is not the slightest danger that the law will be repealed, and there
is not much danger that any President will suffer it to be so laxly
administered as to deprive it of all value; though there is always
need to keep a vigilant lookout for fear of such lax administration.
The danger-point is in the appropriations. The first Civil Service
Commission, established in the days of President Grant, was starved
out by Congress refusing to appropriate for it. A hostile Congress
could repeat the same course now; and, as a matter of fact, in every
Congress resolute efforts are made by the champions of foul government
and dishonest politics to cut off the Commission’s supplies. The bolder
men, who come from districts where little is known of the law, and
where there is no adequate expression of intelligent and honest opinion
on the subject, attack it openly. They are always joined by a number
who make the attack covertly under some point of order, or because of a
nominal desire for economy. These are quite as dangerous as the others,
and deserve exposure. Every man interested in decent government should
keep an eye on his Congressman and see how he votes on the question of
appropriations for the Commission.
The opposition to the reform is generally well led by skilled
parliamentarians, and they fight with the vindictiveness natural to
men who see a chance of striking at the institution which has baffled
their ferocious greed. As a rule, the rank and file are composed of
politicians who could not rise in public life because of their attitude
on any public question, and who derive most of their power from the
skill with which they manipulate the patronage of their districts.
These men have a gift at office-mongering, just as other men have a
peculiar knack in picking pockets; and they are joined by all the
honest dull men, who vote wrong out of pure ignorance, and by a very
few sincere and intelligent, but wholly misguided people. Many of the
spoils leaders are both efficient and fearless, and able to strike
hard blows. In consequence, the leaders on the side of decency must
themselves be men of ability and force, or the cause will suffer. For
our good fortune, we have never yet lacked such leaders.
The Appropriation committees, both in the House and Senate, almost
invariably show a friendly disposition toward the law. They are
composed of men of prominence, who have a sense of the responsibilities
of their positions and an earnest desire to do well for the country and
to make an honorable record for their party in matters of legislation.
They are usually above resorting to the arts of low cunning or of sheer
demagogy to which the foes of the reform system are inevitably driven,
and in consequence they can be relied upon to give, if not what is
needed, at least enough to prevent any retrogression. It is in the open
House and in Committee of the Whole that the fight is waged. The most
dangerous fight occurs in Committee of the Whole, for there the members
do not vote by aye and no, and in consequence a mean politician who
wishes ill to the law, but is afraid of his constituents, votes against
it in committee, but does not dare to do so when the ayes and noes
are called in the House. One result of this has been that more than
once the whole appropriation has been stricken out in Committee of the
Whole, and then voted back again by substantial majorities by the same
men sitting in open House.
In the debate on the appropriation the whole question of the workings
of the law is usually discussed, and those members who are opposed to
it attack not only the law itself, but the Commission which administers
it. The occasion is, therefore, invariably seized as an opportunity
for a pitched battle between the friends and foes of the system, the
former trying to secure such an increase of appropriation as will
permit the Commission to extend its work, and the latter striving to
abolish the law outright by refusing all appropriations. In the 51st
and 52d Congresses, Mr. Lodge, of Massachusetts, led the fight for the
reform in the Lower House. He was supported by such party leaders as
Messrs. Reed, of Maine, and McKinley, of Ohio, among the Republicans,
and Messrs. Wilson, of West Virginia, and Sayers, of Texas, among
the Democrats. Among the other champions of the law on the floor of
the House were Messrs. Hopkins and Butterworth, Mr. Greenhalge, of
Massachusetts, Mr. Henderson, of Iowa, Messrs. Payne, Tracey, and
Coombs, of New York. I wish I had the space to chronicle the names
of all, and to give a complete list of those who voted for the law.
Among the chief opponents of it were Messrs. Spinola, of New York,
Enloe, of Tennessee, Stockdale, of Mississippi, Grosvenor, of Ohio,
and Bowers, of California. The task of the defenders of the law was,
in one way easy, for they had no arguments to meet, the speeches of
their adversaries being invariably divisible into mere declamation
and direct misstatement of facts. In the Senate, Senators Hoar, of
Massachusetts, Allison, of Iowa, Hawley, of Connecticut, Wolcott, of
Colorado, Perkins, of California, Cockrell, of Missouri, and Butler, of
South Carolina, always supported the Commission against unjust attack.
Senator Gorman was naturally the chief leader of the assaults upon the
Commission. Senators Harris, Plumb, Stewart, and Ingalls were among his
allies.
