Men.

Present and absent...................171,450

Present for duty..................... 88,883

The Army of the Tennessee--

Present and absent....................134,763

Present for duty...................... 64,957

The Army of the Ohio--

Present and absent ................... 46,052

Present for duty ..................... 26,242

The department and army commanders had to maintain strong garrisons

in their respective departments, and also to guard their respective

lines of supply. I therefore, in my mind, aimed to prepare out of

these three armies, by the 1st of May, 1864, a compact army for

active operations in Georgia, of about the following numbers:

Army of the Cumberland................ 50,000

Army of the Tennessee................. 35,000

Army of the Ohio ..................... 15,000

Total ............................... 100,000

and, to make these troops as mobile as possible, I made the

strictest possible orders in relation to wagons and all species of

incumbrances and impedimenta whatever. Each officer and soldier

was required to carry on his horse or person food and clothing

enough for five days. To each regiment was allowed but one wagon

and one ambulance, and to the officers of each company one pack

horse or mule.

Each division and brigade was provided a fair proportion of wagons

for a supply train, and these were limited in their loads to carry

food, ammunition, and clothing. Tents were forbidden to all save

the sick and wounded, and one tent only was allowed to each

headquarters for use as an office. These orders were not

absolutely enforced, though in person I set the example, and did

not have a tent, nor did any officer about me have one; but we had

wall tent-flies, without poles, and no tent-furniture of any kind.

We usually spread our flies over saplings, or on fence-rails or

posts improvised on the spot. Most of the general officers, except

Thomas, followed my example strictly; but he had a regular

headquarters-camp. I frequently called his attention to the orders

on this subject, rather jestingly than seriously. He would break

out against his officers for having such luxuries, but, needing a

tent himself, and being good-natured and slow to act, he never

enforced my orders perfectly. In addition to his regular

wagon-train, he had a big wagon which could be converted into an

office, and this we used to call "Thomas's circus." Several times

during the campaign I found quartermasters hid away in some

comfortable nook to the rear, with tents and mess-fixtures which

were the envy of the passing soldiers; and I frequently broke them

up, and distributed the tents to the surgeons of brigades. Yet my

orders actually reduced the transportation, so that I doubt if any

army ever went forth to battle with fewer impedimenta, and where

the regular and necessary supplies of food, ammunition, and

clothing, were issued, as called for, so regularly and so well.

My personal staff was then composed of Captain J. C. McCoy,

aide-de-camp; Captain L. M. Dayton, aide-de-camp; Captain J. C.

Audenried, aide-de-camp; Brigadier-General J. D. Webster, chief of

staff; Major R. M. Sawyer, assistant adjutant-general; Captain

Montgomery Rochester, assistant adjutant-general. These last three

were left at Nashville in charge of the office, and were empowered

to give orders in my name, communication being generally kept up by

telegraph.

Subsequently were added to my staff, and accompanied me in the

field, Brigadier-General W. F. Barry, chief of artillery; Colonel

O. M. Poe, chief of engineers; Colonel L. C. Easton, chief

quartermaster; Colonel Amos Beckwith, chief commissary; Captain

Thos. G. Baylor, chief of ordnance; Surgeon E. D. Kittoe, medical

director; Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, inspector-general;

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Ewing, inspector-general; and Lieutenant-

Colonel Willard Warner, inspector-general.

These officers constituted my staff proper at the beginning of the

campaign, which remained substantially the same till the close of

the war, with very few exceptions; viz.: Surgeon John Moore, United

States Army, relieved Surgeon Kittoe of the volunteers (about

Atlanta) as medical director; Major Henry Hitchcock joined as

judge-advocate, and Captain G. Ward Nichols reported as an extra

aide-de-camp (after the fall of Atlanta) at Gaylesville, just

before we started for Savannah.

During the whole month of April the preparations for active war

were going on with extreme vigor, and my letter-book shows an

active correspondence with Generals Grant, Halleck, Thomas,

McPherson, and Schofield on thousands of matters of detail and

arrangement, most of which are embraced in my testimony before the

Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., Appendix.

When the time for action approached, viz., May 1,1864, the actual

armies prepared to move into Georgia resulted as follows, present

for battle:

Men.

Army of the Cumberland, Major-General THOMAS.

Infantry ....................... 54,568

Artillery ...................... 2,377

Cavalry......................... 3,828

Aggregate............... 60,773

Number of field-guns, 130.

Army of the Tennessee, Major-General McPHERSON.

Infantry ....................... 22,437

Artillery ...................... 1,404

Cavalry ........................ 624

Aggregate ............. 24,465

Guns, 96

Army of the Ohio, Major-General SCHOFIELD.

Infantry ....................... 11,183

Artillery....................... 679

Cavalry......................... 1,697

Aggregate .............. 13,559

Guns, 28.

Grand aggregate, 98,797 men and 254 guns

These figures do not embrace the cavalry divisions which were still

incomplete, viz., of General Stoneman, at Lexington, Kentucky, and

of General Garrard, at Columbia, Tennessee, who were then rapidly

collecting horses, and joined us in the early stage of the

campaign. General Stoneman, having a division of about four

thousand men and horses, was attached to Schofield's Army of the

Ohio. General Garrard's division, of about four thousand five

hundred men and horses, was attached to General Thomas's command;

and he had another irregular division of cavalry, commanded by

Brigadier-General E. McCook. There was also a small brigade of

cavalry, belonging to the Army of the Cumberland, attached

temporarily to the Army of the Tennessee, which was commanded by

Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick. These cavalry commands

changed constantly in strength and numbers, and were generally used

on the extreme flanks, or for some special detached service, as

will be herein-after related. The Army of the Tennessee was still

short by the two divisions detached with General Banks, up Red

River, and two other divisions on furlough in Illinois, Indiana,

and Ohio, but which were rendezvousing at Cairo, under Generals

Leggett and Crocker, to form a part of the Seventeenth Corps, which

corps was to be commanded by Major-General Frank P. Blair, then a

member of Congress, in Washington. On the 2d of April I notified

him by letter that I wanted him to join and to command these two

divisions, which ought to be ready by the 1st of May. General

Blair, with these two divisions, constituting the Seventeenth Army

Corps, did not actually overtake us until we reached Acworth and

Big Shanty, in Georgia, about the 9th of June, 1864.

In my letter of April 4th to General John A. Rawains, chief of

staff to General Grant at Washington, I described at length all the

preparations that were in progress for the active campaign thus

contemplated, and therein estimated Schofield at twelve thousand,

Thomas at forty-five thousand, and McPherson at thirty thousand.

At first I intended to open the campaign about May 1st, by moving

Schofield on Dalton from Cleveland, Thomas on the same objective

from Chattanooga, and McPherson on Rome and Kingston from Gunter's

Landing. My intention was merely to threaten Dalton in front, and

to direct McPherson to act vigorously against the railroad below

Resaca, far to the rear of the enemy. But by reason of his being

short of his estimated strength by the four divisions before

referred to, and thus being reduced to about twenty-four thousand

men, I did not feel justified in placing him so far away from the

support of the main body of the army, and therefore subsequently

changed the plan of campaign, so far as to bring that army up to

Chattanooga, and to direct it thence through Ship's Gap against the

railroad to Johnston's rear, at or near Resaca, distant from Dalton

only eighteen miles, and in full communication with the other

armies by roads behind Rocky face Ridge, of about the same length.

On the 10th of April I received General Grant's letter of April 4th

from Washington, which formed the basis of all the campaigns of the

year 1864, and subsequently received another of April 19th, written

from Culpepper, Virginia, both of which are now in my possession,

in his own handwriting, and are here given entire. These letters

embrace substantially all the orders he ever made on this

particular subject, and these, it will be seen, devolved on me the

details both as to the plan and execution of the campaign by the

armies under my immediate command. These armies were to be

directed against the rebel army commanded by General Joseph E.

Johnston, then lying on the defensive, strongly intrenched at

Dalton, Georgia; and I was required to follow it up closely and

persistently, so that in no event could any part be detached to

assist General Lee in Virginia; General Grant undertaking in like

manner to keep Lee so busy that he could not respond to any calls

of help by Johnston. Neither Atlanta, nor Augusta, nor Savannah,

was the objective, but the "army of Jos. Johnston," go where it

might.

[PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON D. C., April 4, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the

Mississippi.

GENERAL: It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to

take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of

the army together, and somewhat toward a common centre. For your

information I now write you my programme, as at present determined

upon.

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up his

present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to turn

over the defense of Red River to General Steels and the navy, and

to return your troops to you, and his own to New Orleans; to

abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with

not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on

the Mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to

collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men.

To this I will add five thousand from Missouri. With this force he

is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can. It

will be impossible for him to commence too early.

Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate

against Richmond from the south aide of James River. This will

give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W. F. Smith

commanding the right wing of his forces, and Gillmore the left

wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by

Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand effective

men, and operate directly against Lee's army, wherever it may be

found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under

Ord and Averill, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the other,

under Crook, to start from Charleston, on the Kanawha, to move

against the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad.

Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about

Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will be

all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of

all arms.

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and

to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can,

inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply

to lay down the work it is desirable to have done, and leave you

free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as

early as you can, your plan of operations.

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he

can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th

inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is

concentrating now. None will move from their places of rendezvous

until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready to move by the

25th inst., if possible; but all I can now direct is that you get

ready as soon as possible. I know you will have difficulties to

encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are

abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it.

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do not

calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I can take

troops from there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has to

protect, he can spare no troops, except to move directly to his

front. In this way he must get through to inflict great damage on

the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large

force to prevent it. In other words, if Sigel can't skin himself,

he can hold a leg while some one else skins.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 10, 1864

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, Washington, D.

