THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO THEIR NEW DEPENDENCIES

In modern times there have been two principal colonizing nations,

which not merely have occupied and administered a great transmarine

domain, but have impressed upon it their own identity--the totality of

their political and racial characteristics--to a degree that is likely

to affect permanently the history of the world at large.

These two nations, it is needless to say, are Great Britain and Spain.

Russia, their one competitor, differs from them in that her sustained

advance over alien regions is as wholly by land as theirs has been by

sea. France and Holland have occupied and administered, and continue

to occupy and administer, large extents of territory; but it is

scarcely necessary to argue that in neither case has the race

possessed the land, nor have the national characteristics been

transmitted to the dwellers therein as a whole. They have realized,

rather, the idea recently formulated by Mr. Benjamin Kidd for the

development of tropical regions,--administration from without.

The unexpected appearance of the United States as in legal control of

transmarine territory, which as yet they have not had opportunity

either to occupy or to administer, coincides in time with the final

downfall of Spain's colonial empire, and with a stage in the upward

progress of that of Great Britain, so marked, in the contrast it

presents to the ruin of Spain, as to compel attention and comparison,

with an ultimate purpose to draw therefrom instruction for the United

States in the new career forced upon them. The larger colonies of

Great Britain are not indeed reaching their majority, for that they

did long ago; but the idea formulated in the phrase "imperial

federation" shows that they, and the mother country herself, have

passed through and left behind the epoch when the accepted thought in

both was that they should in the end separate, as sons leave the

father's roof, to set up, each for himself. To that transition phase

has succeeded the ideal of partnership, more complex indeed and

difficult of attainment, but trebly strong if realized. The terms of

partnership, the share of each member in the burdens and in the

profits, present difficulties which will delay, and may prevent, the

consummation; time alone can show. The noticeable factor in this

change of mind, however, is the affectionate desire manifested by both

parent and children to ensure the desired end. Between nations long

alien we have high warrant for saying that interest alone determines

action; but between communities of the same blood, and when the ties

of dependence on the one part are still recent, sentiments--love and

mutual pride--are powerful, provided there be good cause for them. And

good cause there is. Since she lost what is now the United States,

Great Britain has become benevolent and beneficent to her colonies.

It is not in colonies only, however, that Great Britain has been

beneficent to weaker communities; nor are benevolence and beneficence

the only qualities she has shown. She has been strong also,--strong in

her own interior life, whence all true strength issues; strong in the

quality of the men she has sent forth to colonize and to administer;

strong to protect by the arm of her power, by land, and, above all, by

sea. The advantage of the latter safeguard is common to all her

dependencies; but it is among subject and alien races, and not in

colonies properly so called, that her terrestrial energy chiefly

manifests itself, to control, to protect, and to elevate. Of these

functions, admirably discharged in the main, India and Egypt are the

conspicuous illustrations. In them she administers from without, and

cannot be said to colonize, for the land was already full.

Conspicuous result constitutes example: for imitation, if honorable;

for warning, if shameful. Experience is the great teacher, and is at

its best when personal; but in the opening of a career such experience

is wanting to the individual, and must be sought in the record of

other lives, or of other nations. The United States are just about to

enter on a task of government--of administration--over regions which,

in inhabitants, in climate, and in political tradition, differ

essentially from themselves. What are the conditions of success?

We have the two great examples. Great Britain has been, in the main,

and increasingly, beneficent and strong. Spain, from the very first,

as the records show, was inhumanly oppressive to the inferior races;

and, after her own descendants in the colonies became aliens in habit

to the home country, she to them also became tyrannically exacting.

But, still more, Spain became weaker and weaker as the years passed,

the tyranny of her extortions being partially due to exigencies of her

political weakness and to her economical declension. Let us, however,

not fail to observe that the beneficence, as well as the strength, of

Great Britain has been a matter of growth. She was not always what she

now is to the alien subject. There is, therefore, no reason to

despair, as some do, that the United States, who share her traditions,

can attain her success. The task is novel to us; we may make blunders;

but, guided by her experience, we should reach the goal more quickly.

And it is to our interest to do so. Enlightened self-interest demands

of us to recognize not merely, and in general, the imminence of the

great question of the farther East, which is rising so rapidly before

us, but also, specifically, the importance to us of a strong and

beneficent occupation of adjacent territory. In the domain of color,

black and white are contradictory; but it is not so with self-interest

and beneficence in the realm of ideas. This paradox is now too

generally accepted for insistence, although in the practical life of

states the proper order of the two is too often inverted. But, where

the relations are those of trustee to ward, as are those of any state

which rules over a weaker community not admitted to the full

privileges of home citizenship, the first test to which measures must

be brought is the good of the ward. It is the first interest of the

guardian, for it concerns his honor. Whatever the part of the United

States in the growing conflict of European interests around China and

the East, we deal there with equals, and may battle like men; but our

new possessions, with their yet minor races, are the objects only of

solicitude.

Ideas underlie action. If the paramount idea of beneficence becomes a

national conviction, we may stumble and err, we may at times sin, or

be betrayed by unworthy representatives; but we shall advance

unfailingly. I have been asked to contribute to the discussion of this

matter something from my own usual point of view; which is, of

course, the bearing of sea power upon the security and the progress of

nations. Well, one great element of sea power, which, it will be

remembered, is commercial before it is military, is that there be

territorial bases of action in the regions important to its commerce.

