THE
LIFE
OF
ROBERT, LORD CLIVE:
COLLECTED FROM THE FAMILY PAPERS
COMMUNICATED BY
THE EARL OF POWIS.
BY
MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR JOHN MALCOLM, G.C.B. F.R.S. &c.
IN THREE VOLUMES.
WITH A PORTRAIT AND MAP.
VOL. III.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
MDCCCXXXVI.
London:
Printed by A. Spottiswoode,
New-Street-Square.
CONTENTS
OF
THE THIRD VOLUME.
CHAPTER XV.
Mutinous Combinations among the Officers of the Army.--Repressed
by Clive.--His general Conduct towards the
Army, 1766 Page 1
CHAP. XVI.
Proceedings regarding the Salt Trade.--Gold Coinage.--General
Measures of Clive's Government.--He resigns in
January, 1767 81
CHAP. XVII.
Clive's Transactions in England.--Honours paid him.--Prolongation
of Period of holding his Jaghire.--His ill
Health.--Disorders in the Company's Affairs.--Share
which the Government take in them.--Clive's Politics.--Death
of Mr. Grenville.--Letter to Mr. Hastings.--1771 173
CHAP. XVIII.
Increased Disorder of the Company's Affairs.--Charges
against Lord Clive.--His Answer in the House of Commons,
1772.--Select Committee and Committee of
Secrecy, 1772.--Resolutions moved by Burgoyne.--Debates.--Votes
of the House, 1773.--Parliamentary
Proceedings.--Clive's Death and Character 263
APPENDIX.
Agreement between the East India Company and the Right
Honourable Lord Clive respecting the Fund established
for Relief of the Honourable Company's Military; dated
April 6. 1770: together with general Regulations for
transacting the Business of the said Fund, and Instructions
for the Pensioners 397
MEMOIRS
OF
LORD CLIVE.
CHAPTER XV.
Difficult as was the situation in which Lord Clive was placed when
he adopted those active measures to remedy the abuses in the civil
administration of Bengal, which have been already described, a much
more arduous task awaited him; that of carrying into execution the
positive orders he had received from the Directors, to reduce the
allowances of the officers of the army of that presidency. This
excited a spirit of mutinous defection from their duty in that body,
which it required all the energy and decision of Clive to subdue. The
subject has importance in various ways, and in none more than as it
is so singularly illustrative of his character. To make it clearly
understood, it will be useful to give a concise account[1] of the
whole transaction.
The plea for the mutinous defection from their duty of a great
proportion of the officers of the Bengal army in 1766, was the
reduction of double batta, which was first introduced after the
battle of Plassey, by the Nabob Jaffier Ally Cawn, who granted it to
the English force, of which, according to treaty, he was to pay the
expenses. Lord Clive, at the period of this grant, warned the army,
that it must be considered as an indulgence on the part of the Nabob,
which the Company would not be inclined to continue. It happened as
he anticipated; for, when the Nabob assigned certain districts to the
Company, in order to defray the expenses of the army, the Court of
Directors, unwilling to adopt so expensive a precedent, issued the
most positive orders[2], that double batta should be abolished. These
orders were several times repeated, but the remonstrances of the army
had hitherto prevented the Governor and Council carrying them into
execution. In 1764, when Lord Clive accepted for the second time
the government of Bengal, this was one of the points most strongly
pressed[3] upon him by the Court of Directors.
The whole army had been formed into regiments, and divided into three
brigades, according to a plan of Clive. The first, under Lieutenant
Colonel Sir R. Fletcher, garrisoned Monghyr; the third brigade, under
Colonel Sir Robert Barker, was cantoned at Bankipore; and the second,
under Colonel Smith, was stationed at Allahabad, at the request of the
Emperor of Delhi and Sujah Dowlah, to keep the Mahrattas in check.
The peace which had been established, and the regimenting the troops,
offered a favourable opportunity for carrying into effect the positive
commands of the Directors; and accordingly an order was issued by
the Select Committee, directing that, from the 1st of January, 1766,
double batta to the European officers of the army should cease, except
at Allahabad, where, on account of the distance from Calcutta, it was
continued to the second brigade, as long as it should be actually in
the field; but when in cantonments, that corps was to be reduced to
single batta. At Patna and Monghyr, the troops were allowed half batta
when not on service; while those at the presidency were put upon the
same footing as the troops on the coast of Coromandel, who drew no
batta, except when actually marching or serving in the field.