DEAR GENERAL: Your two letters of April 4th are now before me, and

afford me infinite satisfaction. That we are now all to act on a

common plan, converging on a common centre, looks like enlightened

war.

Like yourself, you take the biggest load, and from me you shall

have thorough and hearty cooperation. I will not let side issues

draw me off from your main plans in which I am to knock Jos.

Johnston, and to do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as

possible. I have heretofore written to General Rawlins and to

Colonel Comstock (of your staff) somewhat of the method in which I

propose to act. I have seen all my army, corps, and division

commanders, and have signified only to the former, viz., Schofield,

Thomas, and McPherson, our general plans, which I inferred from the

purport of our conversation here and at Cincinnati.

First, I am pushing stores to the front with all possible dispatch,

and am completing the army organization according to the orders

from Washington, which are ample and perfectly satisfactory.

It will take us all of April to get in our furloughed veterans, to

bring up A. J. Smith's command, and to collect provisions and

cattle on the line of the Tennessee. Each of the armies will

guard, by detachments of its own, its rear communications.

At the signal to be given by you, Schofield, leaving a select

garrison at Knoxville and London, with twelve thousand men will

drop down to the Hiawassee, and march against Johnston's right by

the old Federal road. Stoneman, now in Kentucky, organizing the

cavalry forces of the Army of the Ohio, will operate with Schofield

on his left front--it may be, pushing a select body of about two

thousand cavalry by Ducktown or Elijah toward Athens, Georgia.

Thomas will aim to have forty-five thousand men of all arms, and

move straight against Johnston, wherever he may be, fighting him

cautiously, persistently, and to the best advantage. He will have

two divisions of cavalry, to take advantage of any offering.

McPherson will have nine divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, if

A. J. Smith gets here, in which case he will have full thirty

thousand of the best men in America. He will cross the Tennessee

at Decatur and Whitesburg, march toward Rome, and feel for Thomas.

If Johnston falls behind the Coosa, then McPherson will push for

Rome; and if Johnston falls behind the Chattahoochee, as I believe

he will, then McPherson will cross over and join Thomas.

McPherson has no cavalry, but I have taken one of Thomas's

divisions, viz., Garrard's, six thousand strong, which is now at

Colombia, mounting, equipping, and preparing. I design this

division to operate on McPherson's right, rear, or front, according

as the enemy appears. But the moment I detect Johnston falling

behind the Chattahoochee, I propose to cast off the effective part

of this cavalry division, after crossing the Coosa, straight for

Opelika, West Point, Columbus, or Wetumpka, to break up the road

between Montgomery and Georgia. If Garrard can do this work well,

he can return to the Union army; but should a superior force

interpose, then he will seek safety at Pensacola and join Banks,

or, after rest, will act against any force that he can find east of

Mobile, till such time as he can reach me.

Should Johnston fall behind the Chattahoochee, I will feign to the

right, but pass to the left and act against Atlanta or its eastern

communications, according to developed facts.

This is about as far ahead as I feel disposed, to look, but I will

ever bear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy

that he cannot in any event send any part of his command against

you or Banks.

If Banks can at the same time carry Mobile and open up the Alabama

River, he will in a measure solve the most difficult part of my

problem, viz., "provisions." But in that I must venture. Georgia

has a million of inhabitants. If they can live, we should not

starve. If the enemy interrupt our communications, I will be

absolved from all obligations to subsist on our own resources, and

will feel perfectly justified in taking whatever and wherever we

can find. I will inspire my command, if successful, with the

feeling that beef and salt are all that is absolutely necessary to

life, and that parched corn once fed General Jackson's army on that

very ground.

As ever, your friend and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES

CULPEPPER COURT HOUSE, VIRGINIA, April 19, 1864.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the

Mississippi.

GENERAL: Since my letter to you of April 4th I have seen no reason

to change any portion of the general plan of campaign, if the enemy

remain still and allow us to take the initiative. Rain has

continued so uninterruptedly until the last day or two that it will

be impossible to move, however, before the 27th, even if no more

should fall in the meantime. I think Saturday, the 30th, will

probably be the day for our general move.

Colonel Comstock, who will take this, can spend a day with you, and

fill up many little gaps of information not given in any of my

letters.

What I now want more particularly to say is, that if the two main

attacks, yours and the one from here, should promise great success,

the enemy may, in a fit of desperation, abandon one part of their

line of defense, and throw their whole strength upon the other,

believing a single defeat without any victory to sustain them

better than a defeat all along their line, and hoping too, at the

same time, that the army, meeting with no resistance, will rest

perfectly satisfied with their laurels, having penetrated to a

given point south, thereby enabling them to throw their force first

upon one and then on the other.

With the majority of military commanders they might do this.

But you have had too much experience in traveling light, and

subsisting upon the country, to be caught by any such ruse. I hope

my experience has not been thrown away. My directions, then, would

be, if the enemy in your front show signs of joining Lee, follow

him up to the full extent of your ability. I will prevent the

concentration of Lee upon your front, if it is in the power of this

army to do it.

The Army of the Potomac looks well, and, so far as I can judge,

officers and men feel well. Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 24, 1864

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief,

Culpepper, Virginia

GENERAL: I now have, at the hands of Colonel Comstock, of your

staff, the letter of April 19th, and am as far prepared to assume

the offensive as possible. I only ask as much time as you think

proper, to enable me to get up McPherson's two divisions from

Cairo. Their furloughs will expire about this time, and some of

them should now be in motion for Clifton, whence they will march to

Decatur, to join General Dodge.

McPherson is ordered to assemble the Fifteenth Corps near Larkin's,

and to get the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps (Dodge and Blair) at

Decatur at the earliest possible moment. From these two points he

will direct his forces on Lebanon, Summerville, and Lafayette,

where he will act against Johnston, if he accept battle at Dalton;

or move in the direction of Rome, if the enemy give up Dalton, and

fall behind the Oostenaula or Etowah. I see that there is some

risk in dividing our forces, but Thomas and Schofield will have

strength enough to cover all the valleys as far as Dalton; and,

should Johnston turn his whole force against McPherson, the latter

will have his bridge at Larkin's, and the route to Chattanooga via

Willa's Valley and the Chattanooga Creek, open for retreat; and if

Johnston attempt to leave Dalton, Thomas will have force enough to

push on through Dalton to Kingston, which will checkmate him. My

own opinion is that Johnston will be compelled to hang to his

railroad, the only possible avenue of supply to his army, estimated

at from forty-five to sixty thousand men.

At Lafayette all our armies will be together, and if Johnston

stands at Dalton we must attack him in position. Thomas feels

certain that he has no material increase of force, and that he has

not sent away Hardee, or any part of his army. Supplies are the

great question. I have materially increased the number of cars

daily. When I got here, the average was from sixty-five to eighty

per day. Yesterday the report was one hundred and ninety-three;

to-day, one hundred and thirty-four; and my estimate is that one

hundred and forty-five cars per day will give us a day's supply and

a day's accumulation.

McPherson is ordered to carry in wagons twenty day's rations, and

to rely on the depot at Ringgold for the renewal of his bread.

Beeves are now being driven on the hoof to the front; and the

commissary, Colonel Beckwith, seems fully alive to the importance

of the whole matter.

Our weakest point will be from the direction of Decatur, and I will

be forced to risk something from that quarter, depending on the

fact that the enemy has no force available with which to threaten

our communications from that direction.

Colonel Comstock will explain to you personally much that I cannot

commit to paper. I am, with great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

On the 28th of April I removed my headquarters to Chattanooga, and

prepared for taking the field in person. General Grant had first

indicated the 30th of April as the day for the simultaneous

advance, but subsequently changed the day to May 5th. McPhersons

troops were brought forward rapidly to Chattanooga, partly by rail

and partly by marching. Thomas's troops were already in position

(his advance being out as far as Ringgold-eighteen miles), and

Schofield was marching down by Cleveland to Red Clay and Catoosa

Springs. On the 4th of May, Thomas was in person at Ringgold, his

left at Catoosa, and his right at Leet's Tan-yard. Schofield was

at Red Clay, closing upon Thomas's left; and McPherson was moving

rapidly into Chattanooga, and out toward Gordon's Mill.

On the 5th I rode out to Ringgold, and on the very day appointed by

General Grant from his headquarters in Virginia the great campaign

was begun. To give all the minute details will involve more than

is contemplated, and I will endeavor only to trace the principal

events, or rather to record such as weighed heaviest on my own mind

at the time, and which now remain best fixed in my memory.

My general headquarters and official records remained back at

Nashville, and I had near me only my personal staff and

inspectors-general, with about half a dozen wagons, and a single

company of Ohio sharp-shooters (commanded by Lieutenant McCrory) as

headquarters or camp guard. I also had a small company of

irregular Alabama cavalry (commanded by Lieutenant Snelling), used

mostly as orderlies and couriers. No wall-tents were allowed, only

the flies. Our mess establishment was less in bulk than that of

any of the brigade commanders; nor was this from an indifference to

the ordinary comforts of life, but because I wanted to set the

example, and gradually to convert all parts of that army into a

mobile machine, willing and able to start at a minute's notice, and

to subsist on the scantiest food. To reap absolute success might

involve the necessity even of dropping all wagons, and to subsist

on the chance food which the country was known to contain. I had

obtained not only the United States census-tables of 1860, but a

compilation made by the Controller of the State of Georgia for the

purpose of taxation, containing in considerable detail the

"population and statistics" of every county in Georgia. One of my

aides (Captain Dayton) acted as assistant adjutant general, with an

order-book, letter-book, and writing-paper, that filled a small

chest not much larger than an ordinary candle-boa. The only

reports and returns called for were the ordinary tri-monthly

returns of "effective strength." As these accumulated they were

sent back to Nashville, and afterward were embraced in the archives

of the Military Division of the Mississippi, changed in 1865 to the

Military Division of the Missouri, and I suppose they were burned

in the Chicago fire of 1870. Still, duplicates remain of all

essential papers in the archives of the War Department.

