From the descriptions of warships usually published, it would
naturally be inferred that the determination of their various
qualities concern primarily the naval architect and the marine
engineer. This is an error. Warships exist for war. Their powers,
being for the operations of war, are military necessities, the
appreciation of which, and the consequent qualities demanded, are
military questions. Only when these have been decided, upon military
reasons, begins the office of the technologist; namely, to produce the
qualities prescribed by the sea officer. An eminent British naval
architect used to say, "I hold that it is the part of the naval
officers to tell us just what qualities--speed, gun-power, armor, coal
endurance, etc.--are required in a ship to be built, and then leave it
to us to produce the ship." These words distinguish accurately and
summarily the functions of the military and the technical experts in
the development of navies. It is from the military standpoint, solely,
that this article is written.
The military function of a navy is to control the sea, so far as the
sea contributes to the maintenance of the war. The sea is the theatre
of naval war; it is the field in which the naval campaign is waged;
and, like other fields of military operations, it does not resemble a
blank sheet of paper, every point of which is equally important with
every other point. Like the land, the sea, as a military field, has
its important centres, and it is not controlled by spreading your
force, whatever its composition, evenly over an entire field of
operations, like butter over bread, but by occupying the centres with
aggregated forces--fleets or armies--ready to act in masses, in
various directions from the centres. This commonplace of warfare is
its first principle. It is called concentration, because the forces
are not spread out, but drawn together at the centres which for the
moment are most important.
Concentrated forces, therefore, are those upon which warfare depends
for efficient control, and for efficient energy in the operations of
war. They have two chief essential characteristics: force, which is
gained by concentration of numbers; and mobility, which is the ability
to carry the force rapidly, as well as effectively, from the centre to
any point of the outlying field where action, offensive or defensive,
becomes necessary. It is essential to keep in mind both these factors,
and to study them in their true mutual relations of priority, in order
and in importance,--force first, mobility second; for the force does
not exist for the mobility, but the mobility for the force, which it
subserves. Force without mobility is useful; even though limited, as
in coast fortifications; mobility without force is almost useless for
the greater purposes of war. Consequently, when it is found, as is
frequently the case, that one must yield somewhat, in order to the
full development of the other, it is extreme mobility, extreme speed,
which must give way to greater force.
This caution may seem superfluous, but it is not so; for in the
popular fancy, and in the appreciation of the technical expert, and
to some extent also in the official mind as well,--owing to that
peculiar fad of the day which lays all stress on machinery,--mobility,
speed, is considered the most important characteristic in every kind
of ship of war. Let the reader ask himself what is the most pronounced
impression left upon his mind by newspaper accounts of a new ship. Is
it not that she is expected to make so many knots? Compared with that,
what does the average man know of the fighting she can do, when she
has reached the end of that preposterously misleading performance
called her trial trip? The error is of the nature of a half-truth, the
most dangerous of errors; for it is true that, as compared with land
forces, the great characteristic of navies is mobility; but it is not
true that, between different classes of naval vessels, the swiftest
are the most efficient for control of the sea. Force is for that the
determining element.
Keeping these relations of force and mobility constantly in mind,
there is a further consideration, easily evident, but which needs to
be distinctly stated and remembered. When a ship is once built, she
cannot be divided. If you have on land concentrated ten thousand men,
you can detach any fraction of them you wish for a particular purpose;
you can send one man or ten, or a company, or a regiment. You can, in
short, make of them any fresh combination you choose. With ships, the
least you can send is one ship, and the smallest you have may be more
than you wish to spare. From this (as well as for other reasons)
arises a necessity for ships of different classes and sizes, which
must be determined beforehand. The determination must be reached not
merely by _a priori_ reasoning, as though the problem were wholly new;
but regard must be had to the experience of the past,--to the teaching
of history. History is experience, and as such underlies progress,
just as the cognate idea, experiment, underlies scientific advance.
Both history and reasoning, of the character already outlined in these
papers, concur in telling us that control of the sea is exercised by
vessels individually very large for their day, concentrated into
bodies called fleets, stationed at such central points as the
emergency demands. Our predecessors of the past two centuries called
these vessels "ships of the line of battle," from which probably
derives our briefer modern name "battleship," which is appropriate
only if the word "battle" be confined to fleet actions.
Among the naval entities, fleets are at once the most powerful and the
least mobile; yet they are the only really determining elements in
naval war. They are the most powerful, because in them are
concentrated many ships, each of which is extremely strong for
fighting. They are the least mobile, because many ships, which must
keep together, can proceed only at the rate of the slowest among them.
It is natural to ask why not build them all equally fast? The reply
is, it is possible to do so within very narrow limits, but it is not
possible to keep them so. Every deterioration, accident, or adverse
incident, which affects one involves all, as regards speed, though not
as regards fighting force. In our recent war, when an extensive
operation was contemplated, the speed of one battleship reduced the
calculated speed of the fleet by one knot,--one sea mile per hour.
