IV

PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY CERVERA'S APPEARANCE IN WEST INDIAN

WATERS.--MOVEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES DIVISIONS AND

OF THE OREGON.--FUNCTIONS OF CRUISERS IN A NAVAL

CAMPAIGN.

The departure of Admiral Cervera from Martinique for Curaçao was

almost simultaneous with that of Admiral Sampson from San Juan for Key

West. The immediate return of the latter to the westward was dictated

by reasons, already given in his own words, the weight of which he

doubtless felt more forcibly because he found himself actually so far

away from the centre of the blockade and from his base at Key West.

When he began thus to retrace his steps, he was still ignorant of

Cervera's arrival. The following night, indeed, he heard from a

passing vessel the rumor of the Spanish squadron's regaining Cadiz,

with which the Navy Department had been for a moment amused. He

stopped, therefore, to communicate with Washington, intending, if the

rumor were confirmed, to resume the attack upon San Juan. But on the

morning of the 15th--Sunday--at 3.30, his despatch-boat returned to

him with the official intelligence, not only of the enemy's being off

Martinique, but of his arrival at Curaçao, which occurred shortly

after daylight of the 14th. The same telegram informed him that the

Flying Squadron was on its way to Key West, and directed him to regain

that point himself with all possible rapidity.

Cervera left behind him at Martinique one of his torpedo destroyers,

the _Terror_. A demonstration was made by this vessel, probably,

though it may have been by one of her fellows, before St.

Pierre,--another port of the island,--where the _Harvard_ was lying;

and as the latter had been sent hurriedly from home with but a

trifling battery, some anxiety was felt lest the enemy might score a

point upon her, if the local authorities compelled her to leave. If

the Spaniard had been as fast as represented, he would have had an

advantage over the American in both speed and armament,--very serious

odds. The machinery of the former, however, was in bad order, and she

soon had to seek a harbor in Fort de France, also in Martinique; after

which the usual rule, that two belligerents may not leave the same

neutral port within twenty-four hours of each other, assured the

_Harvard_ a safe start. This incident, otherwise trivial, is worthy of

note, for it shows one of the results of our imperfect national

preparation for war. If the conditions had allowed time to equip the

_Harvard_ with suitable guns, she could have repulsed such an enemy,

as a ship of the same class, the _St. Paul_, did a few weeks later off

San Juan, whither the _Terror_ afterwards repaired, and where she

remained till the war was over.

The news of Cervera's appearance off Martinique was first received at

the Navy Department about midnight of May 12th-13th, nearly thirty-six

hours after the fact. As our representatives there, and generally

throughout the West Indies, were very much on the alert, it seems not

improbable that their telegrams, to say the least, were not given

undue precedence of other matters. That, however, is one of the

chances of life, and most especially of war. It is more to the

purpose, because more useful to future guidance, to consider the

general situation at the moment the telegram was received, the means

at hand to meet the exigencies of the case, and what instructive light

is thereby thrown back upon preceding movements, which had resulted in

the actual conditions.

Admiral Cervera's division had been at Martinique, and, after a brief

period of suspense, was known to have disappeared to the westward. The

direction taken, however, might, nay, almost certainly must, be

misleading,--that was part of his game. From it nothing could be

decisively inferred. The last news of the _Oregon_ was that she had

left Bahia, in Brazil, on the 9th of the month. Her whereabouts and

intended movements were as unknown to the United States authorities as

to the enemy. An obvious precaution, to assure getting assistance to

her, would have been to prescribe the exact route she should follow,

subject only to the conditional discretion which can never wisely be

taken from the officer in command on the spot. In that way it would

have been possible to send a division to meet her, if indications at

any moment countenanced the suspicion entertained by some--the author

among others--that Cervera would attempt to intercept her. After

careful consideration, this precaution had not been attempted,

because the tight censorship of the Press had not then been

effectually enforced, and it was feared that even so vital and evident

a necessity as that of concealing her movements would not avail

against the desire of some newspapers to manifest enterprise, at

whatever cost to national interests. If we ever again get into a

serious war, a close supervision of the Press, punitive as well as

preventive, will be one of the first military necessities, unless the

tone and disposition, not of the best, but of the worst, of its

members shall have become sensibly improved; for occasional

unintentional leakage, by well-meaning officials possessing more

information than native secretiveness, cannot be wholly obviated, and

must be accepted, practically, as one of the inevitable difficulties

of conducting war.

The _Oregon_, therefore, was left a loose end, and was considered to

be safer so than if more closely looked after. From the time she left

Bahia till she arrived at Barbados, and from thence till she turned up

off Jupiter Inlet, on the Florida coast, no one in Washington knew

where she was. Nevertheless, she continued a most important and

exposed fraction of the national naval force. That Cervera had turned

west when last seen from Martinique meant nothing. It was more

significant and reassuring to know that he had not got coal there.

Still, it was possible that he might take a chance off Barbados,

trusting, as he with perfect reason could, that when he had waited

there as long as his coal then on hand permitted, the British

authorities would let him take enough more to reach Puerto Rico, as

they did give Captain Clark sufficient to gain a United States port.

