Another of our important tasks was seeing that the elections were

carried on honestly. Under the old Tammany rule the cheating was

gross and flagrant, and the police were often deliberately used to

facilitate fraudulent practices at the polls. This came about in part

from the very low character of the men put in as election officers.

By conducting a written examination of the latter, and supplementing

this by a careful inquiry into their character, in which we invited any

decent outsiders to assist, we very distinctly raised their calibre.

To show how necessary our examinations were, I may mention that before

each election held under us we were obliged to reject, for moral or

mental shortcomings, over a thousand of the men whom the regular party

organizations, exercising their legal rights, proposed as election

officers. We then merely had to make the police thoroughly understand

that their sole duty was to guarantee an honest election, and that they

would be punished with the utmost rigor if they interfered with honest

citizens on the one hand, or failed to prevent fraud and violence on

the other. The result was that the elections of 1895 and 1896 were by

far the most honest and orderly ever held in New York City.

There were a number of other ways in which we sought to reform the

police force, less important, and nevertheless very important. We

paid particular heed to putting a premium on specially meritorious

conduct, by awarding certificates of honorable mention, and medals,

where we were unable to promote. We introduced a system of pistol

practice by which, for the first time, the policemen were brought to

a reasonable standard of efficiency in handling their revolvers. The

Bertillion system for the identification of criminals was introduced.

A bicycle squad was organized with remarkable results, this squad

speedily becoming a kind of _corps d’elite_, whose individual members

distinguished themselves not only by their devotion to duty, but by

repeated exhibitions of remarkable daring and skill. One important

bit of reform was abolishing the tramp lodging-houses, which had

originally been started in the police stations, in a spirit of

unwise philanthropy. These tramp lodging-houses, not being properly

supervised, were mere nurseries for pauperism and crime, tramps and

loafers of every shade thronging to the city every winter to enjoy

their benefits. We abolished them, a municipal lodging-house being

substituted. Here all homeless wanderers were received, forced to

bathe, given night-clothes before going to bed, and made to work next

morning, and in addition they were so closely supervised that habitual

tramps and vagrants were speedily detected and apprehended.

There was a striking increase in the honesty of the force, and there

was a like increase in its efficiency. When we took office it is not

too much to say that the great majority of the citizens of New York

were firmly convinced that no police force could be both honest and

efficient. They felt it to be part of the necessary order of things

that a policeman should be corrupt, and they were convinced that the

most efficient way of warring against certain forms of crime--notably

crimes against person and property--was by enlisting the service of

other criminals, and of purveyors of vice generally, giving them

immunity in return for their aid. Before we took power the ordinary

purveyor of vice was allowed to ply his or her trade unmolested,

partly in consideration of paying blackmail to the police, partly in

consideration of giving information about any criminal who belonged

to the unprotected classes. We at once broke up this whole business

of blackmail and protection, and made war upon all criminals alike,

instead of getting the assistance of half in warring on the other

half. Nevertheless, so great was the improvement in the spirit of the

force, that, although deprived of their former vicious allies, they

actually did better work than ever before against those criminals who

threatened life and property. Relatively to the population, fewer

crimes of violence occurred during our administration of the Board than

in any previous two years of the city’s history in recent times; and

the total number of arrests of criminals increased, while the number of

cases in which no arrest followed the commission of crime decreased.

The detective bureau nearly doubled the number of arrests made

compared with the year before we took office; obtaining, moreover, 365

convictions of felons and 215 convictions for misdemeanors, as against

269 and 105 respectively for the previous year. At the same time every

attempt at riot or disorder was summarily checked, and all gangs of

violent criminals brought into immediate subjection; while on the other

hand the immense mass meetings and political parades were handled with

such care that not a single case of clubbing of any innocent citizen

was reported.

The result of our labors was of value to the city, for we gave the

citizens better protection than they had ever before received, and

at the same time cut out the corruption which was eating away civic

morality. We showed conclusively that it was possible to combine both

honesty and efficiency in handling the police. We were attacked with

the most bitter animosity by every sensational newspaper and every

politician of the baser sort, not because of our shortcomings, but

because of what we did that was good. We enforced the laws as they were

on the statute books, we broke up blackmail, we kept down the spirit of

disorder, and repressed rascality, and we administered the force with

an eye single to the welfare of the city. In doing this we encountered,

as we had expected, the venemous opposition of all men whose interest

it was that corruption should continue, or who were of such dull

morality that they were not willing to see honesty triumph at the cost

of strife.