That is self-interest. But the history of Spain's decline, and the

history of Great Britain's advance,--in the latter of which the stern

lesson given by the revolt of the United States is certainly a

conspicuous factor, as also, perhaps, the other revolt known as the

Indian Mutiny, in 1857,--alike teach us that territories beyond the

sea can be securely held only when the advantage and interests of the

inhabitants are the primary object of the administration. The

inhabitants may not return love for their benefits,--comprehension or

gratitude may fail them; but the sense of duty achieved, and the

security of the tenure, are the reward of the ruler.

I have understood also that, through the pages of "The Engineering

Magazine," I should speak to the men who stand at the head of the

great mechanical industries of the country,--the great inventors and

the leaders in home development,--and that they would be willing to

hear me. But what can I say to them that they do not know? Their own

businesses are beyond my scope and comprehension. The opportunities

offered by the new acquisitions of the United States to the pursuits

with which they are identified they can understand better than I.

Neither is it necessary to say that adequate--nay, great--naval

development is a condition of success, although such an assertion is

more within my competence, as a student of navies and of history. That

form of national strength which is called sea power becomes now doubly

incumbent. It is needed not merely for national self-assertion, but

for beneficence; to ensure to the new subjects of the nation peace and

industry, uninterrupted by wars, the great protection against which is

preparation--to use that one counsel of Washington's which the

anti-imperialist considers to be out of date.

I have, therefore, but one thing which I have not already often said

to offer to such men, who affect these great issues through their own

aptitudes and through their far-reaching influence upon public

opinion, which they touch through many channels. Sea power, as a

national interest, commercial and military, rests not upon fleets

only, but also upon local territorial bases in distant commercial

regions. It rests upon them most securely when they are extensive, and

when they have a numerous population bound to the sovereign country by

those ties of interest which rest upon the beneficence of the ruler;

of which beneficence power to protect is not the least factor. Mere

just dealing and protection, however, do not exhaust the demands of

beneficence towards alien subjects, still in race-childhood. The firm

but judicious remedying of evils, the opportunities for fuller and

happier lives, which local industries and local development afford,

these also are a part of the duty of the sovereign power. Above all,

there must be constant recognition that self-interest and beneficence

alike demand that the local welfare be first taken into account. It is

possible, of course, that it may at times have to yield to the

necessities of the whole body; but it should be first considered.

The task is great; who is sufficient for it? The writer believes

firmly in the ultimate power of ideas. Napoleon is reported to have

said: "Imagination rules the world." If this be generally so, how

much more the true imaginations which are worthy to be called ideas!

There is a nobility in man which welcomes the appeal to beneficence.

May it find its way quickly now to the heads and hearts of the

American people, before less worthy ambitions fill them; and, above

all, to the kings of men, in thought and in action, under whose

leadership our land makes its giant strides. There is in this no

Quixotism. Materially, the interest of the nation is one with its

beneficence; but if the ideas get inverted, and the nation sees in its

new responsibilities, first of all, markets and profits, with

incidental resultant benefit to the natives, it will go wrong. Through

such mistakes Great Britain passed. She lost the United States; she

suffered bitter anguish in India; but India and Egypt testify to-day

to the nobility of her repentance. Spain repented not. The examples

are before us. Which shall we follow?

And is there not a stimulus to our imagination, and to high ambition,

to read, as we easily may, how the oppressed have been freed, and the

degraded lifted, in India and in Egypt, not only by political

sagacity and courage, but by administrative capacity directing the

great engineering enterprises, which change the face of a land and

increase a hundredfold the opportunities for life and happiness? The

profession of the writer, and the subject consequently of most of his

writing, stands for organized force, which, if duly developed, is the

concrete expression of the nation's strength. But while he has never

concealed his opinion that the endurance of civilization, during a

future far beyond our present foresight, depends ultimately upon due

organization of force, he has ever held, and striven to say, that such

force is but the means to an end, which end is durable peace and

progress, and therefore beneficence. The triumphs and the sufferings

of the past months have drawn men's eyes to the necessity for increase

of force, not merely to sustain over-sea dominion, but also to ensure

timely use, in action, of the latent military and naval strength which

the nation possesses. The speedy and inevitable submission of Spain

has demonstrated beyond contradiction the primacy of navies in

determining the issue of transmarine wars; for after Cavité and

Santiago had crippled hopelessly the enemy's navy, the end could not

be averted, though it might have been postponed. On the other hand,

the numerical inadequacy of the troops sent to Santiago, and their

apparently inadequate equipment, have shown the necessity for greater

and more skilfully organized land forces. The deficiency of the United

States in this respect would have permitted a prolonged resistance by

the enemy's army in Cuba,--a course which, though sure ultimately to

fail, appealed strongly to military punctilio.

These lessons are so obvious that it is not supposable that the

national intelligence, which has determined the American demand for

the Philippines, can overlook them; certainly not readers of the

character of those to whom this paper is primarily addressed. But when

all this has been admitted and provided for, it still remains that

force is but the minister, under whose guardianship industry does its

work and enjoys peaceably the fruits of its labor. To the mechanical

industries of the country, in their multifold forms, our new

responsibilities propound the questions, not merely of naval and

military protection, but of material development, which, first

beneficent to the inhabitants and to the land, gives also, and

thereby, those firm foundations of a numerous and contented

population, and of ample local resources, upon which alone military

power can securely rest.

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