I remember, when riding around by a by-street in Covington, to

avoid the crowd that followed the marching column, that some one

brought me an invitation to dine with a sister of Sam. Anderson,

who was a cadet at West Point with me; but the messenger reached me

after we had passed the main part of the town. I asked to be

excused, and rode on to a place designated for camp, at the

crossing of the Ulcofauhachee River, about four miles to the east

of the town. Here we made our bivouac, and I walked up to a

plantation-house close by, where were assembled many negroes, among

them an old, gray-haired man, of as fine a head as I ever saw. I

asked him if he understood about the war and its progress. He said

he did; that he had been looking for the "angel of the Lord" ever

since he was knee-high, and, though we professed to be fighting for

the Union, he supposed that slavery was the cause, and that our

success was to be his freedom. I asked him if all the negro slaves

comprehended this fact, and he said they surely did. I then

explained to him that we wanted the slaves to remain where they

were, and not to load us down with useless mouths, which would eat

up the food needed for our fighting men; that our success was their

assured freedom; that we could receive a few of their young, hearty

men as pioneers; but that, if they followed us in swarms of old and

young, feeble and helpless, it would simply load us down and

cripple us in our great task. I think Major Henry Hitchcock was

with me on that occasion, and made a note of the conversation, and

I believe that old man spread this message to the slaves, which was

carried from mouth to mouth, to the very end of our journey, and

that it in part saved us from the great danger we incurred of

swelling our numbers so that famine would have attended our

progress. It was at this very plantation that a soldier passed me

with a ham on his musket, a jug of sorghum-molasses under his arm,

and a big piece of honey in his hand, from which he was eating,

and, catching my eye, he remarked sotto voce and carelessly to a

comrade, "Forage liberally on the country," quoting from my general

orders. On this occasion, as on many others that fell under my

personal observation, I reproved the man, explained that foraging

must be limited to the regular parties properly detailed, and that

all provisions thus obtained must be delivered to the regular

commissaries, to be fairly distributed to the men who kept their

ranks.

From Covington the Fourteenth Corps (Davis's), with which I was

traveling, turned to the right for Milledgeville, via Shady Dale.

General Slocum was ahead at Madison, with the Twentieth Corps,

having torn up the railroad as far as that place, and thence had

sent Geary's division on to the Oconee, to burn the bridges across

that stream, when this corps turned south by Eatonton, for

Milledgeville, the common "objective" for the first stage of the

"march." We found abundance of corn, molasses, meal, bacon, and

sweet-potatoes. We also took a good many cows and oxen, and a

large number of mules. In all these the country was quite rich,

never before having been visited by a hostile army; the recent crop

had been excellent, had been just gathered and laid by for the

winter. As a rule, we destroyed none, but kept our wagons full,

and fed our teams bountifully.

The skill and success of the men in collecting forage was one of

the features of this march. Each brigade commander had authority

to detail a company of foragers, usually about fifty men, with one

or two commissioned officers selected for their boldness and

enterprise. This party would be dispatched before daylight with a

knowledge of the intended day's march and camp; would proceed on

foot five or six miles from the route traveled by their brigade,

and then visit every plantation and farm within range. They would

usually procure a wagon or family carriage, load it with bacon,

corn-meal, turkeys, chickens, ducks, and every thing that could be

used as food or forage, and would then regain the main road,

usually in advance of their train. When this came up, they would

deliver to the brigade commissary the supplies thus gathered by the

way. Often would I pass these foraging-parties at the roadside,

waiting for their wagons to come up, and was amused at their

strange collections--mules, horses, even cattle, packed with old

saddles and loaded with hams, bacon, bags of cornmeal, and poultry

of every character and description. Although this foraging was

attended with great danger and hard work, there seemed to be a

charm about it that attracted the soldiers, and it was a privilege

to be detailed on such a party. Daily they returned mounted on all

sorts of beasts, which were at once taken from them and

appropriated to the general use; but the next day they would start

out again on foot, only to repeat the experience of the day before.

No doubt, many acts of pillage, robbery, and violence, were

committed by these parties of foragers, usually called "bummers;"

for I have since heard of jewelry taken from women, and the plunder

of articles that never reached the commissary; but these acts were

exceptional and incidental. I never heard of any cases of murder

or rape; and no army could have carried along sufficient food and

forage for a march of three hundred miles; so that foraging in some

shape was necessary. The country was sparsely settled, with no

magistrates or civil authorities who could respond to requisitions,

as is done in all the wars of Europe; so that this system of

foraging was simply indispensable to our success. By it our men

were well supplied with all the essentials of life and health,

while the wagons retained enough in case of unexpected delay, and

our animals were well fed. Indeed, when we reached Savannah, the

trains were pronounced by experts to be the finest in flesh and

appearance ever seen with any army.

Habitually each corps followed some main road, and the foragers,

being kept out on the exposed flank, served all the military uses

of flankers. The main columns gathered, by the roads traveled,

much forage and food, chiefly meat, corn, and sweet-potatoes, and

it was the duty of each division and brigade quartermaster to fill

his wagons as fast as the contents were issued to the troops. The

wagon-trains had the right to the road always, but each wagon was

required to keep closed up, so as to leave no gaps in the column.

If for any purpose any wagon or group of wagons dropped out of

place, they had to wait for the rear. And this was always dreaded,

for each brigade commander wanted his train up at camp as soon

after reaching it with his men as possible.

I have seen much skill and industry displayed by these

quarter-masters on the march, in trying to load their wagons with

corn and fodder by the way without losing their place in column.

They would, while marching, shift the loads of wagons, so as to have

six or ten of them empty. Then, riding well ahead, they would secure

possession of certain stacks of fodder near the road, or cribs of

corn, leave some men in charge, then open fences and a road back for

a couple of miles, return to their trains, divert the empty wagons

out of column, and conduct them rapidly to their forage, load up and

regain their place in column without losing distance. On one occasion

I remember to have seen ten or a dozen wagons thus loaded with corn

from two or three full cribs, almost without halting. These cribs

were built of logs, and roofed. The train-guard, by a lever, had

raised the whole side of the crib a foot or two; the wagons drove

close alongside, and the men in the cribs, lying on their backs,

kicked out a wagon-load of corn in the time I have taken to describe

it.

In a well-ordered and well-disciplined army, these things might be

deemed irregular, but I am convinced that the ingenuity of these

younger officers accomplished many things far better than I could

have ordered, and the marches were thus made, and the distances

were accomplished, in the most admirable way. Habitually we

started from camp at the earliest break of dawn, and usually

reached camp soon after noon. The marches varied from ten to

fifteen miles a day, though sometimes on extreme flanks it was

necessary to make as much as twenty, but the rate of travel was

regulated by the wagons; and, considering the nature of the roads,

fifteen miles per day was deemed the limit.

The pontoon-trains were in like manner distributed in about equal

proportions to the four corps, giving each a section of about nine

hundred feet. The pontoons were of the skeleton pattern, with

cotton-canvas covers, each boat, with its proportion of balks and

cheeses, constituting a load for one wagon. By uniting two such

sections together, we could make a bridge of eighteen hundred feet,

enough for any river we had to traverse; but habitually the leading

brigade would, out of the abundant timber, improvise a bridge

before the pontoon-train could come up, unless in the cases of

rivers of considerable magnitude, such as the Ocmulgee, Oconee,

Ogeechee, Savannah, etc.

On the 20th of November I was still with the Fourteenth Corps, near

Eatonton Factory, waiting to hear of the Twentieth Corps; and on

the 21st we camped near the house of a man named Mann; the next

day, about 4 p.m., General Davis had halted his head of column on a

wooded ridge, overlooking an extensive slope of cultivated country,

about ten miles short of Milledgeville, and was deploying his

troops for camp when I got up. There was a high, raw wind blowing,

and I asked him why he had chosen so cold and bleak a position. He

explained that he had accomplished his full distance for the day,

and had there an abundance of wood and water. He explained further

that his advance-guard was a mile or so ahead; so I rode on, asking

him to let his rear division, as it came up, move some distance

ahead into the depression or valley beyond. Riding on some

distance to the border of a plantation, I turned out of the main

road into a cluster of wild-plum bushes, that broke the force of

the cold November wind, dismounted, and instructed the staff to

pick out the place for our camp.

The afternoon was unusually raw and cold. My orderly was at hand

with his invariable saddle-bags, which contained a change of

under-clothing, my maps, a flask of whiskey, and bunch of cigars.

Taking a drink and lighting a cigar, I walked to a row of

negro-huts close by, entered one and found a soldier or two warming

themselves by a wood-fire. I took their place by the fire,

intending to wait there till our wagons had got up, and a camp made

for the night. I was talking to the old negro woman, when some one

came and explained to me that, if I would come farther down the

road, I could find a better place. So I started on foot, and found

on the main road a good double-hewed-log house, in one room of

which Colonel Poe, Dr. Moore, and others, had started a fire. I

sent back orders to the "plum-bushes" to bring our horses and

saddles up to this house, and an orderly to conduct our headquarter

wagons to the same place. In looking around the room, I saw a

small box, like a candle-box, marked "Howell Cobb," and, on

inquiring of a negro, found that we were at the plantation of

General Howell Cobb, of Georgia, one of the leading rebels of the

South, then a general in the Southern army, and who had been

Secretary of the United States Treasury in Mr. Buchanan's time. Of

course, we confiscated his property, and found it rich in corn,

beans, pea-nuts, and sorghum-molasses. Extensive fields were all

round the house; I sent word back to General David to explain whose

plantation it was, and instructed him to spare nothing. That night

huge bonfires consumed the fence-rails, kept our soldiers warm, and

the teamsters and men, as well as the slaves, carried off an

immense quantity of corn and provisions of all sorts.

In due season the headquarter wagons came up, and we got supper.

After supper I sat on a chair astride, with my back to a good fire,

musing, and became conscious that an old negro, with a

tallow-candle in his hand, was scanning my face closely. I inquired,

"What do you want, old man!" He answered, "Dey say you is Massa

Sherman." I answered that such was the case, and inquired what he

wanted. He only wanted to look at me, and kept muttering, "Dis

nigger can't sleep dis night." I asked him why he trembled so, and

he said that he wanted to be sure that we were in fact "Yankees,"

for on a former occasion some rebel cavalry had put on light-blue

overcoats, personating Yankee troops, and many of the negroes were

deceived thereby, himself among the number had shown them sympathy,

and had in consequence been unmercifully beaten therefor. This

time he wanted to be certain before committing himself; so I told

him to go out on the porch, from which he could see the whole

horizon lit up with camp-fires, and he could then judge whether he

had ever seen any thing like it before. The old man became

convinced that the "Yankees" had come at last, about whom he had

been dreaming all his life; and some of the staff officers gave him

a strong drink of whiskey, which set his tongue going. Lieutenant

Spelling, who commanded my escort, was a Georgian, and recognized

in this old negro a favorite slave of his uncle, who resided about

six miles off; but the old slave did not at first recognize his

young master in our uniform. One of my staff-officers asked him

what had become of his young master, George. He did not know, only

that he had gone off to the war, and he supposed him killed, as a

matter of course. His attention was then drawn to Spelling's face,

when he fell on his knees and thanked God that he had found his

young master alive and along with the Yankees. Spelling inquired

all about his uncle and the family, asked my permission to go and

pay his uncle a visit, which I granted, of course, and the next

morning he described to me his visit. The uncle was not cordial,

by any means, to find his nephew in the ranks of the host that was

desolating the land, and Spelling came back, having exchanged his

tired horse for a fresher one out of his uncle's stables,

explaining that surely some of the "bummers" would have got the

horse had he not.

