deviated from his plan of not trading, and of deriving no pecuniary

benefit to himself from his voyage to India.

As to the first, we have seen that several letters were certainly

received from the Court of Directors, after his arrival in Bengal,

declaring their decided hostility to their servants engaging in the

inland trade at all, and especially in that of salt. But a comparison

of dates has shown that these letters were directed, not against any

measures of Lord Clive, which were not then known, but against the

grossly unjust and pernicious proceedings which took place before his

arrival. To the letter of the Select Committee of Calcutta, of the

30th of September, 1765, detailing the plan for the first society of

trade, an answer, dated the 17th of May, 1766, was received on the

8th of December following: and so far was Lord Clive from obstinately

persisting in continuing the trade, as has been asserted, that on

the 24th of the following month, while hardly yet recovered from a

dangerous illness, he declared the society abolished, at the close

of the season. He had fixed so limited a period as one year for its

duration, because it was only experimental, and to admit of any change

suggested by the Directors.

The second charge was, that, as a sharer in this society of trade, he

had deviated from his intention expressed in his letter to the Company,

not to improve his fortune by his voyage to India.

His share as Governor in the society of trade (a concern, the details

of which were entirely confided to a committee, and the operations of

which he knew only from their result) was certainly very different in

its nature from private trade on his own account. To his intention

not to increase his private fortune by the emoluments of his office,

or by trade in any shape, he religiously adhered. Of the allowances

to the Governor, the honorary presents that could not be refused

without giving offence, the proceeds of the Governor's share of the

society of trade, with all other emoluments annexed to his office,

he caused a distinct account to be kept. Out of it were defrayed his

expenses as Governor, and by the surplus he did not benefit. He had

taken with him to India three gentlemen: Mr. Maskelyne, his friend and

near connection; Mr. Henry Strachey, his private secretary; and Mr.

Ingham, his family physician;--no large establishment for a Governor

leaving his family and going abroad in the circumstances Lord Clive

did. The sums in question were employed in remunerating them, and

some persons of his household; and by the account kept of these and

of all other sums received by him from the time he left England till

his return, which was communicated to the Company, and afterwards

laid before Parliament, far from having added, in any respect, to his

private fortune, as this charge supposes, it has never been disputed

that there was a balance of 5816_l._ 16_s._ 9_d._ against it. If these

gentlemen were remunerated, therefore, it was not at the Company's

expense, by any extraordinary charges upon them; but at the expense of

the Governor, who gave up to them the allowances which he might have

retained to himself.[89] The charge was really as unfounded as it was

ungracious, and, it is to be observed, was brought against him by men

who had shown no such pecuniary delicacy.

Of another charge, also brought some years after, against Lord Clive's

administration, that of having fixed an improper rate of exchange

between the gold and silver coinage of Bengal, it is not necessary to

say much. In India, gold and silver coin are articles of trade even

more directly than in most countries in the world, and the variation

in their relative value is often extremely great. In the year 1766,

a scarcity of silver existed in Bengal, from the quantity exported

to China, from decreased importation, and other causes. It was known

that there was much gold in the country, in various shapes; and

to inexperienced political economists it seemed a very reasonable

expedient to give a premium for its being brought out. A favourable

rate was therefore fixed on the new gold mohur then coined. This

certainly had the effect of bringing gold to the mint; but, as might

have been foreseen, only increased the evil, by causing still more

silver coin to be withdrawn from circulation. The bankers and shroffs

of the country, who are proficients in the science of exchange,

naturally paid their demands in gold, and exported or hoarded the

silver. The gold coin they were unwilling to receive at its legal

value, without a large batta, or exchange, in reality to compensate

its inferior intrinsic value as compared with silver, the ordinary

circulation of the country. This necessary measure of self-defence was

regarded as a trick or fraud in trade. The proclamation of 30th June,

1766, directing the coin to be taken at certain rates, was one of those

ineffectual attempts to force circumstances, formerly so usual with

politicians of every class and of every country. It was, of course,

ineffectual; and necessarily occasioned no small inconvenience to

merchants and retail traders. Its effects were chiefly felt after Clive

had left India. The Court of Directors, from their correspondence,

seems to have been nearly as much puzzled as the Council of Calcutta;

though the fact, that the difference of market value between the gold

and the silver coin rose to 17-1/2 per cent., ought to have afforded

an easy explanation of the difficulty.[90] Yet those who recollect

the discussions, in our own times, in the British parliament, on the

difference of value between the guinea and the bank note, and on the

bullion question in general, will not be disposed to view with much

surprise a similar difficulty that occurred in a distant country, half

a century before.

Though these charges were brought against Lord Clive long afterwards,

yet, as they all relate to India, it has been judged best to state them

at this period of his career, when he was still engaged in his active

services in that country.