In reply to the remonstrances of the officers, the positive commands
of the Company were stated; and, on the appointed day, the reduction
took place. Though the officers seemed to acquiesce, secret meetings
were held in each brigade, at which a general resignation of their
commissions was proposed. This plan was originally formed at Monghyr,
in December[4] 1765, or January 1766, and, when matured, proposed
to the second and third brigades. The second, at first, considering
themselves as engaged in actual service by being on the frontier,
declined taking an active part; but these sentiments of honour soon
gave way to the general infatuation, and nearly two hundred commissions
of captains and subalterns were, in a short time collected, to be
placed, on the 1st of June, in the hands of the officers commanding
the respective brigades; though it was agreed that they should offer
to serve as volunteers till the 15th, to give time for an answer to
be received from Lord Clive and the Select Committee. The officers
combined in this proceeding, bound themselves by an oath to secresy,
and to preserve, at the hazard of their own lives, the life of any
one of their body who might be condemned by a court-martial to death.
In order to avoid the charge of mutiny, they determined to refuse the
usual advance of pay for the month of June. Each officer bound himself
separately by a bond of 500_l._, not to accept his commission again, if
double batta was not restored. And subscriptions were entered into for
those who might be cashiered. To this subscription several civilians
were said to have contributed.
The advance of between fifty and sixty thousand Mahrattas towards
Corah, about one hundred and fifty miles from Allahabad, inspired
those in the plot with fresh hopes of success, as it appeared that the
services of one brigade, at least, would be required, at the very time
fixed for the general resignation. Colonel Smith, who commanded on the
frontier, was ordered to encamp at Serajapoor, with the whole of the
second brigade, except the European regiment, who were not to march on
account of the great heat.
Such was the state of affairs in March, 1766, when Lord Clive and
General Carnac set out from Calcutta, to regulate with Mr. Sykes (the
Resident at the Nabob's court) the collections of the revenue at
Moorshedabad and Patna for the ensuing year; to receive from Sujah
Dowlah the balance of the fifty lacs of rupees stipulated by the treaty
of August, 1765, and to form alliances with the princes of the Empire
against the Mahrattas.
In April, 1766, Lord Clive arrived at Moorshedabad, when he received a
letter, dated 19th April, from Mr. Verelst and the Council at Calcutta,
enclosing the remonstrance of the third brigade relative to the
reduction of the batta, signed by nine captains, twelve lieutenants,
and twenty ensigns.[5] The Board having declined answering it without
obtaining Lord Clive's sentiments thereon, Lord Clive, in a letter
dated 22d April, 1766[6], recommended that it should be sent to Sir R.
Barker for his information, as the Board could take no notice of any
paper brought before them, except through the commanding officer. But
lest it should have been regularly transmitted through the commanding
officer, he proposed that the same answer should be given as had been
on a former remonstrance; remarking, at the same time, that many
lieutenants of the Sepoy battalions had signed, who, having an extra
allowance of two rupees per diem, could not be considered as having
any great hardship to complain of. Hitherto no suspicion had been
entertained of the intended resignation. On the 28th of April, Lord
Clive received a letter from Sir Robert Fletcher, dated 25th April,
which contained the first intimation on the subject.[7] He stated that
the officers seemed determined to make another attempt for the recovery
of batta; that their commissions were to be sent to him at the end of
the month; but that they would continue to serve in May as volunteers.
To explain the matter further, he enclosed a letter from Sir R. Barker,
21st April[8], informing him of a quarrel among some officers of the
third brigade, which had developed a serious combination, which, he
had reason to believe, was not confined to that part of the army. Sir
R. Fletcher also transmitted his answer[9] to Sir R. Barker, dated the
24th April, in which he states that, though he has for some days heard
that the officers had thoughts of resuming their demand, he could not
think it deserved much notice; observing, at the same time, that should
it prove that they offered to resign, as Lord Clive would probably not
alter his resolution, it would afford him an opportunity of "picking
out the best officers, and getting rid of the useless ones."
To this communication Lord Clive replied on the 28th April[10], 1766,
approving of Sir Robert Fletcher's proceedings, and declaring his
determination, that any officer who offered his resignation should be
immediately dismissed, and never restored to the service. The quarrel
among the officers alluded to in Sir R. Barker's letter, arose from
Ensign Davis refusing to give up his commission to Captain Duff, which,
connected with the result of a Court of Inquiry, led to a discovery
of the whole of their proceedings. In consequence of this premature
disclosure of their combination, the 1st of May was fixed on instead
of the 1st of June, for the resignation of their commissions, with
a view of preventing Lord Clive and the Committee having time to
counteract the execution of their intention. A letter signed "Full
Batta," dated 15th April[11], addressed to Captain Carnac (who was
with Lord Clive), was received about the same time, informing him of
the plan of resigning, and calling upon him to send his commission to
some friend of his, and to sign the subscription for such officers
as might be turned out of the service. The contents of this letter,
being communicated to Lord Clive, convinced him that the combination
was general; nor was he without apprehension that the troops might
follow the example of their officers, and a general mutiny ensue.