The next morning, November 23d, we rode into Milledgeville, the

capital of the State, whither the Twentieth Corps had preceded us;

and during that day the left wing was all united, in and around

Milledgeville. From the inhabitants we learned that some of

Kilpatrick's cavalry had preceded us by a couple of days, and that

all of the right wing was at and near Gordon, twelve miles off,

viz., the place where the branch railroad came to Milledgeville

from the Mason & Savannah road. The first stage of the journey

was, therefore, complete, and absolutely successful.

General Howard soon reported by letter the operations of his right

wing, which, on leaving Atlanta, had substantially followed the two

roads toward Mason, by Jonesboro' and McDonough, and reached the

Ocmulgee at Planters' Factory, which they crossed, by the aid of

the pontoon-train, during the 18th and 19th of November. Thence,

with the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair's) he (General Howard)

had marched via Monticello toward Gordon, having dispatched

Kilpatrick's cavalry, supported by the Fifteenth Corps

(Osterhaus's), to feign on Mason. Kilpatrick met the enemy's

cavalry about four miles out of Mason, and drove them rapidly back

into the bridge-defenses held by infantry. Kilpatrick charged

these, got inside the parapet, but could not hold it, and retired

to his infantry supports, near Griswold Station. The Fifteenth

Corps tore up the railroad-track eastward from Griswold, leaving

Charles R. Wood's division behind as a rear-guard-one brigade of

which was intrenched across the road, with some of Kilpatrick's

cavalry on the flanks. On the 22d of November General G. W. Smith,

with a division of troops, came out of Mason, attacked this brigade

(Walcutt's) in position, and was handsomely repulsed and driven

back into Mason. This brigade was in part armed with Spencer

repeating-rifles, and its fire was so rapid that General Smith

insists to this day that he encountered a whole division; but he is

mistaken; he was beaten by one brigade (Walcutt's), and made no

further effort to molest our operations from that direction.

General Walcutt was wounded in the leg, and had to ride the rest of

the distance to Savannah in a carriage.

Therefore, by the 23d, I was in Milledgeville with the left wing,

and was in full communication with the right wing at Gordon. The

people of Milledgeville remained at home, except the Governor

(Brown), the State officers, and Legislature, who had ignominiously

fled, in the utmost disorder and confusion; standing not on the

order of their going, but going at once--some by rail, some by

carriages, and many on foot. Some of the citizens who remained

behind described this flight of the "brave and patriotic" Governor

Brown. He had occupied a public building known as the "Governor's

Mansion," and had hastily stripped it of carpets, curtains, and

furniture of all sorts, which were removed to a train of

freight-cars, which carried away these things--even the cabbages and

vegetables from his kitchen and cellar--leaving behind muskets,

ammunition, and the public archives. On arrival at Milledgeville I

occupied the same public mansion, and was soon overwhelmed with

appeals for protection. General Slocum had previously arrived with

the Twentieth Corps, had taken up his quarters at the Milledgeville

Hotel, established a good provost-guard, and excellent order was

maintained. The most frantic appeals had been made by the Governor

and Legislature for help from every quarter, and the people of the

State had been called out en masse to resist and destroy the invaders

of their homes and firesides. Even the prisoners and convicts of the

penitentiary were released on condition of serving as soldiers, and

the cadets were taken from their military college for the same

purpose. These constituted a small battalion, under General Harry

Wayne, a former officer of the United States Army, and son of the

then Justice Wayne of the Supreme Court. But these hastily retreated

east across the Oconee River, leaving us a good bridge, which we

promptly secured.

At Milledgeville we found newspapers from all the South, and

learned the consternation which had filled the Southern mind at our

temerity; many charging that we were actually fleeing for our lives

and seeking safety at the hands of our fleet on the sea-coast. All

demanded that we should be assailed, "front, flank, and rear;" that

provisions should be destroyed in advance, so that we would starve;

that bridges should be burned, roads obstructed, and no mercy shown

us. Judging from the tone of the Southern press of that day, the

outside world must have supposed us ruined and lost. I give a few

of these appeals as samples, which to-day must sound strange to the

parties who made them:

Corinth, Mississippi, November 18, 1884.

To the People of Georgia:

Arise for the defense of your native soil! Rally around your

patriotic Governor and gallant soldiers! Obstruct and destroy all

the roads in Sherman's front, flank, and rear, and his army will

soon starve in your midst. Be confident. Be resolute. Trust in an

overruling Providence, and success will soon crown your efforts. I

hasten to join you in the defense of your homes and firesides.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

RICHMOND, November 18, 1884.

To the People of Georgia:

You have now the best opportunity ever yet presented to destroy the

enemy. Put every thing at the disposal of our generals; remove all

provisions from the path of the invader, and put all obstructions

in his path.

Every citizen with his gun, and every negro with his spade and axe,

can do the work of a soldier. You can destroy the enemy by

retarding his march.

Georgians, be firm! Act promptly, and fear not!

B. H. Hill, Senator.

I most cordially approve the above.

James A. SEDDON, Secretary of War.

Richmond, November 19,1864.

To the People of Georgia:

We have had a special conference with President Davis and the

Secretary of War, and are able to assure you that they have done

and are still doing all that can be done to meet the emergency that

presses upon you. Let every man fly to arms! Remove your negroes,

horses, cattle, and provisions from Sherman's army, and burn what

you cannot carry. Burn all bridges, and block up the roads in his

route. Assail the invader in front, flank, and rear, by night and

by day. Let him have no rest.

JULIAN HARTRIDGE

MARK BLANDFORD,

J. H. ECHOLS

GEO. N. LESTER

JOHN T. SHUEMAKER

JAS. M. SMITH,

Members of Congress.

Of course, we were rather amused than alarmed at these threats, and

made light of the feeble opposition offered to our progress. Some

of the officers (in the spirit of mischief) gathered together in

the vacant hall of Representatives, elected a Speaker, and

constituted themselves the Legislature of the State of Georgia! A

proposition was made to repeal the ordinance of secession, which

was well debated, and resulted in its repeal by a fair vote! I was

not present at these frolics, but heard of them at the time, and

enjoyed the joke.

Meantime orders were made for the total destruction of the arsenal

and its contents, and of such public buildings as could be easily

converted to hostile uses. But little or no damage was done to

private property, and General Slocum, with my approval, spared

several mills, and many thousands of bales of cotton, taking what

he knew to be worthless bonds, that the cotton should not be used

for the Confederacy. Meantime the right wing continued its

movement along the railroad toward Savannah, tearing up the track

and destroying its iron. At the Oconee was met a feeble resistance

from Harry Wayne's troops, but soon the pontoon-bridge was laid,

and that wing crossed over. Gilpatrick's cavalry was brought into

Milledgeville, and crossed the Oconee by the bridge near the town;

and on the 23d I made the general orders for the next stage of the

march as far as Millen. These were, substantially, for the right

wing to follow the Savannah Railroad, by roads on its south; the

left wing was to move to Sandersville, by Davisboro' and

Louisville, while the cavalry was ordered by a circuit to the

north, and to march rapidly for Millen, to rescue our prisoners of

war confined there. The distance was about a hundred miles.

General Wheeler, with his division of rebel cavalry, had succeeded

in getting ahead of us between Milledgeville and Augusta, and

General P. J. Hardee had been dispatched by General Beauregard from

Hood's army to oppose our progress directly in front. He had,

however, brought with him no troops, but relied on his influence

with the Georgians (of whose State he was a native) to arouse the

people, and with them to annihilate Sherman's army!

On the 24th we renewed the march, and I accompanied the Twentieth

Corps, which took the direct road to Sandersville, which we reached

simultaneously with the Fourteenth Corps, on the 26th. A brigade

of rebel cavalry was deployed before the town, and was driven in

and through it by our skirmish-line. I myself saw the rebel cavalry

apply fire to stacks of fodder standing in the fields at

Sandersville, and gave orders to burn some unoccupied dwellings

close by. On entering the town, I told certain citizens (who would

be sure to spread the report) that, if the enemy attempted to carry

out their threat to burn their food, corn, and fodder, in our

route, I would most undoubtedly execute to the letter the general

orders of devastation made at the outset of the campaign. With

this exception, and one or two minor cases near Savannah, the

people did not destroy food, for they saw clearly that it would be

ruin to themselves.

At Sandersville I halted the left wing until I heard that the right

wing was abreast of us on the railroad. During the evening a negro

was brought to me, who had that day been to the station (Tenille),

about six miles south of the town. I inquired of him if there were

any Yankees there, and he answered, "Yes." He described in his own

way what he had seen.

"First, there come along some cavalry-men, and they burned the

depot; then come along some infantry-men, and they tore up the

track, and burned it;" and just before he left they had "sot fire

to the well."

The next morning, viz., the 27th, I rode down to the station, and

found General Corse's division (of the Fifteenth Corps) engaged in

destroying the railroad, and saw the well which my negro informant

had seen "burnt." It was a square pit about twenty-five feet deep,

boarded up, with wooden steps leading to the bottom, wherein was a

fine copper pump, to lift the water to a tank above. The soldiers

had broken up the pump, heaved in the steps and lining, and set

fire to the mass of lumber in the bottom of the well, which

corroborated the negro's description.

From this point Blair's corps, the Seventeenth, took up the work of

destroying the railroad, the Fifteenth Corps following another road

leading eastward, farther to the south of the railroad. While the

left wing was marching toward Louisville, north of the railroad,

General Kilpatrick had, with his cavalry division, moved rapidly

toward Waynesboro', on the branch railroad leading from Millen to

Augusta. He found Wheeler's division of rebel cavalry there, and

had considerable skirmishing with it; but, learning that our

prisoners had been removed two days before from Millen, he returned

to Louisville on the 29th, where he found the left wing. Here he

remained a couple of days to rest his horses, and, receiving orders

from me to engage Wheeler and give him all the fighting he wanted,

he procured from General Slocum the assistance of the infantry

division of General Baird, and moved back for Waynesboro' on the 2d

of December, the remainder of the left wing continuing its march on

toward Millers. Near Waynesboro' Wheeler was again encountered,

and driven through the town and beyond Brier Creek, toward Augusta,

thus keeping up the delusion that the main army was moving toward

Augusta. General Kilpatrick's fighting and movements about

Waynesboro' and Brier Creek were spirited, and produced a good

effect by relieving the infantry column and the wagon-trains of all

molestation during their march on Millen. Having thus covered that

flank, he turned south and followed the movement of the Fourteenth

Corps to Buckhead Church, north of Millen and near it.

On the 3d of December I entered Millen with the Seventeenth Corps

(General Frank P. Blair), and there paused one day, to communicate

with all parts of the army. General Howard was south of the

Ogeechee River, with the Fifteenth Corps, opposite Scarboro'.

General Slocum was at Buckhead Church, four miles north of Millen,

with the Twentieth Corps. The Fourteenth (General Davis) was at

Lumpkin's Station, on the Augusta road, about ten miles north of

Millen, and the cavalry division was within easy support of this

wing. Thus the whole army was in good position and in good

condition. We had largely subsisted on the country; our wagons

were full of forage and provisions; but, as we approached the

sea-coast, the country became more sandy and barren, and food

became more scarce; still, with little or no loss, we had traveled

two-thirds of our distance, and I concluded to push on for

Savannah. At Millen I learned that General Bragg was in Augusta,

and that General Wade Hampton had been ordered there from Richmond,

to organize a large cavalry force with which to resist our

progress.