When the _Oregon_ got to Barbados at 3.20 A.M. of May 18th, less than

six days had elapsed since Cervera quitted Martinique; and the two

islands are barely one hundred miles apart. All this, of course, is

very much more clear to our present knowledge than it could possibly

be to the Spanish Admiral, who probably, and not unnaturally, thought

it far better to get his "fleet in being" under the guns of a friendly

port than to hazard it on what might prove a wild-goose chase; for,

after all, Captain Clark might not have gone to Barbados.

It may be interesting to the reader to say here that the Navy

Department,--which was as much in the dark as Cervera

himself,--although it was necessarily concerned about the _Oregon_, and

gave much thought to the problem how best to assure her safety, was

comforted by the certainty that, whatever befell the ship, the national

interests would not be gravely compromised if she did meet the enemy.

The situation was not novel or unprecedented, and historical precedents

are an immense support to the spirit in doubtful moments. Conscious of

the power of the ship herself, and confident in her captain and

officers, whom it knew well, the Department was assured, to use words

of Nelson when he was expecting to be similarly outnumbered, "Before we

are destroyed, I have little doubt but the enemy will have their wings

so completely clipped that they will be easily overtaken." Such odds

for our ship were certainly not desired; but, the best having been done

that could be in the circumstances, there was reasonable ground to

believe that, by the time the enemy got through with her, they would

not amount to much as a fighting squadron.

Some little while after the return of Admiral Sampson's squadron to

New York, the writer chanced to see, quoted as an after-dinner speech

by the chief engineer of the _Oregon_, the statement that Captain

Clark had communicated to his officers the tactics he meant to pursue,

if he fell in with the Spanish division. His purpose, as so explained,

deserves to be noted; for it assures our people, if they need any

further assurance, that in the single ship, as in the squadrons,

intelligent skill as well as courage presided in the councils of the

officers in charge. The probability was that the Spanish vessels,

though all reputed faster than the _Oregon_, had different rates of

speed, and each singly was inferior to her in fighting force, in

addition to which the American ship had a very heavy stern battery.

The intention therefore was, in case of a meeting, to turn the stern

to the enemy and to make a running fight. This not only gave a

superiority of fire to the _Oregon_ so long as the relative positions

lasted, but it tended, of course, to prolong it, confining the enemy

to their bow fire and postponing to the utmost possible the time of

their drawing near enough to open with the broadside rapid-fire

batteries. Moreover, if the Spanish vessels were not equally fast,

and if their rate of speed did not much exceed that of the _Oregon_,

both very probable conditions, it was quite possible that in the

course of the action the leading ship would outstrip her followers so

much as to be engaged singly, and even that two or more might thus be

successively beaten in detail. If it be replied that this is assuming

a great deal, and attributing stupidity to the enemy, the answer is

that the result here supposed has not infrequently followed upon

similar action, and that war is full of uncertainties,--an instance

again of the benefit and comfort which some historical acquaintance

with the experience of others imparts to a man engaged with present

perplexities. Deliberately to incur such odds would be unjustifiable;

but when unavoidably confronted with them, resolution enlightened by

knowledge may dare still to hope.

An instructive instance of drawing such support from the very fountain

heads of military history, in the remote and even legendary past, is

given by Captain Clark in a letter replying to inquiries from the

present writer:--

"There is little to add to what you already know about the

way I hoped to fight Cervera's fleet, if we fell in with it.

What I feared was that he would be able to bring his ships up

within range together, supposing that the slowest was faster

than the _Oregon_; but there was the chance that their

machinery was in different stages of deterioration, and there

was also the hope that impetuosity or excitement might after

a time make some press on in advance of the others. I, of

course, had in mind the tactics of the last of the Horatii,

and hopefully referred to them. The announcement Milligan

(the chief engineer) spoke of was made before we reached

Bahia, I think before we turned Cape Frio, as it was off that

headland that I decided to leave the _Marietta_ and

_Nictheroy_, (now the _Buffalo_), and to push on alone. You

may be sure that was an anxious night for me when I decided

to part company. The Department was, of course, obliged to

leave much to my discretion, and I knew that the Spaniards

might all close to rapid-fire range, overpower all but our

turret guns, and then send in their torpedo boats."

It was upon the _Marietta_ that he had previously depended, in a

measure, to thwart the attacks of these small vessels; but in such a

contest as that with four armored cruisers she could scarcely count,

and she was delaying his progress in the run immediately before him.

"The torpedo boat [he continues] was a rattlesnake to me,

that I feared would get in his work while I was fighting the

tiger; but I felt that the chances were that Cervera was

bound to the West Indies, and so that the need of the

_Oregon_ there was so great that the risk of his turning

south to meet me should be run, so I hurried to Bahia, and

cabled to the Department my opinion of what the _Oregon_

might do alone and in a running fight.... My object was to

add the _Oregon_ to our fleet, and not to meet the Spaniards,

if it could be avoided."

It may be added that in this his intention coincided with the wish of

the Department.

"So when, in Barbados, the reports came off that the Spanish

fleet (and rumors had greatly increased its size) was at

Martinique, that three torpedo boats had been seen from the

island, I ordered coal to be loaded till after midnight, but

left soon after dark, started west, then turned and went

around the island"--that is, well to the eastward--"and made

to the northward."

This was on the evening of May 18th. Six days later the ship was off

the coast of Florida, and in communication with the Department.