In each session the net result of the fight was an increase in the
appropriation for the Commission. The most important increase was
that obtained in the first session of the 53d Congress. On this
occasion Mr. Lodge was no longer in the House, having been elected
to the Senate. The work of the Commission had grown so that it was
impossible to perform it without a great increase of force; and it
would have been impossible to have put into effect the extensions of
the classified service had this increase not been allowed. In the House
the Committee on Appropriations, of which Mr. Sayers was chairman,
allowed the increase, but it was stricken out in the House itself after
an acrimonious debate, in which the cause of the law was sustained
by Messrs. Henderson and Hopkins, Mr. McCall, of Massachusetts, Mr.
Coombs, Mr. Crain, of Texas, Mr. Storer, of Ohio, and many others,
while the spoils-mongers were led by Messrs. Stockdale and Williams,
of Mississippi, Pendelton, of West Virginia, Fithian, of Illinois, and
others less important.
When the bill went over to the Senate, however, Mr. Lodge, well
supported by Messrs. Allison, Cockrell, Wolcott, and Teller, had the
provision for the increase of appropriation for the Commission restored
and increased, thereby adding by one half to the efficiency of the
Commission’s work. Had it not been for this the Commission would have
been quite unable to have undertaken the extensions recently ordered by
President Cleveland.
It is noteworthy that the men who have done most effective work for the
law in Washington in the departments, and more especially in the House
and Senate, are men of spotless character, who show by their whole
course in public life that they are not only able and resolute, but
also devoted to a high ideal. Much of what they have done has received
little comment in public, because much of the work in committee, and
some of the work in the House, such as making or combating points of
order, and pointing out the danger or merit of certain bills, is not
of a kind readily understood or appreciated by an outsider; yet no men
have deserved better of the country, for there is in American public
life no one other cause so fruitful of harm to the body-politic as the
spoils system, and the legislators and administrative officers who have
done the best work toward its destruction merit a peculiar meed of
praise from all well-wishers of the Republic.
I have spoken above of the good that would come from a thorough and
intelligent knowledge as to who were the friends and who were the foes
of the law in Washington. Departmental officers, the heads of bureaus,
and, above all, the Commissioners themselves, should be carefully
watched by all friends of the reform. They should be supported when
they do well, and condemned when they do ill; and attention should
be called not only to what they do, but to what they fail to do. To
an even greater extent, of course, this applies to the President. As
regards the Senators and Congressmen also there is urgent need of
careful supervision by the friends of the law. We need criticism by
those who are unable to do their part in action; but the criticism, to
be useful, must be both honest and intelligent, and the critics must
remember that the system has its stanch friends and bitter foes among
both party men and men of no party--among Republicans, Democrats,
and Independents. Each Congressman should be made to feel that it is
his duty to support the law, and that he will be held to account if
he fails to support it. Especially is it necessary to concentrate
effort in working for each step of reform. In legislative matters,
for instance, there is need of increase of appropriations for the
Commission, and there is a chance of putting through the bill to reform
the Consular service. This has received substantial backing in the
Senate, and has the support of the majority of the Foreign Affairs
Committee. Instead of wasting efforts by a diffuse support of eight
or ten bills, it would be well to bend every energy to securing the
passage of the Consular bill; and to do this it is necessary to arouse
not only the Civil Service Reform Associations, but the Boards of Trade
throughout the country, and to make the Congressmen and Senators feel
individually the pressure from those of their constituents who are
resolved no longer to tolerate the peculiarly gross manifestation of
the spoils system which now obtains in the consular service, with its
attendant discredit to the national honor abroad.
People sometimes grow a little down-hearted about the reform. When
they feel in this mood it would be well for them to reflect on what
has actually been gained in the past six years. By the inclusion of
the railway mail service, the smaller free-delivery offices, the
Indian School service, the Internal Revenue service, and other less
important branches, the extent of the public service which is under
the protection of the law has been more than doubled, and there are
now nearly fifty thousand employees of the Federal Government who have
been withdrawn from the degrading influences that rule under the spoils
system. This of itself is a great success and a great advance, though,
of course, it ought only to spur us on to renewed effort. In the fall
of 1894 the people of the State of New York, by a popular vote, put
into their constitution a provision providing for a merit system in the
affairs of the State and its municipalities; and the following spring
the great city of Chicago voted, by an overwhelming majority, in favor
of applying in its municipal affairs the advanced and radical Civil
Service Reform Law, which had already passed the Illinois Legislature.
