EVENTS OF 1801.
BRITISH EXPEDITION TO THE BALTIC—BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN—BONAPARTE'S
FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO CONTEST CONTROL OF THE SEA—HIS CONTINENTAL
POLICY—PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITH GREAT BRITAIN, OCTOBER,
1801—INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER SO FAR UPON THE COURSE OF THE REVOLUTION.
By the peace of Lunéville Great Britain was left alone, and for the
moment against all Europe. The ministry met the emergency with vigor
and firmness, though possibly with too much reliance upon diplomacy
and too little upon the military genius of the great seaman whose
services were at their disposal. Upon the Continent nothing could be
effected, all resistance to France had been crushed by the genius of
Bonaparte; but time had to be gained for the expedition then under way
against Egypt and destined to compel its evacuation by the French. The
combination in the North also must be quickly dissolved, if the country
were to treat on anything like equal terms.
An armed negotiation with the Baltic powers, similar to that employed
with Denmark the preceding August, was therefore determined; and a
fleet of eighteen sail-of-the-line with thirty-five smaller vessels
was assembled at Yarmouth, on the east coast of England. Rapidity of
movement was essential to secure the advantage from the ice, which,
breaking up in the harbors less rapidly than in the open water, would
delay the concentration of the hostile navies; and also to allow the
Baltic powers the least possible time to prepare for hostilities
which they had scarcely anticipated. Everything pointed to Nelson,
the most energetic and daring of British admirals, for the chief
command of an expedition in which so much depended upon the squadron,
numerically inferior to the aggregate of forces arrayed against it,
attacking separately each of the component parts before their junction;
but Nelson was still among the junior flag-officers, and the rather
erratic manner in which, while in the central Mediterranean and under
the influence of Lady Hamilton, he had allowed his views of the
political situation to affect his actions even in questions of military
subordination, had probably excited in Earl Spencer, the First Lord,
by whom the officers were selected, a distrust of his fitness for a
charge requiring a certain delicacy of discretion as well as vigor
of action. Whatever the reason, withholding the chief command from
him was unquestionably a mistake,—which would not have been made by
St. Vincent, who succeeded Spencer a few weeks later upon the fall of
the Pitt ministry. The conditions did not promise a pacific solution
when the expedition was planned, and the prospect was even worse when
it sailed. The instructions given to Sir Hyde Parker allowed Denmark
forty-eight hours to accept Great Britain's terms and withdraw from her
engagements with the other Powers. Whether she complied peaceably or
not, after she was reduced to submission the division of the Russian
fleet at Revel was to be attacked, before the melting ice allowed it to
join the main body in Cronstadt; and Sweden was to be similarly dealt
with. Under such orders diplomacy had a minor part to play, while in
their directness and simplicity they were admirably suited to the fiery
temper and prompt military action which distinguished Nelson; and, but
for the opportune death of Paul I., Great Britain might have had reason
to regret that the opportunity to give Russia a severe reminder of
her sea power was allowed to slip through the lax grasp of a sluggish
admiral.
The fleet sailed from Yarmouth on the 12th of March, 1801; and on the
19th, although there had been some scattering in a heavy gale, nearly
all were collected off the Skaw, the northern point of Jutland at the
entrance of the Kattegat. The wind being north-west was fair for going
to Copenhagen, and Nelson, if in command, would have advanced at once
with the ambassador on board. "While the negotiation is going on,"
he said, "the Dane should see our flag waving every moment he lifted
his head." As it was, the envoy went forward with a frigate alone and
the fleet waited. On the 12th it was off Elsineur, where the envoy
rejoined, Denmark having rejected the British terms.
This amounted to an acceptance of hostilities, and it only remained
to the commander-in-chief to act at once; for the wind was favorable,
an advantage which at any moment might be lost. On this day Nelson
addressed Parker a letter, summing up in a luminous manner the features
of the situation and the different methods of action. "Not a moment
should be lost in attacking," he said; "we shall never be so good a
match for them as at this moment." He next hinted, what he had probably
already said, that the fleet ought to have been off Copenhagen, and not
at Elsineur, when the negotiation failed. "Then you might instantly
attack and there would be scarcely a doubt but the Danish fleet would
be destroyed, and the capital made so hot that Denmark would listen to
reason and its true interest." Since, however, the mistake of losing so
much time had been made, he seeks to stir his superior to lose no more.
"Almost the safety, certainly the honor, of England is more entrusted
to you than ever yet fell to the lot of any British officer; ... never
did our country depend so much on the success of any fleet as of this."
Having thus shown the necessity for celerity, Nelson next discussed the
plan of operations. Copenhagen is on the east side of the island of
Zealand, fronting the coast of Sweden, from which it is separated by
the passage called the Sound. On the west the island is divided from
the other parts of Denmark by the Great Belt. The navigation of the
latter being much the more difficult, the preparations of the Danes
had been made on the side of the Sound, and chiefly about Copenhagen
itself. For half a mile from the shore in front of the city, flats
extend, and in the Sound itself at a distance of little over a mile,
is a long shoal called the Middle Ground. Between these two bodies of
shallow water is a channel, called the King's, through which a fleet
of heavy ships could sail, and from whose northern end a deep pocket
stretches toward Copenhagen, forming the harbor proper. The natural
point of attack therefore appears to be at the north; and there the
Danes had erected powerful works, rising on piles out of the shoal
water off the harbor's mouth and known as the Three-Crown Batteries.
Nelson, however, pointed out that not only was this head of the line
exceedingly strong, but that the wind that was fair to attack would
be foul to return; therefore a disabled ship would have no escape but
by passing through the King's Channel. Doing so she would have to run
the gantlet of a line of armed hulks, which the Danes had established
as floating batteries along the inner edge of the channel—covering the
front of Copenhagen—and would also be separated from her fleet. Nor
was this difficulty, which may be called tactical, the only objection
to a plan that he disparaged as "taking the bull by the horns." He
remarked that so long as the British fleet remained in the Sound,
without entering the Baltic, the way was left open for both the Swedes
and the Russians, if released by the ice, to make a junction with the
Danes. Consequently, he advised that a sufficiently strong force of
the lighter ships-of-the-line should pass outside the Middle Ground,
despite the difficulties of navigation, which were not insuperable, and
come up in rear of the city. There they would interpose between the
Danes and their allies, and be in position to assail the weaker part of
the hostile order. He offered himself to lead this detachment.
[Illustration: Battle of Copenhagen.]