General Hardee was ahead, between us and Savannah, with McLaw's

division, and other irregular troops, that could not, I felt

assured, exceed ten thousand men. I caused the fine depot at

Millen to be destroyed, and other damage done, and then resumed the

march directly on Savannah, by the four main roads. The Seventeenth

Corps (General Blair) followed substantially the railroad,

and, along with it, on the 5th of December, I reached Ogeechee

Church, about fifty miles from Savannah, and found there fresh

earthworks, which had been thrown up by McLaw's division; but he

must have seen that both his flanks were being turned, and

prudently retreated to Savannah without a fight. All the columns

then pursued leisurely their march toward Savannah, corn and forage

becoming more and more scarce, but rice-fields beginning to occur

along the Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers, which proved a good

substitute, both as food and forage. The weather was fine, the

roads good, and every thing seemed to favor us. Never do I recall

a more agreeable sensation than the sight of our camps by night,

lit up by the fires of fragrant pine-knots. The trains were all in

good order, and the men seemed to march their fifteen miles a day

as though it were nothing. No enemy opposed us, and we could only

occasionally hear the faint reverberation of a gun to our left

rear, where we knew that General Kilpatrick was skirmishing with

Wheeler's cavalry, which persistently followed him. But the

infantry columns had met with no opposition whatsoever. McLaw's

division was falling back before us, and we occasionally picked up

a few of his men as prisoners, who insisted that we would meet with

strong opposition at Savannah.

On the 8th, as I rode along, I found the column turned out of the

main road, marching through the fields. Close by, in the corner of

a fence, was a group of men standing around a handsome young

officer, whose foot had been blown to pieces by a torpedo planted

in the road. He was waiting for a surgeon to amputate his leg, and

told me that he was riding along with the rest of his brigade-staff

of the Seventeenth Corps, when a torpedo trodden on by his horse

had exploded, killing the horse and literally blowing off all the

flesh from one of his legs. I saw the terrible wound, and made

full inquiry into the facts. There had been no resistance at that

point, nothing to give warning of danger, and the rebels had

planted eight-inch shells in the road, with friction-matches to

explode them by being trodden on. This was not war, but murder,

and it made me very angry. I immediately ordered a lot of rebel

prisoners to be brought from the provost-guard, armed with picks

and spades, and made them march in close order along the road, so

as to explode their own torpedoes, or to discover and dig them up.

They begged hard, but I reiterated the order, and could hardly help

laughing at their stepping so gingerly along the road, where it was

supposed sunken torpedoes might explode at each step, but they

found no other torpedoes till near Fort McAllister. That night we

reached Pooler's Station, eight miles from Savannah, and during the

next two days, December 9th and 10th, the several corps reached the

defenses of Savannah--the Fourteenth Corps on the left, touching

the river; the Twentieth Corps next; then the Seventeenth; and the

Fifteenth on the extreme right; thus completely investing the city.

Wishing to reconnoitre the place in person, I rode forward by the

Louisville road, into a dense wood of oak, pine, and cypress, left

the horses, and walked down to the railroad-track, at a place where

there was a side-track, and a cut about four feet deep. From that

point the railroad was straight, leading into Savannah, and about

eight hundred yards off were a rebel parapet and battery. I could

see the cannoneers preparing to fire, and cautioned the officers

near me to scatter, as we would likely attract a shot. Very soon I

saw the white puff of smoke, and, watching close, caught sight of

the ball as it rose in its flight, and, finding it coming pretty

straight, I stepped a short distance to one side, but noticed a

negro very near me in the act of crossing the track at right

angles. Some one called to him to look out; but, before the poor

fellow understood his danger, the ball (a thirty-two-pound round

shot) struck the ground, and rose in its first ricochet, caught the

negro under the right jaw, and literally carried away his head,

scattering blood and brains about. A soldier close by spread an

overcoat over the body, and we all concluded to get out of that

railroad-cut. Meantime, General Mower's division of the Seventeenth

Corps had crossed the canal to the right of the Louisville

road, and had found the line of parapet continuous; so at Savannah

we had again run up against the old familiar parapet, with its deep

ditches, canals, and bayous, full of water; and it looked as though

another siege was inevitable. I accordingly made a camp or bivouac

near the Louisville road, about five miles from Savannah, and

proceeded to invest the place closely, pushing forward

reconnoissances at every available point.

As soon as it was demonstrated that Savannah was well fortified,

with a good garrison, commanded by General William J. Hardee, a

competent soldier, I saw that the first step was to open

communication with our fleet, supposed to be waiting for us with

supplies and clothing in Ossabaw Sound.

General Howard had, some nights previously, sent one of his best

scouts, Captain Duncan, with two men, in a canoe, to drift past

Fort McAllister, and to convey to the fleet a knowledge of our

approach. General Kilpatrick's cavalry had also been transferred

to the south bank of the Ogeechee, with orders to open

communication with the fleet. Leaving orders with General Slocum

to press the siege, I instructed General Howard to send a division

with all his engineers to Grog's Bridge, fourteen and a half miles

southwest from Savannah, to rebuild it. On the evening of the 12th

I rode over myself, and spent the night at Mr. King's house, where

I found General Howard, with General Hazen's division of the

Fifteenth Corps. His engineers were hard at work on the bridge,

which they finished that night, and at sunrise Hazen's division

passed over. I gave General Hazen, in person, his orders to march

rapidly down the right bank of the Ogeechee, and without hesitation

to assault and carry Fort McAllister by storm. I knew it to be

strong in heavy artillery, as against an approach from the sea, but

believed it open and weak to the rear. I explained to General

Hazen, fully, that on his action depended the safety of the whole

army, and the success of the campaign. Kilpatrick had already felt

the fort, and had gone farther down the coast to Kilkenny Bluff, or

St. Catharine's Sound, where, on the same day, he had communication

with a vessel belonging to the blockading fleet; but, at the time,

I was not aware of this fact, and trusted entirely to General Hazen

and his division of infantry, the Second of the Fifteenth Corps,

the same old division which I had commanded at Shiloh and

Vicksburg, in which I felt a special pride and confidence.

Having seen General Hazen fairly off, accompanied by General

Howard, I rode with my staff down the left bank of the Ogeechee,

ten miles to the rice-plantation of a Mr. Cheevea, where General

Howard had established a signal-station to overlook the lower

river, and to watch for any vessel of the blockading squadron,

which the negroes reported to be expecting us, because they nightly

sent up rockets, and daily dispatched a steamboat up the Ogeechee

as near to Fort McAllister as it was safe.

On reaching the rice-mill at Cheevea's, I found a guard and a

couple of twenty-pound Parrott gone, of De Gres's battery, which

fired an occasional shot toward Fort McAllister, plainly seen over

the salt-marsh, about three miles distant. Fort McAllister had the

rebel flag flying, and occasionally sent a heavy shot back across

the marsh to where we were, but otherwise every thing about the

place looked as peaceable and quiet as on the Sabbath.

The signal-officer had built a platform on the ridge-pole of

the rice-mill. Leaving our horses behind the stacks of rice-straw,

we all got on the roof of a shed attached to the mill, wherefrom I

could communicate with the signal-officer above, and at the same

time look out toward Ossabaw Sound, and across the Ogeechee River

at Fort McAllister. About 2 p.m. we observed signs of commotion

in the fort, and noticed one or two guns fired inland, and some

musket-skirmishing in the woods close by.

This betokened the approach of Hazen's division, which had been

anxiously expected, and soon thereafter the signal-officer

discovered about three miles above the fort a signal-flag, with

which he conversed, and found it to belong to General Hazen, who

was preparing to assault the fort, and wanted to know if I were

there. On being assured of this fact, and that I expected the fort

to be carried before night, I received by signal the assurance of

General Hazen that he was making his preparations, and would soon

attempt the assault. The sun was rapidly declining, and I was

dreadfully impatient. At that very moment some one discovered a

faint cloud of smoke, and an object gliding, as it were, along the

horizon above the tops of the sedge toward the sea, which little by

little grew till it was pronounced to be the smoke-stack of a

steamer coming up the river. "It must be one of our squadron!"

Soon the flag of the United States was plainly visible, and our

attention was divided between this approaching steamer and the

expected assault. When the sun was about an hour high, another

signal-message came from General Hazen that he was all ready, and I

replied to go ahead, as a friendly steamer was approaching from

below. Soon we made out a group of officers on the deck of this

vessel, signaling with a flag, "Who are you!" The answer went back

promptly, "General Sherman." Then followed the question, "Is Fort

McAllister taken?" "Not yet, but it will be in a minute!" Almost

at that instant of time, we saw Hazen's troops come out of the dark

fringe of woods that encompassed the fort, the lines dressed as on

parade, with colors flying, and moving forward with a quick, steady

pace. Fort McAllister was then all alive, its big guns belching

forth dense clouds of smoke, which soon enveloped our assaulting

lines. One color went down, but was up in a moment. On the lines

advanced, faintly seen in the white, sulphurous smoke; there was a

pause, a cessation of fire; the smoke cleared away, and the

parapets were blue with our men, who fired their muskets in the

air, and shouted so that we actually heard them, or felt that we

did. Fort McAllister was taken, and the good news was instantly

sent by the signal-officer to our navy friends on the approaching

gunboat, for a point of timber had shut out Fort McAllister from

their view, and they had not seen the action at all, but must have

heard the cannonading.

During the progress of the assault, our little group on Cheeves's

mill hardly breathed; but no sooner did we see our flags on the

parapet than I exclaimed, in the language of the poor negro at

Cobb's plantation, "This nigger will have no sleep this night!"

I was resolved to communicate with our fleet that night, which

happened to be a beautiful moonlight one. At the wharf belonging

to Cheeves's mill was a small skiff, that had been used by our men

in fishing or in gathering oysters. I was there in a minute,

called for a volunteer crew, when several young officers, Nichols

and Merritt among the number; said they were good oarsmen, and

volunteered to pull the boat down to Fort McAllister. General

Howard asked to accompany me; so we took seats in the stern of the

boat, and our crew of officers pulled out with a will. The tide

was setting in strong, and they had a hard pull, for, though the

distance was but three miles in an air-line, the river was so

crooked that the actual distance was fully six miles. On the way

down we passed the wreck of a steamer which had been sunk some

years before, during a naval attack on Fort McAllister.

Night had fairly set in when we discovered a soldier on the beach.

I hailed him, and inquired if he knew where General Hazen was. He

answered that the general was at the house of the overseer of the

plantation (McAllister's), and that he could guide me to it. We

accordingly landed, tied our boat to a driftlog, and followed our

guide through bushes to a frame-house, standing in a grove of

live-oaks, near a row of negro quarters.

General Hazen was there with his staff, in the act of getting

supper; he invited us to join them, which we accepted promptly, for

we were really very hungry. Of course, I congratulated Hazen most

heartily on his brilliant success, and praised its execution very

highly, as it deserved, and he explained to me more in detail the

exact results. The fort was an inclosed work, and its land-front

was in the nature of a bastion and curtains, with good parapet,

ditch, fraise, and chevaux-de-frise, made out of the large branches

of live-oaks. Luckily, the rebels had left the larger and unwieldy

trunks on the ground, which served as a good cover for the

skirmish-line, which crept behind these logs, and from them kept

the artillerists from loading and firing their guns accurately.

The assault had been made by three parties in line, one from below,

one from above the fort, and the third directly in rear, along the

capital. All were simultaneous, and had to pass a good abatis and

line of torpedoes, which actually killed more of the assailants

than the heavy guns of the fort, which generally overshot the mark.

Hazen's entire loss was reported, killed and wounded, ninety-two.

Each party reached the parapet about the same time, and the

garrison inside, of about two hundred and fifty men (about fifty of

them killed or wounded), were in his power. The commanding

officer, Major Anderson, was at that moment a prisoner, and

General Hazen invited him in to take supper with us, which he did.