[Illustration]

FOOTNOTES:

[14] _Atlantic Monthly_, September, 1897.

[15] My predecessor in the Presidency of the Police Board.

[16] The italics are my own.

[Illustration]

IX

THE VICE-PRESIDENCY AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1896[17]

The Vice-President is an officer unique in his character and functions,

or to speak more properly, in his want of functions while he remains

Vice-President, and in his possibility of at any moment ceasing to be a

functionless official and becoming the head of the whole nation. There

is no corresponding position in any constitutional government. Perhaps

the nearest analogue is the heir apparent in a monarchy. Neither the

French President nor the British Prime Minister has a substitute, ready

at any moment to take his place, but exercising scarcely any authority

until his place is taken. The history of such an office is interesting,

and the personality of the incumbent for the time being may at any

moment become of vast importance.

The founders of our government--the men who did far more than draw

up the Declaration of Independence, for they put forth the National

Constitution--in many respects builded very wisely of set purpose. In

some cases they built wiser than they knew. In yet other instances

they failed entirely to achieve objects for which they had endeavored

to provide by a most elaborate and ingenious governmental arrangement.

They distrusted what would now be called pure Democracy, and they

dreaded what we would now call party government.

Their distrust of Democracy induced them to construct the electoral

college for the choice of a President, the original idea being that

the people should elect their best and wisest men who in turn should,

untrammeled by outside pressure, elect a President. As a matter of fact

the functions of the electorate have now by time and custom become of

little more importance than those of so many letter-carriers. They

deliver the electoral votes of their states just as a letter-carrier

delivers his mail. But in the presidential contest this year it may be

we shall see a partial return to the ideals of the men of 1789; for

some of the electors on the Bryan-Sewall-Watson ticket may exercise a

choice between the vice-presidential candidates.

The distrust felt by the founders of the constitution for party

government took shape in the scheme to provide that the majority party

should have the foremost place, and the minority party the second

place, in the national executive. The man who received the greatest

number of electoral votes was made President, and the man who received

the second greatest number was made Vice-President, on a theory

somewhat akin to that by which certain reformers hope to revolutionize

our system of voting at the present day. In the early days under the

present constitution this system resulted in the choice of Adams

for President and of his anti-type Jefferson as Vice-President, the

combination being about as incongruous as if we should now see McKinley

President and either Bryan or Watson Vice-President. Even in theory

such an arrangement is very bad, because under it the Vice-President

might readily be, and as a matter of fact was, a man utterly opposed

to all the principles to which the President was devoted, so that

the arrangement provided in the event of the death of the President,

not for a succession, but for a revolution. The system was very

soon dropped, and each party nominated its own candidates for both

positions. But it was many years before all the members of the

electoral college of one party felt obliged to cast the same votes for

both President and Vice-President, and consequently there was a good

deal of scrambling and shifting in taking the vote. When, however,

the parties had crystallized into Democratic and Whig, a score of

years after the disappearance of the Federalists, the system of party

voting also crystallized. Each party then as a rule nominated one

man for President and one for Vice-President, these being voted for

throughout the nation. This system in turn speedily produced strange

results, some of which remain to this day. There are and must be in

every party factions. The victorious faction may crush out and destroy

the others, or it may try to propitiate at least its most formidable

rival. In consequence, the custom grew of offering the vice-presidency

as a consolation prize, to be given in many cases to the very men

who were most bitterly opposed to the nomination of the successful

candidate for President. Sometimes this consolation prize was awarded

for geographical reasons, sometimes to bring into the party men who on

points of principle might split away because of the principles of the

presidential candidate himself, and at other times it was awarded for

merely factional reasons to some faction which did not differ in the

least from the dominant faction in matters of principles, but had very

decided views on the question of offices.

The presidency being all important, and the vice-presidency of

comparatively little note, the entire strength of the contending

factions is spent in the conflict over the first, and very often a man

who is most anxious to take the first place will not take the second,

preferring some other political position. It has thus frequently

happened that the two candidates have been totally dissimilar in

character and even in party principle, though both running on the same

ticket. Very odd results have followed in more than one instance.

A striking illustration of the evils sometimes springing from this

system is afforded by what befell the Whigs after the election and

death of the elder Harrison. Translated into the terms of the politics

of continental Europe of to-day, Harrison’s adherents represented

a union between the right and the extreme left against the centre.