This whole letter of March 24, 1801,[22] possesses peculiar interest;
for it shows with a rare particularity, elicited by the need he felt
of arousing and convincing his superior, Nelson's clear discernment of
the decisive features of a military situation. The fame of this great
admiral has depended less upon his conduct of campaigns than upon the
renowned victories he won in the actual collision of fleet with fleet;
and even then has been mutilated by the obstinacy with which, despite
the perfectly evident facts, men have persisted in seeing in them
nothing but dash,—heart, not head.[23] Throughout his correspondence,
it is true, there are frequent traces of the activity of his mental
faculties and of the general accuracy of his military conclusions; but
ordinarily it is from his actions that his reasonings and principles
must be deduced. In the present case we have the views he held and the
course he evidently would have pursued clearly formulated by himself;
and it cannot but be a subject of regret that the naval world should
have lost so fine an illustration as he would there have given of the
principles and conduct of naval warfare. He concluded his letter with
a suggestion worthy of Napoleon himself, and which, if adopted, would
have brought down the Baltic Confederacy with a crash that would have
resounded throughout Europe. "Supposing us through the Belt with the
wind first westerly, would it not be possible to go with the fleet,
or detach ten ships of three and two decks, with one bomb and two
fire-ships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian squadron at that place? I
do not see the great risk of such a detachment, and with the remainder
to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The measure may be thought bold,
but I am of opinion the boldest are the safest; and our country demands
a most vigorous exertion of her force, directed with judgment."
Committed as the Danes were to a stationary defence, this
recommendation to strike at the soul of the confederacy evinced the
clearest perception of the key to the situation, which Nelson himself
summed up in the following words: "I look upon the Northern League to
be like a tree, of which Paul was the trunk and Sweden and Denmark
the branches. If I can get at the trunk and hew it down, the branches
fall of course; but I may lop the branches and yet not be able to
fell the tree, and my power must be weaker when its greatest strength
is required"[24]—that is, the Russians should have been attacked
before the fleet was weakened, as it inevitably must be, by the
battle with the Danes. "If we could have cut up the Russian fleet,"
he said again, "that was my object." Whatever Denmark's wishes about
fighting, she was by her continental possessions tied to the policy
of Russia and Prussia, either of whom could overwhelm her by land.
She dared not disregard them. The course of both depended upon the
czar; for the temporizing policy of Prussia would at once embrace
his withdrawal from the league as an excuse for doing the same. At
Revel were twelve Russian ships-of-the-line, fully half their Baltic
fleet, whose destruction would have paralyzed the remainder and the
naval power of the empire. To persuade Parker to such a step was,
however, hopeless. "Our fleet would never have acted against Russia
and Sweden," wrote Nelson afterwards, "although Copenhagen would have
been burned; for Sir Hyde Parker was determined not to leave Denmark
hostile in his rear;"[25] a reason whose technical accuracy under all
the circumstances was nothing short of pedantic, and illustrates the
immense distance between a good and accomplished officer, which Parker
was, and a genius whose comprehension of rules serves only to guide,
not to fetter, his judgment.
Although unable to rise equal to the great opportunity indicated by
Nelson, Sir Hyde Parker adopted his suggestion as to the method and
direction of the principal attack upon the defences of Copenhagen.
For this, Nelson asked ten ships-of-the-line and a number of smaller
vessels, with which he undertook to destroy the floating batteries
covering the front of the city. These being reduced, the bomb vessels
could be placed so as to play with effect upon the dockyard, arsenals,
and the town, in case further resistance was made.
The nights of the 30th and 31st of March were employed sounding the
channel. On the first of April the fleet moved up to the north end of
the Middle Ground, about four miles from the city; and that afternoon
Nelson's division, to which Parker had assigned two ships-of-the-line
more than had been asked—or twelve altogether—got under way, passed
through the outer channel and anchored towards sundown off the
south-east end of the shoal, two miles from the head[26] of the
Danish line. Nelson announced his purpose to attack as soon as the
wind served; and the night was passed by him in arranging the order
of battle. The enterprise was perilous, not on account of the force
to be engaged, but because of the great difficulties of navigation.
The pilots were mostly mates of merchantmen trading with the Baltic;
and their experience in vessels of three or four hundred tons did
not fit them for the charge of heavy battle-ships. They betrayed
throughout great indecision, and their imperfect knowledge contributed
to the principal mishaps of the day, as well as to a comparative
incompleteness in the results of victory.
The next morning the wind came fair at south-south-east, and at eight
A. M. the British captains were summoned to the flag-ship for their
final instructions. The Danish line to be attacked extended in a
north-west and south-east direction for somewhat over a mile. It was
composed of hulks and floating batteries, eighteen to twenty in number
and mounting 628 guns, of which about 375 would—fighting thus at
anchor—be on the engaged side. The southern flank now to be assailed
was partly supported by works on shore; but from the intervening shoal
water these were too distant for thoroughly efficient fire. Being thus
distinctly weaker than the northern extremity, which was covered by the
Three-Crown Battery and a second line of heavy ships, this southern end
was most properly chosen by the British as the point of their chief
assault for tactical reasons, independently of the strategic advantage
urged by Nelson in thus interposing between the enemy and his allies.
At half-past nine signal was made to weigh. The ships were soon under
sail; but the difficulties of pilotage, despite careful soundings made
during the night by an experienced naval captain, were soon apparent.
The "Agamemnon," of sixty-four guns, was unable to weather the point
of the Middle Ground, and had to anchor out of range. She had no share
in the battle. The "Bellona" and "Russell," seventy-fours, the fourth
and fifth in the order, entered the Channel; but keeping too far to
the eastward they ran ashore on its farther side—upon the Middle
Ground. They were not out of action, but beyond the range of the
most efficient gunnery under the conditions of that period. Nelson's
flag-ship following them passed clear, as did the rest of the heavy
ships; but the loss of these three out of the line prevented by so
much its extension to the northward. The result was to expose that
part of the British order to a weight of fire quite disproportioned to
its strength. A body of frigates very gallantly undertook to fill the
gap, which they could do but inadequately, and suffered heavy loss in
attempting.
The battle was at its height at half-past eleven. There was then no
more manœuvring, but the simple question of efficient gunnery and
endurance. At about two P. M. a great part of the Danish line had
ceased to fire, and the flag-ship "Dannebrog" was in flames. During the
action the Danish crews were frequently re-enforced from the shore;
and the new-comers in several cases, reaching the ships after they had
struck, renewed the fight, either through ignorance or indifference
to the fact. The land batteries also fired on boats trying to take
possession. Nelson seized on this circumstance to bring the affair to a
conclusion. He wrote a letter addressed "To the brothers of Englishmen,
the Danes," and sent it under flag of truce to the Crown Prince, who
was in the city. "Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark when
no longer resisting; but if the firing is continued on the part of
Denmark, Lord Nelson will be obliged to set on fire all the floating
batteries he has taken, without having the power of saving the brave
Danes who have defended them." The letter was sent on shore by a
British officer who had served in the Russian navy and spoke Danish.