He was, however, determined not to concede; and resolved to leave
Moorshedabad as soon as his important business would allow, and to
reach Monghyr before the 15th of May. In conjunction with General
Carnac and Mr. Sykes, he despatched an express to the Council at
Calcutta, dated the 29th April[12], informing them of the proposed
resignation, and desiring them to write to Madras, in order that all
officers and cadets that could be spared from that presidency should
be held in readiness to embark for Bengal at the shortest notice,
promising them rank according to their standing. Alluding to the
Bengal officers, he observes, in this letter, "Such a spirit must
at all hazards be suppressed at the birth, unless we determine upon
seeing the government of these provinces pass from the civil into the
hands of the military department." In the same letter he desired that
the Presidency of Fort St. George should be informed of the approach
of the Mahrattas, of the number of the officers who had placed
their commissions at the disposal of the combination (being then one
hundred and thirty); and he concludes, by stating the necessity of
the Committee at Calcutta coming to an absolute determination that no
officer now resigning shall ever hereafter hold any place or station
in the East India Company's service. The Council sent off a despatch
to Fort St. George[13] to the above effect. Lord Clive wrote also to
Colonel Smith, Sir R. Barker, and Sir Robert Fletcher, enclosing a
copy of his letter to the Council, and giving those officers leave
to make his opinions known to their respective corps, who, he still
hoped, when they knew his resolution not to yield to their threats,
would change their conduct. From not having heard from Colonel Smith
and Sir R. Barker, he was in hopes, as appears by a letter to Mr.
Verelst (2d May), that the officers, finding the Committee steady
in their resolution, would not venture to brave the consequences.
He soon, however, received a letter from Sir R. Barker, dated 27th
April, 1766[14], stating what he had discovered, in consequence of the
Court of Inquiry respecting the fire at Bankipore; that he had sent
Captain Duff and Ensign Davis prisoners to Calcutta, and would send
those who were active in the combination there too, as any trial of
them by their comrades would be mere trifling; intimating also, that
the civilians at Calcutta were supposed to have subscribed in aid of
this combination to a large amount. To this Lord Clive replied[15], 2d
May, 1766, approving of what he had done, desiring him to arrest such
officers as he thought might be tried for mutiny, till a court martial
of field officers could be summoned. "The ringleaders," he observed,
"of this affair must suffer the severest punishment that martial law
can inflict, else there is an end of discipline in the army, and of
authority in the East India Company over all their servants!!" Similar
letters were sent to Sir R. Fletcher and Colonel Smith.[16] In one
of these letters he takes notice of certain inflammatory anonymous
letters, and says, that if he could discover their authors, his utmost
endeavours should be used "to have them shot." On the 4th of May[17],
he received a letter from Sir R. Fletcher, enclosing one signed by
forty-two of his officers, complaining of the hardships to which they
were subjected by the reduction of their batta, and enclosing their
commissions, but informing him at the same time of their intention to
serve without pay until the 15th of May.[18] He immediately wrote to
Calcutta, directing that officers should be sent for from Fort St.
George, and the free merchants at Calcutta be requested to assist.
On the 5th of May, a letter was received from Sir R. Barker[19], of
the 30th April, informing Lord Clive, that on the 29th of April his
officers had informed him of their intention to resign on the 1st of
May; that he had assembled them, and informed them of the crime they
were committing, and the ruin they were bringing on themselves; but
that they had answered, "that they were solemnly engaged with the other
brigades, and could not be off." Sir Robert states in this letter his
apprehension about the resolution of the men at Monghyr to mutiny, and
mentions that one lac and forty thousand rupees (16,000_l._) was said
to be subscribed for the officers, by gentlemen at Calcutta. These
circumstances Lord Clive communicated to the Council[20], requesting
them to endeavour to discover the civilians who had granted such
encouragement to the army in their mutiny. Directions were also sent
to Sir R. Fletcher[21] to be on his guard against any disorders on the
part of the troops, and to have every thing necessary for detaching
them in small parties. Boats were also ordered to be provided for
sending the officers, at twenty-four hours' notice, to Calcutta. On the
1st of May, Sir R. Barker received a letter from Mr. Robertson, the
Field-Adjutant, enclosing the commissions of the officers of the third
brigade, which Sir Robert returned to them, with an expression of his
resolution to put the severity of military law in execution, in case
any of them should misbehave. He wrote to Lord Clive[22], informing him
of what he had done, and that he had directed Mr. Robertson and three
others to proceed instantly as prisoners to Calcutta. Mr. Robertson
claimed exemption from military law, on the plea that he had resigned;
but nevertheless he was obliged to comply with the orders. Affairs
now becoming critical, Lord Clive determined to set off with all
expedition for Monghyr; and on the 6th of May, leaving the business
at Moorshedabad to the care of Mr. Sykes, he and General Carnac left
Mulajyl, sending forward such officers as he had been able to collect
at so short a notice, and on whom he could rely.[23] Finding, by a
letter he received on the road from Sir R. Fletcher, that the officers
still remained determined in their purpose, and that a correspondence
was begun by them to induce the Madras officers to refuse to come to
the assistance of Government, Lord Clive[24] ordered that all private
letters between Calcutta and Madras should be stopped, and directed
Sir R. Fletcher to secure the assistance of the serjeants and native
officers[25], in case of any appearance of mutiny among the men.[26] In
a letter to Sir R. Barker, dated 8th May, 1766, Lord Clive, alluding
to the report just received of the determination of the officers to
persevere, observes,--
"Will men, so abandoned to all sense of honour, and who still persevere
in supporting acts of mutiny and desertion, when they have abandoned
one point, cease there? History can furnish but few instances of that
nature. For my own part, I must see the soldiers' bayonets levelled
at my throat, before I can be induced to give way; and then, not so
much for the preservation of my own life, as the temporary salvation
of the Company: temporary only it can be, for I shall think Bengal in
the utmost danger, when we are reduced to the necessity of submitting
the civil power to the mercy of men who have gone lengths that will
frighten and astonish all England.