Up to this time General Hazen did not know that a gunboat was in

the river below the fort; for it was shut off from sight by a point

of timber, and I was determined to board her that night, at

whatever risk or cost, as I wanted some news of what was going on

in the outer world. Accordingly, after supper, we all walked down

to the fort, nearly a mile from the house where we had been,

entered Fort McAllister, held by a regiment of Hazen's troops, and

the sentinel cautioned us to be very careful, as the ground outside

the fort was full of torpedoes. Indeed, while we were there, a

torpedo exploded, tearing to pieces a poor fellow who was hunting

for a dead comrade. Inside the fort lay the dead as they had

fallen, and they could hardly be distinguished from their living

comrades, sleeping soundly side by side in the pale moonlight. In

the river, close by the fort, was a good yawl tied to a stake, but

the tide was high, and it required some time to get it in to the

bank; the commanding officer, whose name I cannot recall, manned

the boat with a good crew of his men, and, with General Howard, I

entered, and pulled down-stream, regardless of the warnings all

about the torpedoes.

The night was unusually bright, and we expected to find the gunboat

within a mile or so; but, after pulling down the river fully three

miles, and not seeing the gunboat, I began to think she had turned

and gone back to the sound; but we kept on, following the bends of

the river, and about six miles below McAllister we saw her light,

and soon were hailed by the vessel at anchor. Pulling alongside,

we announced ourselves, and were received with great warmth and

enthusiasm on deck by half a dozen naval officers, among them

Captain Williamson, United States Navy. She proved to be the

Dandelion, a tender of the regular gunboat Flag, posted at the

mouth of the Ogeechee. All sorts of questions were made and

answered, and we learned that Captain Duncan had safely reached the

squadron, had communicated the good news of our approach, and they

had been expecting us for some days. They explained that Admiral

Dahlgren commanded the South-Atlantic Squadron, which was then

engaged in blockading the coast from Charleston south, and was on

his flag-ship, the Harvest Moon, lying in Wassaw Sound; that

General J. G. Foster was in command of the Department of the South,

with his headquarters at Hilton Head; and that several ships loaded

with stores for the army were lying in Tybee Roads and in Port

Royal Sound. From these officers I also learned that General Grant

was still besieging Petersburg and Richmond, and that matters and

things generally remained pretty much the same as when we had left

Atlanta. All thoughts seemed to have been turned to us in Georgia,

cut off from all communication with our friends; and the rebel

papers had reported us to be harassed, defeated, starving, and

fleeing for safety to the coast. I then asked for pen and paper,

and wrote several hasty notes to General Foster, Admiral Dahlgren,

General Grant, and the Secretary of War, giving in general terms

the actual state of affairs, the fact of the capture of Fort

McAllister, and of my desire that means should be taken to

establish a line of supply from the vessels in port up the Ogeechee

to the rear of the army. As a sample, I give one of these notes,

addressed to the Secretary of War, intended for publication to

relieve the anxiety of our friends at the North generally:

ON BOARD DANDELION, OSSABAW SOUND, December 13, 1864--11.50 p.m.

To Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

To-day, at 6 p. m., General Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps

carried Fort McAllister by assault, capturing its entire garrison

and stores. This opened to us Ossabaw Sound, and I pushed down to

this gunboat to communicate with the fleet. Before opening

communication we had completely destroyed all the railroads leading

into Savannah, and invested the city. The left of the army is on

the Savannah River three miles above the city, and the right on the

Ogeechee, at King's Bridge. The army is in splendid order, and

equal to any thing. The weather has been fine, and supplies were

abundant. Our march was most agreeable, and we were not at all

molested by guerrillas.

We reached Savannah three days ago, but, owing to Fort McAllister,

could not communicate; but, now that we have McAllister, we can go

ahead.

We have already captured two boats on the Savannah river and

prevented their gunboats from coming down.

I estimate the population of Savannah at twenty-five thousand, and

the garrison at fifteen thousand. General Hardee commands.

We have not lost a wagon on the trip; but have gathered a large

supply of negroes, mules, horses, etc., and our teams are in far

better condition than when we started.

My first duty will be to clear the army of surplus negroes, mules,

and horses. We have utterly destroyed over two hundred miles of

rails, and consumed stores and provisions that were essential to

Lee's and Hood's armies.

The quick work made with McAllister, the opening of communication

with our fleet, and our consequent independence as to supplies,

dissipate all their boasted threats to head us off and starve the

army.

I regard Savannah as already gained.

Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

By this time the night was well advanced, and the tide was running

ebb-strong; so I asked. Captain Williamson to tow us up as near

Fort McAllister as he would venture for the torpedoes, of which the

navy-officers had a wholesome dread. The Dandelion steamed up some

three or four miles, till the lights of Fort McAllister could be

seen, when she anchored, and we pulled to the fort in our own boat.

General Howard and I then walked up to the McAllister House, where

we found General Hazen and his officers asleep on the floor of one

of the rooms. Lying down on the floor, I was soon fast asleep, but

shortly became conscious that some one in the room was inquiring

for me among the sleepers. Calling out, I was told that an officer

of General Fosters staff had just arrived from a steamboat anchored

below McAllister; that the general was extremely anxious to see me

on important business, but that he was lame from an old Mexican-War

wound, and could not possibly come to me. I was extremely weary

from the incessant labor of the day and night before, but got up,

and again walked down the sandy road to McAllister, where I found a

boat awaiting us, which carried us some three miles down the river,

to the steamer W. W. Coit (I think), on board of which we found

General Foster. He had just come from Port Royal, expecting to

find Admiral Dahlgren in Ossabaw Sound, and, hearing of the capture

of Fort McAllister, he had come up to see me. He described fully

the condition of affairs with his own command in South Carolina.

He had made several serious efforts to effect a lodgment on the

railroad which connects Savannah with Charleston near Pocotaligo,

but had not succeeded in reaching the railroad itself, though he

had a full division of troops, strongly intrenched, near Broad

River, within cannon-range of the railroad. He explained,

moreover, that there were at Port Royal abundant supplies of bread

and provisions, as well as of clothing, designed for our use. We

still had in our wagons and in camp abundance of meat, but we

needed bread, sugar, and coffee, and it was all-important that a

route of supply should at once be opened, for which purpose the

assistance of the navy were indispensable. We accordingly

steamed down the Ogeechee River to Ossabaw Sound, in hopes to meet

Admiral Dahlgren, but he was not there, and we continued on by the

inland channel to Warsaw Sound, where we found the Harvest Moon,

and Admiral Dahlgren. I was not personally acquainted with him at

the time, but he was so extremely kind and courteous that I was at

once attracted to him. There was nothing in his power, he said,

which he would not do to assist us, to make our campaign absolutely

successful. He undertook at once to find vessels of light draught

to carry our supplies from Port Royal to Cheeves's Mill, or to

Grog's Bridge above, whence they could be hauled by wagons to our

several camps; he offered to return with me to Fort McAllister, to

superintend the removal of the torpedoes, and to relieve me of all

the details of this most difficult work. General Foster then

concluded to go on to Port Royal, to send back to us six hundred

thousand rations, and all the rifled guns of heavy calibre, and

ammunition on hand, with which I thought we could reach the city of

Savannah, from the positions already secured. Admiral Dahlgren

then returned with me in the Harvest Moon to Fort McAllister. This

consumed all of the 14th of December; and by the 15th I had again

reached Cheeves's Mill, where my horse awaited me, and rode on to

General Howard's headquarters at Anderson's plantation, on the

plank-road, about eight miles back of Savannah. I reached this

place about noon, and immediately sent orders to my own

head-quarters, on the Louisville road, to have them brought over to

the plank-road, as a place more central and convenient; gave written

notice to Generals Slocum and Howard of all the steps taken, and

ordered them to get ready to receive the siege-guns, to put them in

position to bombard Savannah, and to prepare for the general assault.

The country back of Savannah is very low, and intersected with

innumerable saltwater creeks, swamps, and rice-fields. Fortunately

the weather was good and the roads were passable, but, should the

winter rains set in, I knew that we would be much embarrassed.

Therefore, heavy details of men were at once put to work to prepare a

wharf and depot at Grog's Bridge, and the roads leading thereto were

corduroyed in advance. The Ogeechee Canal was also cleared out for

use; and boats, such as were common on the river plantations, were

collected, in which to float stores from our proposed base on the

Ogeechee to the points most convenient to the several camps.

Slocum's wing extended from the Savannah River to the canal, and

Howard's wing from the canal to the extreme right, along down the

Little Ogeechee. The enemy occupied not only the city itself, with

its long line of outer works, but the many forts which had been

built to guard the approaches from the sea-such as at Beaulieu,

Rosedew, White Bluff, Bonaventura, Thunderbolt, Cansten's Bluff,

Forts Tatnall, Boggs, etc., etc. I knew that General Hardee could

not have a garrison strong enough for all these purposes, and I was

therefore anxious to break his lines before he could receive

reenforcements from Virginia or Augusta. General Slocum had

already captured a couple of steamboats trying to pass down the

Savannah River from Augusta, and had established some of his men on

Argyle and Hutchinson Islands above the city, and wanted to

transfer a whole corps to the South Carolina bank; but, as the

enemy had iron-clad gunboats in the river, I did not deem it

prudent, because the same result could be better accomplished from

General Fosters position at Broad River.

Fort McAllister was captured as described, late in the evening of

December 13th, and by the 16th many steamboats had passed up as

high as King's Bridge; among them one which General Grant had

dispatched with the mails for the army, which had accumulated since

our departure from Atlanta, under charge of Colonel A. H. Markland.

These mails were most welcome to all the officers and soldiers of

the army, which had been cut off from friends and the world for two

months, and this prompt receipt of letters from home had an

excellent effect, making us feel that home was near. By this

vessel also came Lieutenant Dune, aide-de-camp, with the following

letter of December 3d, from General Grant, and on the next day

Colonel Babcock, United States Engineers, arrived with the letter

of December 6th, both of which are in General Grant's own

handwriting, and are given entire:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 3, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Armies near Savannah,

Georgia.

GENERAL: The little information gleaned from the Southern press

indicating no great obstacle to your progress, I have directed your

mails (which had been previously collected in Baltimore by Colonel

Markland, special-agent of the Post-Office Department) to be sent

as far as the blockading squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to

you as soon as heard from on the coast.

Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain from

congratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has

been struck. I have never had a fear, however, for the result.

Since you left Atlanta no very great progress has been made here.

The enemy has been closely watched, though, and prevented from

detaching against you. I think not one man has gone from here,

except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. Bragg

has gone from Wilmington. I am trying to take advantage of his

absence to get possession of that place. Owing to some

preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are making to blow

up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do not believe

a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition off. I

hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg will

not have started back by that time.

In this letter I do not intend to give you any thing like

directions for future action, but will state a general idea I have,

and will get your views after you have established yourself on the

sea-coast. With your veteran army I hope to get control of the only

two through routes from east to west possessed by the enemy before

the fall of Atlanta. The condition will be filled by holding

Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other port to the east of

Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington falls, a force from there

can cooperate with you.

Thomas has got back into the defenses of Nashville, with Hood close

upon him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads,

except the main one leading to Chattanooga. Part of this falling

back was undoubtedly necessary, and all of it may have been. It

did not look so, however, to me. In my opinion, Thomas far

outnumbers Hood in infantry. In cavalry Hood has the advantage in

morale and numbers. I hope yet that Hood will be badly crippled,

if not destroyed. The general news you will learn from the papers

better than I can give it.

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there

is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will run

down the coast to see you. If you desire it, I will ask Mrs.

Sherman to go with me.

Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the

Mississippi

GENERAL: On reflection since sending my letter by the hands of

Lieutenant Dunn, I have concluded that the most important operation

toward closing out the rebellion will be to close out Lee and his

army.

You have now destroyed the roads of the South so that it will

probably take them three months without interruption to reestablish

a through line from east to west. In that time I think the job here

will be effectually completed.