The engagement continued until about three P. M., when the whole line
of floating defences south-east of the Crown Batteries had either
struck or been destroyed.
The fortifications were still unharmed, as were the ships west of them
covering the harbor proper; but their fire was stopped by the bearer
of a flag of truce who was bringing to Nelson the reply of the Crown
Prince. The latter demanded the precise purport of the first message.
Nelson took a high hand. He had destroyed the part of the enemy's
line which he had attacked; but it was important now to withdraw his
crippled ships, and with the existing wind that could only be done by
passing the Crown Batteries. Had the three that ran aground been in the
line, it is permissible to believe that that work would have been so
far injured as to be practically harmless; but this was far from the
case. The admiral in his second letter politicly ignored this feature
of the situation. He wrote, "Lord Nelson's object in sending on shore a
flag of truce is humanity;[27] he therefore _consents_ that hostilities
shall cease till Lord Nelson can take his prisoners out of the prizes,
and he consents to land all the wounded Danes and to burn or remove
his prizes. Lord Nelson, with humble duty to His Royal Highness, begs
leave to say that he will ever esteem it the greatest victory he ever
gained, if this flag of truce may be the happy forerunner of a lasting
and happy union between my most gracious Sovereign and His Majesty the
King of Denmark." Having written the letter, he referred the bearer
for definite action to Sir Hyde Parker, who lay some four miles off
in the "London;" foreseeing that the long pull there and back would
give time for the leading ships, which were much crippled, to clear
the shoals, though their course for so doing lay close under the Crown
Batteries. Thus the exposed part of the British fleet was successfully
removed from a dangerous position and rejoined Parker north of the
Middle Ground. The advantage obtained by Nelson's presence of mind
and promptness in gaining this respite was shown by the difficulties
attending the withdrawal. Three out of five ships-of-the-line grounded,
two of which remained fast for several hours a mile from the batteries,
but protected by the truce.
The result of the battle of Copenhagen was to uncover the front of the
city and lay it, with its dockyards and arsenals, open to bombardment.
It was now safe to place the bomb vessels in the King's Channel. It
became a question for Denmark to decide, whether fear of her powerful
allies and zeal for the claims of neutrals should lead her to undergo
further punishment, or whether the suffering already endured and the
danger still threatening were excuse sufficient for abandoning the
coalition. On the other hand, Nelson, who was the brains as well as the
backbone of the British power in the North, cared little, either now or
before the battle, about the attitude of Denmark, except as it deterred
Parker from advancing. Now, as before, his one idea was to get at the
Russian division still locked in Revel by the ice. The negotiations
were carried on by him and resulted in an armistice for fourteen weeks,
after which hostilities could be resumed upon fourteen days' notice.
Thus was assured to Parker for four months the entire immunity he
desired for his communications. Fear of Russia long deterred the Danes
from this concession, which Nelson frankly told them he must have, so
as to be at liberty to act against the Russian fleet and return to
them; and he made it the indispensable requisite to sparing the city.
During the discussions, however, the Crown Prince received news of the
czar's death. Paul I. had been murdered by a body of conspirators on
the night of March 24. The Danish government concealed the tidings;
but the departure of the soul of the confederacy relieved their worst
fears and encouraged them to yield to Nelson's demands.
Denmark's part in the Armed Neutrality was suspended during the
continuance of the armistice; but the British ministers showed
as little appreciation of the military situation as did their
commander-in-chief in the Baltic. "Upon a consideration of all the
circumstances," they wrote to Nelson,[28] "His Majesty has thought fit
to approve the armistice." Nelson was naturally and justly indignant at
this absurdly inadequate understanding of the true nature of services,
concerning whose military character a French naval critic has truly
said that "they will always be in the eyes of seamen his fairest
title to glory. He alone was capable of displaying such boldness and
perseverance; he alone could confront the immense difficulties of that
enterprise and overcome them."[29] But his conduct at Copenhagen,
brilliant as was the display of energy, of daring and of endurance,
was far from exhausting the merits of his Baltic campaign. He had
lifted and carried on his shoulders the dead weight of his superior,
he had clearly read the political as well as the military situation,
and he never for one moment lost sight of the key to both. To bombard
Copenhagen was to his mind a useless piece of vandalism, which would
embitter a nation that ought to be conciliated, and destroy the
only hold Great Britain still had over Denmark.[30] Except for the
necessity of managing his lethargic and cautious commander-in-chief,
we may believe he would never have contemplated it; but under the
circumstances he used the threat as the one means by which he could
extort truce from Denmark and induce Parker to move. With the latter
to handle, the armistice slipped the knot of the military difficulty;
it was the one important point, alongside which every other fell into
insignificance. "My object," he said, "was to get at Revel before the
frost broke up at Cronstadt, that the twelve sail-of-the-line might
be destroyed." Well might St. Vincent write, "Your Lordship's whole
conduct, from your first appointment to this hour, is the subject of
our constant admiration. It does not become me to make comparisons; all
agree there is but one Nelson."
Meantime, while the British fleet had been dallying in the approaches
to the Baltic, important events had occurred, furthering the projects
of Bonaparte in the North and seriously complicating the position of
Great Britain. No formal declaration of war was at any time issued by
the latter country; but its government had not unjustly regarded as
an act of direct hostility the combination of Denmark, Sweden, and
Prussia, to support the czar in a course first undertaken to assure
his claim upon Malta, and in furtherance of which he had seized as
pledges three hundred British merchant vessels with their crews.[31]
As an offset to the British interests thus foreclosed upon by Russia,
and to negotiate upon somewhat equal terms, the government, on the 14th
of January, 1801, ordered an embargo laid upon Russian, Danish, and
Swedish vessels in British ports, and the seizure of merchant ships of
these powers at sea. Of four hundred and fifty Swedish vessels then
abroad, two hundred were detained or brought into British harbors.
They were not, however, condemned as prizes, but held inviolable to
await the issue of the existing difficulties. To the remonstrances of
Sweden and Denmark, supported by Prussia, the British ministry replied
definitely, on the 7th of March, that the embargo would not be revoked
so long as the Powers affected "continued to form part of a confederacy
which had for its object to impose by force on his Majesty a new system
of maritime law, inconsistent with the dignity and independence of his
crown, and the rights and interests of his people."[32] In consequence
of this and of the entrance of the Sound by Parker's fleet, Prussia, on
the 30th of March, and as a measure of retaliation, closed the mouths
of the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems—in other words, the ports of North
Germany—against British commerce, and took possession of the German
states belonging to the king of Great Britain. On the same day a corps
of Danish troops occupied Hamburg, more certainly to stop British trade
therewith.