"With me it is beyond a doubt, that if the officers do not resolve
to submit, and acknowledge their crime, ruin and destruction must be
equally their lot, whether they succeed or not; and if arguments of
this kind can make no impression, none will. I cannot help thinking
more evil is still intended."
In the mean time, the Council had resolved that all commissions
tendered should be accepted, and the officer tendering them immediately
sent to Calcutta. On applying to the free merchants to come forward to
do duty as officers on the present emergency, two only would accept
commissions, which confirmed the suspicions that the greater part of
them approved the conduct of the officers, even if they had not entered
into a subscription to support the combination.
Advice was received from Colonel Smith, that the Mahrattas were in
motion. It appeared that he was still unacquainted with the intended
resignation of his officers. Lord Clive, however, in his answer[27]
contemplating this act, authorised him to enter into alliance with
the neighbouring princes; and, should he find himself reduced to
the utmost extremity, but not otherwise, to make terms with the
malecontents. The officers who had been sent forward by Lord Clive, on
their arrival at Monghyr, endeavoured to impress those who had resigned
with a sense of the enormity of their conduct; informing them that
Lord Clive was coming, determined not to yield to them; and remarking
strongly on their ingratitude towards a person who had lately given up
70,000_l._[28], to form a fund for invalids and widows. The officers
replied, that it was impossible for them now to retract. They stated
that Sir R. Fletcher had never communicated to them Lord Clive's
donation to the army; and concluded by accusing Sir Robert as the
originator of the whole plan for resisting the orders of government.
On the 13th of May, the European soldiers got under arms, intending to
follow their officers; but the appearance of Captain Smith with the
sepoy battalion restored order; and when Sir R. Fletcher addressed
them, and distributed money among them, they informed him, that they
had been assured that he was to head them; but as that was not the
case, they would return to their duty. The officers offered to assist,
but were ordered to quit the garrison immediately. On the 15th of
May, Lord Clive arrived at Monghyr, and received the account of past
proceedings from Sir R. Fletcher, who added, that he had known of the
combination of the officers since _January_, and had seemed to approve
of their schemes, that nothing might be done without his knowledge.
It is here to be remarked, that the date of Sir Robert's letter, which
first intimated any thing about the resignation of the officers,
was the 25th of _April_. Whatever were Lord Clive's sentiments on
this communication, he did not think fit either to express his
dissatisfaction, or take any steps at the moment. Immediately on his
arrival he addressed the soldiers, explaining the crime of their
officers, and mentioning his own donation to the European part of the
army. He ordered double pay to be issued to the native troops for May
and June.
At Bankipore[29], where Sir Robert Barker commanded, neither officers
nor men behaved in so violent a manner as at Monghyr. More of the
officers remained with their corps, and there was no appearance of
mutiny among the troops.
At Serajipoor, Colonel Smith, who was daily in expectation of a battle,
was placed in a peculiarly difficult situation. On the 6th of May,
all the officers in camp, except two, requested leave to resign, some
immediately, and others from the first of June. The Colonel immediately
ordered the first to proceed to Calcutta, and informed the latter
that they should have an answer before the time they had fixed;
remarking to both, that he should be obliged to place that confidence
in the black troops which he had before their recent conduct reposed
in the zeal of his own countrymen. The officers answered this, by
complaining of the attempt to asperse their honour; to which Colonel
Smith replied, that the first point of honour in a soldier was military
obedience, and repeated his order, that all those who had offered
to resign immediately should leave camp, and go to the presidency.
Lieutenant Vertue having been refused permission to resign, and leaving
his commission on Colonel Smith's table, was ordered into arrest, to
be tried by a court-martial at Patna. The officers of the European
regiment who were stationed at Allahabad declared their intention
of setting out for Calcutta on the 20th of May, and behaved in so
disorderly a manner, that Major Smith, who commanded that fortress,
would have ordered them all into arrest, if he could have depended on
the men; but, as there was some idea that the soldiers would assist
the officers, he sent for an old battalion of sepoys, which had been
long under his command. These troops having performed a march of one
hundred and four miles from Serajipoor, in fifty-four hours, arrived in
camp a few hours before the officers were on the point of leaving the
garrison. With their assistance Major Smith compelled the officers to
make apologies and submission for the insult they had offered to his
authority, and he contented himself with sending off six to Calcutta.