The 6th of May was given to Schofield and McPherson to get into

position, and on the 7th General Thomas moved in force against

Tunnel Hill, driving off a mere picket-guard of the enemy, and I

was agreeably surprised to find that no damage had been done to the

tunnel or the railroad. From Tunnel Hill I could look into the

gorge by which the railroad passed through a straight and

well-defined range of mountains, presenting sharp palisade faces,

and known as "Rocky Face." The gorge itself was called the

"Buzzard Roost." We could plainly see the enemy in this gorge and

behind it, and Mill Creek which formed the gorge, flowing toward

Dalton, had been dammed up, making a sort of irregular lake,

filling the road, thereby obstructing it, and the enemy's batteries

crowned the cliffs on either side. The position was very strong,

and I knew that such a general as was my antagonist (Jos.

Johnston), who had been there six months, had fortified it to the

maximum. Therefore I had no intention to attack the position

seriously in front, but depended on McPherson to capture and hold

the railroad to its rear, which would force Johnston to detach

largely against him, or rather, as I expected, to evacuate his

position at Dalton altogether. My orders to Generals Thomas and

Schofield were merely to press strongly at all points in front,

ready to rush in on the first appearance of "let go," and, if

possible, to catch our enemy in the confusion of retreat.

All the movements of the 7th and 8th were made exactly as ordered,

and the enemy seemed quiescent, acting purely on the defensive.

I had constant communication with all parts of the army, and on the

9th McPherson's head of column entered and passed through Snake

Creek, perfectly undefended, and accomplished a complete surprise

to the enemy. At its farther debouche he met a cavalry brigade,

easily driven, which retreated hastily north toward Dalton, and

doubtless carried to Johnston the first serious intimation that a

heavy force of infantry and artillery was to his rear and within a

few miles of his railroad. I got a short note from McPherson that

day (written at 2 p.m., when he was within a mile and a half of the

railroad, above and near Resaca), and we all felt jubilant. I

renewed orders to Thomas and Schofield to be ready for the instant

pursuit of what I expected to be a broken and disordered army,

forced to retreat by roads to the east of Resaca, which were known

to be very rough and impracticable.

That night I received further notice from McPherson that he had

found Resaca too strong for a surprise; that in consequence he had

fallen back three miles to the month of Snake Creek Gap, and was

there fortified. I wrote him the next day the following letters,

copies of which are in my letter-book; but his to me were mere

notes in pencil, not retained.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

IN THE FIELD, TUNNEL HILL, GEORGIA, May 11, 1864

Major-General McPHERSON, commanding army of the Tennessee,

Sugar Valley, Georgia.

GENERAL: I received by courier (in the night) yours of 5 and 8.30

P. M. of yesterday.

You now have your twenty-three thousand men, and General Hooker is

in close support, so that you can hold all of Jos. Johnston's army

in check should he abandon Dalton. He cannot afford to abandon

Dalton, for he has fixed it up on purpose to receive us, and he

observes that we are close at hand, waiting for him to quit. He

cannot afford a detachment strong enough to fight you, as his army

will not admit of it.

Strengthen your position; fight any thing that comes; and threaten

the safety of the railroad all the time. But, to tell the truth, I

would rather the enemy would stay in Dalton two more days, when he

may find in his rear a larger party than he expects in an open

field. At all events, we can then choose our own ground, and he

will be forced to move out of his works. I do not intend to put a

column into Buzzard-Roost Gap at present.

See that you are in easy communication with me and with all

head-quarters. After to-day the supplies will be at Ringgold.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

IN THE FIELD, TUNNEL HILL, GEORGIA, May 11, 1864-Evening

Major-General McPHERSON, commanding army of the Tennessee,

Sugar Valley, Georgia

GENERAL: The indications are that Johnston is evacuating Dalton.

In that event, Howard's corps and the cavalry will pursue; all the

rest will follow your route. I will be down early in the morning.

Try to strike him if possible about the forks of the road.

Hooker must be with you now, and you may send General Garrard by

Summerville to threaten Rome and that flank. I will cause all the

lines to be felt at once.

W. T. SHERMAN, major-general commanding.

McPherson had startled Johnston in his fancied security, but had

not done the full measure of his work. He had in hand twenty-three

thousand of the best men of the army, and could have walked into

Resaca (then held only by a small brigade), or he could have placed

his whole force astride the railroad above Resaca, and there have

easily withstood the attack of all of Johnston's army, with the

knowledge that Thomas and Schofield were on his heels. Had he done

so, I am certain that Johnston would not have ventured to attack

him in position, but would have retreated eastward by Spring Place,

and we should have captured half his army and all his artillery and

wagons at the very beginning of the campaign.

Such an opportunity does not occur twice in a single life, but at

the critical moment McPherson seems to have been a little cautious.

Still, he was perfectly justified by his orders, and fell back and

assumed an unassailable defensive position in Sugar Valley, on the

Resaca side of Snake-Creek Gap. As soon as informed of this, I

determined to pass the whole army through Snake-Creek Gap, and to

move on Resaca with the main army.

But during the 10th, the enemy showed no signs of evacuating

Dalton, and I was waiting for the arrival of Garrard's and

Stoneman's cavalry, known to be near at hand, so as to secure the

full advantages of victory, of which I felt certain. Hooker's

Twentieth Corps was at once moved down to within easy supporting

distance of McPherson; and on the 11th, perceiving signs of

evacuation of Dalton, I gave all the orders for the general

movement, leaving the Fourth Corps (Howard) and Stoneman's cavalry

in observation in front of Buzzard-Roost Gap, and directing all the

rest of the army to march through Snake-Creek Gap, straight on

Resaca. The roads were only such as the country afforded, mere

rough wagon-ways, and these converged to the single narrow track

through Snake-Creek Gap; but during the 12th and 13th the bulk of

Thomas's and Schofield's armies were got through, and deployed

against Resaca, McPherson on the right, Thomas in the centre, and

Schofield on the left. Johnston, as I anticipated, had abandoned

all his well-prepared defenses at Dalton, and was found inside of

Resaca with the bulk of his army, holding his divisions well in

hand, acting purely on the defensive, and fighting well at all

points of conflict. A complete line of intrenchments was found

covering the place, and this was strongly manned at all points. On

the 14th we closed in, enveloping the town on its north and west,

and during the 15th we had a day of continual battle and skirmish.

At the same time I caused two pontoon-bridges to be laid across the

Oostenaula River at Lay's Ferry, about three miles below the town,

by which we could threaten Calhoun, a station on the railroad seven

miles below Resaca. At the same time, May 14th, I dispatched

General Garrard, with his cavalry division, down the Oostenaula by

the Rome road, with orders to cross over, if possible, and to

attack or threaten the railroad at any point below Calhoun and

above Kingston.

During the 15th, without attempting to assault the fortified works,

we pressed at all points, and the sound of cannon and musketry rose

all day to the dignity of a battle. Toward evening McPherson moved

his whole line of battle forward, till he had gained a ridge

overlooking the town, from which his field-artillery could reach

the railroad-bridge across the Oostenaula. The enemy made several

attempts to drive him away, repeating the sallies several times,

and extending them into the night; but in every instance he was

repulsed with bloody loss.

Hooker's corps had also some heavy and handsome fighting that

afternoon and night on the left, where the Dalton roan entered the

intrenchments, capturing a four-gun intrenched battery, with its

men and guns; and generally all our men showed the finest fighting

qualities.

Howard's corps had followed Johnston down from Dalton, and was in

line; Stoneman's division of cavalry had also got up, and was on

the extreme left, beyond the Oostenaula.

On the night of May 15th Johnston got his army across the bridges,

set them on fire, and we entered Resaca at daylight. Our loss up

to that time was about six hundred dead and thirty-three hundred

and seventy-five wounded--mostly light wounds that did not

necessitate sending the men to the rear for treatment. That

Johnston had deliberately designed in advance to give up such

strong positions as Dalton and Resaca, for the purpose of drawing

us farther south, is simply absurd. Had he remained in Dalton

another hour, it would have been his total defeat, and he only

evacuated Resaca because his safety demanded it. The movement by

us through Snake-Creek Gap was a total surprise to him. My army

about doubled his in size, but he had all the advantages of natural

positions, of artificial forts and roads, and of concentrated

action. We were compelled to grope our way through forests, across

mountains, with a large army, necessarily more or less dispersed.

Of course, I was disappointed not to have crippled his, army more

at that particular stage of the game; but, as it resulted, these

rapid successes gave us the initiative, and the usual impulse of a

conquering army.

Johnston having retreated in the night of May 15th, immediate

pursuit was begun. A division of infantry (Jeff. C. Davis's) was

at once dispatched down the valley toward Rome, to support

Garrard's cavalry, and the whole army was ordered to pursue,

McPherson by Lay's Ferry, on the right, Thomas directly by the

railroad, and Schofield by the left, by the old road that crossed

the Oostenaula above Echota or Newtown.