My idea now is that you establish a base on the sea-coast, fortify

and leave in it all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantry

to protect them, and at the same time so threaten the interior that

the militia of the South will have to be kept at home. With the

balance of your command come here by water with all dispatch.

Select yourself the officer to leave in command, but you I want in

person. Unless you see objections to this plan which I cannot see,

use every vessel going to you for purposes of transportation.

Hood has Thomas close in Nashville. I have said all I can to force

him to attack, without giving the positive order until to-day.

To-day, however, I could stand it no longer, and gave the order

without any reserve. I think the battle will take place to-morrow.

The result will probably be known in New York before Colonel

Babcock (the bearer of this) will leave it. Colonel Babcock will

give you full information of all operations now in progress.

Very respectfully your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

The contents of these letters gave me great uneasiness, for I had

set my heart on the capture of Savannah, which I believed to be

practicable, and to be near; for me to embark for Virginia by sea

was so complete a change from what I had supposed would be the

course of events that I was very much concerned. I supposed, as a

matter of course, that a fleet of vessels would soon pour in, ready

to convey the army to Virginia, and as General Grant's orders

contemplated my leaving the cavalry, trains, and artillery, behind,

I judged Fort McAllister to be the best place for the purpose, and

sent my chief-engineer, Colonel Poe, to that fort, to reconnoitre

the ground, and to prepare it so as to make a fortified camp large

enough to accommodate the vast herd of mules and horses that would

thus be left behind. And as some time might be required to collect

the necessary shipping, which I estimated at little less than a

hundred steamers and sailing-vessels, I determined to push

operations, in hopes to secure the city of Savannah before the

necessary fleet could be available. All these ideas are given in

my answer to General Grant's letters (dated December 16, 1864)

herewith, which is a little more full than the one printed in the

report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, because in that

copy I omitted the matter concerning General Thomas, which now need

no longer be withheld:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 16, 1864.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point,

Virginia.

GENERAL: I received, day before yesterday, at the hands of

Lieutenant Dunn, your letter of December 8d, and last night, at the

hands of Colonel Babcock, that of December 6th. I had previously

made you a hasty scrawl from the tugboat Dandelion, in Ogeechee

River, advising you that the army had reached the sea-coast,

destroying all the railroads across the State of Georgia, investing

closely the city of Savannah, and had made connection with the

fleet.

Since writing that note, I have in person met and conferred with

General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, and made all the arrangements

which were deemed essential for reducing the city of Savannah to

our possession. But, since the receipt of yours of the 6th, I have

initiated measures looking principally to coming to you with fifty

or Sixty thousand infantry, and incidentally to capture Savannah,

if time will allow.

At the time we carried Fort McAllister by assault so handsomely,

with its twenty-two guns and entire garrison, I was hardly aware

of its importance; but, since passing down the river with General

Foster and up with Admiral Dahlgren, I realize how admirably

adapted are Ossabaw Sound and Ogeechee River to supply an army

operating against Savannah. Seagoing vessels can easily come to

King's Bridge, a point on Ogeechee River, fourteen and a half miles

due west of Savannah, from which point we have roads leading to all

our camps. The country is low and sandy, and cut up with marshes,

which in wet weather will be very bad, but we have been so favored

with weather that they are all now comparatively good, and heavy

details are constantly employed in double-corduroying the marshes,

so that I have no fears even of bad weather. Fortunately, also, by

liberal and judicious foraging, we reached the sea-coast abundantly

supplied with forage and provisions, needing nothing on arrival

except bread. Of this we started from Atlanta, with from eight to

twenty days' supply per corps and some of the troops only had one

day's issue of bread during the trip of thirty days; yet they did

not want, for sweet-potatoes were very abundant, as well as

corn-meal, and our soldiers took to them naturally. We started

with about five thousand head of cattle, and arrived with over ten

thousand, of course consuming mostly turkeys, chickens, sheep,

hogs, and the cattle of the country. As to our mules and horses,

we left Atlanta with about twenty-five hundred wagons, many of

which were drawn by mules which had not recovered from the

Chattanooga starvation, all of which were replaced, the poor mules

shot, and our transportation is now in superb condition. I have no

doubt the State of Georgia has lost, by our operations, fifteen

thousand first-rate mules. As to horses, Kilpatrick collected all

his remounts, and it looks to me, in riding along our

columns, as though every officer had three or four led horses, and

each regiment seems to be followed by at least fifty negroes and

foot-sore soldiers, riding on horses and mules. The custom was for

each brigade to send out daily a foraging-party of about fifty men,

on foot, who invariably returned mounted, with several wagons

loaded with poultry, potatoes, etc., and as the army is composed of

about forty brigades, you can estimate approximately the number of

horses collected. Great numbers of these were shot by my order,

because of the disorganizing effect on our infantry of having too

many idlers mounted. General Euston is now engaged in collecting

statistics on this subject, but I know the Government will never

receive full accounts of our captures, although the result aimed at

was fully attained, viz., to deprive our enemy of them. All these

animals I will have sent to Port Royal, or collected behind Fort

McAllister, to be used by General Saxton in his farming operations,

or by the Quartermaster's Department, after they are systematically

accounted for. While General Easton is collecting transportation

for my troops to James River, I will throw to Port Royal Island all

our means of transportation I can, and collect the rest near Fort

McAllister, covered by the Ogeeehee River and intrenchments to be

erected, and for which Captain Poe, my chief-engineer, is now

reconnoitring the ground, but in the mean time will act as I have

begun, as though the city of Savannah were my objective: namely,

the troops will continue to invest Savannah closely, making attacks

and feints wherever we have fair ground to stand upon, and I will

place some thirty-pound Parrotts, which I have got from General

Foster, in position, near enough to reach the centre of the city,

and then will demand its surrender. If General Hardee is alarmed,

or fears starvation, he may surrender; otherwise I will bombard the

city, but not risk the lives of our men by assaults across the

narrow causeways, by which alone I can now reach it.

If I had time, Savannah, with all its dependent fortifications,

would surely fall into our possession, for we hold all its avenues

of supply.

The enemy has made two desperate efforts to get boats from above to

the city, in both of which he has been foiled-General Slocum (whose

left flank rests on the river) capturing and burning the first

boat, and in the second instance driving back two gunboats and

capturing the steamer Resolute, with seven naval officers and a

crew of twenty-five seamen. General Slocum occupies Argyle Island

and the upper end of Hutchinson Inland, and has a brigade on the

South Carolina shore opposite, and is very urgent to pass one of

his corps over to that shore. But, in view of the change of plan

made necessary by your order of the 6th, I will maintain things in

statu quo till I have got all my transportation to the rear and out

of the way, and until I have sea-transportation for the troops you

require at James River, which I will accompany and command in

person. Of course, I will leave Kilpatrick, with his cavalry (say

five thousand three hundred), and, it may be, a division of the

Fifteenth Corps; but, before determining on this, I must see

General Foster, and may arrange to shift his force (now over above

the Charleston Railroad, at the head of Broad River) to the

Ogeeohee, where, in cooperation with Kilpatrick's cavalry, he can

better threaten the State of Georgia than from the direction of

Port Royal. Besides, I would much prefer not to detach from my

regular corps any of its veteran divisions, and would even prefer

that other less valuable troops should be sent to reenforce Foster

from some other quarter. My four corps, full of experience and

full of ardor, coming to you en masse, equal to sixty thousand

fighting men, will be a reenforcement that Lee cannot disregard.

Indeed, with my present command, I had expected, after reducing

Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina; thence to

Raleigh, and thence to report to you. But this would consume, it

may be, six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah; whereas, by

sea, I can probably reach you with my men and arms before the

middle of January.

I myself am somewhat astonished at the attitude of things in

Tennessee. I purposely delayed at Kingston until General Thomas

assured me that he was all ready, and my last dispatch from him of

the 12th of November was full of confidence, in which he promised

me that he would ruin Hood if he dared to advance from Florence,

urging me to go ahead, and give myself no concern about Hood's army

in Tennessee.

Why he did not turn on him at Franklin, after checking and

discomfiting him, surpasses my understanding. Indeed, I do not

approve of his evacuating Decatur, but think he should have assumed

the offensive against Hood from Pulaski, in the direction of

Waynesburg.

I know full well that General Thomas is slow in mind and in action;

but he is judicious and brave and the troops feel great confidence

in him. I still hope he will out-manoeuvre and destroy Hood.

As to matters in the Southeast, I think Hardee, in Savannah, has

good artillerists, some five or six thousand good infantry, and,

it may be, a mongrel mass of eight to ten thousand militia. In all

our marching through Georgia, he has not forced us to use any thing

but a skirmish-line, though at several points he had erected

fortifications and tried to alarm us by bombastic threats. In

Savannah he has taken refuge in a line constructed behind swamps

and overflowed rice-fields, extending from a point on the Savannah

River about three miles above the city, around by a branch of the

Little Ogeechee, which stream is impassable from its salt-marshes

and boggy swamps, crossed only by narrow causeways or common

corduroy-roads.

There must be twenty-five thousand citizens, men, women, and

children, in Savannah, that must also be fed, and how he is to feed

them beyond a few days I cannot imagine. I know that his

requisitions for corn on the interior counties were not filled, and

we are in possession of the rice-fields and mills, which could

alone be of service to him in this neighborhood. He can draw

nothing from South Carolina, save from a small corner down in the

southeast, and that by a disused wagon-road. I could easily get

possession of this, but hardly deem it worth the risk of making a

detachment, which would be in danger by its isolation from the main

army. Our whole army is in fine condition as to health, and the

weather is splendid. For that reason alone I feel a personal

dislike to turning northward. I will keep Lieutenant Dunn here

until I know the result of my demand for the surrender of Savannah,

but, whether successful or not, shall not delay my execution of

your order of the 6th, which will depend alone upon the time it

will require to obtain transportation by sea.

I am, with respect, etc., your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General United States Army.

Having concluded all needful preparations, I rode from my

headquarters, on the plank-road, over to General Slocum's

headquarters, on the Macon road, and thence dispatched (by flag of

truce) into Savannah, by the hands of Colonel Ewing,

inspector-general, a demand for the surrender of the place. The

following letters give the result. General Hardee refused to

surrender, and I then resolved to make the attempt to break his

line of defense at several places, trusting that some one would

succeed.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 17, 1864.

General WILLIAM J. HARDEE, commanding Confederate Forces in

Savannah.

GENERAL: You have doubtless observed, from your station at Rosedew

that sea-going vessels now come through Ossabaw Sound and up the

Ogeechee to the rear of my army, giving me abundant supplies of all

kinds, and more especially heavy ordnance necessary for the

reduction of Savannah. I have already received guns that can cast

heavy and destructive shot as far as the heart of your city; also,

I have for some days held and controlled every avenue by which the

people and garrison of Savannah can be supplied, and I am therefore

justified in demanding the surrender of the city of Savannah, and

its dependent forts, and shall wait a reasonable time for your

answer, before opening with heavy ordnance. Should you entertain

the proposition, I am prepared to grant liberal terms to the

inhabitants and garrison; but should I be forced to resort to

assault, or the slower and surer process of starvation, I shall

then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and

shall make little effort to restrain my army--burning to avenge the

national wrong which they attach to Savannah and other large cities

which have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil

war. I inclose you a copy of General Hood's demand for the

surrender of the town of Resaoa, to be used by you for what it is

worth. I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA AND FLORIDA

SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 17, 1864

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Federal Forces near

Savannah, Georgia.

GENERAL: I have to acknowledge the receipt of a communication from

you of this date, in which you demand "the surrender of Savannah

and its dependent forts," on the ground that you "have received

guns that can cast heavy and destructive shot into the heart of the

city," and for the further reason that you "have, for some days,

held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison

can be supplied." You add that, should you be "forced to resort to

assault, or to the slower and surer process of starvation, you will

then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and will

make little effort to restrain your army," etc., etc. The position

of your forces (a half-mile beyond the outer line for the

land-defense of Savannah) is, at the nearest point, at least four

miles from the heart of the city. That and the interior line are

both intact.