Colonel Smith at Serajipoor, pursuing the same vigorous measures, had
secured tranquillity at that station, by sending half his officers to
Calcutta.
On the 20th of May, Lord Clive arrived at Bankipore; many of the
officers who had resigned still continuing to do duty were restored to
their commissions. The officers who had been ordered to Calcutta having
attempted to assemble on the road, and disturbance being apprehended,
some detachments of sepoys were sent to compel them to continue their
journey. The principal leaders of this mutinous opposition to authority
being now arrested, and ordered to prepare for their trial, repentance
and humiliation became general, the objects of the combination were
defeated, their union and strength broken, and those who were restored
were compelled to sign a contract to serve the Company for three
years, and to give a year's notice of their intention to quit the
service. Messrs. Duffield and Robertson of the third brigade, who were
ringleaders, on being ordered to embark for England, protested against
the order, and blockaded themselves in their houses till the ships for
England left Calcutta; but, on their making their appearance, they were
seized and sent off to Madras, and from thence to England.
Though there was no doubt of the assistance which the military derived
from the civilians, yet from the precaution taken by the latter, of
sending their letters by private posts in disguised hands, it was
difficult to substantiate the charge against any individuals. Mr.
Higginson, however, the sub-secretary to the Council, and Mr. Grindal
in the secretary's office, having the charge brought home to them,
were dismissed. Captain Stainforth, accused of having expressed a
determination of assassinating Lord Clive, was tried and condemned
to be cashiered. When authority was fully vindicated, as much lenity
was shown by Lord Clive as was consistent with the public safety to
those concerned in this combination. Out of six officers tried and
found guilty of mutiny, not one was sentenced to death. A defect of
the Mutiny Act for the East India Company's service, in omitting
the contract between the officer and Company, might, it was thought
by many, render the legality of the proceedings doubtful; and this
inclined the members of the court-martial to mercy. Lieutenant Vertue,
on this ground, refused to plead; nevertheless, he was put on his
trial, condemned, and cashiered with infamy.
Sir Robert Fletcher, who was publicly accused by many of the officers
who resigned, and more particularly by Captain Goddard[30], of
having been the instigator of the whole plan, was tried by a court
martial, found guilty, and cashiered. It appeared in evidence for the
prosecution, that Sir Robert Fletcher was acquainted throughout with
the design of the general resignation; and that he, in fact, proposed
it, as a scheme by which the officers might recover their double
batta.[31]
Such is the detail of a combination of officers, which threatened
with the most imminent danger the newly established authority of the
Company over the rich provinces of Bengal and Bahar. Never did Lord
Clive display more prominently that superior knowledge of human nature,
that intimate acquaintance with the feelings and motives of military
men, or that firmness and decision by which alone those can be kept in
subordination, than on this trying occasion. He never hesitated nor
swerved from the resolutions he adopted on the first moment that he
learnt the extent of the combination formed against the government. He
was well supported by the members of the committee, of which General
Carnac, commander of the troops, was a member; and with the conduct of
the senior officer of the army, Colonel R. Smith, who commanded one of
the brigades, as well as of Sir Robert Barker, who commanded another,
he had every reason to be satisfied.
The high opinion he entertained of Sir R. Fletcher as a gallant
officer, his apparent zeal and constant communications, long misled
Lord Clive into a confidence on his co-operation, which, had he been a
man of less talent and less prompt decision, would have occasioned a
ruinous compromise of the public interests. But that and all the other
evil consequences which this alarming combination threatened, were
subdued by his presence, and by the personal display of that calm and
unyielding courage, which, in military bodies, extorts, even from those
it subdues, respect and admiration.