But, it may be urged, will not your slowest speed be much increased,
if every vessel be originally faster? Doubtless; but speed means
tonnage,--part of the ship's weight devoted to engines; and weight, if
given to speed, is taken from other qualities; and if, to increase
speed, you reduce fighting power, you increase something you cannot
certainly hold, at the expense of something at once much more
important and more constant--less liable to impairment. In the
operation just cited the loss of speed was comparatively of little
account; but the question of fighting force upon arrival was serious.
An escape from this dilemma is sought by the advocates of very high
speed for battleships by increasing the size of the individual ship.
If this increase of size is accompanied by increase of speed, but not
proportionately of fighting power, the measure, in the opinion of the
writer, stands self-condemned. But, granting that force gains equally
with speed, there is a further objection already mentioned. The
exigencies of war demand at times division, as well as concentration;
and, in fact, concentration, properly understood, does not mean
keeping ships necessarily within sight of one another, but so disposed
that they can unite readily at will,--a consideration which space
forbids me more than to state. Now, a big ship cannot be divided into
two; or, more pertinently, eight ships cannot be made into ten when
you want two bodies of five each. The necessity, or supposed
necessity, of maintaining the Flying Squadron at Hampton Roads during
the late hostilities exactly illustrates this idea. Under all the
conditions, this disposition was not wholly false to concentration,
rightly considered; but had the ships been fewer and bigger, it could
not have been made.
The net result, therefore, of the argument, supported, as the writer
believes, by the testimony of history, is: (1) that a navy which
wishes to affect decisively the issues of a maritime war must be
composed of heavy ships--"battleships"--possessing a maximum of
fighting power, and so similar in type as to facilitate that
uniformity of movement and of evolution upon which concentration, once
effected, must depend for its maintenance, whether during a passage or
in actual engagement; (2) that in such ships, regarded as fighting
factors, which is their primary function, size is limited, as to the
minimum, by the advisability of concentrating as much fighting power
as possible under the hand of a single captain; but, on the other
hand, size is also limited, as to its maximum, by the need of
retaining ability to subdivide the whole fleet, according to
particular exigencies; (3) as regards that particular form of mobility
called speed, the writer regards it as distinctly secondary for the
battleship; that, to say the least, the present proportions of weight
assigned to fighting force should not be sacrificed to obtain increase
of speed. Neither should the size of the individual ships be increased
merely to obtain rates of speed higher than that already shown by some
of our present battleships.
Concerning that particular function of mobility which is called coal
endurance,--that is, the ability to steam a certain distance without
stopping to recoal,--the convenience to military operations of such a
quality is evident; but it is obvious that it cannot, with the fuels
now available, be possessed beyond very narrow limits. A battleship
that can steam the greatest distance that separates two fortified
coaling stations of her nation, with a reasonable margin above that to
meet emergencies, will evidently be able to remain for a long while
with the fleet, when this is concentrated to remain under reduced
steam at a particular point. The recoaling of ships is a difficulty
which must be met by improving the methods of that operation, not by
sacrificing the military considerations which should control the size
and other qualities of the vessel.
It is the belief of the writer that ten thousand tons represent very
nearly the minimum, and twelve thousand the maximum, of size for the
battleship. Our present battleships fall within those limits, and,
although less uniform in their qualities than might be desired, they
give perfectly satisfactory indications that the requisite qualities
can all be had without increase of size. When more is wanted--and we
should always be striving for perfection--it should be sought in the
improvement of processes, and not in the adding of ton to ton, like a
man running up a bill. It is the difference between economy and
extravagance. Into battleships such as these should go the greater
proportion of the tonnage a nation gives to its navy. Ships so
designed may reach the ground of action later than those which have
more speed; but when they arrive, the enemy, if of weaker fighting
power, must go, and what then has been the good of their speed? War
is won by holding on, or driving off; not by successful running away.
An important consideration in determining the necessary composition of
a navy is the subdivision of fighting power into offensive and
defensive. The latter is represented chiefly by armor, the former by
guns; although other factors contribute to both. The relative
importance of the two depends upon no mere opinion of the writer, but
upon a consensus of authority practically unanimous, and which,
therefore, demands no argument, but simple statement. Offensive
action--not defensive--determines the issues of war. "The best defence
against the enemy's fire is a rapid fire from our own guns," was a
pithy phrase of our Admiral Farragut; and in no mere punning sense it
may be added that it is for this reason that the rapid-fire gun of the
present day made such big strides in professional favor, the instant
it was brought to the test of battle. The rapid-fire gun is smaller
than the great cannon mounted in the turrets; but, while the latter
have their proper usefulness, the immensely larger number of
projectiles fired in a given time, and valid against the target
presented to them, makes the rapid-fire battery a much stronger
weapon, offensively, than the slow-acting giants. Here is the great
defect of the monitor, properly so-called; that is, the low-freeboard
monitor. Defensively, the monitor is very strong; offensively, judged
by present-day standards, it is weak, possessing the heavy cannon, but
deficient in rapid fire. Consequently, its usefulness is limited
chiefly to work against fortifications,--a target exceptional in
resistance, and rarely a proper object for naval attack. It is the
opinion of the writer that no more monitors should be built, except as
accessory to the defence of those harbors where submarine mines cannot
be depended upon,--as at San Francisco and Puget Sound. It should be
added that the monitor at sea rolls twice as rapidly as the
battleship, which injuriously affects accuracy of aim; that is,
offensive power.
