*Nature of Fighting Changes.*
[Dated Oct. 26.]
Before the narrative [Transcriber: original 'narative'] of the progress
of the fighting near the Franco-Belgian frontier subsequent to Oct. 20
is continued a brief description will be given of the movement of a
certain fraction of our troops from its former line facing north, on the
east of Paris, to its present position facing east, in the northwest
corner of France, by which a portion of the British Army has been
enabled to join hands with the incoming and growing stream of
reinforcements.
This is now an accomplished fact, as is generally known, and can
therefore be explained in some detail without detriment. Mention will
also be made of the gradual development up to Oct. 20 in the nature of
the operations in this quarter of the theatre of war, which has recently
come into such prominence.
In its broad lines the transfer of strength by one combatant during the
course of a great battle which has just been accomplished is somewhat
remarkable. It can best be compared with the action of the Japanese
during the battle of Mukden, when Gen. Oku withdrew a portion of his
force from his front, moved it northward behind the line, and threw it
into the fight again near the extreme left of the Japanese armies.
In general direction, though not in scope or possible results, owing to
the coast line being reached by the Allies, the parallel [Transcriber:
original 'parellel'] is complete. The Japanese force concerned, however,
was much smaller than ours and the distance covered by it was less than
that from the Aisne to the Franco-Belgian frontier. Gen. Oku's troops,
moreover, marched, whereas ours were moved by march, rail, and motor.
What was implied in the actual withdrawal from contact with the enemy
along the Aisne will be appreciated when the conditions under which we
were then situated are recalled.
In places the two lines were not one hundred yards apart, and for us no
movement was possible during daylight. In some of the trenches which
were under enfilade fire our men had to sit all day long close under the
traverses--as are called those mounds of earth which stretch like
partitions at intervals across a trench so as to give protection from
lateral fire. Even where there was cover, such as that afforded by
depressions or sunken roads, on the hillside below and behind our firing
line, any attempt to cross the intervening space was met by fierce
bursts of machine gun and shell fire.
The men in the firing line were on duty for twenty-four hours at a time,
and brought rations and water with them when they came on duty, for none
could be sent up to them during the day. Even the wounded could not be
removed until dark.
The preliminary retirement of the units was therefore carried out
gradually, under cover of darkness. That the Germans only once opened
fire on them while so engaged was due to the care with which the
operation was conducted, and also, probably, to the fact that the enemy
were so accustomed to the recurrence of the sounds made by the reliefs
of the men in the firing line and by the movement of the supply trains
below that they were misled as to what was actually taking place.
What the operation amounted to on our part was the evacuation of the
trenches, under carefully made arrangements with the French who had to
take our place in the trenches; the retirement to the river below--in
many cases down a steep slope; the crossing of the river over the noisy
plank roadways of floating or repaired bridges, which were mostly
commanded by the enemy's guns--and the climb up to the top of the
plateau on the south side.
The rest of the move was a complicated feat of transportation which cut
across some of the lines of communication of our allies; but it requires
no description here. In spite of the various difficulties, the whole
strategic operation of transferring the large number of troops from the
Aisne was carried out without loss and practically without a hitch.
As regards the change in the nature of the fighting in which we have
recently been engaged, it has already been pointed out that the
operations had up till then been of a preparatory nature and that the
Germans were obviously seeking to delay us by advanced troops while
heavier forces were being got ready and brought up to the scene of
action. It was known that they were raising a new army, consisting of
corps formed of Ersatz, (supernumerary reserves), volunteers, and other
material which had not yet been drawn upon, and that part of it would in
all probability be sent to the western theatre, either to cover the
troops laying siege to Antwerp, in case that place should hold out, or,
in the event of the capture of the fortress, to act in conjunction with
the besieging force in a violent offensive movement toward the coast.
After the fall of Antwerp and the release of the besieging troops there
was a gradual increase in the strength of the opposition met with by us.
The resistance of the detachments--which beyond the right extreme of the
German fortified line near Bethune a fortnight ago consisted almost
entirely of cavalry--grew more and more determined as more infantry and
guns came into the front line, until Tuesday, Oct. 20, when the arrival
opposite us of a large portion of the new formations and a considerable
number of heavy guns enabled the enemy to assume the offensive
practically against the whole of our line at the same time that they
attacked the Belgians between us and the coast.
The operations then really assumed a fresh complexion.
Since that date, up to the 25th, apart from the operations on either
side of us, there has been plenty of action to chronicle on our
immediate front, where some of the heaviest fighting in which we have
yet been engaged has taken place, resulting in immense loss to the
Germans.
On Wednesday, the 21st, the new German formations again pressed forward
in force vigorously all along our line. On our right, south of the Lys,
an attack on Violaines was repulsed with loss to the assailants.
On the other hand, we were driven from some ground close by, to the
north, but regained it by a counter attack.
Still further north the Germans gained and retained some points.
Their total casualties to the southeast of Armentieres are estimated at
over 6,000.
On the north of the Lys, in our centre, a fiercely contested action took
place near La Gheir, which village was captured in the morning by the
enemy and then retaken by us. In this direction the German casualties
were also extremely heavy. They came on with the greatest bravery, in
swarms, only to be swept away by our fire. One battalion of their 104th
Regiment was practically wiped out, some 400 dead being picked up by us
in our lines alone.
Incidentally, by our counter attack, we took 130 prisoners and released
some forty of our own men who had been surrounded and captured,
including a subaltern of artillery who had been cut off while observing
from a point of vantage.
It is agreeable to record that our men were very well treated by their
captors, who were Saxons, being placed in cellars for protection from
the bombardment of our own guns.