During these proceedings Clive's mind appears, from his whole
correspondence, public and private, to have been resolutely fixed
on the accomplishment of the objects for which he abandoned ease
and affluence in his native country; namely, those of restoring
discipline in the military, and order in the civil, branches of the
service. But we are able to trace the motives under which he acted
on this momentous occasion more minutely in his private than in his
public communications. From his letters to General Carnac and others
it is evident that Lord Clive cherished, even at the moment he was
reducing them to obedience, the kindest feelings towards the officers
of the Bengal army. In one to the General he makes some mild but
judicious remarks upon the warm language which his friend had used in
representing the discontent of the officers under his orders (prior to
the combination) at their being superseded by Captain Macpherson, whom
the Council-Board at Calcutta had admitted to the rank of captain in a
mode which the Bengal officers deemed injurious to their interests. "I
am concerned," Lord Clive observes in this letter[32], "at the warmth
of your letter to the Board. Although they have used both you and me
extremely ill, and, as individuals, deserved our utmost contempt, yet
I think there is some indulgence due to their stations. That they have
acted unjustly, as well as contrary to the known rules of the army,
in the case of Captain Macpherson, cannot be doubted; yet I cannot
think the officers ought to carry matters so far as to insist upon a
Governor and Council retracting what they have done. There must be an
absolute power lodged somewhere, and that certainly is in the hands of
the Governor and Council, until the pleasure of the Court of Directors
be known. However, if the account of Captain Macpherson is proved true,
I will be answerable that he shall act as youngest of the corps he has
been introduced to, and take care that no such unjust proceedings shall
be countenanced in future. I hope this will prove satisfactory to the
officers, who, by their gallant behaviour, are entitled to every mark
of attention and distinction from the Company."
This kind and friendly remonstrance, on the part of Lord Clive, had not
the desired effect: on the contrary, it appears by the following letter
to his respected friend General Lawrence, that the resentment of the
officers at this act of government gave rise to demands of a character
that showed how much a spirit of insubordination had spread throughout
the Bengal army.
"I[33] should have done myself the pleasure of writing to you sooner,
if I had not deferred it from day to day, in hopes of being able to
entertain you with some important news from camp. There has, however,
but one material circumstance happened, and that I am sure will
astonish you. Some time ago, the Governor in Council here permitted
Captain Whichcot to dispose of his commission to Captain Macpherson,
and appointed the latter to the same rank among the captains, that
Whichcot held. Upon a representation of this grievance, Macpherson
was ordered to take rank as youngest captain; but the military
gentlemen, still dissatisfied, thought fit to remonstrate against his
being appointed to any other than that of youngest ensign. Such an
unreasonable request could not be granted, and the consequence of the
refusal has been, it seems, a general association among the officers,
captains as well as subalterns; the former thinking it incumbent on
them to support what they are pleased to suppose the rights of the
latter. The import of this association is, that all the officers,
captains, lieutenants and ensigns are to resign their commissions,
unless Macpherson be degraded to the lowest rank! Civil departments, in
every state, will now and then entertain abuses, in spite of the most
vigilant magistracy; but I appeal, my dear General, to your memory,
whether, in the long experience you have had in military affairs,
a single instance can be given of a corps of officers, in time of
actual service and an enemy in the field, uniting in a combination
of this nature. To me it appears so repugnant to every regulation of
discipline, so destructive of that subordination, without which no army
can exist, and above all, so disobedient to the Mutiny Act and Articles
of War, that I am determined to refuse them the liberty of resigning (I
mean those at least whose contract with the Company is not expired),
and break them, or perhaps proceed to greater extremities by a general
court-martial. The expediency of my plan of regimenting the forces,
and appointing the proper proportion of field officers, appears now,
I think, in a stronger light than ever; and in consequence of this
mutiny (must I call it?) I have already ordered all the corps which I
brought from Europe to march up to camp, whither I intend to be myself,
as soon as the interior policy of affairs will permit. To say truth,
every principle of government in this presidency has within these few
months past been so debauched, that one can hardly determine upon the
branches which ought first to be lopped. Pray tell Mr. Palk that I do
not write to him by this post because my politics are not yet ripe for
communication, and I consider this as a letter to you both."
Some time before the combination of the officers took place, several
efforts were made by Clive to enforce the principles of subordination,
which, we find from his private letters, were greatly relaxed in all
ranks. He appears to have grounded his chief hopes of restoring and
maintaining discipline on his plan of giving shape to the army, by
forming it into corps and brigades, and placing it under officers of
rank and reputation; but his difficulty was to keep those in order who
had been selected to command others. This is strongly evinced in a
letter to Sir R. Fletcher, who, while he recommended the introduction
of better discipline, objected to serve under Sir R. Barker.
"I have received your letter[34]," Lord Clive observes, "and agree
entirely with you in the necessity of introducing discipline and
subordination among the officers and soldiers in the service of the
Company, although I see no such difficulty in bringing this about,
since those who decline complying with the regulations which are to be
made will most certainly be dismissed the service.
"I must confess it gives me much concern, that you, who preach up
the necessity of discipline and reformation, should be the first to
act in contradiction to your own declared sentiments, by declining
to serve under Sir R. Barker; but what surprises me still more is,
that you who have been removed from one settlement to another, and
have actually superseded numbers, should object to serve under an
officer, who was a captain when you were only an ensign or volunteer
on the same establishment. Without disparagement to your merit, which
I shall always be ready to acknowledge, it is not in the eyes of the
world equal to that of Sir R. Barker, who has had more time and more
opportunities than you possibly could of distinguishing himself. You
think he should have remained in the artillery. That would not have
hindered him from commanding you, upon all occasions when you were both
upon service together. Indeed his rank is so high, that he must always
command wherever he is, if Carnac or Smith be not present, which may
seldom happen; except, indeed, by being an artillery officer, he should
be thought improper to command the whole; and by that means an officer
of his rank and merit would be deprived of an opportunity of acting in
the field at all. In short, every one who knows Sir R. Barker esteems
him equal to any command, both military and artillery; and as a proof
of what I affirm, General Lawrence, Mr. Palk, and the Nabob[35] pressed
me, in the strongest terms, to have Sir R. Barker; promising that he
should have both rank and command next to Colonel Campbell.