We hastily repaired the railroad bridge at Resaca, which had been

partially burned, and built a temporary floating bridge out of

timber and materials found on the spot; so that Thomas got his

advance corps over during the 16th, and marched as far as Calhoun,

where he came into communication with McPherson's troops, which had

crossed the Oostenaula at Lay's Ferry by our pontoon-bridges,

previously laid. Inasmuch as the bridge at Resaca was overtaxed,

Hooker's Twentieth Corps was also diverted to cross by the fords

and ferries above Resaca, in the neighborhood of Echota.

On the 17th, toward evening, the head of Thomas's column, Newton's

division, encountered the rear-guard of Johnston's army near

Adairsville. I was near the head of column at the time, trying to

get a view of the position of the enemy from an elevation in an

open field. My party attracted the fire of a battery; a shell

passed through the group of staff-officers and burst just beyond,

which scattered us promptly. The next morning the enemy had

disappeared, and our pursuit was continued to Kingston, which we

reached during Sunday forenoon, the 19th.

From Resaca the railroad runs nearly due south, but at Kingston it

makes junction with another railroad from Rome, and changes

direction due east. At that time McPherson's head of column was

about four miles to the west of Kingston, at a country place called

"Woodlawn;" Schofield and Hooker were on the direct roads leading

from Newtown to Casaville, diagonal to the route followed by

Thomas. Thomas's head of column, which had followed the country

roads alongside of the railroad, was about four miles east of

Kingston, toward Cassville, when about noon I got a message from

him that he had found the enemy, drawn up in line of battle, on

some extensive, open ground, about half-way between Kingston and

Cassville, and that appearances indicated a willingness and

preparation for battle.

Hurriedly sending orders to McPherson to resume the march, to

hasten forward by roads leading to the south of Kingston, so as to

leave for Thomas's troops and trains the use of the main road, and

to come up on his right, I rode forward rapidly, over some rough

gravel hills, and about six miles from Kingston found General

Thomas, with his troops deployed; but he reported that the enemy

had fallen back in echelon of divisions, steadily and in superb

order, into Cassville. I knew that the roads by which Generals

Hooker and Schofield were approaching would lead them to a seminary

near Cassville, and that it was all-important to secure the point

of junction of these roads with the main road along which we were

marching. Therefore I ordered General Thomas to push forward his

deployed lines as rapidly as possible; and, as night was

approaching, I ordered two field-batteries to close up at a gallop

on some woods which lay between us and the town of Cassville. We

could not see the town by reason of these woods, but a high range

of hills just back of the town was visible over the tree-tops. On

these hills could be seen fresh-made parapets, and the movements of

men, against whom I directed the artillery to fire at long range.

The stout resistance made by the enemy along our whole front of a

couple of miles indicated a purpose to fight at Cassville; and, as

the night was closing in, General Thomas and I were together, along

with our skirmish-lines near the seminary, on the edge of the town,

where musket-bullets from the enemy were cutting the leaves of the

trees pretty thickly about us. Either Thomas or I remarked that

that was not the place for the two senior officers of a great army,

and we personally went back to the battery, where we passed the

night on the ground. During the night I had reports from

McPherson, Hooker, and Schofield. The former was about five miles

to my right rear, near the "nitre-caves;" Schofield was about six

miles north, and Hooker between us, within two miles. All were

ordered to close down on Cassville at daylight, and to attack the

enemy wherever found. Skirmishing was kept up all night, but when

day broke the next morning, May 20th, the enemy was gone, and our

cavalry was sent in pursuit. These reported him beyond the Etowah

River. We were then well in advance of our railroad-trains, on

which we depended for supplies; so I determined to pause a few days

to repair the railroad, which had been damaged but little, except

at the bridge at Resaca, and then to go on.

Nearly all the people of the country seemed to have fled with

Johnston's army; yet some few families remained, and from one of

them I procured the copy of an order which Johnston had made at

Adairsville, in which he recited that he had retreated as far as

strategy required, and that his army must be prepared for battle at

Cassville. The newspapers of the South, many of which we found,

were also loud in denunciation of Johnston's falling back before us

without a serious battle, simply resisting by his skirmish-lines

and by his rear-guard. But his friends proclaimed that it was all

strategic; that he was deliberately drawing us farther and farther

into the meshes, farther and farther away from our base of

supplies, and that in due season he would not only halt for battle,

but assume the bold offensive. Of course it was to my interest to

bring him to battle as soon as possible, when our numerical

superiority was at the greatest; for he was picking up his

detachments as he fell back, whereas I was compelled to make

similar and stronger detachments to repair the railroads as we

advanced, and to guard them. I found at Cassville many evidences

of preparation for a grand battle, among them a long line of fresh

intrenchments on the hill beyond the town, extending nearly three

miles to the south, embracing the railroad-crossing. I was also

convinced that the whole of Polk's corps had joined Johnston from

Mississippi, and that he had in hand three full corps, viz.,

Hood's, Polk's, and Hardee's, numbering about sixty thousand men,

and could not then imagine why he had declined battle, and did not

learn the real reason till after the war was over, and then from

General Johnston himself.

In the autumn of 1865, when in command of the Military Division of

the Missouri, I went from St. Louis to Little Rock, Arkansas, and

afterward to Memphis. Taking a steamer for Cairo, I found as

fellow-passengers Generals Johnston and Frank Blair. We were, of

course, on the most friendly terms, and on our way up we talked

over our battles again, played cards, and questioned each other as

to particular parts of our mutual conduct in the game of war. I

told Johnston that I had seen his order of preparation, in the

nature of an address to his army, announcing his purpose to retreat

no more, but to accept battle at Cassville. He answered that such

was his purpose; that he had left Hardee's corps in the open fields

to check Thomas, and gain time for his formation on the ridge, just

behind Cassville; and it was this corps which General Thomas had

seen deployed, and whose handsome movement in retreat he had

reported in such complimentary terms. Johnston described how he

had placed Hood's corps on the right, Polk's in the centre, and

Hardee's on the left. He said he had ridden over the ground, given

to each corps commander his position, and orders to throw up

parapets during the night; that he was with Hardee on his extreme

left as the night closed in, and as Hardee's troops fell back to

the position assigned them for the intended battle of the next day;

and that, after giving Hardee some general instructions, he and his

staff rode back to Cassville. As he entered the town, or village,

he met Generals Hood and Polk. Hood inquired of him if he had had

any thing to eat, and he said no, that he was both hungry and

tired, when Hood invited him to go and share a supper which had

been prepared for him at a house close by. At the supper they

discussed the chances of the impending battle, when Hood spoke of

the ground assigned him as being enfiladed by our (Union)

artillery, which Johnston disputed, when General Polk chimed in

with the remark that General Hood was right; that the cannon-shots

fired by us at nightfall had enfiladed their general line of

battle, and that for this reason he feared they could not hold

their men. General Johnston was surprised at this, for he

understood General Hood to be one of those who professed to

criticise his strategy, contending that, instead of retreating, he

should have risked a battle. General Johnston said he was

provoked, accused them of having been in conference, with being

beaten before battle, and added that he was unwilling to engage in

a critical battle with an army so superior to his own in numbers,

with two of his three corps commanders dissatisfied with the ground

and positions assigned them. He then and there made up his mind to

retreat still farther south, to put the Etowah River and the

Allatoona range between us; and he at once gave orders to resume

the retrograde movement.

This was my recollection of the substance of the conversation, of

which I made no note at the time; but, at a meeting of the Society

of the Army of the Cumberland some years after, at Cleveland, Ohio,

about 1868, in a short after-dinner speech, I related this

conversation, and it got into print. Subsequently, in the spring

of 1870, when I was at New Orleans, on route for Texas, General

Hood called to see me at the St. Charles Hotel, explained that he

had seen my speech reprinted in the newspapers and gave me his

version of the same event, describing the halt at Cassville, the

general orders for battle on that ground, and the meeting at supper

with Generals Johnston and Polk, when the chances of the battle to

be fought the next day were freely and fully discussed; and he

stated that he had argued against fighting the battle purely on the

defensive, but had asked General Johnston to permit him with his

own corps and part of Polk's to quit their lines, and to march

rapidly to attack and overwhelm Schofield, who was known to be

separated from Thomas by an interval of nearly five miles, claiming

that he could have defeated Schofield, and got back to his position

in time to meet General Thomas's attack in front. He also stated

that he had then contended with Johnston for the "offensive-

defensive" game, instead of the "pure defensive," as proposed by

General Johnston; and he said that it was at this time that General

Johnston had taken offense, and that it was for this reason he had

ordered the retreat that night. As subsequent events estranged

these two officers, it is very natural they should now differ on

this point; but it was sufficient for us that the rebel army did

retreat that night, leaving us masters of all the country above the

Etowah River.

For the purposes of rest, to give time for the repair of the

railroads, and to replenish supplies, we lay by some few days in

that quarter--Schofield with Stoneman's cavalry holding the ground

at Cassville Depot, Cartersville, and the Etowah Bridge; Thomas

holding his ground near Cassville, and McPherson that near

Kingston. The officer intrusted with the repair of the railroads

was Colonel W. W. Wright, a railroad-engineer, who, with about two

thousand men, was so industrious and skillful that the bridge at

Resaca was rebuilt in three days, and cars loaded with stores came

forward to Kingston on the 24th. The telegraph also brought us the

news of the bloody and desperate battles of the Wilderness, in

Virginia, and that General Grant was pushing his operations against

Lee with terrific energy. I was therefore resolved to give my

enemy no rest.

