LXXVII. Having then answered the arguments alledged to be built upon
experience, there only remains, that they prove to us the pretended
inequality by some physical reason. But I affirm no such can be
assigned, because recourse can only be had in this matter, either to
an entative inequality of souls, to a distinct organization, or to a
different temperament of the bodies of both sexes.
LXXVIII. From the entative inequality of souls, nothing can be deduced,
for it is a generally received opinion among philosophers, that all
rational souls, in point of physical perfection, are equal. I well
know, that some quote St. Austin as entertaining an opposite sentiment,
in his 15th book, chap. 13, on the Trinity; but I can’t find, that St.
Austin in that chapter, does even so much as touch upon the matter. I
know likewise, that the faculty of Paris condemned a proposition, which
affirmed the soul of our Lord Christ was not more perfect than the soul
of the treacherous Judas. To this the great Scottish master answered,
that, as the condemnation was not confirmed by the holy see, we are not
bound to observe it. In strictness this is so; but I think it would be
right that such a proposition should be blotted out of every book in
which it is found, as dissonant, harsh, and offensive to weak people,
who in souls, can’t distinguish the physical from the moral; but this
does not in any manner affect the truth of the general opinion, which
assents to a total physical equality of souls.
LXXIX. But if we were to admit of an entative inequality of souls, how
would they prove to us, or make us believe, that God chose the best for
the men, and left the least-perfect for the women? We ought rather to
believe in this matter, that the soul of holy Mary was the best which
could be possessed by a pure creature; and, in fact, the famous Saurez
affirms, that, physically speaking, it was most perfect; so that the
women may be firm in asserting, that the soul is neither masculine nor
feminine, because such an assertion is well founded.
LXXX. With regard to organization, I am inclined to think, that the
variation of it, may greatly vary the operations of the soul; though
we don’t to this day know, which organization is best suited to,
or conduces most to, distinguishing and reasoning well. Aristotle
pretends, that those with small heads are the best reasoners, a
conjecture, which before he committed it to writing, he took care
should correspond with the measure of his own head. Others give their
vote in favour of large heads; these we may conclude, are not of the
little-headed race, if they had, we might suppose they would have
been on the side of Aristotle. Cardinal S’frondati, in his Curso
Philosophico, says, that the reasoning organs of Cardinal Richelieu
were double, to which he attributes the signal perspicuity, and
intellectual agility of that minister. I apprehend, that he must mean
double in magnitude, and not in number, for that would be monstrous;
and this corresponds with what many others say, that the larger the
brain is in quantity, the better people reason, which they collect
from having observed, that the human brain is bigger in proportion
than that of any other animal. Martinez and others, in their books of
anatomy, excluding the great heads and the little ones, maintain, that
those of the middle size are the best adapted for the operations of
the understanding. Those who go about taking measure of the members
of the body, in order to compute the value of the soul, may say what
they please; but experience shews, that among men with large heads, you
will find some stupid, and others ingenious, and that the same thing
is to be observed among those with small ones. If a difference in the
magnitude of the head or the brain, was to induce an inequality in the
operations of the understanding, we should find a great difference
in point of comprehension, among men of unequal stature, because in
proportion as they were larger or smaller, so would their sculls and
brains be; but this is contrary to observation.
LXXXI. But with all this, and even admitting what Pliny says to be
true, that the material substance of the brain, is larger in men than
it is in women, touching which matter, I beg leave to suspend my
judgment, till the assertion is affirmed by some able anatomists; but
I say, admitting the thing to be true, it proves nothing; for if the
comprehending better, was to be governed by this material exceeding in
the substance of the brain, it would follow, that an ingenious man,
should have forty or fifty times more brain than an ideot, and that men
of large bulk should be people of much more perspicuity than those of
small stature, as we must suppose their brains to be in proportion to
their size; but those, he who writes this can persuade to believe it,
should return him thanks, for broaching a doctrine so well suited to
their capacities.
LXXXII. I agree however, that the greater or less degree of clearness,
or facility of understanding, depends in a great measure upon the
difference of organization; though not upon a sensible different
organization of the larger parts, but upon the insensible different one
of the most minute parts, such as the different texture or firmness of
the most subtile fibres, or the freeness from obstruction, or clearness
of the delicate passages through which the animal spirits circulate,
and also upon the tension and elasticity of the membranes which form
those passages; although, we can know nothing about whether these are
different in men and women, nor can even the anatomical spectacles, pry
into the secret, or assist us with such a discernment or discovery;
neither can the Cartesians, with all the microscopes they are capable
of inventing, explore, whether the pineal gland, which they assign as
the seat of the soul, is of a different texture in women, from what it
is in men.
LXXXIII. That a different sensible organization, does not produce a
variety in the rational operations, is manifest, at least, if this
difference is not very enormous; there being men differently organized,
who are of equal abilities; and men organized as nearly alike as
possible, who, with respect to the faculties of the soul, are very
dissimilar. The frigid Æsop, was in every part of his body, so deformed
and ill-shaped, that he scarce appeared a human creature; on which
account, his name in succeeding ages, was used to express an extreme
degree of deformity; with all this, it is well known, that he was of
a delicate and penetrating mind. Socrates, did not differ much from
Æsop in the irregularity of his make; notwithstanding which, antiquity
knew no man of a clearer or better understanding. But supposing we were
to admit, that a distinct sensible organization produced a distinct
intellectual ability, what could you in this case infer from it? Why
nothing, because women are not formed differently from men in the
organs which administer to, or assist the faculty of reasoning, but are
distinctly formed in those only, which Nature has appropriated for the
propagation of the species.