Your statement that you have, for some days, held and controlled

every avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied, is

incorrect. I am in free and constant communication with my

department.

Your demand for the surrender of Savannah and its dependent forts

is refused.

With respect to the threats conveyed in the closing paragraphs of

your letter (of what may be expected in case your demand is not

complied with), I have to say that I have hitherto conducted the

military operations intrusted to my direction in strict accordance

with the rules of civilized warfare, and I should deeply regret the

adoption of any course by you that may force me to deviate from

them in future. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your

obedient servant,

W. J. HARDEE, Lieutenant-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 18, 1864 8 p.m.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

GENERAL: I wrote you at length (by Colonel Babcock) on the 16th

instant. As I therein explained my purpose, yesterday I made a

demand on General Hardee for the surrender of the city of Savannah,

and to-day received his answer--refusing; copies of both letters

are herewith inclosed. You will notice that I claim that my lines

are within easy cannon-range of the heart of Savannah; but General

Hardee asserts that we are four and a half miles distant. But I

myself have been to the intersection of the Charleston and Georgia

Central Railroads, and the three-mile post is but a few yards

beyond, within the line of our pickets. The enemy has no pickets

outside of his fortified line (which is a full quarter of a mile

within the three-mile post), and I have the evidence of Mr. R. R.

Cuyler, President of the Georgia Central Railroad (who was a

prisoner in our hands), that the mile-posts are measured from the

Exchange, which is but two squares back from the river. By

to-morrow morning I will have six thirty-pound Parrotts in

position, and General Hardee will learn whether I am right or not.

From the left of our line, which is on the Savannah River, the

spires can be plainly seen; but the country is so densely wooded

with pine and live-oak, and lies so flat, that we can see nothing

from any other portion of our lines. General Slocum feels

confident that he can make a successful assault at one or two

points in front of General Davis's (Fourteenth) corps. All of

General Howard's troops (the right wing) lie behind the Little

Ogeechee, and I doubt if it can be passed by troops in the face of

an enemy. Still, we can make strong feints, and if I can get a

sufficient number of boats, I shall make a cooperative

demonstration up Vernon River or Wassaw Sound. I should like very

much indeed to take Savannah before coming to you; but, as I wrote

to you before, I will do nothing rash or hasty, and will embark for

the James River as soon as General Easton (who is gone to Port

Royal for that purpose) reports to me that he has an approximate

number of vessels for the transportation of the contemplated force.

I fear even this will cost more delay than you anticipate, for

already the movement of our transports and the gunboats has

required more time than I had expected. We have had dense fogs;

there are more mud-banks in the Ogeechee than were reported, and

there are no pilots whatever. Admiral Dahlgren promised to have

the channel buoyed and staked, but it is not done yet. We find

only six feet of water up to King's Bridge at low tide, about ten

feet up to the rice-mill, and sixteen to Fort McAllister. All

these points may be used by us, and we have a good, strong bridge

across Ogeechee at King's, by which our wagons can go to Fort

McAllister, to which point I am sending all wagons not absolutely

necessary for daily use, the negroes, prisoners of war, sick, etc.,

en route for Port Royal. In relation to Savannah, you will remark

that General Hardee refers to his still being in communication with

his department. This language he thought would deceive me; but I

am confirmed in the belief that the route to which he refers (the

Union Plank-road on the South Carolina shore) is inadequate to feed

his army and the people of Savannah, and General Foster assures me

that he has his force on that very road, near the head of Broad

River, so that cars no longer run between Charleston and Savannah.

We hold this end of the Charleston Railroad, and have destroyed it

from the three-mile post back to the bridge (about twelve miles).

In anticipation of leaving this country, I am continuing the

destruction of their railroads, and at this moment have two

divisions and the cavalry at work breaking up the Gulf Railroad

from the Ogeechee to the Altamaha; so that, even if I do not take

Savannah, I will leave it in a bad way. But I still hope that

events will give me time to take Savannah, even if I have to

assault with some loss. I am satisfied that, unless we take it,

the gunboats never will, for they can make no impression upon the

batteries which guard every approach from the sea. I have a faint

belief that, when Colonel Babcock reaches you, you will delay

operations long enough to enable me to succeed here. With Savannah

in our possession, at some future time if not now, we can punish

South Carolina as she deserves, and as thousands of the people in

Georgia hoped we would do. I do sincerely believe that the whole

United States, North and South, would rejoice to have this army

turned loose on South Carolina, to devastate that State in the

manner we have done in Georgia, and it would have a direst and

immediate bearing on your campaign in Virginia.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General United States Army.

As soon as the army had reached Savannah, and had opened

communication with the fleet, I endeavored to ascertain what had

transpired in Tennessee since our departure. We received our

letters and files of newspapers, which contained full accounts of

all the events there up to about the 1st of December. As before

described, General Hood had three full corps of infantry--S. D.

Lee's, A. P. Stewart's, and Cheatham's, at Florence, Alabama--with

Forrest's corps of cavalry, numbering in the aggregate about

forty-five thousand men. General Thomas was in Nashville, Tennessee,

quietly engaged in reorganizing his army out of the somewhat broken

forces at his disposal. He had posted his only two regular corps,

the Fourth and Twenty-third, under the general command of

Major-General J. M. Schofield, at Pulaski, directly in front of

Florence, with the three brigades of cavalry (Hatch, Croxton, and

Capron), commanded by Major-General Wilson, watching closely for

Hood's initiative.

This force aggregated about thirty thousand men, was therefore

inferior to the enemy; and General Schofield was instructed, in

case the enemy made a general advance, to fall back slowly toward

Nashville, fighting, till he should be reenforced by General Thomas

in person. Hood's movement was probably hurried by reason of my

advance into Georgia; for on the 17th his infantry columns marched

from Florence in the direction of Waynesboro', turning, Schofield's

position at Pulaski. The latter at once sent his trains to the

rear, and on the 21st fell back to Columbia, Tennessee. General

Hood followed up this movement, skirmished lightly with Schofield

at Columbia, began the passage of Duck River, below the town, and

Cheatham's corps reached the vicinity of Spring Hill, whither

General Schofield had sent General Stanley, with two of his

divisions, to cover the movement of his trains. During the night

of November 29th General Schofield passed Spring Hill with his

trains and army, and took post at Franklin, on the south aide of

Harpeth River. General Hood now attaches serious blame to General

Cheatham for not attacking General Schofield in flank while in

motion at Spring Hill, for he was bivouacked within eight hundred

yards of the road at the time of the passage of our army. General

Schofield reached Franklin on the morning of November 30th, and

posted his army in front of the town, where some

rifle-intrenchments had been constructed in advance. He had the

two corps of Stanley and Cox (Fourth and Twenty-third), with

Wilson's cavalry on his flanks, and sent his trains behind the

Harpeth.

General Hood closed upon him the same day, and assaulted his

position with vehemence, at one time breaking the line and wounding

General Stanley seriously; but our men were veterans, cool and

determined, and fought magnificently. The rebel officers led their

men in person to the several persistent assaults, continuing the

battle far into the night, when they drew off, beaten and

discomfited.

Their loss was very severe, especially in general officers; among

them Generals Cleburn and Adams, division commanders. Hood's loss

on that day was afterward ascertained to be (Thomas's report):

Buried on the field, seventeen hundred and fifty; left in hospital

at Franklin, thirty-eight hundred; and seven hundred and two

prisoners captured and held: aggregate, six thousand two hundred

and fifty-two. General Schofields lose, reported officially, was

one hundred and eighty-nine killed, one thousand and thirty-three

wounded, and eleven hundred and four prisoners or missing:

aggregate, twenty-three hundred and twenty-six. The next day

General Schofield crossed the Harpeth without trouble, and fell

back to the defenses of Nashville.

Meantime General Thomas had organized the employees of the

Quartermaster's Department into a corps, commanded by the

chief-quartermaster, General J. Z. Donaldson, and placed them in the

fortifications of Nashville, under the general direction of

Major-General Z. B. Tower, now of the United States Engineers. He

had also received the two veteran divisions of the Sixteenth Corps,

under General A. J. Smith, long absent and long expected; and he

had drawn from Chattanooga and Decatur (Alabama) the divisions of

Steedman and of R. S. Granger. These, with General Schofields army

and about ten thousand good cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson,

constituted a strong army, capable not only of defending Nashville,

but of beating Hood in the open field. Yet Thomas remained inside

of Nashville, seemingly passive, until General Hood had closed upon

him and had entrenched his position.

General Thomas had furthermore held fast to the railroad leading

from Nashville to Chattanooga, leaving strong guards at its

principal points, as at Murfreesboro', Deckerd, Stevenson,

Bridgeport, Whitesides, and Chattanooga. At Murfreesboro' the

division of Rousseau was reenforced and strengthened up to about

eight thousand men.

At that time the weather was cold and sleety, the ground was

covered with ice and snow, and both parties for a time rested on

the defensive. Those matters stood at Nashville, while we were

closing down on Savannah, in the early part of December, 1864; and

the country, as well as General Grant, was alarmed at the seeming

passive conduct of General Thomas; and General Grant at one time

considered the situation so dangerous that he thought of going to

Nashville in person, but General John A. Logan, happening to be at

City Point, was sent out to supersede General Thomas; luckily for

the latter, he acted in time, gained a magnificent victory, and

thus escaped so terrible a fate.

On the 18th of December, at my camp by the side of the plank-road,

eight miles back of Savannah, I received General Hardee's letter

declining to surrender, when nothing remained but to assault. The

ground was difficult, and, as all former assaults had proved so

bloody, I concluded to make one more effort to completely surround

Savannah on all aides, so as further to excite Hardee's fears, and,

in case of success, to capture the whole of his army. We had

already completely invested the place on the north, west, and

south, but there remained to the enemy, on the east, the use of the

old dike or plank-road leading into South Carolina, and I knew that

Hardee would have a pontoon-bridge across the river. On examining

my maps, I thought that the division of John P. Hatch, belonging to

General Fosters command, might be moved from its then position at

Broad River, by water, down to Bluffton, from which it could reach

this plank-road, fortify and hold it--at some risk, of course,

because Hardee could avail himself of his central position to fall

on this detachment with his whole army. I did not want to make a

mistake like "Ball's Bluff" at that period of the war; so, taking

one or two of my personal staff, I rode back to Grog's Bridge,

leaving with Generals Howard and Slocum orders to make all

possible preparations, but not to attack, during my two or three

days' absence; and there I took a boat for Wassaw Sound, whence

Admiral Dahlgren conveyed me in his own boat (the Harvest Moon) to

Hilton Head, where I represented the matter to General Foster, and

he promptly agreed to give his personal attention to it. During

the night of the 20th we started back, the wind blowing strong,

Admiral Dahlgren ordered the pilot of the Harvest Moon to run into

Tybee, and to work his way through to Wassaw Sound and the Ogeechee

River by the Romney Marshes. We were caught by a low tide and

stuck in the mud. After laboring some time, the admiral ordered

out his barge; in it we pulled through this intricate and shallow

channel, and toward evening of December 21st we discovered, coming

toward us, a tug, called the Red Legs, belonging to the

Quarter-master's Department, with a staff-officer on board, bearing

letters from Colonel Dayton to myself and the admiral, reporting that

the city of Savannah had been found evacuated on the morning of

December 21st, and was then in our possession. General Hardee had

crossed the Savannah River by a pontoon-bridge, carrying off his men

and light artillery, blowing up his iron-clads and navy-yard, but

leaving for us all the heavy guns, stores, cotton, railway-cars,

steamboats, and an immense amount of public and private property.