"I am persuaded that when you reflect upon the merits and pretensions
which Sir Robert Barker has to the Company's favour, you will not
hesitate a moment to give up the point. If you consider that Mr.
Sulivan alone sent you out, in that distinguished station which you
now possess, and that his interest is at best become a very precarious
one, I am sure your own good sense will prevail upon you not to oppose
my appointment; for I must frankly tell you, that, though I am really
inclined to do you every service in my power, yet, in this instance,
you must not expect the same indulgence from me which you have received
from General Carnac."
In a subsequent letter he states his disapprobation of Sir Robert
Fletcher's receipt of a large present from the King, subsequent to the
arrival of the covenants, by which all such sources of emolument were
prohibited to public servants.
"[36]With regard to the lac of rupees received from the King, I think
you ought not to have received it in the manner you did, for three
reasons; first, on account of the King's distresses and poverty;
secondly, because General Carnac had never received one farthing from
his Majesty, whom he had laid under obligations much beyond what you
had rendered him; and, lastly, because you knew it was the intent of
the Court of Directors that no presents should be received, after the
receipt of the covenants, without the consent of the Governor and
Council. Indeed, most of the gentlemen of council are under a very
severe censure for their accepting of presents after the receipt of the
covenants."
Lord Clive appears, from some of his letters at this period, not to
have been quite satisfied with some parts of the conduct of his friend
General Carnac.
"You will observe," he writes in a letter[37] to Mr. Sumner, "that the
General does not mention a word about the conduct of the officers;
and I should not be surprised to find them in a disposition, not
only to insist upon Macpherson's appointment, by the Governor and
Council being set aside, but also to refuse signing the covenants and
submitting to the reduction of batta. However, I am determined totally
to subdue this mutinous and unsoldierlike behaviour, which may easily
be effected with the assistance of the field officers, as soon as we
have concluded a peace with Sujah Dowlah."
In a letter written next day to the General, from which I have already
quoted, he begs him, if uneasy under the part he is to act, to let the
whole weight fall upon _his_ shoulders; concluding with reference to
the recent violent representations in the case of the appointment of
Captain Macpherson.[38]
"If the officers of the army," he observes, "think it concerns their
honour to support and countenance so very unmilitary a proceeding, I
think it still more concerns my character and reputation to support the
dignity and power of the Governor and Council."
Writing to Mr. Verelst[39] a few days afterwards, he comments on the
long silence of the General, and his feelings as a military man, in the
following terms:--
"I have at last received a letter from Carnac, copy of which has been
sent you. However, his silence upon particular subjects convinces me,
he has too much given way to the warmth of his passions; and much I
fear, he thinks too highly of the services, dignity, and authority of
the military.
"With regard to the first, although a soldier myself, I am of opinion
that we imbibe such arbitrary notions, by the absolute power which we
are obliged to exercise towards the officers and soldiers, in order to
keep up subordination and military discipline, so essentially necessary
for the good of the service, that we shall always be endeavouring to
encroach upon the civil power, if they do not repeatedly make use of
that authority with which they are invested; and I appeal to yourself,
whether the commanding officers, whoever they were, since my departure
from India, until my second arrival in this quarter, have not, by their
conduct, endeavoured to impress upon the minds of the princes of the
country, that the power was rather in the Commander-in-chief of the
army, than in the Governor and Council. Indeed, a few months more of
Mr. Spencer's government would have made them Lords paramount."
Colonel Richard Smith, who was next in rank to General Carnac, and with
whose decided conduct, during the combination of the officers, Lord
Clive appears to have been fully satisfied, was evidently considered
by his Lordship (with whom he had been a passenger in the same ship
from England) as a person that required to be kept in as good order, as
he was disposed to keep others. To preserve the means of doing this,
Clive had acted towards him with a reserve that gave offence; and the
Colonel, in the concluding paragraph of an able letter[40], upon the
future arrangements of the army observes:--
"Your Lordship well knows what public-spirited motives influenced
me to return to India; and by this time, I flatter myself, you are
convinced, that I am determined religiously to observe the same uniform
conduct which has been my principal object. Your late letters to me
seem to breathe that same air of confidence, which only could first
prevail on me to think of quitting England. Why there has been any
interruption to it, your Lordship can only tell; for I declare myself
an utter stranger to the cause. I have been induced to open myself thus
frankly, from some conversations that passed with General Carnac on
this subject. It remains now in your breast, whether my correspondence
with your Lordship, in future, shall be simply from the Colonel to the
Commander-in-chief, _or_, whether I shall go beyond that line, and
offer my own sentiments on such matters regarding the public service,
as from time to time may occur."