The _Oregon_ may properly be regarded as one of the three principal

detachments into which the United States fleet was divided at the

opening of the eventful week, May 12th-19th, and which, however they

might afterwards be distributed around the strategic centre,--which we

had chosen should be about Havana and Cienfuegos,--needed to be

brought to it as rapidly as possible. No time was avoidably lost. On

the evening of May 13th, eighteen hours after Cervera's appearance at

Martinique was reported, the two larger divisions, under Sampson and

Schley, were consciously converging upon our point of concentration at

Key West; while the third, the _Oregon_, far more distant, was also

moving to the same place in the purpose of the Department, though, as

yet, unconsciously to herself. Sampson had over twenty-four hours'

start of the Flying Squadron; and the distances to be traversed, from

Puerto Rico and Hampton Roads, were practically the same.[3] But the

former was much delayed by the slowness of the monitors, and, great as

he felt the need of haste to be, and urgent as was the Department's

telegram, received on the 15th, he very properly would not allow his

vessels to separate until nearer their destination. Precautionary

orders were sent by him to the _Harvard_ and _Yale_--two swift

despatch vessels then under his immediate orders--to coal to the

utmost and to hold themselves at the end of a cable ready for

immediate orders; while Commodore Remey, commanding at Key West, was

directed to have every preparation complete for coaling the squadron

on the 18th, when it might be expected to arrive. The _St. Louis_, a

vessel of the same type as the _Harvard_, met the Admiral while these

telegrams were being written. She was ordered to cut the cables at

Santiago and Guantanamo Bay, and afterwards at Ponce, Puerto Rico.

The Flying Squadron had sailed at 4 P.M. of the 13th. Its fighting

force consisted of the _Brooklyn_, armored cruiser, flagship; the

_Massachusetts_, first-class, and the _Texas_, second-class,

battleships. It is to be inferred from the departure of these vessels

that the alarm about our own coast, felt while the whereabouts of the

hostile division was unknown, vanished when it made its appearance.

The result was, perhaps, not strictly logical; but the logic of the

step is of less consequence than its undoubted military correctness.

We had chosen our objective, and now we were concentrating upon it,--a

measure delayed too long, though unavoidably. Commodore Schley was

directed to call off Charleston for orders; for, while it is essential

to have a settled strategic idea in any campaign, it is also

necessary, in maritime warfare, at all events, to be ready to change a

purpose suddenly and to turn at once upon the great objective,--which

dominates and supersedes all others,--the enemy's navy, when a

reasonable prospect of destroying it, or any large fraction of it,

offers. When Schley left Hampton Roads, it was known only that the

Spanish division had appeared off Martinique. The general intention,

that our own should go to Key West, must therefore be held subject to

possible modification, and to that end communication at a half-way

point was imperative. No detention was thereby caused. At 4.30 P.M. of

the 15th the Flying Squadron, which had been somewhat delayed by ten

hours of dense fog, came off Charleston Bar, where a lighthouse

steamer had been waiting since the previous midnight. From the officer

in charge of her the Commodore received his orders, and at 6 P.M. was

again under way for Key West, where he arrived on the 18th,

anticipating by several hours Sampson's arrival in person, and by a

day the coming of the slower ships of the other division.

But if it is desirable to ensure frequent direct communication with

the larger divisions of the fleet, at such a moment, when their

movements must be held subject to sudden change to meet the as yet

uncertain developments of the enemy's strategy, it is still more

essential to keep touch from a central station with the swift single

cruisers, the purveyors of intelligence and distributors of the

information upon which the conduct of the war depends. If the broad

strategic conception of the naval campaign is correct, and the

consequent action consistent, the greater fighting units--squadrons or

fleets--may be well, or better, left to themselves, after the initial

impulse of direction is given, and general instructions have been

issued to their commanders. These greater units, however, cannot

usually be kept at the end of a telegraph cable; yet they must,

through cables, maintain, with their centres of intelligence,

communication so frequent as to be practically constant. The Flying

Squadron when off Cienfuegos, and Admiral Sampson's division at the

time now under consideration, while on its passage from San Juan to

Key West, are instances in point. Conversely, dependence may be placed

upon local agents to report an enemy when he enters port; but when at

sea for an unknown destination, it is necessary, if practicable, to

get and keep touch with him, and to have his movements, actual and

probable, reported. In short, steady communication must be maintained,

as far as possible, between the always fixed points where the cables

end, and the more variable positions where the enemy's squadrons and

our own are, whether for a stay or in transit. This can be done only

through swift despatch vessels; and for these, great as is the need

that no time be wasted in their missions, the homely proverb, "more

haste, less speed," has to be kept in mind. To stop off at a wayside

port, to diverge even considerably from the shortest route, may often

be a real economy of time.

The office of cruisers thus employed is to substitute certainty for

conjecture; to correct or to confirm, by fuller knowledge, the

inferences upon which the conduct of operations otherwise so much

depends. Accurate intelligence is one of the very first _desiderata_

of war, and as the means of obtaining and transmitting it are never in

excess of the necessities, those means have to be carefully

administered. Historically, no navy ever has had cruisers enough;

partly because the lookout and despatch duties themselves are so

extensive and onerous; partly because vessels of the class are wanted

for other purposes also,--as, for instance, in our late war, for the

blockade of the Cuban ports, which was never much more than

technically "effective," and for the patrolling of our Atlantic

seaboard. True economical use of the disposable vessels, obtaining the

largest results with the least expenditure of means never adequate,

demands much forethought and more management, and is best effected by

so arranging that the individual cruisers can be quickly got hold of

when wanted. This is accomplished by requiring them to call at cable

ports and report; or by circumscribing the area in which they are to

cruise, so that they can be readily found; or by prescribing the

course and speed they are to observe,--in short, by ensuring a pretty

close knowledge of their position at every moment.