Admiral Dahlgren concluded to go toward a vessel (the Sonoma) of his

blockading fleet, which lay at anchor near Beaulieu, and I

transferred to the Red Legs, and hastened up the Ogeechee River to

Grog's Bridge, whence I rode to my camp that same night. I there

learned that, early on the morning of December 21st, the skirmishers

had detected the absence of the enemy, and had occupied his lines

simultaneously along their whole extent; but the left flank (Slocum),

especially Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps, claimed to have

been the first to reach the heart of the city.

Generals Slocum and Howard moved their headquarters at once into

the city, leaving the bulk of their troops in camps outside. On

the morning of December 22d I followed with my own headquarters,

and rode down Bull Street to the custom-house, from the roof of

which we had an extensive view over the city, the river, and the

vast extent of marsh and rice-fields on the South Carolina side.

The navy-yard, and the wreck of the iron-clad ram Savannah, were

still smouldering, but all else looked quiet enough. Turning back,

we rode to the Pulaski Hotel, which I had known in years long gone,

and found it kept by a Vermont man with a lame leg, who used to be

a clerk in the St. Louis Hotel, New Orleans, and I inquired about

the capacity of his hotel for headquarters. He was very anxious to

have us for boarders, but I soon explained to him that we had a

full mess equipment along, and that we were not in the habit of

paying board; that one wing of the building would suffice for our

use, while I would allow him to keep an hotel for the accommodation

of officers and gentlemen in the remainder. I then dispatched an

officer to look around for a livery-stable that could accommodate

our horses, and, while waiting there, an English gentleman, Mr.

Charles Green, came and said that he had a fine house completely

furnished, for which he had no use, and offered it as headquarters.

He explained, moreover, that General Howard had informed him, the

day before, that I would want his house for headquarters. At first

I felt strongly disinclined to make use of any private dwelling,

lest complaints should arise of damage and lose of furniture, and

so expressed myself to Mr. Green; but, after riding about the city,

and finding his house so spacious, so convenient, with large yard

and stabling, I accepted his offer, and occupied that house during

our stay in Savannah. He only reserved for himself the use of a

couple of rooms above the dining-room, and we had all else, and a

most excellent house it was in all respects.

I was disappointed that Hardee had escaped with his army, but on

the whole we had reason to be content with the substantial fruits

of victory. The Savannah River was found to be badly obstructed by

torpedoes, and by log piers stretched across the channel below the

city, which piers were filled with the cobble stones that formerly

paved the streets. Admiral Dahlgren was extremely active, visited

me repeatedly in the city, while his fleet still watched

Charleston, and all the avenues, for the blockade-runners that

infested the coast, which were notoriously owned and managed by

Englishmen, who used the island of New Providence (Nassau) as a

sort of entrepot. One of these small blockade-runners came into

Savannah after we were in full possession, and the master did not

discover his mistake till he came ashore to visit the custom-house.

Of coarse his vessel fell a prize to the navy. A heavy force was

at once set to work to remove the torpedoes and obstructions in the

main channel of the river, and, from that time forth, Savannah

became the great depot of supply for the troops operating in that

quarter.

Meantime, on the 15th and 16th of December, were fought, in front

of Nashville, the great battles in which General Thomas so nobly

fulfilled his promise to ruin Hood, the details of which are fully

given in his own official reports, long-since published. Rumors of

these great victories reached us at Savannah by piecemeal, but his

official report came on the 24th of December, with a letter from

General Grant, giving in general terms the events up to the 18th,

and I wrote at once through my chief of staff, General Webster, to

General Thomas, complimenting him in the highest terms. His

brilliant victory at Nashville was necessary to mine at Savannah to

make a complete whole, and this fact was perfectly comprehended by

Mr. Lincoln, who recognized it fully in his personal letter of

December 26th, hereinbefore quoted at length, and which is also

claimed at the time, in my Special Field Order No. 6, of January 8,

1865, here given:

(Special Field Order No. 6.)

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 8, 1864.

The general commanding announces to the troops composing the

Military Division of the Mississippi that he has received from the

President of the United States, and from Lieutenant-General Grant,

letters conveying their high sense and appreciation of the campaign

just closed, resulting in the capture of Savannah and the defeat of

Hood's army in Tennessee.

In order that all may understand the importance of events, it is

proper to revert to the situation of affairs in September last. We

held Atlanta, a city of little value to us, but so important to the

enemy that Mr. Davis, the head of the rebellious faction in the

South, visited his army near Palmetto, and commanded it to regain

the place and also to ruin and destroy us, by a series of measures

which he thought would be effectual. That army, by a rapid march,

gained our railroad near Big Shanty, and afterward about Dalton.

We pursued it, but it moved so rapidly that we could not overtake

it, and General Hood led his army successfully far over toward

Mississippi, in hope to decoy us out of Georgia. But we were not

thus to be led away by him, and preferred to lead and control

events ourselves. Generals Thomas and Schofield, commanding the

departments to our rear, returned to their posts and prepared to

decoy General Hood into their meshes, while we came on to complete

the original journey. We quietly and deliberately destroyed

Atlanta, and all the railroads which the enemy had used to carry on

war against us, occupied his State capital, and then captured his

commercial capital, which had been so strongly fortified from the

sea as to defy approach from that quarter. Almost at the moment of

our victorious entry into Savannah came the welcome and expected

news that our comrades in Tennessee had also fulfilled nobly and

well their part, had decoyed General Hood to Nashville and then

turned on him, defeating his army thoroughly, capturing all his

artillery, great numbers of prisoners, and were still pursuing the

fragments down in Alabama. So complete success in military

operations, extending over half a continent, is an achievement that

entitles it to a place in the military history of the world. The

armies serving in Georgia and Tennessee, as well as the local

garrisons of Decatur, Bridgeport, Chattanooga, and Murfreesboro',

are alike entitled to the common honors, and each regiment may

inscribe on its colors, at pleasure, the word "Savannah" or

"Nashville." The general commanding embraces, in the same general

success, the operations of the cavalry under Generals Stoneman,

Burbridge, and Gillem, that penetrated into Southwest Virginia, and

paralyzed the efforts of the enemy to disturb the peace and safety

of East Tennessee. Instead of being put on the defensive, we have

at all points assumed the bold offensive, and have completely

thwarted the designs of the enemies of our country.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.

Here terminated the "March to the Sea," and I only add a few

letters, selected out of many, to illustrate the general feeling of

rejoicing throughout the country at the time. I only regarded the

march from Atlanta to Savannah as a "shift of base," as the

transfer of a strong army, which had no opponent, and had finished

its then work, from the interior to a point on the sea-coast, from

which it could achieve other important results. I considered this

march as a means to an end, and not as an essential act of war.

Still, then, as now, the march to the sea was generally regarded as

something extraordinary, something anomalous, something out of the

usual order of events; whereas, in fact, I simply moved from

Atlanta to Savannah, as one step in the direction of Richmond, a

movement that had to be met and defeated, or the war was

necessarily at an end.

Were I to express my measure of the relative importance of the

march to the sea, and of that from Savannah northward, I would

place the former at one, and the latter at ten, or the maximum.

I now close this long chapter by giving a tabular statement of the

losses during the march, and the number of prisoners captured. The

property captured consisted of horses and mules by the thousand,

and of quantities of subsistence stores that aggregate very large,

but may be measured with sufficient accuracy by assuming that

sixty-five thousand men obtained abundant food for about forty

days, and thirty-five thousand animals were fed for a like period,

so as to reach Savannah in splendid flesh and condition. I also

add a few of the more important letters that passed between

Generals Grant, Halleck, and myself, which illustrate our opinions

at that stage of the war:

STATEMENT OF CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE ARMY IN THE

FIELD, CAMPAIGN OF GEORGIA.

Killed Wounded Missing Captured

Officers/Men Officers/Men Officers/Men Officers/Men

10 93 24 404 1 277 77 1,261

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1864

Major-General SHERMAN (via Hilton Head).

GENERAL: Lieutenant-General Grant informs me that, in his last

dispatch sent to you, he suggested the transfer of your infantry to

Richmond. He now wishes me to say that you will retain your entire

force, at least for the present, and, with such assistance as may

be given you by General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, operate from

such base as you may establish on the coast. General Foster will

obey such instructions as may be given by you.

Should you have captured Savannah, it is thought that by

transferring the water-batteries to the land side that place may be

made a good depot and base of operations on Augusta, Branchville,

or Charleston. If Savannah should not be captured, or if captured

and not deemed suitable for this purpose, perhaps Beaufort would

serve as a depot. As the rebels have probably removed their most

valuable property from Augusta, perhaps Branchville would be the

most important point at which to strike in order to sever all

connection between Virginia and the Southwestern Railroad.

General Grant's wishes, however, are, that this whole matter of

your future actions should be entirely left to your discretion.

We can send you from here a number of complete batteries of

field-artillery, with or without horses, as you may desire; also, as

soon as General Thomas can spare them, all the fragments,

convalescents, and furloughed men of your army. It is reported that

Thomas defeated Hood yesterday, near Nashville, but we have no

particulars nor official reports, telegraphic communication being

interrupted by a heavy storm.

Our last advises from you was General Howard's note, announcing his

approach to Savannah. Yours truly,

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah (via Hilton Head).

My DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 13th, by Major Anderson, is just

received. I congratulate you on your splendid success, and shall

very soon expect to hear of the crowning work of your campaign--the

capture of Savannah. Your march will stand out prominently as the

great one of this great war. When Savannah falls, then for another

wide swath through the centre of the Confederacy. But I will not

anticipate. General Grant is expected here this morning, and will

probably write you his own views.

I do not learn from your letter, or from Major Anderson, that you

are in want of any thing which we have not provided at Hilton Head.

Thinking it probable that you might want more field-artillery, I

had prepared several batteries, but the great difficulty of

foraging horses on the sea-coast will prevent our sending any

unless you actually need them. The hay-crop this year is short,

and the Quartermaster's Department has great difficulty in

procuring a supply for our animals.

General Thomas has defeated Hood, near Nashville, and it is hoped

that he will completely, crush his army. Breckenridge, at last

accounts, was trying to form a junction near Murfreesboro', but, as

Thomas is between them, Breckenridge must either retreat or be

defeated.

General Rosecrans made very bad work of it in Missouri, allowing

Price with a small force to overrun the State and destroy millions

of property.

Orders have been issued for all officers and detachments having

three months or more to serve, to rejoin your army via Savannah.

Those having less than three months to serve, will be retained by

General Thomas.

Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by some accident the

place may be destroyed, and, if a little salt should be sown upon

its site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of

nullification and secession.

Yours truly,

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1864.

To Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the

Mississippi.

My DEAR GENERAL: I have just received and read, I need not tell you

with how mush gratification, your letter to General Halleck. I

congratulate you and the brave officers and men under your command

on the successful termination of your most brilliant campaign. I

never had a doubt of the result. When apprehensions for your

safety were expressed by the President, I assured him with the army

you had, and you in command of it, there was no danger but you

would strike bottom on salt-water some place; that I would not feel

the same security--in fact, would not have intrusted the expedition

to any other living commander.

It has been very hard work to get Thomas to attack Hood. I gave

him the most peremptory order, and had started to go there myself,

before he got off. He has done magnificently, however, since he

started. Up to last night, five thousand prisoners and forty-nine

pieces of captured artillery, besides many wagons and innumerable

small-arms, had been received in Nashville. This is exclusive of

the enemy's loss at Franklin, which amounted to thirteen general

officers killed, wounded, and captured. The enemy probably lost

five thousand men at Franklin, and ten thousand in the last three

days' operations. Breckenridge is said to be making for

Murfreesboro'.