Thus Bonaparte's conception was completely realized. There was not
only a naval combination against Great Britain, but also an exclusion
of her trade from one of its chief markets. The danger, however, was
much less than it seemed. On the one hand, while the annoyances to
neutral navigation were indisputable, the advantages it drew from the
war were far greater; its interests really demanded peace, even at
the price set by Great Britain. On the other hand, the more important
claims of the great Sea Power, however judged by standards of natural
right, had prescription on their side; and in the case of contraband,
whatever may be thought of classifying naval stores as such, there
was for it a colorable pretext in the fact that France then had no
merchant shipping, except coasters; that naval stores entering her
ports were almost certainly for ships of war; and that it was in
part to the exclusion of such articles that Great Britain owed the
maritime supremacy, which alone among armed forces had successfully
defied Bonaparte. In short, the interest of the Northern states was
to yield the points in dispute, while that of Great Britain was not
to yield; a truth not only asserted by the ministry but conceded in
the main by the opposition. There needed therefore only to throw a
little weight into one scale, or to take a little from the other, to
turn the balance; while the coalition would dissolve entirely either
upon decisive naval operations by Great Britain, or upon the death
of Paul I. The czar was the only person embarked heart and soul in
the Northern quarrel, because the only one deaf to the call of clear
interest. Herein is apparent the crying mistake of intrusting the
conduct of the naval campaign to another than Nelson. The time placidly
consumed by Parker in deliberations and talking would have sufficed his
lieutenant to scour the Baltic, to destroy the Russians at Revel as he
did the Danish line at Copenhagen, and to convince the neutral states
of the hopelessness of the struggle. Fortunately for Great Britain,
the interests of Russian proprietors, which were bound up with British
commerce, and hardly yielded eight years later to restrictions imposed
by the popular Alexander I., rebelled against the measures of a ruler
whose insanity was no longer doubtful. The murder of Paul opened the
way for peace.
Among the first measures of the new czar was the release of the British
seamen imprisoned by his father. This order was dated April 7. On the
12th the British ships entered the Baltic,—much to the surprise of
the Northern Powers, who thought their heavy draught would prevent.
The three-deckers had to remove their guns to pass some shoal ground
ten miles above Copenhagen. After an excursion to intercept a Swedish
fleet said to be at sea, Parker anchored his ships in Kioge Bay,—off
the coast of Zealand just within the entrance to the Baltic,—and
there awaited further instructions from home; the Russian minister
at Copenhagen having informed him that the new czar would not go to
war.[33] Nelson entirely disapproved of this inactive attitude. Russia
might yield the conditions of Great Britain, but she would be more
likely to do so if the British fleet lay off the harbor of Revel. This
seems also to have been the view of the ministry. It received news
of the battle of Copenhagen on April 15, and at about the same date
learned the death of Paul I. Advantage was very properly taken of the
latter to adopt a policy of conciliation. On the 17th orders were
issued to Parker modifying his first instructions. If Alexander removed
the embargo and released the seamen, all hostile movements were to be
suspended. If not, a cessation of hostilities was to be offered, if
Russia were willing to treat; _but upon condition that, until these
ships and men were released, the Revel division should not join that in
Cronstadt, nor vice versâ_.[34] This presumed a position of the British
fleet very different from Kioge Bay, over four hundred miles from Revel.
Four days later, orders were issued relieving Parker and leaving Nelson
in command. Taken as this step was, only a week after the news of a
victory, it can scarcely be construed otherwise than as an implied
censure. To this view an expression of Nelson's lends color. "They
are not Sir Hyde Parker's real friends who wish for an inquiry," he
wrote to a confidential correspondent. "His friends in the fleet wish
everything of this fleet to be forgot, for we all respect and love Sir
Hyde; but the dearer his friends, the more uneasy they have been at
his _idleness,_ for that is the truth—no criminality."[35] The orders
were received on May 5. Nelson's first signal was to hoist the boats
aboard and prepare to weigh. "If Sir Hyde were gone," he wrote the
same afternoon, "I would now be under sail." On the 7th the fleet left
Kioge Bay and on the 12th appeared off Revel. The Russian division had
sailed three days before and was now safe under the guns of Cronstadt.
From Revel Nelson dispatched very complimentary letters to the Russian
minister of foreign affairs, but received in reply the message that
"the only proof of the loyalty of his intentions that the czar could
accept was the prompt withdrawal of his fleet; and that until then no
negotiation could proceed." "I do not believe he would have written
such a letter," said Nelson, "if the Russian fleet had been in
Revel;"[36] but the bird was flown, and with a civil explanation he
withdrew from the port. He still remained in the Baltic, awaiting the
issue of the negotiations; but Russia meant peace, and on the 17th of
May the czar ordered the release of the embargoed British ships. On the
4th of June Great Britain also released the Danes and Swedes detained
in her ports. Russia and Prussia had already agreed, on the 27th of
April, that hostile measures against England should cease, Hamburg and
Hanover be evacuated, and the free navigation of the rivers restored.
On the 17th of June was signed at St. Petersburg a convention between
Russia and Great Britain, settling the points that had been in dispute.
The question of Malta was tacitly dropped. As regards neutral claims
Russia conceded that the neutral flag should not cover enemy's goods;
and while she obtained the formal admission that articles of hostile
origin which had become _bonâ fide_ neutral property were exempt from
seizure, she yielded the very important exception of colonial produce.
This, no matter who the owner, could not by a neutral be carried
direct from the colony to the mother country of a nation at war.[37]
Great Britain, on the other hand, conceded the right of neutrals to
carry on the coasting trade of a belligerent; and that naval stores
should not be classed as contraband of war. The latter was an important
concession, the former probably not, coasting trade being ordinarily
done by small craft especially adapted to the local conditions. As
regards searching merchant vessels under convoy of a ship of war,
Russia yielded the principle and Great Britain accepted methods which
would make the process less offensive. Privateers in such case could
not search. The question was unimportant; for neutral merchant ships
will not lightly submit to the restraint and delays of convoy, and
so lose the chief advantage, that of speed, which they have over
belligerents. When a neutral sees necessary to convoy her merchantmen,
the very fact shows relations already strained.