Our attention has hitherto been too exclusively directed to Lord

Clive's civil and military reforms, to admit of any connected view of

the very important treaties which he negotiated with the native powers,

and which really changed the face of India. We have seen that one of

his first objects, after his arrival in Bengal, was to conclude a

peace with Sujah-u-Dowlah, the Vizier, Nabob of Oude, and to make some

arrangement with our ally, the King. The war, though successful, had

long been carried on at an expense ruinous to the Company's finances.

With these objects he resolved to combine a settlement with the young

Nabob of Bengal (whose finances were in disorder), so as to place

his and the Company's affairs on a definite and solid basis. Clive

had left Calcutta on the afternoon of the 25th of June, 1765, and on

the 9th of July writes to the Select Committee, that the business of

Nujm-u-Dowlah's durbar was perfectly finished. By the arrangement

then entered into, provision was made for the management of public

affairs at the Nabob's court, and in the three provinces, the immediate

administration of which was committed to Mahommed Reza Khan, Doolubram,

and Jugget Seit, and regulations were signed by them and the Nabob for

that purpose. A barrier was thus provided against the shifting policy

and intrigues of a corrupt court, and a weak and ignorant prince. At

the same time Lord Clive procured from the Nabob a sunnud for the

reversion in perpetuity of his jaghire to the Company. But he now

plainly saw that things could not stop where they were. The truth is,

that it was now clear enough, that two independent governments could

not exist in the country at the same time. The one must swallow up the

other; and the Company having the sword in their hand, and not being

disposed to recede, it was necessary to reduce the Nabob to a cipher.

Two days afterwards[91] Clive writes to the Select Committee;--"We have

often lamented that the gentlemen of the Council, by precipitating the

late treaty, had lost the most glorious opportunity that could ever

happen of settling matters upon that solid and advantageous footing for

the Company, which no temporary invasion could endanger. The true and

only security for our commerce and territorial possessions in this

country is, in a manner, always to have it in our power to overawe

the very Nabob we are bound by treaty to support. A maxim contrary to

this has of late been much adopted; and from that fundamental error,

as I may call it, have sprung the innumerable evils, or at least

deficiencies, in our government, which, I have now the pleasure to

inform you, are in a fair way of being perfectly removed.

"The Nabob, upon my representation of the great expense of such an

army as will be necessary to support him in his government, the large

sums due for restitution, and to the navy, together with an annual

tribute, which he will be under a necessity of paying to the King,

hath consented, and I have agreed, provided it should obtain your

approbation, that all the revenues of the country shall be appropriated

to those purposes, 50 lacs of rupees excepted. Out of this sum is to be

defrayed all his expenses of every nature and denomination. Mahommed

Reza Khan, however, being of a disposition extremely timorous, is

desirous of having the payment of the cavalry and sepoys pass through

his hands, though included in the said 50 lacs. This, I think, will be

complied with.

"I am of opinion also, that certain stipends, out of the above

mentioned sum, should be fixed for the Begum, for the Chuta Nabob,

and for the rest of the Nabob's brothers and nephews, Miriam's son

included; or else we must be subject to frequent complaints from those

quarters; for I am persuaded that the dependents and parasites of the

present Nabob will always keep him in distress, be his income what

it may. Although the sum proposed to be stipulated for the Nabob,

considering the present great expenses and demands, may appear large,

yet, by what I now learn, his expense exceeds the sum to be allowed;

and although it is certain that neither his education nor abilities

will enable him to appear to any advantage at the head of these great

and rich provinces, yet, I think, we are bound in honour to support the

dignity of his station, so far as is consistent with the true interest

of the Company.

"The particulars of this matter may be farther adjusted in my absence

by Mr. Sykes, to whom I have communicated my ideas, if the plan be

approved of by the Select Committee; and the whole may be finally

concluded to our satisfaction, upon the Company's being appointed the

King's Duan, who will be empowered, by the nature of their office, as

well as by the King's consent, to settle every point."

Writing the same day to Mr. Verelst, Lord Clive sufficiently

characterises the Nabob by a single trait. "He received the proposal

of having a sum of money for himself and household at his will with

infinite pleasure; and the only reflection he made, upon leaving me,

was, 'Thank God! I shall now have as many dancing girls as I please.'"

It is not to be supposed that the Select Committee would object to a

plan which threw the greater part of the revenue of Bengal into the

hands of the Company, and the treaty was finally concluded in the

course of the same month. The allowance made to the Nabob was raised to

something more than 53 lacs of rupees.

Lord Clive, proceeding up the river, met the Vizier, as has been

mentioned, at Benares. The fortune of war had been against him; his

armies had been repeatedly defeated, and his capital, Lucknow, taken.

He had given himself up to General Carnac, and was eager for peace.