Undoubtedly, after every success there comes a moment of reaction. The
friends of the reform grow temporarily lukewarm, or, because it fails
to secure everything they hoped, they neglect to lay proper stress
upon all that it does secure. Yet, in spite of all rebuffs, in spite
of all disappointments and opposition, the growth of the principle of
Civil Service reform has been continually more rapid, and every year
has taken us measurably nearer that ideal of pure and decent government
which is dear to the heart of every honest American citizen.
[Illustration]
FOOTNOTES:
[13] _Scribner’s Magazine_, August, 1895.
[Illustration]
VIII
ADMINISTERING THE NEW YORK POLICE FORCE[14]
In New York, in the fall of 1894, Tammany Hall was overthrown by
a coalition composed partly of the regular republicans, partly of
anti-Tammany democrats, and partly of independents. Under the latter
head must be included a great many men who in national politics
habitually act with one or the other of the two great parties,
but who feel that in municipal politics good citizens should act
independently. The tidal wave, which was running high against the
democratic party, was undoubtedly very influential in bringing about
the anti-Tammany victory; but the chief factor in producing the
result was the wide-spread anger and disgust felt by decent citizens
at the corruption which, under the sway of Tammany, had honey-combed
every department of the city government, but especially the police
force. A few well-meaning people have at times tried to show that
this corruption was not really so very great. In reality it would be
difficult to overestimate the utter rottenness of many branches of
the city administration. There were a few honorable and high-minded
Tammany officials, and there were a few bureaus which were administered
with more or less efficiency, although dishonestly. But the corruption
had become so wide-spread as seriously to impair the work of
administration, and to bring us back within measurable distance of the
days of Tweed.
The chief centre of corruption was the Police Department. No man not
intimately acquainted with both the lower and humbler sides of New York
life--for there is a wide distinction between the two--can realize
how far this corruption extended. Except in rare instances, where
prominent politicians made demands which could not be refused, both
promotions and appointments towards the close of Tammany rule were made
almost solely for money, and the prices were discussed with cynical
frankness. There was a well-recognized tariff of charges, ranging from
two or three hundred dollars for appointment as a patrolman, to twelve
or fifteen thousand dollars for promotion to the position of captain.
The money was reimbursed to those who paid it by an elaborate system
of blackmail. This was chiefly carried on at the expense of gamblers,
liquor sellers, and keepers of disorderly houses; but every form of
vice and crime contributed more or less, and a great many respectable
people who were ignorant or timid were blackmailed under pretence of
forbidding or allowing them to violate obscure ordinances and the like.
From top to bottom the New York police force was utterly demoralized
by the gangrene of such a system, where venality and blackmail went
hand in hand with the basest forms of low ward politics, and where the
policeman, the ward politician, the liquor seller, and the criminal
alternately preyed on one another and helped one another to prey on the
general public.
In May, 1895, I was made president of the newly appointed police board,
whose duty it was to cut out the chief source of civic corruption in
New York by cleansing the police department. The police board consisted
of four members. All four of the new men were appointed by Mayor
Strong, the reform Mayor, who had taken office in January.
With me, was associated, as treasurer of the Board, Mr. Avery D.
Andrews. He was a democrat and I a republican, and there were questions
of national politics on which we disagreed widely; but such questions
could not enter into the administration of the New York police, if that
administration was to be both honest and efficient; and as a matter
of fact, during my two years’ service, Mr. Andrews and I worked in
absolute harmony on every important question of policy which arose. The
prevention of blackmail and corruption, the repression of crime and
violence, safeguarding of life and property, securing honest elections,
and rewarding efficient and punishing inefficient police service, are
not, and cannot properly be made, questions of party difference. In
other words, such a body as the police force of New York can be wisely
and properly administered only upon a non-partisan basis, and both Mr.
Andrews and myself were quite incapable of managing it on any other.
There were many men who helped us in our work; and among them all,
the man who helped us most, by advice and counsel, by stalwart, loyal
friendship, and by ardent championship of all that was good against all
that was evil, was Jacob A. Riis, the author of _How the Other Half
Lives_.