Sweden and Denmark necessarily followed the course of Russia and
acceded to all the terms of the convention between that court and Great
Britain; Sweden on the 23d of October, 1801, and Denmark on the 30th
of the following March. The claim to carry colonial produce to Europe,
thus abandoned, was of importance to them, though not to Russia. At the
same time the Baltic states renewed among themselves the engagements,
which they had relinquished in their convention with Great Britain,
that the neutral flag should cover enemy's property on board and
that the convoy of a ship of war should exempt merchant vessels from
search. These principles were in point of fact modifications sought to
be introduced into international law, and not prescriptive rights, as
commonly implied by French historians[38] dealing with this question.
For this reason both the United States and the Baltic powers, while
favoring the new rule, were little disposed to attempt by arms to
compel the surrender by Great Britain of a claim sanctioned by long
custom.
Thus had fallen resultless, as far as the objects of the first consul
were concerned, the vast combination against Great Britain which he
had fostered in the North. During its short existence he had actively
pursued in the south of Europe, against Naples and Portugal, other
measures intended further to embarrass, isolate, and cripple the
great Sea Power, and to facilitate throwing much needed supplies and
re-enforcements into Egypt. "The ambassador of the republic," he wrote
in February, 1801, "will make the Spanish ministry understand that we
must at whatsoever cost become masters of the Mediterranean.... France
will have fifteen ships-of-the-line in the Mediterranean before the
equinox; and, if Spain will join to them fifteen others, the English,
who are about to have the ports of Lisbon, Sicily, and Naples closed to
them, will not be able to keep thirty ships in the Mediterranean. That
being so, I doubt not they will evacuate Mahon, being unable to remain
in that sea."[39]
For the closure of the ports Bonaparte relied with good reason upon
his armies; but in the concurrent expectation of uniting thirty French
and Spanish ships he reckoned without his host, as he did also upon
the Russian Black Sea fleet, and the numbers the British must keep
in the Baltic and off Brest. After the armistice with Austria in
Italy, a corps under Murat was pushed toward Naples; and on the same
day that the treaty of Lunéville was concluded, February 9, a truce
for thirty days was signed with the Two Sicilies. This was followed
on the 28th of March by a definitive treaty of peace. Naples engaged
to exclude from all her ports, including those of Sicily, the ships
both of war and commerce belonging to Great Britain and Turkey; while
those of France and her allies, as well as of the Northern powers,
should have free access. She also suffered some slight territorial
loss; but the most significant article was kept secret. The boot of
Italy was to be occupied by a division of twelve or fifteen thousand
French, whom Naples was to pay and support, and to whom were to be
delivered all the maritime fortresses south of the river Ofanto and
east of the Bradano, including the ports of Taranto and Brindisi. "This
occupation," wrote Bonaparte to his war-minister, "is only in order to
facilitate the communications of the army of Egypt with France."[40]
The Neapolitan ports became a refuge for French squadrons; while the
army of occupation stood ready to embark, if any body of ships found
their way to those shores. Unfortunately, the combined British and
Turkish armies had already landed in Egypt, and had won the battle of
Alexandria a week before the treaty with Naples was signed. As a speedy
result the French in Egypt were divided; part being forced back upon
Cairo and part shut up in Alexandria,—while the fleet of Admiral Keith
cruised off the coast.
No French squadron succeeded in carrying to Egypt the desired
re-enforcements, notwithstanding the numerous efforts made by the
first consul. The failure arose from two causes: the penury of the
French arsenals, and the difficulty of a large body of ships escaping
together, or of several small bodies effecting a combination, in face
of the watchfulness of the British. Both troubles were due mainly to
the rigid and methodical system introduced by Earl St. Vincent; who,
fortunately for Great Britain, assumed command of the Channel fleet
at the same time that Bonaparte sought to impress upon the French
navy a more sagacious direction and greater energy of action. His
instructions to Admiral Bruix in February, 1800,[41] were to sail
from Brest with over thirty French and Spanish sail-of-the-line, to
drive the British blockaders from before the port, to relieve Malta,
send a light squadron to Egypt, and then bring his fleet to Toulon,
where it would be favorably placed to control the Mediterranean.
Delay ensuing, owing to lack of supplies and the unwillingness of the
Spaniards, he wrote again at the end of March, "If the equinox passes
without the British fleet dispersing, then, great as is our interest in
raising the blockade of Malta and carrying help to Egypt, they must be
abandoned;"[42] and throughout the summer months he confined his action
to the unremitting efforts, already noticed, to keep a stream of small
vessels constantly moving towards Egypt.
After the autumn equinox Bonaparte again prepared for a grand naval
operation. Admiral Ganteaume was detailed to sail from Brest with
seven ships-of-the-line, carrying besides their crews four thousand
troops and an immense amount of material. "Admiral Ganteaume," wrote
he to Menou, commander-in-chief in Egypt, "brings to your army the
succor we have not before been able to send. He will hand you this
letter." The letter was dated October 29, 1800, but it never reached
its destination. Ganteaume could not get out from Brest till nearly
three months later, when, on January 23d, 1801, a terrible north-east
gale drove off the British squadron and enabled him to put to sea. "A
great imprudence," says Thiers, "but what could be done in presence of
an enemy's fleet which incessantly blockaded Brest in all weathers, and
only retired when cruising became impossible. It was necessary either
never to go out, or to do so in a tempest which should remove the
British squadron." The incident of the sortie, as well as Ganteaume's
subsequent experiences, illustrates precisely the deterrent effect
exercised by St. Vincent's blockades.[43] They could not prevent
occasional escapes, but they did throw obstacles nearly insuperable in
the way of combining and executing any of the major operations of war.
Owing to the weather which had to be chosen for starting, the squadron
was at once dispersed and underwent considerable damage.[44] It was
not all reunited till a week later. On the 9th of February it passed
Gibraltar; but news of its escape had already reached the British
admiral Warren cruising off Cadiz, who followed quickly, entering
Gibraltar only twenty-hours after the French went by. On the 13th of
January Ganteaume captured a British frigate, from which he learned
that the Mediterranean fleet under Lord Keith was then convoying an
army of fifteen thousand British troops against Egypt. He expected
that Warren also would soon be after him, and the injuries received in
the gale weighed upon his mind. Considering all the circumstances, he
decided to abandon Egypt and go to Toulon. Warren remained cruising
in the Mediterranean watching for the French admiral, who twice again
started for his destination. The first time he was obliged to return
by a collision between two ships. The second, an outbreak of disease
compelled him to send back three of the squadron. The other four
reached the African coast some distance west of Alexandria, where
they undertook to land the troops; but Keith's fleet appeared on the
horizon, and, cutting their cables, they made a hasty retreat, without
having effected their object.
Similar misfortune attended Bonaparte's attempt to collect an efficient
force in Cadiz, where Spain had been induced or compelled to yield to
him six ships-of-the-line, and where she herself had some vessels.