In early days (1844), when a lieutenant of the Third Artillery, I

had been sent from Charleston, South Carolina, to Marietta,

Georgia, to assist Inspector-General Churchill to take testimony

concerning certain losses of horses and accoutrements by the

Georgia Volunteers during the Florida War; and after completing the

work at Marietta we transferred our party over to Bellefonte,

Alabama. I had ridden the distance on horseback, and had noted

well the topography of the country, especially that about Kenesaw,

Allatoona, and the Etowah River. On that occasion I had stopped

some days with a Colonel Tumlin, to see some remarkable Indian

mounds on the Etowah River, usually called the "Hightower:" I

therefore knew that the Allatoona Pass was very strong, would be

hard to force, and resolved not even to attempt it, but to turn the

position, by moving from Kingston to Marietta via. Dallas;

accordingly I made orders on the 20th to get ready for the march to

begin on the 23d. The Army of the Cumberland was ordered to march

for Dallas, by Euharlee and Stilesboro; Davis's division, then in

Rome, by Van Wert; the Army of the Ohio to keep on the left of

Thomas, by a place called Burnt Hickory; and the Army of the

Tennessee to march for a position a little to the south, so as to

be on the right of the general army, when grouped about Dallas.

The movement contemplated leaving our railroad, and to depend for

twenty days on the contents of our wagons; and as the country was

very obscure, mostly in a state of nature, densely wooded, and with

few roads, our movements were necessarily slow. We crossed the

Etowah by several bridges and fords, and took as many roads as

possible, keeping up communication by cross-roads, or by couriers

through the woods. I personally joined General Thomas, who had the

centre, and was consequently the main column, or "column of

direction." The several columns followed generally the valley of

the Euharlee, a tributary coming into the Etowah from the south,

and gradually crossed over a ridge of mountains, parts of which had

once been worked over for gold, and were consequently full of paths

and unused wagon-roads or tracks. A cavalry picket of the enemy at

Burnt Hickory was captured, and had on his person an order from

General Johnston, dated at Allatoona, which showed that he had

detected my purpose of turning his position, and it accordingly

became necessary to use great caution, lest some of the minor

columns should fall into ambush, but, luckily the enemy was not

much more familiar with that part of the country than we were. On

the other side of the Allatoona range, the Pumpkin-Vine Creek, also

a tributary of the Etowah, flowed north and west; Dallas, the point

aimed at, was a small town on the other or east side of this creek,

and was the point of concentration of a great many roads that led

in every direction. Its possession would be a threat to Marietta

and Atlanta, but I could not then venture to attempt either, till I

had regained the use of the railroad, at least as far down as its

debouche from the Allatoona range of mountains. Therefore, the

movement was chiefly designed to compel Johnston to give up

Allatoona.

On the 25th all the columns were moving steadily on Dallas

--McPherson and Davis away off to the right, near Van Wert; Thomas on

the main road in the centre, with Hooker's Twentieth Corps ahead,

toward Dallas; and Schofield to the left rear. For the convenience

of march, Hooker had his three divisions on separate roads, all

leading toward Dallas, when, in the afternoon, as he approached a

bridge across Pumpkin-Vine Creek, he found it held by a cavalry

force, which was driven off, but the bridge was on fire. This fire

was extinguished, and Hooker's leading division (Geary's) followed

the retreating cavalry on a road leading due east toward Marietta,

instead of Dallas. This leading division, about four miles out from

the bridge, struck a heavy infantry force, which was moving down from

Allatoona toward Dallas, and a sharp battle ensued. I came up in

person soon after, and as my map showed that we were near an

important cross-road called "New Hope," from a Methodist

meeting-house there of that name, I ordered General Hooker to secure

it if possible that night. He asked for a short delay, till he could

bring up his other two divisions, viz., of Butterfield and Williams,

but before these divisions had got up and were deployed, the enemy

had also gained corresponding strength. The woods were so dense, and

the resistance so spirited, that Hooker could not carry the position,

though the battle was noisy, and prolonged far into the night. This

point, "New Hope," was the accidental intersection of the road

leading from Allatoona to Dallas with that from Van Wert to Marietta,

was four miles northeast of Dallas, and from the bloody fighting

there for the next week was called by the soldiers "Hell-Hole."

The night was pitch-dark, it rained hard, and the convergence of

our columns toward Dallas produced much confusion. I am sure

similar confusion existed in the army opposed to us, for we were

all mixed up. I slept on the ground, without cover, alongside of a

log, got little sleep, resolved at daylight to renew the battle,

and to make a lodgment on the Dallas and Allatoona road if

possible, but the morning revealed a strong line of intrenchments

facing us, with a heavy force of infantry and guns. The battle was

renewed, and without success. McPherson reached Dallas that

morning, viz., the 26th, and deployed his troops to the southeast

and east of the town, placing Davis's division of the Fourteenth

Corps, which had joined him on the road from Rome, on his left; but

this still left a gap of at least three miles between Davis and

Hooker. Meantime, also, General Schofield was closing up on

Thomas's left.

Satisfied that Johnston in person was at New Hope with all his

army, and that it was so much nearer my "objective;" the railroad,

than Dallas, I concluded to draw McPherson from Dallas to Hooker's

right, and gave orders accordingly; but McPherson also was

confronted with a heavy force, and, as he began to withdraw

according to his orders, on the morning of the 28th he was fiercely

assailed on his right; a bloody battle ensued, in which he repulsed

the attack, inflicting heavy loss on his assailants, and it was not

until the 1st of June that he was enabled to withdraw from Dallas,

and to effect a close junction with Hooker in front of New Hope.

Meantime Thomas and Schofield were completing their deployments,

gradually overlapping Johnston on his right, and thus extending our

left nearer and nearer to the railroad, the nearest point of which

was Acworth, about eight miles distant. All this time a continual

battle was in progress by strong skirmish-lines, taking advantage

of every species of cover, and both parties fortifying each night

by rifle-trenches, with head-logs, many of which grew to be as

formidable as first-class works of defense. Occasionally one party

or the other would make a dash in the nature of a sally, but

usually it sustained a repulse with great loss of life. I visited

personally all parts of our lines nearly every day, was constantly

within musket-range, and though the fire of musketry and cannon

resounded day and night along the whole line, varying from six to

ten miles, I rarely saw a dozen of the enemy at any one time; and

these were always skirmishers dodging from tree to tree, or behind

logs on the ground, or who occasionally showed their heads above

the hastily-constructed but remarkably strong rifle-trenches. On

the occasion of my visit to McPherson on the 30th of May, while

standing with a group of officers, among whom were Generals

McPherson, Logan, Barry, and Colonel Taylor, my former chief of

artillery, a Minie-ball passed through Logan's coat-sleeve,

scratching the skin, and struck Colonel Taylor square in the

breast; luckily he had in his pocket a famous memorandum-book, in

which he kept a sort of diary, about which we used to joke him a

good deal; its thickness and size saved his life, breaking the

force of the ball, so that after traversing the book it only

penetrated the breast to the ribs, but it knocked him down and

disabled him for the rest of the campaign. He was a most competent

and worthy officer, and now lives in poverty in Chicago, sustained

in part by his own labor, and in part by a pitiful pension recently

granted.

On the 1st of June General McPherson closed in upon the right, and,

without attempting further to carry the enemy's strong position at

New Hope Church, I held our general right in close contact with it,

gradually, carefully, and steadily working by the left, until our

strong infantry-lines had reached and secured possession of all the

wagon-roads between New Hope, Allatoona, and Acworth, when I

dispatched Generals Garrard's and Stoneman's divisions of cavalry

into Allatoona, the first around by the west end of the pass, and

the latter by the direct road. Both reached their destination

without opposition, and orders were at once given to repair the

railroad forward from Kingston to Allatoona, embracing the bridge

across the Etowah River. Thus the real object of my move on Dallas

was accomplished, and on the 4th of June I was preparing to draw

off from New Hope Church, and to take position on the railroad in

front of Allatoona, when, General Johnston himself having evacuated

his position, we effected the change without further battle, and

moved to the railroad, occupying it from Allatoona and Acworth

forward to Big Shanty, in sight of the famous Kenesaw Mountain.

Thus, substantially in the month of May, we had steadily driven our

antagonist from the strong positions of Dalton, Resaea, Cassville,

Allatoona, and Dallas; had advanced our lines in strong, compact

order from Chattanooga to Big Shanty, nearly a hundred miles of as

difficult country as was ever fought over by civilized armies; and

thus stood prepared to go on, anxious to fight, and confident of

success as soon as the railroad communications were complete to

bring forward the necessary supplies. It is now impossible to

state accurately our loss of life and men in any one separate

battle; for the fighting was continuous, almost daily, among trees

and bushes, on ground where one could rarely see a hundred yards

ahead.

The aggregate loss in the several corps for the month of May is

reported-as follows in the usual monthly returns sent to the

Adjutant-General's office, which are, therefore, official:

Casualties during the Month of May, 1864

(Major-General SHERMAN commanding).

Killed and Missing. Wounded. Total.

1,863 7,436 9,299

General Joseph E. Johnston, in his "Narrative of his Military

Operations," just published (March 27, 1874), gives the effective

strength of his army at and about Dalton on the 1st of May, 1864

(page 302), as follows:

Infantry..................... 37,652

Artillery.................... 2,812

Cavalry...................... 2,392

Total ................... 42,856

During May, and prior to reaching Cassville, he was further

reenforced (page 352)

Polk's corps of three divisions....... 12,000

Martin's division of cavalry.......... 3,500

Jackson's division of cavalry......... 3,900

And at New Hope Church, May 26th

Brigade of Quarles.................... 2,200

Grand-total.................. 64,456

His losses during the month of May are stated by him, as taken from

the report of Surgeon Foard (page 325)

Killed Wounded Total

721 4,672 5,393

These figures include only the killed and wounded, whereas my

statement of losses embraces the "missing," which are usually

"prisoners," and of these we captured, during the whole campaign of

four and a half months, exactly 12,983, whose names, rank, and

regiments, were officially reported to the Commissary-General of

Prisoners; and assuming a due proportion for the month of May,

viz., one-fourth, makes 3,245 to be added to the killed and wounded

given above, making an aggregate loss in Johnston's army, from

Dalton to New Hope, inclusive, of 8,638, against ours of 9,299.

