SECT. II.

III. I cannot help remarking a monstrous contradiction, that is

very frequent in this matter. If a man of any rank or figure in the

world, is told to his face that he lies, he considers himself as very

seriously injured, and according to the cruel laws of human honour, is

esteemed as having put up with a very gross affront, if he does not

demand of the man who told him so, a very sanguinary satisfaction; but

I would be glad to know, how telling a man he lies, can be a very

serious injury, if lying is not esteemed a very serious defect in him

who is addicted to it; or how a man can be considered as affronted,

because he is told he lies, if the action of lying is not scandalous

or unworthy. The degree of reproach annexed to a vice, is generally

estimated according to the light in which that vice is considered

by the world at large. If the vice is not held to be such a one, as

tarnishes a man’s honour, his honour will not be deemed wounded by

the commission of it; and it may be said of a man in such a case,

that his honour is not injured. This being a notorious fact, the

inference I would draw from the before-mentioned observation, is, that

the frequency of lying, lessens in the generality of mankind, the

abhorrence, which natural reason left to itself, has of this vice; but

notwithstanding this custom, it has not diminished so thoroughly, but

that there still remains in the soul of man, a clear conviction, that

lying is a baseness.

IV. I am confirmed in this opinion, by the observation, that a man’s

denying what he has said, is looked upon as an opprobrium to him.

And why is this? why because it amounts to a confession that he had

before told a lie. The opprobrium cannot lie in the truth of what he

now confesses; and therefore must consist in the lie which he told

before. Confessing that he has lied, is a mark of sincerity, and no one

need blush for having been sincere; therefore all the ignominy must be

annexed to the lie. This, I say, makes it manifest to me, that their

native sentiment of this matter is not so obscured in mankind, but that

it represents a lie to them as a most unworthy and a vile thing.

Essays, or discourses, vol. 2 (of 4) · 第 25 / 105 题