To these he intended to send a large detachment from Rochefort under
Admiral Bruix, who was to command the whole, when combined. To
concentrations at any point, however, British squadrons before the
ports whence the divisions were to sail imposed obstacles, which, even
if occasionally evaded, were fatal to the final great design. The
advantage of the central position was consistently realized. On the
other hand, where a great number of ships happened to be together,
as at Brest in 1801, the want of supplies, caused by the same close
watch and by the seizure of naval stores as contraband, paralyzed
their equipment. Finding himself baffled at Brest for these reasons,
the first consul appointed Rochefort for the first concentration. When
the second was effected at Cadiz, Bruix was to hold himself ready for
further operations. If Egypt could not be directly assisted, it might
be indirectly by harassing the British communications. "Every day,"
wrote Bonaparte, "a hundred sails pass the straits under weak convoy,
to supply Malta and the English fleet." If this route were flanked at
Cadiz, by a squadron like that of Bruix, much exertion would be needed
to protect it. But the concentration at Rochefort failed, the ships
from Brest could not get there, and the Rochefort ships themselves
never sailed.
Coincidently with this attempt, another effort was made to strengthen
the force at Cadiz.[45] The three vessels sent back by Ganteaume, after
his second sailing from Toulon, were also ordered to proceed there,
under command of Rear Admiral Linois. Linois successfully reached
the Straits of Gibraltar, but there learned from a prize that seven
British ships were cruising off his destination. These had been sent
with Admiral Saumarez from the Channel fleet, to replace Warren, when
the admiralty learned the active preparations making in Cadiz and the
French ports. Not venturing to proceed against so superior an enemy,
Linois put into Gibraltar Bay, anchoring on the Spanish side under
the guns of Algesiras. Word was speedily sent to Saumarez; and on
July 6, two days after Linois anchored, six British ships were seen
rounding the west point of the bay. They attacked at once; but the
wind was baffling, they could not get their positions, and both flanks
of the French line were supported by shore batteries, which were
efficiently worked by soldiers landed from the squadron. The attack was
repulsed, and one British seventy-four that grounded under a battery
was forced to strike. Saumarez withdrew under Gibraltar and proceeded
to refit; the crews working all day and by watches at night to gain
the opportunity to revenge their defeat. Linois sent to Cadiz for the
help he needed, and on the 10th five Spanish ships-of-the-line and one
French[46] from there anchored off Algesiras. On the 12th they got
under way with Linois's three, and at the same time Saumarez with his
six hauled out from Gibraltar. The allies retreated upon Cadiz, the
British following. During the night the van of the pursuers brought
the hostile rear to action, and a terrible scene ensued. A Spanish
three-decker caught fire, and in the confusion was taken for an enemy
by one of her own fleet of the same class. The two ships, of one
hundred and twelve guns each and among the largest in the world, ran
foul of each other and perished miserably in a common conflagration.
The French "St. Antoine" was captured.
The incident of Saumarez's meeting with Linois has a particular value,
because of the repulse and disaster to the British vessels on the first
occasion. Unvarying success accounts, or seems to account, for itself;
but in this case the advantage of the squadron's position before Cadiz
transpires through a failure on the battle-field. To that position
was due, first, that Linois's detachment could not make its junction;
second, that it was attacked separately and very severely handled;
third, that in the retreat to Cadiz the three French ships were not
in proper condition to engage, although one of them when brought to
action made a very dogged resistance to, and escaped from, an inferior
ship. Consequently, the six British that pursued had only six enemies
instead of nine to encounter. After making allowance for the very
superior quality of the British officers and crews over the Spanish, it
is evident the distinguishing feature in these operations was that the
British squadron brought the enemies' divisions to action separately.
It was able to do so because it had been kept before the hostile port,
interposing between them.
Saumarez had wrung success out of considerable difficulty. The failure
of the wind greatly increased the disadvantage to his vessels, coming
under sail into action with others already drawn up at anchor,
and to whom the loss of spars for the moment meant little. These
circumstances, added to the support of the French by land batteries and
some gunboats, went far to neutralize tactically the superior numbers
of the British. With all deductions, however, the fight at Algesiras
was extremely creditable to Linois. He was a man not only distinguished
for courage, but also of a cautious temper peculiarly fitted to secure
every advantage offered by a defensive position. Despite his success
there, the broad result was decisively in favor of his opponents. "Sir
James Saumarez's action," wrote Lord St. Vincent, "has put us upon
velvet." Seven British had worsted nine enemy's ships, as distinctly
superior, for the most part, in individual force as they were in
numbers. Not only had the Spaniards three of ninety guns and over, and
one of eighty, but two of Linois's were of the latter class, of which
Saumarez had but one. The difference between such and the seventy-fours
was not only in number of pieces, but in weight also. The substantial
issue, however, can be distinguished from the simple victory, and it
was secured not only by superior efficiency but also by strategic
disposition.
Brilliant as was Saumarez's achievement, which Nelson, then in
England, warmly extolled in the House of Lords, the claim made by his
biographer, that to these operations alone was wholly due the defeat
of Bonaparte's plan, is exaggerated. It was arranged, he says, that
when the junction was made, the Cadiz ships should proceed off Lisbon,
sack that place, and destroy British merchantmen lying there; "then,
being re-enforced by the Brest fleet, they were to pass the Straits of
Gibraltar, steer direct for Alexandria, and there land such a body of
troops as would raise the siege and drive the English out of Egypt.
_This would certainly have succeeded_ had the squadron under Linois not
encountered that of Sir James, which led to the total defeat of their
combined fleets and to the abandonment of the grand plan."[47] This
might be allowed to stand as a harmless exhibition of a biographer's
zeal, did it not tend to obscure the true lesson to be derived from
this whole naval period, by attributing to a single encounter, however
brilliant, results due to an extensive, well-conceived general
system. Sir James Saumarez's operations were but an epitome of an
action going on everywhere from the Baltic to Egypt. By this command
of the sea the British fleets, after they had adopted the plan of
close-watching the enemy's ports, held everywhere interior positions,
which, by interposing between the hostile detachments, facilitated
beating them in detail. For the most part this advantage of position
resulted in quietly detaining the enemy in port, and so frustrating his
combinations. It was Saumarez's good fortune to illustrate how it could
also enable a compact body of highly disciplined ships to meet in rapid
succession two parts of a force numerically very superior, and by the
injuries inflicted on each neutralize the whole for a definite time.
But, had he never seen Linois, Bonaparte's plan still required the
junctions from Rochefort and Brest which were never effected.
