X. The second reply I have to make to the before-named observation,
is, that it very frequently happens, that those lies which are only
looked upon as officious and jocose, are attended with pernicious
consequences. What does it signify, that he who tells a lie did not
do it with an intention to injure any one, if in reality the mischief
follows? The emperor Theodosius the second, presented the empress
Eudoxia with an apple of uncommon magnitude; and she afterwards gave
it to Paulinus a learned and discreet man, whose conversation she was
very fond of, and with whom, her correspondence was perfectly innocent.
Paulinus, ignorant of the hand by which the apple was brought to the
Empress, shewed it to the Emperor, and begged him to accept of it;
the Emperor, recollecting that it was the same apple he had given the
Empress, took an occasion to ask Eudoxia by surprize, what she had
done with the apple? The question coming upon her unawares, and she,
apprehensive the Emperor might be displeased with her for parting
with the apple, answered she had eaten it. This, in the intention of
Eudoxia, was a lie purely officious; but was attended with a most
pernicious consequence, as it was the occasion of Paulinus being put
to death; for Theodosius, suspecting the commerce between him and the
Empress not to be very chaste, ordered him to be dispatched.
XI. Caligula having recalled from banishment, one who had been
sentenced to that punishment by his predecessor, asked him how he
employed his time while he was banished; and he, to recommend himself
to the good graces of the Emperor, answered, that he employed the
greatest part of it in praying to the gods for the death of Tiberius;
because that would make way for his ascending the throne. What lie
to all appearance could be more innocent than this? Yet in its
consequences, it was very pernicious, for Caligula, taking it into his
head, that those he had banished would occupy themselves in the same
way, ordered them all to be put to death.
XII. I could give more examples of the same sort; but am aware, that it
may be said in answer to them, that these are unforeseen accidents;
but they notwithstanding, are the evil accidental consequences of
lies, which although the person who tells them cannot foresee, are not
unworthy the attention of the legislature; and of their taking measures
to prevent the mischiefs arising from them, by assigning some species
of punishment to all kinds of lies whatever. At least, the motive of
preventing these accidental mischiefs, should operate jointly with the
reasons we have already given, to induce the legislature, to fall upon
some mode of punishment to curb the vice of lying.