That is, the regular Whigs who formed the bulk of his supporters were

supplemented by a small body of extremists who in their political

principles were even more alien to the Whigs than were the bulk of the

regular Democrats, but who themselves hated these regular Democrats

with the peculiar ferocity so often felt by the extremist for the man

who goes far, but not quite far enough. In consequence, the President

represented Whig principles, the Vice-President represented a rather

extreme form of the very principles to which the Whigs were most

opposed. The result was that when Harrison died the presidency fell

into the hands of a man who had but a corporal’s guard of supporters in

the nation, and who proceeded to oppose all the measures of the immense

majority of those who elected him.

A somewhat similar instance was afforded in the case of Lincoln and

Johnson. Johnson was put on the ticket largely for geographical

reasons, and on the death of Lincoln he tried to reverse the policy

of the party which had put him in office. An instance of an entirely

different kind is afforded by Garfield and Arthur. The differences

between these two party leaders were mainly merely factional. Each

stood squarely on the platform of the party, and all the principles

advocated by one were advocated by the other; yet the death of Garfield

meant a complete overturn in the _personnel_ of the upper Republican

officials, because Arthur had been nominated expressly to placate the

group of party leaders who most objected to the nomination of Garfield.

Arthur made a very good President, but the bitterness caused by his

succession to power nearly tore the party in twain. It will be noted

that most of these evils arose from the fact that the Vice-President

under ordinary circumstances possesses so little real power. He

presides over the Senate and he has in Washington a position of marked

social importance, but his political weight as Vice-President is almost

_nil_. There is always a chance that he may become President. As this

is only a chance it seems quite impossible to persuade politicians

to give it proper weight. This certainly does not seem right. The

Vice-President should, so far as possible, represent the same views

and principles which have secured the nomination and election of the

President, and he should be a man standing well in the councils of the

party, trusted by his fellow party leaders, and able in the event of

any accident to his chief to take up the work of the latter just where

it was left. The Republican party has this year nominated such a man

in the person of Mr. Hobart. But nominations of this kind have by no

means always been the rule of recent years. No change of parties, for

instance, could well produce a greater revolution in policy than would

have been produced at almost any time during the last three years if

Mr. Cleveland had died and Mr. Stevenson had succeeded him.

One sure way to secure this desired result would undoubtedly be to

increase the power of the Vice-President. He should always be a man

who would be consulted by the President on every great party question.

It would be very well if he were given a seat in the Cabinet. It might

be well if, in addition to his vote in the Senate in the event of a

tie, he should be given a vote, on ordinary occasions, and perchance on

occasions a voice in the debates. A man of the character of Mr. Hobart

is sure to make his weight felt in an administration, but the power of

thus exercising influence should be made official rather than personal.

The present contest offers a striking illustration of the way in which

the Vice-President ought and ought not to be nominated, and to study

this it is necessary to study not only the way in which the different

candidates were nominated, but at least in outline the characters of

the candidates themselves.

For the first time in many years, indeed for the first time since

parties have fairly crystallized along their present lines, there are

three parties running, two of which support the same presidential

candidate but different candidates for the vice-presidency. Each one of

these parties has carried several states during the last three or four

years. Each party has a right to count upon a number of electoral votes

as its own. Closely though the Democratic and Populistic parties have

now approximated in their principles as enunciated in the platforms

of Chicago and St. Louis, they yet do differ on certain points, and

neither would have any chance of beating the Republicans without the

help of the other. The result has been a coalition, yet each party to

the coalition has retained enough of its jealous individuality to make

it refuse to accept the candidate of the other for the second position

on the ticket.

The Republican party stands on a normal and healthy party footing. It

has enunciated a definite set of principles entirely in accord with

its past actions. It has nominated on this platform a President and

Vice-President, both of whom are thorough-going believers in all the

party principles set forth in the platform upon which they stand. Mr.

McKinley believes in sound finance,--that is, in a currency based upon

gold and as good as gold. So does Mr. Hobart. Mr. McKinley believes in

a protective tariff. So does Mr. Hobart. Mr. McKinley believes in the

only method of preserving orderly liberty,--that is, in seeing that the

laws are enforced at whatever cost. So does Mr. Hobart. In short, Mr.

Hobart stands for precisely the same principles that are represented

by Mr. McKinley. He is a man of weight in the community, who has had

wide experience both in business and in politics. He is taking an

active part in the campaign, and he will be a power if elected to

the vice-presidency. All the elements which have rallied behind Mr.

McKinley are just as heartily behind Mr. Hobart. The two represent the

same forces, and they stand for a party with a coherent organization

and a definite purpose, to the carrying out of which they are equally

pledged.