By naval combinations and by holding the Neapolitan ports Bonaparte
sought to preserve Egypt and force Great Britain to peace. "The
question of maritime peace," he wrote to Ganteaume,[48] "hangs now upon
the English expedition to Egypt." Portugal, the ancient ally of Great
Britain, was designed to serve other purposes of his policy,—to furnish
equivalents, with which to wrest from his chief enemy the conquests
that the sea power of France and her allies could not touch. "Notify
our minister at Madrid," wrote he to Talleyrand, September 30, 1800,
"that the Spanish troops must be masters of Portugal before October 15.
This is the only means by which we can have an equivalent for Malta,
Mahon, and Trinidad. Besides, the danger of Portugal will be keenly
felt in England, and will by so much quicken her disposition to peace."
A secret treaty ceding Louisiana to France, in return for Tuscany
to the Spanish infante, had been signed the month before; and Spain
at the same time undertook to bring Portugal to break with Great
Britain. Solicitation proving ineffectual, Bonaparte in the spring
again demanded the stronger measure of an armed occupation of the
little kingdom; growing more urgent as it became evident that Egypt
was slipping from his grasp. Spain finally agreed to invade Portugal,
and accepted the co-operation of a French corps. The first consul
purposed to occupy at least three of the Portuguese provinces;
but he was outwitted by the adroitness of the Spanish government,
unwillingly submissive to his pressure, and by the compliance of his
brother Lucien, French minister to Madrid. Portugal made no efficient
resistance; and the two peninsular courts quickly reached an agreement,
by which the weaker closed her ports to Great Britain, paid twenty
million francs to France, and ceded a small strip of territory to Spain.
Bonaparte was enraged at this treaty, which was ratified without
giving him a chance to interfere;[49] but in the summer of 1801 his
diplomatic game reached a stage where further delay was impossible.
He saw that the loss of Egypt was only a question of time; but so
long as any French troops held out there it was a card in his hand,
too valuable to risk for the trifling gain of a foothold in Portugal.
"The English are not masters of Egypt," he writes boldly on the 23d
of July to the French agent in London. "We have certain news that
Alexandria can hold out a year, and Lord Hawkesbury knows that Egypt is
in Alexandria;"[50] but four days later he sends the hopeless message
to Murat, "There is no longer any question of embarking"[51] the troops
about Taranto, sent there for the sole purpose of being nearer to
Egypt.[52] He continues, in sharp contrast with his former expectation,
"The station of the troops upon the Adriatic is intended to impose upon
the Turks and the English, and to serve as material for compensation
to the latter by evacuating those provinces." Both Naples and Portugal
were too distant, too ex-centric, and thrust too far into contact with
the British dominion of the sea to be profitably, or even safely,
held by France in her condition of naval debility; a truth abundantly
witnessed by the later events of Napoleon's reign, by the disastrous
occupation of Portugal in 1807, by the reverses of Soult and Masséna
in 1809 and 1811, and by the failure even to attempt the conquest of
Sicily.
Russia and Prussia had grown less friendly since the death of Paul.
Even their agreement that Hanover should be evacuated, disposed as they
now were to please Great Britain, was to be postponed until "it was
ascertained that a certain power would not occupy that country;"[53]
a stipulation which betrayed the distrust felt by both. Since then
each had experienced evasions and rebuffs showing the unwillingness of
the first consul to meet their wishes in his treatment of the smaller
states; and they suspected, although they did not yet certainly know,
the steps already taken to incorporate with France regions to whose
independence they held.[54] Both were responding to the call of their
interests, beneficially and vitally connected with the sea power of
Great Britain, and threatened on the Continent by the encroaching
course of the French ruler. Bonaparte felt that the attempt to make
further gains in Europe, with which to traffic against those of Great
Britain abroad, might arouse resistance in these great powers, not yet
exhausted like Austria, and so indefinitely postpone the maritime peace
essential to the revival of the French navy and the re-establishment
of the colonial system; both at this time objects of prime importance
in his eyes. Thus it was that, beginning the year 1801 without a
single ally, in face of the triumphant march of the French armies and
of a formidable maritime combination, the Sea Power of Great Britain
had dispersed the Northern coalition, commanded the friendship of the
great states, retained control of the Mediterranean, reduced Egypt to
submission, and forced even the invincible Bonaparte to wish a speedy
cessation of hostilities.
The great aim of the first consul now was to bring Great Britain
to terms before news of the evacuation of Alexandria could come to
hand. Negotiations had been slowly progressing for nearly six months;
the first advances having been made on the 21st of March by the new
ministry which came into power upon Pitt's resignation. Both parties
being inclined to peace, the advantage necessarily belonged to the man
who, untrammelled by associates in administration, held in absolute
control the direction of his country. The Addington ministry, hampered
by its own intrinsic weakness and by the eagerness of the nation,
necessarily yielded before the iron will of one who was never more firm
in outward bearing than in the most critical moments. He threatened
them with the occupation of Hanover; he intimated great designs for
which troops were embarked at Rochefort, Brest, Toulon, Cadiz, and
ready to embark in Holland; he boasted that Alexandria could hold out
yet a year. Nevertheless, although the terms were incontestably more
advantageous to France than to Great Britain, the government of the
latter insisted upon and obtained one concession, that of Trinidad,
which Bonaparte at first withheld.[55] His eagerness to conclude was in
truth as great as their own, though better concealed. Finally, he sent
on the 17th of September an ultimatum, and added, "If preliminaries are
not signed by the 10th of Vendémiaire (October 2), the negotiations
will be broken." "You will appreciate the importance of this clause,"
he wrote confidentially to the French envoy, "when you reflect that
Menou may possibly not be able to hold in Alexandria beyond the first
of Vendémiaire, that at this season the winds are fair to come from
Egypt, and ships reach Italy and Trieste in very few days. Thus it
is essential to push them to a finish before Vendémiaire 10;" that
is, before they learn the fall of Alexandria. The question of terms,
as he had said before, hinged on Egypt. The envoy, however, was
furnished with a different but plausible reason. "Otto can give them
to understand that from our inferiority at sea and our superiority on
land the campaign begins for us in winter, and therefore I do not wish
to remain longer in this stagnation."[56] Whatever motives influenced
the British ministry, it is evident that Bonaparte was himself in a
hurry for peace. The preliminaries were signed in London on the first
of October, 1801.