For the purposes of intelligence, a cruiser with a roving commission,

or one which neglects to report its movements when opportunity offers,

is nearly useless; and few things are more justly exasperating than

the failure of a cruiser to realize this truth in practice. Of course,

no rule is hard and fast to bind the high discretion of the officer

senior on the spot; but if the captains of cruisers will bear in mind,

as a primary principle, that they, their admirals, and the central

office, are in this respect parts of one highly specialized and most

important system in which co-operation must be observed, discretion

will more rarely err in these matters, where errors may be so serious.

That with a central office, admirals, and captains, all seeking the

same ends, matters will at times work at cross purposes, only proves

the common experience that things will not always go straight here

below. When Nelson was hunting for the French fleet before the battle

of the Nile, his flagship was dismasted in a gale of wind off Corsica.

The commander of the frigates, his lookout ships, having become

separated in the gale, concluded that the Admiral would have to return

to Gibraltar, and took his frigates there. "I thought he knew me

better," commented Nelson. "Every moment I have to regret the frigates

having left me," he wrote later; "the return to Syracuse," due to want

of intelligence, "broke my heart, which on any extraordinary anxiety

now shows itself." It is not possible strictly to define official

discretion, nor to guard infallibly against its misuse; but, all the

same, it is injurious to an officer to show that he lacks sound

judgment.

When the Flying Squadron sailed, there were lying in Hampton Roads

three swift cruisers,--the _New Orleans_, the _St. Paul_, and the

_Minneapolis_. Two auxiliary cruisers, the _Yosemite_ and the _Dixie_,

were nearly but not quite ready for sea. It was for some time justly

considered imperative to keep one such ship there ready for an

immediate mission. The _New Orleans_ was so retained, subject to

further requirements of the Department; but the _Minneapolis_ and the

_St. Paul_ sailed as soon as their coaling was completed,--within

twenty-four hours of the squadron. The former was to cruise between

Haïti and the Caicos Bank, on the road which Cervera would probably

follow if he went north of Haïti; the other was to watch between Haïti

and Jamaica, where he might be encountered if he took the Windward

Passage, going south of Haïti. At the time these orders were issued

the indications were that the Spanish division was hanging about

Martinique, hoping for permission to coal there; and as both of our

cruisers were very fast vessels and directed to go at full speed, the

chances were more than good that they would reach their cruising

ground before Cervera could pass it.

These intended movements were telegraphed to Sampson, and it was

added, "Very important that your fast cruisers keep touch with the

Spanish squadron." This he received May 15th. With his still imperfect

information he gave no immediate orders which would lose him his hold

of the _Harvard_ and the _Yale_; but shortly after midnight he

learned, off Cape Haïtien, that the Spanish division was to have left

Curaçao the previous evening at six o'clock--only six hours before

this despatch reached him. He at once cabled the _Harvard_ and the

_Yale_, to which, as being under his immediate charge, the Department

had given no orders, to go to sea, the former to cruise in the Mona

Passage, to detect the enemy if he passed through it for Puerto Rico,

the _Yale_ to assist the _St. Paul_ at the station of which he had

been notified from Washington. The Department was informed by him of

these dispositions. Sampson at the same time cabled Remey at Key West

to warn the blockaders off Cienfuegos--none of which were armored--of

the possible appearance of the enemy at that port. In this step he had

been anticipated by the Department, which, feeling the urgency of the

case and uncertain of communicating betimes through him, had issued an

order direct to Remey, thirty-six hours before, that those ships, with

a single exception, should be withdrawn; and that the vessels on the

north coast should be notified, but not removed.

These various movements indicate the usefulness and the employments of

the cruiser class, one of which also carried the news to Cienfuegos,

another along the north coast, while a third took Sampson's telegrams

from his position at sea to the cable port. Owing to our insufficient

number of vessels of the kind required, torpedo boats, of great speed

in smooth water, but of delicate machinery and liable to serious

retardation in a sea-way, were much used for these missions, to the

great hurt of their engines, not intended for long-continued high

exertion, and to their own consequent injury for their particular

duties. The _St. Paul's_ career exemplified also the changes of

direction to which cruisers are liable, and the consequent necessity

of keeping them well in hand both as regards position and preparation,

especially of coal. Between the time the _Minneapolis_ sailed and her

own departure, at 6 P.M., of May 14th, the news of the Spanish

division's arrival at Curaçao was received; and as there had been

previous independent information that colliers had been ordered to

meet it in the Gulf of Venezuela, only a hundred miles from Curaçao,

the conclusion was fair that the enemy needed coal and hoped to get it

in that neighborhood. Why else, indeed, if as fast as reported, and

aware, as he must be, that Sampson was as far east as San Juan, had he

not pushed direct for Cuba, his probable objective? In regard to

colliers being due in the Gulf of Venezuela, the reports proved

incorrect; but the inference as to the need of coal was accurate, and

that meant delay. The _St. Paul_ was therefore ordered to Key West,

instructions being telegraphed there to coal her full immediately on

arriving. She would there be as near the Windward Passage as Curaçao

is, and yet able, in case of necessity, to proceed by the Yucatan

Passage or in any direction that might meanwhile become expedient. It

may be added that the _St. Paul_ reached Key West and was coaled ready

for sea by the evening of May 18th, four days from the time she left

Hampton Roads, a thousand miles distant.