No notice was taken by Lord Clive of these remarks; but, on their
being repeated, he replied, in that explicit and manly tone which was
characteristic of his mind. He evinced, on all such occasions, an equal
disdain for evasion, or the concealment of his sentiments.
"I had resolved," he observes[41], "to give you an answer to your
letter of the 31st August last; but, when I considered the explanation
required, could neither afford you pleasure, or be of any service to
the Company in your present situation, I determined to remain silent
upon so disagreeable a subject. But as you have called upon me a second
time, I will answer you with a frankness free of all disguise.
"Your behaviour towards Colonel Peach at the Cape, in reprimanding him
for not paying his respects to me through you, was, in my opinion,
assuming an authority which did not belong to you; and tended to
the lessening of mine. Lieutenant Wenthorp, after he had obtained
my consent for returning to India, because he did not apply to you
first, was discouraged in such a manner, that he chose rather to
forego all the advantages he might obtain from my promises, than risk
the consequences of your displeasure. Such an authority assumed, and
resentment expressed, could not but give me great offence. The warmth
shown and dissatisfaction expressed, (because you was not looked upon
as one of the Committee, and allowed to sign the letter of instructions
to Captain Abercrombie,) by immediately connecting yourself with a
person whom you had been but very little connected with before, and who
had often declared, in the presence of many witnesses, that he would
never be connected with you; the continuance of that very extraordinary
connection the rest of the voyage; convinced me at once, I could not be
on a footing of intimacy, without subjecting myself to inconveniences
which a spirit like mine could never brook. These, Sir, among many
other reasons, have occasioned my acting with reserve towards you.
Indeed, in the whole course of so long a voyage, I could observe a mind
too actuated by ambition: such a tendency in Colonel Smith, to govern
and command those who ought to govern and command him, that I could not
be unreserved, without giving up that authority which I am determined
ever to support; and although I do, and always have allowed you many
virtues, so long as you continue to give so much general offence by
that kind of behaviour, so long will you be exposed to mortifications
and disappointments."
Sir Robert Barker had made an application to Lord Clive to have a
share, as Colonel commanding the brigade at Bahar, in the civil
government of the country; and to form one of the Committee at Patna.
The character of this officer was very different from that of Colonel
Smith, and the reply from Lord Clive, which by a curious coincidence
was written on the following day, was in very different terms.
"I must confess," he observes[42], "the receipt of your letter of the
2d February, has given me infinite concern, because I feel for you
as I should for myself, and there is no officer in this part of the
world for whom I entertain so strong and true regard, or whom I am
so very desirous of serving. I am sure, if it depended upon me, you
should, upon Carnac's departure, succeed to his rank and station; so
well acquainted am I with your merits as a soldier, your moderation
and temper as a man. Your being hurt, therefore, at not having an
appointment which is not in my power to obtain for you, cannot but hurt
me. I am convinced that, great as my interest is, were I to propose
your being joined with Mr. Middleton in directing the collection of
the revenues of the Bahar province, I could not carry that point.
Consider, Barker, how very separate and distinct the services are;
consider how very jealous the Directors are of military men, and how
very attentive they will be to every action of mine, whom they look
upon in a military more than in a civil light. Recollect that they
would not even allow Coote to have a seat at the Board to give his
advice, except upon military matters only. I say further, that were I
to take such an unprecedented step, I doubt whether it would not add
such weight of argument to those counsellors and malecontents, who are
gone home with a full design to exclaim against arbitrary and military
power, that the Company might be induced to disapprove of every thing
I have done for them, from an apprehension that I meant to accomplish
every measure, by the subversion of civil liberty. Persuaded I am,
that the joining with Middleton a man of your steadiness, moderation,
and discretion, would be of singular advantage to the Company:
notwithstanding which, I dare not attempt to do it.
"But, let us suppose for a moment that I could gratify you in this
request, what would be the consequence? Would not every officer
commanding a brigade insist upon the like privilege? What use do you
imagine the _man_ of Allahabad would make of such a concession? Indeed,
Barker, if such an appointment were to take place, the letters from
this settlement would occasion such an alarm in Leadenhall Street,
that I verily believe I should be turned off my government, and all
the field officers ordered home in the first ship. Point out to me, my
friend, any method of extending your influence, without prejudice to
the service we both wish to promote, and no man shall be readier than I
to give the strongest proof of friendship and regard for you. Middleton
shall have orders to consult with you upon all occasions where military
duties are in agitation; so shall Setabroy and Durge Narain, and be
ordered often to wait upon you."