Therefore General Johnston is greatly in error, in his estimates on

page 357, in stating our loss, as compared with his, at six or ten

to one.

I always estimated my force at about double his, and could afford

to lose two to one without disturbing our relative proportion; but

I also reckoned that, in the natural strength of the country, in

the abundance of mountains, streams, and forests, he had a fair

offset to our numerical superiority, and therefore endeavored to

act with reasonable caution while moving on the vigorous

"offensive."

With the drawn battle of New Hope Church, and our occupation of the

natural fortress of Allatoona, terminated the month of May, and the

first stage of the campaign.

CHAPTER XVII.

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN--BATTLES ABOUT KENESAW MOUNTAIN.

JUNE, 1864.

On the 1st of June our three armies were well in hand, in the

broken and densely-wooded country fronting the enemy intrenched at

New Hope Church, about five miles north of Dallas. General

Stoneman's division of cavalry had occupied Allatoona, on the

railroad, and General Garrard's division was at the western end of

the pass, about Stilesboro. Colonel W. W. Wright, of the

Engineers, was busily employed in repairing the railroad and

rebuilding the bridge across the Etowah (or High tower) River,

which had been destroyed by the enemy on his retreat; and the

armies were engaged in a general and constant skirmish along a

front of about six miles--McPherson the right, Thomas the centre,

and Schofield on the left. By gradually covering our front with

parapet, and extending to the left, we approached the railroad

toward Acworth and overlapped the enemy's right. By the 4th of

June we had made such progress that Johnston evacuated his lines in

the night, leaving us masters of the situation, when I deliberately

shifted McPherson's army to the extreme left, at and in front of

Acworth, with Thomas's about two miles on his right, and

Schofield's on his right all facing east. Heavy rains set in about

the 1st of June, making the roads infamous; but our marches were

short, as we needed time for the repair of the railroad, so as to

bring supplies forward to Allatoona Station. On the 6th I rode

back to Allatoona, seven miles, found it all that was expected, and

gave orders for its fortification and preparation as a "secondary

base."

General Blair arrived at Acworth on the 8th with his two divisions

of the Seventeenth Corps--the same which had been on veteran

furlough--had come up from Cairo by way of Clifton, on the

Tennessee River, and had followed our general route to Allatoona,

where he had left a garrison of about fifteen hundred men. His

effective strength, as reported, was nine thousand. These, with

new regiments and furloughed men who had joined early in the month

of May, equaled our losses from battle, sickness, and by

detachments; so that the three armies still aggregated about one

hundred thousand effective men.

On the 10th of June the whole combined army moved forward six

miles, to "Big Shanty," a station on the railroad, whence we had a

good view of the enemy's position, which embraced three prominent

hills known as Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain. On each

of these hills the enemy had signal-stations and fresh lines of

parapets. Heavy masses of infantry could be distinctly seen with

the naked eye, and it was manifest that Johnston had chosen his

ground well, and with deliberation had prepared for battle; but his

line was at least ten miles in extent--too long, in my judgment, to

be held successfully by his force, then estimated at sixty

thousand. As his position, however, gave him a perfect view over

our field, we had to proceed with due caution. McPherson had the

left, following the railroad, which curved around the north base of

Kenesaw; Thomas the centre, obliqued to the right, deploying below

Kenesaw and facing Pine Hill; and Schofield, somewhat refused, was

on the general right, looking south, toward Lost Mountain.

On the 11th the Etowah bridge was done; the railroad was repaired

up to our very skirmish line, close to the base of Kenesaw, and a

loaded train of cars came to Big Shanty. The locomotive, detached,

was run forward to a water-tank within the range of the enemy's

guns on Kenesaw, whence the enemy opened fire on the locomotive;

but the engineer was not afraid, went on to the tank, got water,

and returned safely to his train, answering the guns with the

screams of his engine, heightened by the cheers and shouts of our

men.

The rains continued to pour, and made our developments slow and

dilatory, for there were no roads, and these had to be improvised

by each division for its own supply train from the depot in Big

Shanty to the camps. Meantime each army was deploying carefully

before the enemy, intrenching every camp, ready as against a sally.

The enemy's cavalry was also busy in our rear, compelling us to

detach cavalry all the way back as far as Resaca, and to

strengthen all the infantry posts as far as Nashville. Besides,

there was great danger, always in my mind, that Forrest would

collect a heavy cavalry command in Mississippi, cross the Tennessee

River, and break up our railroad below Nashville. In anticipation

of this very danger, I had sent General Sturgis to Memphis to take

command of all the cavalry in that quarter, to go out toward

Pontotoc, engage Forrest and defeat him; but on the 14th of June I

learned that General Sturgis had himself been defeated on the 10th

of June, and had been driven by Forrest back into Memphis in

considerable confusion. I expected that this would soon be

followed by a general raid on all our roads in Tennessee. General

G. J. Smith, with the two divisions of the Sixteenth and

Seventeenth Corps which had been with General Banks up Red River,

had returned from that ill-fated expedition, and had been ordered

to General Canby at New Orleans, who was making a diversion about

Mobile; but, on hearing of General Sturgis's defeat, I ordered

General Smith to go out from Memphis and renew the offensive, so as

to keep Forrest off our roads. This he did finally, defeating

Forrest at Tupelo, on the 13th, 14th, and 15th days of July; and

he so stirred up matters in North Mississippi that Forrest could

not leave for Tennessee. This, for a time, left me only the task

of covering the roads against such minor detachments of cavalry as

Johnston could spare from his immediate army, and I proposed to

keep these too busy in their own defense to spare detachments. By

the 14th the rain slackened, and we occupied a continuous line of

ten miles, intrenched, conforming to the irregular position of the

enemy, when I reconnoitred, with a view to make a break in their

line between Kenesaw and Pine Mountain. When abreast of Pine

Mountain I noticed a rebel battery on its crest, with a continuous

line of fresh rifle-trench about half-way down the hill. Our

skirmishers were at the time engaged in the woods about the base of

this hill between the lines, and I estimated the distance to the

battery on the crest at about eight hundred yards. Near it, in

plain view, stood a group of the enemy, evidently observing us with

glasses. General Howard, commanding the Fourth Corps, was near by,

and I called his attention to this group, and ordered him to compel

it to keep behind its cover. He replied that his orders from

General Thomas were to spare artillery-ammunition. This was right,

according to the general policy, but I explained to him that we

must keep up the morale of a bold offensive, that he must use his

artillery, force the enemy to remain on the timid defensive, and

ordered him to cause a battery close by to fire three volleys. I

continued to ride down our line, and soon heard, in quick

succession, the three volleys. The next division in order was

Geary's, and I gave him similar orders. General Polk, in my

opinion, was killed by the second volley fired from the first

battery referred to.

In a conversation with General Johnston, after the war, he

explained that on that day he had ridden in person from Marietta to

Pine Mountain, held by Bates's division, and was accompanied by

Generals Hardee and Polk. When on Pine Mountain, reconnoitring,

quite a group of soldiers, belonging to the battery close by,

clustered about him. He noticed the preparations of our battery to

fire, and cautioned these men to scatter. They did so, and he

likewise hurried behind the parapet, from which he had an equally

good view of our position but General Polk, who was dignified and

corpulent, walked back slowly, not wishing to appear too hurried or

cautious in the presence of the men, and was struck across the

breast by an unexploded shell, which killed him instantly. This is

my memory of the conversation, and it is confirmed by Johnston

himself in his "Narrative," page 337, except that he calculated the

distance of our battery at six hundred yards, and says that Polk

was killed by the third shot; I know that our guns fired by volley,

and believe that he was hit by a shot of the second volley. It has

been asserted that I fired the gun which killed General Polk, and

that I knew it was directed against that general. The fact is, at

that distance we could not even tell that the group were officers

at all; I was on horseback, a couple of hundred yards off, before

my orders to fire were executed, had no idea that our shot had

taken effect, and continued my ride down along the line to

Schofield's extreme flank, returning late in the evening to my

head-quarters at Big Shanty, where I occupied an abandoned house.

In a cotton-field back of that house was our signal-station, on the

roof of an old gin-house. The signal-officer reported that by

studying the enemy's signals he had learned the key, and that he

could read their signals. He explained to me that he had

translated a signal about noon, from Pine Mountain to Marietta,

"Send an ambulance for General Polk's body;" and later in the day

another, "Why don't you send an ambulance for General Polk?" From

this we inferred that General Polk had been killed, but how or

where we knew not; and this inference was confirmed later in the

same day by the report of some prisoners who had been captured.

On the 15th we advanced our general lines, intending to attack at

any weak point discovered between Kenesaw and Pine Mountain; but

Pine Mountain was found to be abandoned, and Johnston had

contracted his front somewhat, on a direct line, connecting Kenesaw

with Lost Mountain. Thomas and Schofield thereby gained about two

miles of most difficult, country, and McPherson's left lapped well

around the north end of Kenesaw. We captured a good many

prisoners, among them a whole infantry regiment, the Fourteenth

Alabama, three hundred and twenty strong.