While on her passage, the Department had entertained the purpose of

sending her to the Gulf of Venezuela and adding to her the _Harvard_

and the _Minneapolis_, the object being not only to find the enemy, if

there, but that one of the three should report him, while the other

two dogged his path until no doubt of his destination could remain.

Their great speed, considered relatively to that which the enemy had

so far shown, gave reasonable probability that thus his approach

could be communicated by them, and by cables, throughout the whole

field of operations, with such rapidity as to ensure cornering him at

once, which was the first great essential of our campaign. A cruiser

reporting at Cape Haïtien was picked up and sent to the _Minneapolis_,

whose whereabouts was sufficiently known, because circumscribed, and

she received her orders; but they served only to develop the weakness

of that ship and of the _Columbia_, considered as cruisers. The coal

left after her rapid steaming to her cruising ground did not justify

the further sweep required, and her captain thought it imperative to

go first to St. Thomas to recoal,--a process which involved more delay

than on the surface appears. The bunkers of this ship and of her

sister, the _Columbia_, are minutely subdivided,--an arrangement very

suitable, even imperative, in a battleship, in order to localize

strictly any injury received in battle, but inconsequent and illogical

in a vessel meant primarily for speed. A moment's reflection upon the

services required of cruisers will show that their efficiency does not

depend merely upon rapid going through the water, but upon prompt

readiness to leave port, of which promptness quick coaling is a most

important factor. This is gravely retarded by bunkers much subdivided.

The design of these two ships, meant for speed, involves this lack of

facility for recoaling. There is, therefore, in them a grave failure

in that unity of conception which should dominate all designs.

The movements, actual and projected, of the cruisers at this moment

have purposely been dwelt upon at some length. Such movements and the

management of them play a most important part in all campaigns, and it

is desirable that they should be understood, through illustration such

as this; because the provision for the service should be antecedently

thorough and consistent in plan and in execution, in order to

efficiency. Confusion of thought, and consequent confusion of object,

is fatal to any conception,--at least, to any military conception; it

is absolutely opposed to concentration, for it implies duality of

object. In the designing of a cruiser, as of any class of warship, the

first step, before which none should be taken, is to decide the

primary object to be realized,--what is this ship meant to do? To

this primary requirement every other feature should be subordinated.

Its primacy is not only one of time, but of importance also. The

recognition, in practice, of this requisite does not abolish nor

exclude the others by its predominance. It simply regulates their

development; for they not only must not militate against it, they must

minister to it. It is exactly as in a novel or in a work of art, for

every military conception, from the design of a ship up, should be a

work of art. Perfection does not exclude a multiplicity of detail, but

it does demand unity of motive, a single central idea, to which all

detail is strictly accessory, to emphasize or to enhance,--not to

distract. The cruiser requirements offer a concrete illustration of

the application of this thought. Rapidity of action is the primary

object. In it is involved both coal endurance and facility for

recoaling; for each economizes time, as speed does. Defensive

strength--of which subdivision of coal bunkers is an element--conduces

only secondarily to rapidity of movement, as does offensive power;

they must, therefore, be very strictly subordinated. They must not

detract from speed; yet so far as they do not injure that, they

should be developed, for by the power to repel an enemy--to avert

detention--they minister to rapidity. With the battleship, in this

contrary to the cruiser, offensive power is the dominant feature.

While, therefore, speed is desirable to it, excessive speed is not

admissible, if, as the author believes, it can be obtained only at

some sacrifice of offensive strength.

When Admiral Sampson sent off the telegrams last mentioned, before

daylight of May 16th, the flagship was off Cape Haïtien. During her

stoppage for this purpose, the squadron continued to stand west, in

order not to increase the loss of time due to the slowness of the

monitors, through which the progress of the whole body did not exceed

from seven to eight sea miles per hour. Cape Haïtien is distant from

Key West nearly seven hundred miles; and throughout this distance,

being almost wholly along the coast of Cuba, no close telegraphic

communication could be expected. At the squadron's rate of advance it

could not count upon arriving at Key West, and so regaining touch with

Washington, before the morning of the 19th, and the Department was

thus notified. Thirty-six hours later, at 11.30 A.M., May 17th, being

then in the Old Bahama Channel, between Cuba and the Bahama Banks, the

Admiral felt that his personal presence, under existing conditions,

was more necessary near Havana and Key West. Leaving the division,

therefore, in charge of the senior officer, Captain Evans, of the

_Iowa_, he pushed forward with the flagship _New York_, the fastest of

the armored vessels. Six hours later he was met by the torpedo boat

_Dupont_, bringing him a telegram from the Department, dated the 16th,

forwarded through Key West, directing him to send his most suitable

armored ship ahead to join the Flying Squadron. This order was based

on information that Cervera was bringing munitions of war essential to

the defence of Havana, and that his instructions were peremptory to

reach either Havana or a port connected with it by railroad. Such

commands pointed evidently to Cienfuegos, which place, moreover, was

clearly indicated from the beginning of the campaign, as already shown

in these papers, as the station for one division of our armored

fleet.