On our left our troops advanced against the German 26th Reserve Corps
near Passchendaele, and were met by a determined counter offensive,
which was driven back with great loss. At night the Germans renewed
their efforts unsuccessfully in this quarter.
At one point they tried a ruse which is no longer new. As they came up
in a solid line two deep they shouted out: "Don't fire; we are the
Coldstream Guards."
But our men are getting used to tricks of this kind, and the only result
of this "slimness" was that they allowed the enemy's infantry to
approach, quite close before they swept them down with magazine fire.
Apart from the 400 dead found near our lines in our centre, our patrols
afterwards discovered some 300 dead further out in front of our left,
killed by our artillery.
Thursday, the 22d, saw a renewal of the pressure against us. We
succeeded, however, in holding our ground in nearly every quarter.
South of the Lys the enemy attacked from La Bassée, and gained Violaines
and another point, but their effort against a third village was repulsed
by artillery fire alone, the French and British guns working together
very effectively. On the north of the river it was a day of minor
attacks against us, which were all beaten back.
The Germans advanced in the evening against our centre and left, and
were again hurled back, though they gained some of our trenches in the
latter quarter. By this time the enemy had succeeded in bringing up
several heavy howitzers, and our casualties were considerable.
On Friday, the 23d, all action south of the Lys on our right was
confined to that of the artillery, several of the hostile batteries
being silenced by our fire? In the centre their infantry again
endeavored to force their way forward, and were only repulsed after
determined fighting, leaving many dead on the ground and several
prisoners in our hands. North of the Lys attacks at different points
were repulsed.
On our left the 23d was a bad day for the Germans. Advancing in our
turn, we drove them from some of the trenches out of which they had
turned us on the previous evening, captured 150 prisoners, and released
some of our men whom they had taken.
As the Germans retreated our guns did great execution among them.
They afterwards made five desperate assaults on our trenches, advancing
in mass and singing "Die Wacht am Rhein" as they came on. Each assault
was easily beaten back, our troops waiting until the enemy came to very
close range before they opened fire with rifles and Maxims, causing
terrible havoc in the solid masses.
During the fighting in this quarter on the night of the 22d and on the
23d the German losses were again extremely heavy. We made over 600
prisoners during that time and picked up 1,500 dead, killed on the
latter day alone.
Much of the slaughter was due to the point blank magazine fire of our
men against the German assaults, while our field guns and howitzers,
working in perfect combination, did their share when the enemy were
repulsed. As they fell back they were subjected to a shower of shrapnel.
When they sought shelter in villages or buildings they were shattered
and driven out by high-explosive shells and then again caught by
shrapnel as they came into the open.
The troops to suffer so severely were mostly of Twenty-third Corps, one
of their new formations.
Certainly the way their advance was conducted showed a lack of training
and faults in leading which the almost superhuman bravery of the
soldiers could not counterbalance. It was a holocaust.
The spectacle of these devoted men chanting a national song as they
marched on to certain death was inspiring. It was at the same time
pitiable.
And if any proof were needed that untrained valor alone cannot gain the
day in modern war, the advance of the Twenty-third German Corps on Oct.
23 most assuredly furnished it.
Besides doing its share of execution on the hostile infantry, our
artillery in this quarter brought down a German captive balloon.
As some gauge of the rate at which the guns were firing at what was for
them an ideal target, it may be mentioned that one field battery
expended 1,800 rounds of ammunition during the day.
On Saturday, the 24th, action on our right was once more confined to
that of artillery, except at night, when the Germans pressed on, only to
be repulsed.
In the centre, near Armentières, our troops withstood three separate
attempts of the enemy to push forward, our guns coming into play with
good effect. Against our left the German Twenty-seventh Corps made a
violent effort with no success.
On Sunday, the 25th, it was our turn to take the offensive. This was
carried out by a portion of our left wing, which advanced, gained some
ground, and took two guns and eighty prisoners. It is believed that six
machine guns fell to the French.
In the centre the fighting was severe, though generally indecisive in
result, and the troops in some places were engaged in hand-to-hand
combat. Toward evening we captured 200 prisoners.
On the right action was again confined to that of the guns.
Up to the night of the 25th, therefore, not only have we maintained our
position against the great effort on the part of the enemy to break
through to the west, or to force us back, which started on the 20th; we
have on our left passed to the offensive.
These six days, as may be gathered, have been spent by us in repelling a
succession of desperate onslaughts. It is true that the efforts against
us have been made to a great extent by partially trained men, some of
whom appear to be suffering from lack of food. But it must not be
forgotten that these troops, which are in great force, have only
recently been brought into the field, and are therefore comparatively
fresh. They are fighting also with the utmost determination, in spite
of the fact that many of them are heartily sick of the war.
The struggle has been of the most severe and sanguinary nature, and it
seems that success will favor that side which is possessed of most
endurance, or can bring up and fling fresh forces into the fray. Though
we have undoubtedly inflicted immense loss upon the enemy, they have so
far been able to fill up the gaps in their ranks and to return to the
charge, and we have suffered heavily ourselves.
One feature of the tactics now employed has been the use of cavalry in
dismounted action, for on both sides many of the mounted troops are
fighting in the trenches alongside the infantry.
Armored motor cars, armed with Maxims and light quick-firing guns, also
have recently played a useful part on our side, especially in helping to
eject the enemy lurking in villages and isolated buildings. Against such
parties the combined action of the quick-firer against the snipers in
buildings, and the Maxim against them when they are driven into the
open, is most efficacious.