The conditions are easily stated. Of all her conquests, Great Britain
retained only the islands of Ceylon in the East Indies and Trinidad in
the West. How great this concession, will be realized by enumerating
the chief territories thus restored to their former owners. These were,
in the Mediterranean, Elba, Malta, Minorca; in the West Indies, Tobago,
Santa Lucia, Martinique, and the extensive Dutch possessions in Guiana;
in Africa, the Cape of Good Hope; and in India, the French and Dutch
stations in the peninsula. France consented to leave to Portugal her
possessions entire, to withdraw her troops from the kingdom of Naples
and the Roman territory, and to acknowledge the independence of the
Republic of the Seven Islands. Under this name the former Venetian
islands, Corfu and others—given to France by the treaty of Campo
Formio—had, after their conquest in 1799 by the fleets of Russia and
Turkey, been constituted into an independent state under the guarantee
of those two powers. Their deliverance from France was considered an
important security to the Turkish Empire. The capitulation of the
French troops in Alexandria was not yet known in England; and the
preliminaries merely stipulated the return of Egypt to the Porte,
whose dominions were to be preserved as they existed before the war.
Malta, restored to the Knights of St. John, was to be freed from
all French or British influence and placed under the guarantee of a
third Power. Owing to the decay of the Order, the disposition of this
important naval station, secretly coveted by both parties, was the most
difficult matter to arrange satisfactorily. In the definitive treaty
its status was sought to be secured by a cumbrous set of provisions,
occupying one third of the entire text; and the final refusal of Great
Britain to evacuate, until satisfaction was obtained for what she
claimed to be violations of the spirit of the engagements between the
two countries, became the test question upon which hinged the rupture
of this short-lived peace.
As the first article of the preliminaries stipulated that upon their
ratification hostilities in all parts of the world, by sea and land,
should cease, they were regarded in both Great Britain and France as
equivalent to a definitive treaty; the postponement of the latter
being only to allow the negotiators time to settle the details of the
intricate agreements, thus broadly outlined, without prolonging the
sufferings of war. To France they could not but be acceptable. She
regained much, and gave up nothing that she could have held without
undue and often useless exertion. In Great Britain the general joy was
marred by the severe, yet accurate, condemnation passed upon the terms
by a body of exceptionally able men, drawn mainly from the ranks of the
Pitt cabinet, although their leader gave his own approval. They pointed
out, clearly and indisputably, that the disparity between the material
gains of Great Britain and France was enormous, disproportionate to
their relative advantages at the time of signature, and not to be
reconciled with that security which had been the professed object
of the struggle. They asserted with little exaggeration that the
conditions were for France to hold what she had, and for Great Britain
to recede to her possessions before the war. They predicted with fatal
accuracy the speedy renewal of hostilities, under the disadvantage of
having lost by the peace important positions not easy to be regained.
The ministry had little to reply. To this or that item of criticism
exception might be taken; but in the main their defence was that by
the failure of their allies no hope remained of contesting the power
of France on the Continent, and that Trinidad and Ceylon were very
valuable acquisitions. Being insular, they were controlled by the
nation ruling the sea, while, from their nearness to the mainlands of
South America and of India, they were important as depots of trade,
as well as for strategic reasons. The most assuring argument was put
forward by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had negotiated the
preliminaries. At the beginning of the war Great Britain had 135
ships-of-the-line and 133 frigates; at its close she had 202 of the
former and 277 of the latter. France had begun with 80 of the line and
66 frigates, and ended with 39 and 35 respectively. However the first
consul might exert himself, Lord Hawkesbury justly urged that the
British might allow him many years labor and then be willing to chance
a maritime war.[57]
Material advantages such as had thus been given up undoubtedly
contribute to security. In surrendering as much as she did abroad,
while France retained such extensive gains upon the Continent and
acquired there such a preponderating influence, Great Britain, which
had so large a stake in the European commonwealth, undoubtedly incurred
a serious risk. The shortness of the peace, and the disquieting
disputes which arose throughout it, sufficiently prove this.
Nevertheless, could contemporaries accurately read the signs of their
times, Englishmen of that day need not have been dissatisfied with
the general results of the war. A long stage had been successfully
traversed towards the final solution of a great difficulty. In 1792 the
spirit of propagating revolution by violence had taken possession of
the French nation as a whole. As Napoleon has strikingly remarked, "It
was part of the political religion of the France of that day to make
war in the name of principles."[58] "The Montagnards and the Jacobins,"
says the republican historian Henri Martin, the bitter censurer of
Bonaparte, "were resolved, like the Girondists, to propagate afar, by
arms, the principles of the Revolution; and they hoped, by hurling a
defiance at all kings, to put France in the impossibility of recoiling
or stopping herself."[59] Such a design could be checked only by
raising up against it a barrier of physical armed opposition. This
had been effected and maintained chiefly by the Sea Power of Great
Britain, the prime agent and moving spirit, directly through her navy,
indirectly through the subsidies drawn from her commerce; and the
latter had nearly doubled while carrying on this arduous and extensive
war. In 1801 the aggressive tendencies of the French nation, as a
whole, were exhausted. So far as they still survived, they were now
embodied in and dependent upon a single man, in which shape they were
at once more distinctly to be recognized and more odious. They were
also less dangerous; because the power of one man, however eminent for
genius, is far less for good or evil than the impulse of a great people.
The British statesmen of that day did not clearly distinguish this
real nature of their gains, though they did intuitively discern the
true character of the struggle in which they were engaged. As is
not infrequent with intuitions, the reasoning by which they were
supported was often faulty; but Pitt's formulation of the objects of
Great Britain in the one word "security" was substantially correct.
Security was her just and necessary aim, forced upon her by the
circumstances of the Revolution,—security not for herself alone, but
for the community of states of which she was an important member. This
was threatened with anarchy through the lawless spirit with which
the French leaders proposed to force the spread of principles and
methods, many of them good as well as many bad, but for whose healthful
development were demanded both time and freedom of choice, which they
in their impatience were unwilling to give. "Security," said Pitt in
his speech upon the preliminaries, "was our great object; there were
different means of accomplishing it, with better or worse prospects
of success; and according to the different variations of policy
occasioned by a change of circumstances, we still pursued our great
object, Security. In order to obtain it we certainly did look for the
subversion of that government founded upon revolutionary principles....
We have the satisfaction of knowing that we have survived the violence
of the revolutionary fever, and we have seen the extent of its
principles abated. We have seen Jacobinism deprived of its fascination;
we have seen it stripped of the name and pretext of liberty; it has
shown itself to be capable only of destroying, not of building, and
that it must necessarily end in a military despotism."[60] Such, in
truth, was the gain of the first war of Great Britain with the French
Revolution. It was, however, but a stage in the progress; there
remained still another, of warfare longer, more bitter, more furious,—a
struggle for the mastery, whose end was not to be seen by the chief
leaders of the one preceding it.