The Department could calculate certainly that, by the time its message

reached Sampson, his division would be so far advanced as to ensure

interposing between Havana and the Spaniards, if the latter came by

the Windward Passage--from the eastward. It was safe, therefore, or at

least involved less risk of missing the enemy, to send the Flying

Squadron to Cienfuegos, either heading him off there, or with a chance

of meeting him in the Yucatan Channel, if he tried to reach Havana by

going west of Cuba. But as Cienfuegos was thought the more likely

destination, and was for every reason a port to be effectually

blockaded, it was desirable to reinforce Schley, not by detaining him,

under the pressing need of his getting to Cienfuegos, but by a

battleship following him as soon as possible. Of course, such a ship

might be somewhat exposed to encountering the enemy's division

single-handed, which is contrary to rule. But rules are made to be

broken on occasion, as well as to be observed generally; and again,

and always, war cannot be made without running risks, of which the

greatest is misplaced or exaggerated caution. From the moment the

Spanish ships were reported at Curaçao, a close lookout had been

established in the Yucatan Channel.

By his personal action, in quitting his squadron in order to hasten

forward, Admiral Sampson had anticipated the wishes of the Department.

At 4 P.M., May 18th, he reached Key West, where he found the Flying

Squadron and the _St. Paul_, anchored in the outer roads. His own

telegrams, and those from the Secretary of the Navy, had ensured

preparations for coaling all vessels as they arrived, to the utmost

rapidity that the facilities of the port admitted. The _St. Paul_,

whose orders had been again changed, sailed the same evening for Cape

Haïtien. The Flying Squadron started for Cienfuegos at 9 A.M. the

following day, the 19th, and was followed twenty-six hours later by

the battleship _Iowa_. Shortly after the Admiral left the fleet, it

had been overtaken by the torpedo boat _Porter_, from Cape Haïtien,

bearing a despatch which showed the urgency of the general situation,

although it in no way fettered the discretion of the officer in

charge. Captain Evans, therefore, very judiciously imitated Sampson's

action, quitted the fleet, and hastened with his own ship to Key

West, arriving at dark of the 18th. Being a vessel of large coal

endurance, she did not delay there to fill up, but she took with her

the collier _Merrimac_ for the ships before Cienfuegos.

The remainder of Sampson's division arrived on the 19th. The monitors

_Puritan_ and _Miantonomoh_, which had not been to San Juan, sailed on

the 20th for the Havana blockade, where they were joined before noon

of the 21st by the _Indiana_, and the _New York_, the latter having

the Admiral on board. Commodore Schley, with the Flying Squadron,

arrived off Cienfuegos toward midnight of the same day. The _Iowa_,

came up twelve hours later, about noon of the 22nd, and some four or

five light cruisers joined on that or the following days. On the 24th

the _Oregon_ communicated with Washington off Jupiter Inlet, on the

east coast of Florida. Her engines being reported perfectly ready,

after her long cruise, she was directed to go to Key West, where she

coaled, and on the 28th left for the Havana blockade. It is difficult

to exaggerate the honor which this result does to Chief Engineer

Milligan and to the officers responsible under him for the condition

of her machinery. The combination of skill and care thus evidenced is

of the highest order.

Such, in general outline, omitting details superfluous to correct

comprehension, was the course of incidents on our side, in the Cuban

campaign, during the ten days, May 12th-21st; from the bombardment of

San Juan de Puerto Rico to the establishment of the two armored

divisions in the positions which, under better conditions of national

preparation, they should have occupied by the 1st of the month. All is

well that ends well--so far at least as the wholly past is concerned;

but for the instruction of the future it is necessary not to cast the

past entirely behind our backs before its teachings have been pondered

and assimilated. We cannot expect ever again to have an enemy so

entirely inapt as Spain showed herself to be; yet, even so, Cervera's

division reached Santiago on the 19th of May, two days before our

divisions appeared in the full force they could muster before Havana

and Cienfuegos. Had the Spanish Admiral been trying for one of those

ports, even at the low rate of speed observed in going from Curaçao

to Santiago--about seven and five-tenth knots--he could have left

Curaçao on the evening of May 15th, and have reached Cienfuegos on the

21st, between midnight and daybreak, enabling him to enter the harbor

by 8 A.M.--more than twelve hours before the arrival there of our

Flying Squadron.

The writer assumes that, had our coast defences been such as to put

our minds at ease concerning the safety of our chief seaboard cities,

the Flying Squadron would from the first have been off Cienfuegos. He

is forced to assume so, because his own military conviction has always

been that such would have been the proper course. Whatever _coup de

main_ might have been possible against a harbor inadequately defended

as were some of ours,--the fears of which, even, he considered

exaggerated,--no serious operations against a defended seaboard were

possible to any enemy after a transatlantic voyage, until recoaled. It

would have been safe, militarily speaking, to place our two divisions

before the ports named. It was safer to do so than to keep one at

Hampton Roads; for offence is a safer course than defence.