The general principle of the decisive superiority of offensive power
over defensive is applicable throughout,--to the operations of a war,
to the design of a battleship, to the scheme of building a whole navy.
It is to the erroneous belief in mere defence that we owe much of the
faith in the monitor, and some of the insistence upon armor; while the
cry that went up for local naval defence along our coast, when war
threatened in the spring of 1898, showed an ignorance of the first
principles of warfare, which, if not resisted, would have left us
impotent even before Spain.
Brief mention only can be given to the other classes of vessels needed
by the navy. Concerning them, one general remark must be made. They
are subsidiary to the fighting fleet, and represent rather that
subdivision of a whole navy which is opposed to the idea of
concentration, upon which the battleship rests. As already noted, a
built ship cannot be divided; therefore, battleships must be
supplemented by weaker or smaller vessels, to perform numerous
detached and often petty services.
From this characteristic of detachment--often singly--important
engagements will rarely be fought by these smaller vessels. Therefore,
in them fighting power declines in relative importance, and speed, to
perform their missions, increases in proportion. As their essential
use is not to remain at the centres, but to move about, they are
called generically cruisers, from the French word _croiser_,--to
cross. They cross back and forth, they rove the sea,--despatch boats,
lookouts, scouts, or raiders. They are the cavalry of the fleet.
Prominent among these in modern navies is the so-called "armored"
cruiser,--a type to which belonged the four principal vessels of
Cervera's squadron. The name itself is interesting, as indicating the
inveterate tendency of mankind to straddle,--the reluctance to choose
one of two opposite things, and frankly to give up the other. Armor,
being an element of fighting power, belongs properly to the battleship
rather than the cruiser; and in the latter, if the weight spent in
armor detracts from speed or coal endurance, it contravenes the
leading idea of a cruiser,--mobility. But, while the name is
incongruous, the type has its place as an armored vessel, though not
as a cruiser. In our service at least--where it is represented by the
_New York_ and the _Brooklyn_--it is practically a second-class
battleship, in which weight taken from fighting power is given to
enginery and to speed. The advantage arising from this is purely
tactical; that is, it comes into play only when in touch with the
enemy. The armored cruiser belongs with the fleet, therefore her
superior speed does not tell in making passages; but when fleets are
in presence, or in the relative conditions of chase and pursuit, there
is an advantage in being able to throw to the front, rear, or flanks,
vessels which on a pinch can either fight or fly. This, be it noted in
passing, is no new thing, but as old as naval history. A squadron of
fast battleships of the day, thrown to the front of a fleet to harass
the flanks of the enemy, is a commonplace of naval tactics, alike of
galleys and sailing ships. Off Santiago, the _New York_ and _Brooklyn_
were, by Admiral Sampson, placed on the flanks of his squadron.
Whichever way Cervera turned he would find a vessel of speed and
fighting power equal to those of his own ships. Though unequal in
fighting power to a first-class battleship, many circumstances may
arise which would justify the armored cruiser in engaging one,
provided her own fleet was in supporting distance. From their hybrid
type, and from the exceptional circumstances under which they can be
used, the tonnage put into these vessels should be but a small
percentage of that given to the battle fleet, to which, and not to the
cruisers, they really belong.
Concerning all other cruisers, mobility, represented in speed and coal
endurance, is the chief requisite. Notwithstanding occasional
aberrations in the past, the development of the cruiser classes may be
safely entrusted by the public to the technical experts; provided it
be left to naval officers, military men, to say what qualities should
predominate. Moreover, as such vessels generally act singly, it is of
less importance that they vary much in type, and the need of
subdivision carries with it that of numerous sizes; but battleships,
including armored cruisers, are meant to work together, and insistence
should be made upon homogeneousness, especially in manoeuvring
qualities.
To sum up: the attention of the public should be centred upon the
armored fleet, to which the bulk of expenditure should be devoted; the
monitor, pure and simple,--save for very exceptional uses,--should be
eliminated; the development of the true cruiser,--not armored,--both
in type and in numbers, does not require great interest of the
public; much of the duties of this class, also, can be discharged
fairly well by purchased vessels, although such will never have the
proportion of fighting power which every type of ship of war should
possess. As a rule, it is undesirable that a military force, land or
sea, should have to retreat before one of equal size, as auxiliary
cruisers often would.