I think he is in a most excellent place. Stoneman has nearly wiped

out John Morgan's old command, and five days ago entered Bristol.

I did think the best thing to do was to bring the greater part of

your army here, and wipe out Lee. The turn affairs now seem to be

taking has shaken me in that opinion. I doubt whether you may not

accomplish more toward that result where you are than if brought

here, especially as I am informed, since my arrival in the city,

that it would take about two months to get you here with all the

other calls there are for ocean transportation.

I want to get your views about what ought to be done, and what can

be done. If you capture the garrison of Savannah, it certainly

will compel Lee to detach from Richmond, or give us nearly the

whole South. My own opinion is that Lee is averse to going out of

Virginia, and if the cause of the South is lost he wants Richmond

to be the last place surrendered. If he has such views, it may be

well to indulge him until we get every thing else in our hands.

Congratulating you and the army again upon the splendid results of

your campaign, the like of which is not read of in past history, I

subscribe myself, more than ever, if possible, your friend,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 26, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah, Georgia.

GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 22d inst., brought by

Major Grey of General Foster's staff; is fast at hand. As the

major starts back at once, I can do no more at present than simply

acknowledge its receipt. The capture of Savannah, with all its

immense stores, must tell upon the people of the South. All well

here.

Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 24, 1864.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.

GENERAL: Your letter of December 18th is just received. I feel

very much gratified at receiving the handsome commendation you pay

my army. I will, in general orders, convey to the officers and men

the substance of your note.

I am also pleased that you have modified your former orders, for I

feared that the transportation by sea would very much disturb the

unity and morale of my army, now so perfect.

The occupation of Savannah, which I have heretofore reported,

completes the first part of our game, and fulfills a great part of

your instructions; and we are now engaged in dismantling the rebel

forts which bear upon the sea-channels, and transferring the heavy

ordnance and ammunition to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, where they

can be more easily guarded than if left in the city.

The rebel inner lines are well adapted to our purpose, and with

slight modifications can be held by a comparatively small force;

and in about ten days I expect to be ready to sally forth again. I

feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. I have thought them

over so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight. I

left Augusta untouched on purpose, because the enemy will be in

doubt as to my objective point, after we cross the Savannah River,

whether it be Augusta or Charleston, and will naturally divide his

forces. I will then move either on Branchville or Colombia, by any

curved line that gives us the best supplies, breaking up in our

course as much railroad as possible; then, ignoring Charleston and

Augusta both, I would occupy Columbia and Camden, pausing there

long enough to observe the effect. I would then strike for the

Charleston & Wilmington Railroad, somewhere between the Santee and

Cape Fear Rivers, and, if possible, communicate with the fleet

under Admiral Dahlgren (whom I find a most agreeable gentleman,

accommodating himself to our wishes and plans). Then I would favor

an attack on Wilmington, in the belief that Porter and Butler will

fail in their present undertaking. Charleston is now a mere

desolated wreck, and is hardly worth the time it would take to

starve it out. Still, I am aware that, historically and

politically, much importance is attached to the place, and it may

be that, apart from its military importance, both you and the

Administration may prefer I should give it more attention; and it

would be well for you to give me some general idea on that subject,

for otherwise I would treat it as I have expressed, as a point of

little importance, after all its railroads leading into the

interior have been destroyed or occupied by us. But, on the

hypothesis of ignoring Charleston and taking Wilmington, I would

then favor a movement direct on Raleigh. The game is then up with

Lee, unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you and fights me; in

which case I should reckon on your being on his heels. Now that

Hood is used up by Thomas, I feel disposed to bring the matter to

an issue as quick as possible. I feel confident that I can break

up the whole railroad system of South Carolina and North Carolina,

and be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time

spring fairly opens; and, if you feel confident that you can whip

Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident that I

can handle him in the open country.

One reason why I would ignore Charleston is this: that I believe

Hardee will reduce the garrison to a small force, with plenty of

provisions; I know that the neck back of Charleston can be made

impregnable to assault, and we will hardly have time for siege

operations.

I will have to leave in Savannah a garrison, and, if Thomas can

spare them, I would like to have all detachments, convalescents,

etc., belonging to these four corps, sent forward at once. I do

not want to cripple Thomas, because I regard his operations as

all-important, and I have ordered him to pursue Hood down into

Alabama, trusting to the country for supplies.

I reviewed one of my corps to-day, and shall continue to review the

whole army. I do not like to boast, but believe this army has a

confidence in itself that makes it almost invincible. I wish you

could run down and see us; it would have a good effect, and show to

both armies that they are acting on a common plan. The weather is

now cool and pleasant, and the general health very good. Your true

friend,

W. T. SHERMAN Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

IN THE FIELD, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 24, 1864.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK, Chief-of-Staff; Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: I had the pleasure of receiving your two letters of the

16th and 18th instant to-day, and feel more than usually flattered

by the high encomiums you have passed on our recent campaign, which

is now complete by the occupation of Savannah.

I am also very glad that General Grant has changed his mind about

embarking my troops for James River, leaving me free to make the

broad swath you describe through South and North Carolina; and

still more gratified at the news from Thomas, in Tennessee, because

it fulfills my plans, which contemplated his being able to dispose

of Hood, in case he ventured north of the Tennessee River. So, I

think, on the whole, I can chuckle over Jeff. Davis's

disappointment in not turning my Atlanta campaign into a "Moscow

disaster."

I have just finished a long letter to General Grant, and have

explained to him that we are engaged in shifting our base from the

Ogeeohee to the Savannah River, dismantling all the forts made by

the enemy to bear upon the salt-water channels, transferring the

heavy ordnance, etc., to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, and in

remodeling the enemy's interior lines to suit our future plans and

purposes. I have also laid down the programme for a campaign which

I can make this winter, and which will put me in the spring on the

Roanoke, in direct communication with General Grant on James River.

In general terms, my plan is to turn over to General Foster the

city of Savannah, to sally forth with my army resupplied, cross the

Savannah, feign on Charleston and Augusta, but strike between,

breaking en route the Charleston & Augusta Railroad, also a large

part of that from Branchville and Camden toward North Carolina, and

then rapidly to move for some point of the railroad from Charleston

to Wilmington, between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers; then,

communicating with the fleet in the neighborhood of Georgetown, I

would turn upon Wilmington or Charleston, according to the

importance of either. I rather prefer Wilmington, as a live place,

over Charleston, which is dead and unimportant when its railroad

communications are broken. I take it for granted that the present

movement on Wilmington will fail. If I should determine to take

Charleston, I would turn across the country (which I have hunted

over many a time) from Santee to Mount Pleasant, throwing one wing

on the peninsula between the Ashley and Cooper. After

accomplishing one or other of these ends, I would make a bee-line

for Raleigh or Weldon, when Lee world be forced to come out of

Richmond, or acknowledge himself beaten. He would, I think, by the

use of the Danville Railroad, throw himself rapidly between me and

Grant, leaving Richmond in the hands of the latter. This would not

alarm me, for I have an army which I think can maneuver, and I

world force him to attack me at a disadvantage, always under the

supposition that Grant would be on his heels; and, if the worst

come to the worst, I can fight my way down to Albermarle Sound, or

Newbern.

I think the time has come now when we should attempt the boldest

moves, and my experience is, that they are easier of execution than

more timid ones, because the enemy is disconcerted by them--as, for

instance, my recent campaign.

I also doubt the wisdom of concentration beyond a certain extent,

for the roads of this country limit the amount of men that can be

brought to bear in any one battle, and I do not believe that any

one general can handle more than sixty thousand men in battle.

I think our campaign of the last month, as well as every step I

take from this point northward, is as much a direct attack upon

Lee's army as though we were operating within the sound of his

artillery.

I am very anxious that Thomas should follow up his success to the

very utmost point. My orders to him before I left Kingston were,

after beating Hood, to follow him as far as Columbus, Mississippi,

or Selma, Alabama, both of which lie in districts of country which

are rich in corn and meat.

I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy's

country, because this war differs from European wars in this

particular: we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile

people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard

hand of war, as well as their organized armies. I know that this

recent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effect

in this respect. Thousands who had been deceived by their lying

newspapers to believe that we were being whipped all the time now

realize the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of the

same experience. To be sure, Jeff. Davis has his people under

pretty good discipline, but I think faith in him is much shaken in

Georgia, and before we have done with her South Carolina will not

be quite so tempestuous.

I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and do not think

"salt" will be necessary. When I move, the Fifteenth Corps will be

on the right of the right wing, and their position will naturally

bring them into Charleston first; and, if you have watched the

history of that corps, you will have remarked that they generally

do their work pretty well. The truth is, the whole army is burning

with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina.

I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that

seems in store for her.

Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why we did not go to

South Carolina; and, when I answered that we were enroute for that

State, the invariable reply was, "Well, if you will make those

people feel the utmost severities of war, we will pardon you for

your desolation of Georgia."

I look upon Colombia as quite as bad as Charleston, and I doubt if

we shall spare the public buildings there as we did at

Milledgeville.

I have been so busy lately that I have not yet made my official

report, and I think I had better wait until I get my subordinate

reports before attempting it, as I am anxious to explain clearly

not only the reasons for every step, but the amount of execution

done, and this I cannot do until I get the subordinate reports; for

we marched the whole distance in four or more columns, and, of

course, I could only be present with one, and generally that one

engaged in destroying railroads. This work of destruction was

performed better than usual, because I had an engineer-regiment,

provided with claws to twist the bars after being heated. Such

bars can never be used again, and the only way in which a railroad

line can be reconstructed across Georgia is, to make a new road

from Fairburn Station (twenty-four miles southwest of Atlanta) to

Madison, a distance of one hundred miles; and, before that can be

done, I propose to be on the road from Augusta to Charleston, which

is a continuation of the same. I felt somewhat disappointed at

Hardee's escape, but really am not to blame. I moved as quickly as

possible to close up the "Union Causeway," but intervening

obstacles were such that, before I could get troops on the road,

Hardee had slipped out. Still, I know that the men that were in

Savannah will be lost in a measure to Jeff. Davis, for the Georgia

troops, under G. W. Smith, declared they would not fight in South

Carolina, and they have gone north, en route for Augusta, and I

have reason to believe the North Carolina troops have gone to

Wilmington; in other words, they are scattered. I have reason to

believe that Beauregard was present in Savannah at the time of its

evacuation, and think that he and Hardee are now in Charleston,

making preparations for what they suppose will be my next step.

Please say to the President that I have received his kind message

(through Colonel Markland), and feel thankful for his high favor.

If I disappoint him in the future, it shall not be from want of

zeal or love to the cause.

From you I expect a full and frank criticism of my plans for the

future, which may enable me to correct errors before it is too

late. I do not wish to be rash, but want to give my rebel friends

no chance to accuse us of want of enterprise or courage.

Assuring you of my high personal respect, I remain, as ever, your

friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

[General Order No. 3.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1865.

The following resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives

is published to the army:

[PUBLIC RESOLUTION--No. 4.]

Joint resolution tendering the thanks of the people and of Congress

to Major-General William T. Sherman, and the officers and soldiers

of his command, for their gallant conduct in their late brilliant

movement through Georgia.

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks of

the people and of the Congress of the United States are due and are

hereby tendered to Major-General William T. Sherman, and through

him to the officers and men under his command, for their gallantry

and good conduct in their late campaign from Chattanooga to

Atlanta, and the triumphal march thence through Georgia to

Savannah, terminating in the capture and occupation of that city;

and that the President cause a copy of this joint resolution to be

engrossed and forwarded to Major-General Sherman.

Approved, January 10, 1865.

By order of the Secretary of War,

W. A. NICHOLS, Assistant Adjutant-General.