Certain of the difficulties we had to face were merely those which
confronted the entire reform administration in its management of
the municipality. Many worthy people expected that this reform
administration would work an absolute revolution, not merely in the
government, but in the minds of the citizens as a whole; and felt
vaguely that they had been cheated because there was not an immediate
cleansing of every bad influence in civic or social life. Moreover, the
different bodies forming the victorious coalition felt the pressure of
conflicting interests and hopes. The mass of effective strength was
given by the republican organization, and not only all the enrolled
party workers, but a great number of well-meaning republicans who had
no personal interest at stake, expected the administration to be used
to further the fortunes of their own party. Another great body of the
administration’s supporters took a diametrically opposite view, and
believed that the administration should be administered without the
least reference whatever to party. In theory they were quite right,
and I cordially sympathized with them; but as a matter of fact the
victory could not have been won by the votes of this class of people
alone, and it was out of the question to put these theories into
complete effect. Like all other men who actually try to do things
instead of confining themselves to saying how they should be done, the
members of the new city government were obliged to face the facts and
to do the best they could in the effort to get some kind of good result
out of the conflicting forces. They had to disregard party so far as
was possible; and yet they could not afford to disregard all party
connections so utterly as to bring the whole administration to grief.
In addition to these two large groups of supporters of the
administration, there were other groups, also possessing influence
who expected to receive recognition distinctly as democrats, but as
anti-Tammany democrats; and such members of any victorious coalition
are always sure to overestimate their own services, and to feel
ill-treated.
It is of course an easy thing to show on paper that the municipal
administration should have been administered without the slightest
reference to national party lines, and if the bulk of the people saw
things with entire clearness the truth would seem so obvious as to need
no demonstration. But as a matter of fact the bulk of the people who
voted the new administration into power neither saw this nor realized
it, and in politics, as in life generally, conditions must be faced
as they are, and not as they ought to be. The regular democratic
organization, not only in the city but in the State, was completely
under the dominion of Tammany Hall and its allies, and they fought
us at every step with wholly unscrupulous hatred. In the State and
the city alike the democratic campaign was waged against the reform
administration in New York. The Tammany officials who were still
left in power in the city, headed by the comptroller, Mr. Fitch, did
everything in their power to prevent the efficient administration of
the government. The democratic members of the Legislature acted as
their faithful allies in all such efforts. Whatever was accomplished by
the reform administration--and a very great deal was accomplished--was
due to the action of the republican majority in the constitutional
convention, and especially to the republican Governor, Mr. Morton, and
the republican majority in the Legislature, who enacted laws giving
to the newly chosen Mayor, Mr. Strong, the great powers necessary for
properly administering his office. Without these laws the Mayor would
have been very nearly powerless. He certainly could not have done a
tenth part of what actually was done.
Now, of course, the republican politicians who gave Mayor Strong all
these powers, in the teeth of violent democratic opposition to every
law for the betterment of civic conditions in New York, ought not,
under ideal conditions, to have expected the slightest reward. They
should have been contented with showing the public that their only
purpose was to serve the public, and that the republican party wished
no better reward than the consciousness of having done its duty by
the State and the city. But as a whole they had not reached such a
standard. There were some who had reached it; there were others who,
though perfectly honest, and wishing to see good government prosper,
yet felt that somehow it ought to be combined with party advantage of a
tangible sort; and finally, there were yet others who were not honest
at all and cared nothing for the victory unless it resulted in some
way to their own personal advantage. In short, the problem presented
was of the kind which usually is presented when dealing with men as a
mass. The Mayor and his administration had to keep in touch with the
republican party or they could have accomplished nothing; and on the
other hand there was much that the republican machine asked which they
could not do, because a surrender on certain vital points meant the
abandonment of the effort to obtain good administration.
The undesirability of breaking with the republican organization was
shown by what happened in the administration of the police department.
This being the great centre of power was the especial object of the
republican machine leaders. Toward the close of Tammany rule, of the
four Police Commissioners, two had been machine republicans, whose
actions were in no wise to be distinguished from those of their Tammany
colleagues; and immediately after the new board was appointed to office
the machine got through the Legislature the so-called bi-partisan or
Lexow law, under which the department is at present administered; and
a more foolish or vicious law was never enacted by any legislative
body. It modelled the government of the police force somewhat on the
lines of the Polish parliament, and it was avowedly designed to make it
difficult to get effective action. It provided for a four-headed board,
so that it was difficult to get a majority anyhow; but, lest we should
get such a majority, it gave each member power to veto the actions of
his colleagues in certain very important matters; and, lest we should
do too much when we were unanimous, it provided that the chief, our
nominal subordinate, should have entirely independent action in the
most important matters, and should be practically irremovable, except
for proved corruption; so that he was responsible to nobody. The Mayor
was similarly hindered from removing any Police Commissioner, so that
when one of our colleagues began obstructing the work of the board,
and thwarting its effort to reform the force, the Mayor in vain strove
to turn him out. In short, there was a complete divorce of power and
responsibility, and it was exceedingly difficult either to do anything,
or to place anywhere, the responsibility for not doing it.