It will be a matter of much importance to the nation that the next

Vice-President should stand for some settled policy. It is an

unhealthy thing to have the Vice-President and President represented

by principles so far apart that the succession of one to the place of

the other means a change as radical as any possible party overturn. The

straining and dislocation of our governmental institutions was very

great when Tyler succeeded Harrison and Johnson succeeded Lincoln.

In each case the majority of the party that had won the victory felt

that it had been treated with scandalous treachery, for Tyler grew

to be as repulsive to the Whigs as Polk himself, and the Republicans

could scarcely have hated Seymour more than they hated Johnson. The

Vice-President has a three-fold relation. First to the administration;

next as presiding officer in the Senate, where he should be a man of

dignity and force; and third in his social position, for socially he

ranks second to the President alone. Mr. Morton was in every way an

admirable Vice-President under General Harrison, and had he succeeded

to the presidential chair there would have been no break in the great

policies which were being pushed forward by the administration. But

during Mr. Cleveland’s two incumbencies Messrs. Hendricks and Stevenson

have represented, not merely hostile factions, but principles and

interests from which he was sundered by a gulf quite as great as that

which divided him from his normal party foes. Mr. Sewall would make a

colorless Vice-President, and were he at any time to succeed Mr. Bryan

in the White House would travel Mr. Bryan’s path only with extreme

reluctance and under duress. Mr. Watson would be a more startling, more

attractive, and more dangerous figure, for if he got the chance he

would lash the nation with a whip of scorpions, while Mr. Bryan would

be content with the torture of ordinary thongs.

Finally, Mr. Hobart would typify as strongly as Mr. McKinley himself

what was best in the Republican party and in the nation, and would

stand as one of the known champions of his party on the very questions

at issue in the present election. He is a man whose advice would be

sought by all who are prominent in the administration. In short, he

would be the kind of man whom the electors are certain to choose as

Vice-President if they exercise their choice rationally.

The men who left the Republican party because of the nomination

of McKinley would have left it just as quickly if Hobart had been

nominated. They do not believe in sound finance, and though many of

the bolters object to anarchy and favor protection, they feel that in

this crisis their personal desires must be repressed and that they are

conscientiously bound to support the depreciated dollar even at the

cost of incidentally supporting the principles of a low tariff and

the doctrine that a mob should be allowed to do what it likes with

immunity. There are many advocates of clipped or depreciated money

who are rather sorry to see the demand for such currency coupled with

a demand for more lawlessness and an abandonment by the government

of the police functions which are the essential attributes of

civilization; but they have overcome their reluctance, feeling that on

the whole it is more important that the money of the nation should be

unsound than that its laws should be obeyed. People who feel this way

are just as much opposed to Mr. Hobart as to Mr. McKinley. They object

to the platform upon which the two men stand, and they object as much

to the character of one man as to the character of the other. They are

repelled by McKinley’s allegiance to the cause of sound money, and find

nothing to propitiate them in Hobart’s uncompromisingly honest attitude

on the same question. There is no reason whatever why any voter who

would wish to vote against the one should favor the other, or _vice

versa_.

When we cross the political line all this is changed. On the leading

issue of the campaign the entire triangle of candidates are a unit.

Mr. Bryan, the nominee for the presidency, and Messrs. Sewall and

Watson, the nominees for the vice-presidency, are almost equally

devoted adherents of the light-weight dollar and of a currency which

shall not force a man to repay what he has borrowed, and shall punish

the wrong-headed laborer, who expects to be paid his wages in money

worth something, as heavily as the business man or farmer who is so

immoral as to wish to pay his debts. All three are believers in that

old-world school of finance which appears under such protean changes

of policy, always desiring the increase of the circulating medium, but

differing as to the means, which in one age takes the form of putting

base metal in with the good, or of clipping the good, and in another

assumes the guise of fiat money, or the free coinage of silver. On

this currency question they are substantially alike, agreeing (as one

of their adherents picturesquely put it, in arguing in favor of that

form of abundant currency which has as its highest exponent the money

of the late Confederacy) that “the money which was good enough for the

soldiers of Washington is good enough for us.” As a matter of fact the

soldiers of Washington were not at all grateful for the money which the

loud-mouthed predecessors of Mr. Bryan and his kind then thought “good

enough” for them. The money with which the veterans of Washington were

paid was worth two cents on the dollar, and as yet neither Mr. Bryan,

Mr. Sewall, nor Mr. Watson has advocated a two-cent copper dollar.

Still, they are striving toward this ideal, and in their advocacy of

the fifty cent dollar they are one.

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