Consider the conditions. The Spaniards, after crossing the Atlantic,

would have to coal. There were four principal ports at which they

might do so,--Havana, Cienfuegos, Santiago, and San Juan de Puerto

Rico. The first two, on the assumption, would be closed to them,

unless they chose to fight a division so nearly equal to their own

force that, whatever the result of the battle, the question of coaling

would have possessed no further immediate interest for them. Santiago

and San Juan, and any other suitable eastern port open to them--if

such there was--were simply so many special instances of a particular

case; and of these San Juan was the most favorable to them, because,

being the most distant, it ensured more time for coaling and getting

away again before our divisions could arrive. After their departure

from Curaçao was known, but not their subsequent intentions, and while

our divisions were proceeding to Havana and Cienfuegos, measures were

under consideration at the Navy Department which would have made it

even then difficult for them to escape action, if they went to San

Juan for coal; but which would have raised the difficult close to the

point of the impossible, had our divisions from the first been placed

before Havana and Cienfuegos, which strategic conditions dictated, but

fears for our own inadequately defended coast prevented.

To ensure this result, the contemplated method, one simply of

sustained readiness, was as follows. Adequate lookouts around Puerto

Rico were to be stationed, by whom the enemy's approach would be

detected and quickly cabled; and our two divisions were to be kept

ready to proceed at an instant's notice, coaled to their best steaming

lines, as far as this was compatible with a sufficiency of fuel to

hold their ground after arriving off San Juan. Two of our fastest

despatch vessels, likewise at their best steaming immersion, were to

be held at Key West ready to start at once for Cienfuegos to notify

the squadron there; two, in order that if one broke down on the way,

one would surely arrive within twenty-four hours. Thus planned, the

receipt of a cable at the Department from one of the lookouts off

Puerto Rico would be like the touching of a button. The Havana

division, reached within six hours, would start at once; that at

Cienfuegos eighteen hours after the former. Barring accidents, we

should, in five days after the enemy's arrival, have had off San Juan

the conditions which it took over a week to establish at Santiago;

but, allowing for accidents, there would, within five days, have been

at least one division, a force sufficient to hold the enemy in check.

Five days, it may be said, is not soon enough. It would have been

quite soon enough in the case of Spaniards after a sea voyage of

twenty-five hundred miles, in which the larger vessels had to share

their coal with the torpedo destroyers. In case of a quicker enemy of

more executive despatch, and granting, which will be rare, that a

fleet's readiness to depart will be conditioned only by coal, and not

by necessary engine repairs to some one vessel, it is to be remarked

that the speed which can be, and has been, assumed for our ships in

this particular case, nine knots, is far less than the most modest

demands for a battleship,--such as those made even by the present

writer, who is far from an advocate of extreme speed. Had not our

deficiency of dry docks left our ships very foul, they could have

covered the distance well within four days. Ships steady at thirteen

knots would have needed little over three; and it is _sustained_ speed

like this, not a spurt of eighteen knots for twelve hours, that is

wanted. No one, however, need be at pains to dispute that

circumstances alter cases; or that the promptness and executive

ability of an enemy are very material circumstances. Similarly,

although the method proposed would have had probable success at San

Juan, and almost certain success at any shorter distance, it would at

two thousand miles be very doubtfully expedient.

Assuming, moreover, that it had been thought unadvisable to move

against San Juan, because doubtful of arriving in time, what would

have been the situation had Cervera reached there, our armored

divisions being off Havana and Cienfuegos? He would have been watched

by the four lookouts--which were ordered before Santiago immediately

upon his arrival there--and by them followed when he quitted port.

Four leaves a good margin for detaching successively to cable ports

before giving up this following game, and by that time his intentions

would be apparent. Where, indeed, should he go? Before Havana and

Cienfuegos would be divisions capable of fighting him. Santiago, or

any eastern port, is San Juan over again, with disadvantage of

distance. Matanzas is but Havana; he would find himself anticipated

there, because one of those vessels dogging his path would have

hurried on to announce his approach. Were his destination, however,

evidently a North Atlantic port, as some among us had fondly feared,

our division before Havana would be recalled by cable, and that before

Cienfuegos drawn back to Havana, leaving, of course, lookouts before

the southern port. Cienfuegos is thereby uncovered, doubtless; but

either the Spaniard fails to get there, not knowing our movements, or,

if he rightly divines them and turns back, our coast is saved.

Strategy is a game of wits, with many unknown quantities; as Napoleon

and Nelson have said--and not they alone--the unforeseen and chance

must always be allowed for. But, if there are in it no absolute

certainties, there are practical certainties, raised by experience to

maxims, reasonable observance of which gives long odds. Prominent

among these certainties are the value of the offensive over the

defensive, the advantage of a central position, and of interior lines.

All these would have been united, strategically, by placing our

armored divisions before Havana and Cienfuegos. As an offensive step,

this supported, beyond any chance of defeat, the blockade of the Cuban

coast, as proclaimed, with the incidental additional advantage that

Key West, our base, was not only accessible to us, but defended

against serious attack, by the mere situation of our Havana squadron.

Central position and interior lines were maintained, for, Havana being

nearly equidistant from Puerto Rico and the Chesapeake, the squadrons

could be moved in the shortest time in either direction, and they

covered all points of offence and defence within the limits of the

theatre of war by lines shorter than those open to the enemy, which is

what "interior lines" practically means.