On the 16th the general movement was continued, when Lost Mountain

was abandoned by the enemy. Our right naturally swung round, so as

to threaten the railroad below Marietta, but Johnston had still

further contracted and strengthened his lines, covering Marietta

and all the roads below.

On the 17th and 18th the rain again fell in torrents, making army

movements impossible, but we devoted the time to strengthening our

positions, more especially the left and centre, with a view

gradually to draw from the left to add to the right; and we had to

hold our lines on the left extremely strong, to guard against a

sally from Kenesaw against our depot at Big Shanty. Garrard's

division of cavalry was kept busy on our left, McPherson had

gradually extended to his right, enabling Thomas to do the same

still farther; but the enemy's position was so very strong, and

everywhere it was covered by intrenchments, that we found it as

dangerous to assault as a permanent fort. We in like manner

covered our lines of battle by similar works, and even our

skirmishers learned to cover their bodies by the simplest and best

forms of defensive works, such as rails or logs, piled in the form

of a simple lunette, covered on the outside with earth thrown up at

night.

The enemy and ourselves used the same form of rifle-trench, varied

according to the nature of the ground, viz.: the trees and bushes

were cut away for a hundred yards or more in front, serving as an

abatis or entanglement; the parapets varied from four to six feet

high, the dirt taken from a ditch outside and from a covered way

inside, and this parapet was surmounted by a "head-log," composed

of the trunk of a tree from twelve to twenty inches at the butt,

lying along the interior crest of the parapet and resting in

notches cut in other trunks which extended back, forming an

inclined plane, in case the head-log should be knocked inward by a

cannon-shot. The men of both armies became extremely skillful in

the construction of these works, because each man realized their

value and importance to himself, so that it required no orders for

their construction. As soon as a regiment or brigade gained a

position within easy distance for a sally, it would set to work

with a will, and would construct such a parapet in a single night;

but I endeavored to spare the soldiers this hard labor by

authorizing each division commander to organize out of the freedmen

who escaped to us a pioneer corps of two hundred men, who were fed

out of the regular army supplies, and I promised them ten dollars a

month, under an existing act of Congress. These pioneer

detachments became very useful to us during the rest of the war,

for they could work at night while our men slept; they in turn were

not expected to fight, and could therefore sleep by day. Our

enemies used their slaves for a similar purpose, but usually kept

them out of the range of fire by employing them to fortify and

strengthen the position to their rear next to be occupied in their

general retrograde. During this campaign hundreds if not thousands

of miles of similar intrenchments were built by both armies, and,

as a rule, whichever party attacked got the worst of it.

On the 19th of June the rebel army again fell back on its flanks,

to such an extent that for a time I supposed it had retreated to

the Chattahoochee River, fifteen miles distant; but as we pressed

forward we were soon undeceived, for we found it still more

concentrated, covering Marietta and the railroad. These successive

contractions of the enemy's line encouraged us and discouraged him,

but were doubtless justified by sound reasons. On the 20th

Johnston's position was unusually strong. Kenesaw Mountain was his

salient; his two flanks were refused and covered by parapets and by

Noonday and Nose's Creeks. His left flank was his weak point, so

long as he acted on the "defensive," whereas, had he designed to

contract the extent of his line for the purpose of getting in

reserve a force with which to strike "offensively" from his right,

he would have done a wise act, and I was compelled to presume that

such was his object: We were also so far from Nashville and

Chattanooga that we were naturally sensitive for the safety of our

railroad and depots, so that the left (McPherson) was held very

strong.

About this time came reports that a large cavalry force of the

enemy had passed around our left flank, evidently to strike this

very railroad somewhere below Chattanooga. I therefore reenforced

the cavalry stationed from Resaca to Casaville, and ordered forward

from Huntsville, Alabama, the infantry division of General John E.

Smith, to hold Kingston securely.

While we were thus engaged about Kenesaw, General Grant had his

hands full with Lee, in Virginia. General Halleck was the chief of

staff at Washington, and to him I communicated almost daily. I

find from my letter-book that on the 21st of June I reported to him

tersely and truly the condition of facts on that day: "This is the

nineteenth day of rain, and the prospect of fair weather is as far

off as ever. The roads are impassable; the fields and woods become

quagmire's after a few wagons have crossed over. Yet we are at

work all the time. The left flank is across Noonday Creek, and the

right is across Nose's Creek. The enemy still holds Kenesaw, a

conical mountain, with Marietta behind it, and has his flanks

retired, to cover that town and the railroad behind. I am all

ready to attack the moment the weather and roads will permit troops

and artillery to move with any thing like life."

The weather has a wonderful effect on troops: in action and on the

march, rain is favorable; but in the woods, where all is blind and

uncertain, it seems almost impossible for an army covering ten

miles of front to act in concert during wet and stormy weather.

Still I pressed operations with the utmost earnestness, aiming

always to keep our fortified lines in absolute contact with the

enemy, while with the surplus force we felt forward, from one flank

or the other, for his line of communication and retreat. On the

22d of June I rode the whole line, and ordered General Thomas in

person to advance his extreme right corps (Hooker's); and

instructed General Schofield, by letter, to keep his entire army,

viz., the Twenty-third Corps, as a strong right flank in close

support of Hooker's deployed line. During this day the sun came

out, with some promise of clear weather, and I had got back to my

bivouac about dark, when a signal message was received, dated--

KULP HOUSE, 5.30 P.M.

General SHERMAN:

We have repulsed two heavy attacks, and feel confident, our only

apprehension being from our extreme right flank. Three entire

corps are in front of us.

Major-General HOOKER.

Hooker's corps (the Twentieth) belonged to Thomas's army; Thomas's

headquarters were two miles nearer to Hooker than mine; and Hooker,

being an old army officer, knew that he should have reported this

fact to Thomas and not to me; I was, moreover, specially disturbed

by the assertion in his report that he was uneasy about his right

flank, when Schofield had been specially ordered to protect that.

I first inquired of my adjutant, Dayton, if he were certain that

General Schofield had received his orders, and he answered that the

envelope in which he had sent them was receipted by General

Schofield himself. I knew, therefore, that General Schofield must

be near by, in close support of Hooker's right flank. General

Thomas had before this occasion complained to me of General

Hooker's disposition to "switch off," leaving wide gaps in his

line, so as to be independent, and to make glory on his own

account. I therefore resolved not to overlook this breach of

discipline and propriety. The rebel army was only composed of

three corps; I had that very day ridden six miles of their lines,

found them everywhere strongly occupied, and therefore Hooker could

not have encountered "three entire corps." Both McPherson and

Schofield had also complained to me of this same tendency of Hooker

to widen the gap between his own corps and his proper army

(Thomas's), so as to come into closer contact with one or other of

the wings, asserting that he was the senior by commission to both

McPherson and Schofield, and that in the event of battle he should

assume command over them, by virtue of his older commission.

They appealed to me to protect them. I had heard during that day

some cannonading and heavy firing down toward the "Kulp House,"

which was about five miles southeast of where I was, but this was

nothing unusual, for at the same moment there was firing along our

lines full ten miles in extent. Early the next day (23d) I rode

down to the "Kulp House," which was on a road leading from Powder

Springs to Marietta, about three miles distant from the latter. On

the way I passed through General Butterfield's division of Hooker's

corps, which I learned had not been engaged at all in the battle of

the day before; then I rode along Geary's and Williams's divisions,

which occupied the field of battle, and the men were engaged in

burying the dead. I found General Schofield's corps on the Powder

Springs road, its head of column abreast of Hooker's right,

therefore constituting "a strong right flank," and I met Generale

Schofield and Hooker together. As rain was falling at the moment,

we passed into a little church standing by the road-side, and I

there showed General Schofield Hooker's signal-message of the day

before. He was very angry, and pretty sharp words passed between

them, Schofield saying that his head of column (Hascall's division)

had been, at the time of the battle, actually in advance of

Hooker's line; that the attack or sally of the enemy struck his

troops before it did Hooker's; that General Hooker knew of it at

the time; and he offered to go out and show me that the dead men of

his advance division (Hascall's) were lying farther out than any of

Hooker's. General Hooker pretended not to have known this fact. I

then asked him why he had called on me for help, until he had used

all of his own troops; asserting that I had just seen Butterfield's

division, and had learned from him that he had not been engaged the

day before at all; and I asserted that the enemy's sally must have

been made by one corps (Hood's), in place of three, and that it had

fallen on Geary's and Williams's divisions, which had repulsed the

attack handsomely. As we rode away from that church General Hooker

was by my side, and I told him that such a thing must not occur

again; in other words, I reproved him more gently than the occasion

demanded, and from that time he began to sulk. General Hooker had

come from the East with great fame as a "fighter," and at

Chattanooga he was glorified by his "battle above the clouds,"

which I fear turned his head. He seemed jealous of all the army

commanders, because in years, former rank, and experience, he

thought he was our superior.

On the 23d of June I telegraphed to General Halleck this summary,

which I cannot again better state:

We continue to press forward on the principle of an advance against

fortified positions. The whole country is one vast fort, and

Johnston must have at least fifty miles of connected trenches, with

abatis and finished batteries. We gain ground daily, fighting all

the time. On the 21st General Stanley gained a position near the

south end of Kenesaw, from which the enemy attempted in vain to

drive him; and the same day General T. J. Wood's division took a

hill, which the enemy assaulted three times at night without

success, leaving more than a hundred dead on the ground. Yesterday

the extreme right (Hooker and Schofield) advanced on the Powder

Springs road to within three miles of Marietta. The enemy made a

strong effort to drive them away, but failed signally, leaving more

than two hundred dead on the field. Our lines are now in close

contact, and the fighting is incessant, with a good deal of

artillery-fire. As fast as we gain one position the enemy has

another all ready, but I think he will soon have to let go Kenesaw,

which is the key to the whole country. The weather is now better,

and the roads are drying up fast. Our losses are light, and,

not-withstanding the repeated breaks of the road to our rear,

supplies are ample.