So early as the 2d of August, Lord Clive had an interview with him,

and intimated his intention of restoring all his dominions, except

Allahabad, worth 10 lacs yearly, and perhaps Corah, valued at 18. "His

expressions of joy and gratitude upon this occasion," say Lord Clive

and General Carnac, in a joint letter to the Select Committee[92],

"were many and warm. Such an instance of generosity in a victorious

enemy, exceeded his most sanguine expectations, and we doubt not

will be the best foundation of that union and amity which we so

earnestly wish to secure. He consents to pay to the Company 50 lacs for

indemnification. These terms we think moderate and equitable, both for

him and the Company."

This matter being arranged, Lord Clive hastened on to Allahabad, to

meet the King: the first visit took place on the 9th of August. The

King's demands were numerous, but Clive was steady to his purpose.

The demand on the Nabob of Bengal for 32 lacs of rupees as arrears,

and of 5-1/2 lacs annually of jaghires, were refused, with several

others. It was finally settled, on the 11th, that the King should

receive annually, as revenue from Bengal, the sum of 26 lacs, with

the countries of Allahabad and Corah, yielding a farther revenue of

28 lacs, from Sujah-u-Dowlah, as a royal demesne for supporting his

dignity. "This last cession," says Lord Clive and General Carnac,

writing to the Select Committee[93], "we very readily consented to, as

Sujah-u-Dowlah made not the least objection, well knowing that, after

our departure, he could easily settle this matter with the King, to the

satisfaction of both parties." Lord Clive had, it seems, wished to

restore Corah to the Vizier, making over Allahabad only to the King.

"We then presented the King with two arzies (petitions), desiring he

would grant to Nujm-u-Dowlah the Nizamut of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa,

and to the Company, the Dewanny of the same provinces; to both of which

His Majesty has signed his fiat, and the proper instruments for both

are now drawing out."

The King, at the same time, granted firmans confirming to the Company

for ever all the lands round Madras and elsewhere assigned to them

by the Nabob of Arcot; as well as a free gift of the five northern

Circars. This was the first formal grant or confirmation by the King to

the Company, of these territories. The grant of Lord Clive's jaghire,

to the Company, was likewise confirmed.

The King was eager to induce Clive to march to Delhi and replace him

on the throne. But this was steadily refused. Clive's policy was to

interpose a friendly native power between our territories and the

Afghans, and as far as possible the Mahrattas. He saw that the King,

from his weak character and large pretensions was quite unfit for

such a purpose; and that none was so proper, both from character and

power, as Sujah-u-Dowlah. This was one cause why he was anxious to

have strengthened him, by restoring Corah. He wished to induce the

King to reside quietly in the Company's territories; but finding this

impracticable, gave him to understand that the Company could not join

him as a party in any of his ambitious enterprises, beyond the limits

of their own territories.

Such was the conclusion of these important negotiations, by which the

English East India Company became the real sovereigns of Bengal, Bahar,

Orissa, and other extensive territories. In these provinces they now

stood in the place of the Nabobs, and had gained a right to levy and

dispose of the whole revenues under some very moderate burthens. They

were no longer dependent on the regularity of native princes for the

payment of their troops, or support of their establishments. The Nabob

of Bengal was become a puppet in their hands, of little use, but as

a cover to their dealings with European powers. Clive estimates the

annual clear gain to the Company, including their former possessions

of Burdwan, &c., and after paying the King, the Nabob, and all other

expenses, as not short of 122 lacs, or 1,650,000_l._[94]

Clive had received from the King, in 1758, a sunnud appointing him

to the high rank of a munsubdar of six thousand foot, and of five

thousand horse, with the title of Zubdit-al-mulk, Nazir-ed-Dowla,

Sabat Jung, Behader.[95] The title of Sabat Jung he had originally,

as already mentioned, received from the Nabob of Arcot, for his

gallant exploits in that prince's service, and by that title he always

continued to be known in Bengal. He now received some augmentation of

sounding titles, but what they were does not appear.

While Clive was engaged in these public duties he did not intermit in

the regularity of his correspondence with his friends in England. Some

extracts from his letters will show the light in which he considered

his own situation and transactions.

[96][The following letter[97] to Mr. Salvadore, whom he employed

as a man of business, merits to be preserved as a proof of Clive's

disinterested conduct during this his last period of service in India:--

"I return you many thanks for your obliging letter, and for the very

favourable opinion you are pleased to entertain of my abilities,

as well as disposition to do my duty to the Company. It must be my

own fault if I do not answer the expectations of all the real and

disinterested proprietors; as for the occasional ones, and those who

act from resentment and selfish principles, I hold them in too much

contempt to cast away one thought about them.

The Life of Robert, Lord Clive, Vol. 3 (of 3) Collected from the Family Papers Communicated by the Earl of Powis · 第 6 / 22 段