If this disposition did possess these advantages, the question

naturally arises whether it was expedient for the Havana division,

before Cervera's arrival was known, and with the Flying Squadron still

at Hampton Roads, to move to the eastward to San Juan, as was done.

The motive of this step, in which the Navy Department acquiesced, was

the probability, which must be fully admitted, that San Juan was

Cervera's primary destination. If it so proved, our squadron would be

nearer at hand. It was likely, of course, that Cervera would first

communicate with a neutral port, as he did at Martinique, to learn if

the coast were clear before pushing for San Juan. The result of his

going to the latter place would have been to present the strategic

problem already discussed.

Cervera heard that our fleet was at San Juan, went to Curaçao, and

afterwards to Santiago, because, as the Spanish Minister of Marine

declared in the Cortes, it was the only port to which he could go. Our

Admiral's official report, summing up the conditions after the

bombardment of San Juan, as they suggested themselves to his mind at

the time, has been quoted in a previous section. In the present we

have sought to trace as vividly as possible the hurried and various

measures consequent upon Cervera's movements; to reproduce, if may be,

the perplexities--the anxieties, perhaps, but certainly not the

apprehensions--of the next ten days, in which, though we did not fear

being beaten, we did fear being outwitted, which is to no man

agreeable.

If Sampson's division had been before Havana and Schley's at Hampton

Roads when Cervera appeared, the latter could have entered San Juan

undisturbed. What could we then have done? In virtue of our central

position, three courses were open. 1. We could have sent our Havana

division to San Juan, as before proposed, and the Flying Squadron

direct to the same point, with the disadvantage, however, as compared

with the disposition advocated last, that the distance to it from

Hampton Roads is four hundred miles more than from Cienfuegos. 2. We

could have moved the Havana Squadron to San Juan, sending the Flying

Squadron to Key West to coal and await further orders. This is only a

modification of No. 1. Or, 3, we could have ordered the Flying

Squadron to Key West, and at the same moment sent the Havana division

before Cienfuegos,--a simultaneous movement which would have effected

a great economy of time, yet involved no risk, owing to the distance

of the Spanish division from the centre of operations.

Of these three measures the last would have commended itself to the

writer had Cervera's appearance, reported at Martinique, left it at

all doubtful whether or not he were aiming for Havana or Cienfuegos.

In our estimation, that was the strategic centre, and therefore to be

covered before all else. So long as Cervera's destination was unknown,

and might, however improbable, be our coast, there was possible

justification for keeping the Flying Squadron there; the instant he

was known to be in the West Indies, to close the two Cuban ports

became the prime necessity. But had he entered San Juan without

previous appearance, the first or the second should have been adopted,

in accordance with the sound general principle that the enemy's fleet,

if it probably can be reached, is the objective paramount to all

others; because the control of the sea, by reducing the enemy's navy,

is the determining consideration in a naval war.

Without dogmatizing, however, upon a situation which did not obtain,

it appears now to the writer, not only that the eastward voyage of our

Havana division was unfortunate, viewed in the light of subsequent

events, but that it should have been seen beforehand to be a mistake

because inconsistent with a well-founded and generally accepted

principle of war, the non-observance of which was not commanded by the

conditions. The principle is that which condemns "eccentric"

movements. The secondary definition of this word--"odd" or

"peculiar"--has so dislodged all other meanings in common speech that

it seems necessary to recall that primarily, by derivation, it

signifies "away from the centre," to which sense it is confined in

technical military phrase. Our centre of operations had been fixed,

and rightly fixed, at Havana and Cienfuegos. It was subject, properly,

to change--instant change--when the enemy's fleet was known to be

within striking distance; but to leave the centre otherwise, on a

calculation of probabilities however plausible, was a proposition that

should have been squarely confronted with the principle, which itself

is only the concrete expression of many past experiences. It is far

from the writer's wish to advocate slavery to rule; no bondage is more

hopeless or more crushing; but when one thinks of acting contrary to

the weight of experience, the reasons for such action should be most

closely scrutinized, and their preponderance in the particular case

determined.

These remarks are offered with no view of empty criticism of a

mistake--if such it were--in which the writer was not without his

share. In military judgments error is not necessarily censurable. One

of the greatest captains has said: "The general who has made no

mistake has made few campaigns." There are mistakes and mistakes;

errors of judgment, such as the most capable man makes in the course

of a life, and errors of conduct which demonstrate essential unfitness

for office. Of the latter class was that of Admiral Byng, when he

retired from Minorca; a weakness not unparalleled in later times, but

which, whatever the indulgence accorded to the offender, is a military

sin that should for itself receive no condonement of judgment. As

instances of the former, both Nelson and Napoleon admitted, to quote

the latter's words: "I have been so often mistaken that I no longer

blush for it." My wish is to illustrate, by a recent particular

instance, a lesson professionally useful to the future,--the value of

rules. By the disregard of rule in this case we uncovered both Havana

and Cienfuegos, which it was our object to close to the enemy's

division. Had the latter been more efficient, he could have reached

one or the other before we regained the centre. Our movement was

contrary to rule; and while the inferences upon which it was based

were plausible, they were not, in the writer's judgment, adequate to

constitute the exception.