During the 24th and 25th of June General Schofield extended his

right as far as prudent, so as to compel the enemy to thin out his

lines correspondingly, with the intention to make two strong

assaults at points where success would give us the greatest

advantage. I had consulted Generals Thomas, McPherson, and

Schofield, and we all agreed that we could not with prudence

stretch out any more, and therefore there was no alternative but to

attack "fortified lines," a thing carefully avoided up to that

time. I reasoned, if we could make a breach anywhere near the

rebel centre, and thrust in a strong head of column, that with the

one moiety of our army we could hold in check the corresponding

wing of the enemy, and with the other sweep in flank and overwhelm

the other half. The 27th of June was fixed as the day for the

attempt, and in order to oversee the whole, and to be in close

communication with all parts of the army, I had a place cleared on

the top of a hill to the rear of Thomas's centre, and had the

telegraph-wires laid to it. The points of attack were chosen, and

the troops were all prepared with as little demonstration as

possible. About 9 A.M. Of the day appointed, the troops moved to

the assault, and all along our lines for ten miles a furious fire

of artillery and musketry was kept up. At all points the enemy met

us with determined courage and in great force. McPherson's

attacking column fought up the face of the lesser Kenesaw, but

could not reach the summit. About a mile to the right (just below

the Dallas road) Thomas's assaulting column reached the parapet,

where Brigadier-General Barker was shot down mortally wounded, and

Brigadier-General Daniel McCook (my old law-partner) was

desperately wounded, from the effects of which he afterward died.

By 11.30 the assault was in fact over, and had failed. We had not

broken the rebel line at either point, but our assaulting columns

held their ground within a few yards of the rebel trenches, and

there covered themselves with parapet. McPherson lost about five

hundred men and several valuable officers, and Thomas lost nearly

two thousand men. This was the hardest fight of the campaign up to

that date, and it is well described by Johnston in his "Narrative"

(pages 342, 343), where he admits his loss in killed and wounded

as

Total ............. 808

This, no doubt, is a true and fair statement; but, as usual,

Johnston overestimates our loss, putting it at six thousand,

whereas our entire loss was about twenty-five hundred, killed and

wounded.

While the battle was in progress at the centre, Schofield crossed

Olley's Creek on the right, and gained a position threatening

Johnston's line of retreat; and, to increase the effect, I ordered

Stoneman's cavalry to proceed rapidly still farther to the right,

to Sweetwater. Satisfied of the bloody cost of attacking

intrenched lines, I at once thought of moving the whole army to the

railroad at a point (Fulton) about ten miles below Marietta, or to

the Chattahoochee River itself, a movement similar to the one

afterward so successfully practised at Atlanta. All the orders

were issued to bring forward supplies enough to fill our wagons,

intending to strip the railroad back to Allatoona, and leave that

place as our depot, to be covered as well as possible by Garrard's

cavalry. General Thomas, as usual, shook his head, deeming it

risky to leave the railroad; but something had to be done, and I

had resolved on this move, as reported in my dispatch to General

Halleck on July 1st:

General Schofield is now south of Olley's Creek, and on the head of

Nickajack. I have been hurrying down provisions and forage, and

tomorrow night propose to move McPherson from the left to the

extreme right, back of General Thomas. This will bring my right

within three miles of the Chattahoochee River, and about five miles

from the railroad. By this movement I think I can force Johnston

to move his whole army down from Kenesaw to defend his railroad and

the Chattahoochee, when I will (by the left flank) reach the

railroad below Marietta; but in this I must cut loose from the

railroad with ten days' supplies in wagons. Johnston may come out

of his intrenchments to attack Thomas, which is exactly what I

want, for General Thomas is well intrenched on a line parallel with

the enemy south of Kenesaw. I think that Allatoona and the line of

the Etowah are strong enough for me to venture on this move. The

movement is substantially down the Sandtown road straight for

Atlanta.

McPherson drew out of his lines during the night of July 2d,

leaving Garrard's cavalry, dismounted, occupying his trenches, and

moved to the rear of the Army of the Cumberland, stretching down

the Nickajack; but Johnston detected the movement, and promptly

abandoned Marietta and Kenesaw. I expected as much, for, by the

earliest dawn of the 3d of July, I was up at a large spy-glass

mounted on a tripod, which Colonel Poe, United States Engineers,

had at his bivouac close by our camp. I directed the glass on

Kenesaw, and saw some of our pickets crawling up the hill

cautiously; soon they stood upon the very top, and I could plainly

see their movements as they ran along the crest just abandoned by

the enemy. In a minute I roused my staff, and started them off

with orders in every direction for a pursuit by every possible

road, hoping to catch Johnston in the confusion of retreat,

especially at the crossing of the Chattahoochee River.

I must close this chapter here, so as to give the actual losses

during June, which are compiled from the official returns by

months. These losses, from June 1st to July 3d, were all

substantially sustained about Kenesaw and Marietta, and it was

really a continuous battle, lasting from the 10th day of June till

the 3d of July, when the rebel army fell back from Marietta toward

the Chattahoochee River. Our losses were:

Killed and Missing Wounded Total

Loss in June Aggregate 1,790 5,740 7,530

Johnston makes his statement of losses from the report of his

surgeon Foard, for pretty much the same period, viz., from June 4th

to July 4th (page 576):

Killed Wounded Total

Total............ 468 3,480 3,948

In the tabular statement the "missing" embraces the prisoners; and,

giving two thousand as a fair proportion of prisoners captured by

us for the month of June (twelve thousand nine hundred and

eighty-three in all the campaign), makes an aggregate loss in the

rebel army of fifty-nine hundred and forty-eight, to ours of

seventy-five hundred and thirty--a less proportion than in the

relative strength of our two armies, viz., as six to ten, thus

maintaining our relative superiority, which the desperate game

of war justified.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN--BATTLES ABOUT ATLANTA

JULY, 1864.

As before explained, on the 3d of July, by moving McPherson's

entire army from the extreme left, at the base of Kenesaw to the

right, below Olley's Creek, and stretching it down the Nickajack

toward Turner's Ferry of the Chattahoochee, we forced Johnston to

choose between a direct assault on Thomas's intrenched position, or

to permit us to make a lodgment on his railroad below Marietta, or

even to cross the Chattahoochee. Of course, he chose to let go

Kenesaw and Marietta, and fall back on an intrenched camp prepared

by his orders in advance on the north and west bank of the

Chattahoochee, covering the railroad-crossing and his several

pontoon-bridges. I confess I had not learned beforehand of the

existence of this strong place, in the nature of a tete-du-pont,

and had counted on striking him an effectual blow in the expected

confusion of his crossing the Chattahoochee, a broad and deep river

then to his rear. Ordering every part of the army to pursue

vigorously on the morning of the 3d of July, I rode into Marietta,

just quitted by the rebel rear-guard, and was terribly angry at the

cautious pursuit by Garrard's cavalry, and even by the head of our

infantry columns. But Johnston had in advance cleared and

multiplied his roads, whereas ours had to cross at right angles

from the direction of Powder Springs toward Marrietta, producing

delay and confusion. By night Thomas's head of column ran up

against a strong rear-guard intrenched at Smyrna camp-ground, six

miles below Marietta, and there on the next day we celebrated our

Fourth of July, by a noisy but not a desperate battle, designed

chiefly to hold the enemy there till Generals McPherson and

Schofield could get well into position below him, near the

Chattahoochee crossings.

It was here that General Noyes, late Governor of Ohio, lost his

leg. I came very near being shot myself while reconnoitring in the

second story of a house on our picket-line, which was struck

several times by cannon-shot, and perfectly riddled with

musket-balls.

During the night Johnston drew back all his army and trains inside

the tete-du-pont at the Chattahoochee, which proved one of the

strongest pieces of field-fortification I ever saw. We closed up

against it, and were promptly met by a heavy and severe fire.

Thomas was on the main road in immediate pursuit; next on his right

was Schofield; and McPherson on the extreme right, reaching the

Chattahoochee River below Turner's Ferry. Stoneman's cavalry was

still farther to the right, along down the Chattahoochee River as

far as opposite Sandtown; and on that day I ordered Garrard's

division of cavalry up the river eighteen miles, to secure

possession of the factories at Roswell, as well as to hold an

important bridge and ford at that place.

About three miles out from the Chattahoochee the main road forked,

the right branch following substantially the railroad, and the left

one leading straight for Atlanta, via Paice's Ferry and Buckhead.

We found the latter unoccupied and unguarded, and the Fourth Corps

(Howard's) reached the river at Paice's Ferry. The right-hand road

was perfectly covered by the tete-du-pont before described, where

the resistance was very severe, and for some time deceived me, for

I was pushing Thomas with orders to fiercely assault his enemy,

supposing that he was merely opposing us to gain time to get his

trains and troops across the Chattahoochee; but, on personally

reconnoitring, I saw the abatis and the strong redoubts, which

satisfied me of the preparations that had been made by Johnston in

anticipation of this very event. While I was with General Jeff. C.

Davis, a poor negro came out of the abatis, blanched with fright,

said he had been hidden under a log all day, with a perfect storm

of shot, shells, and musket-balls, passing over him, till a short

lull had enabled him to creep out and make himself known to our

skirmishers, who in turn had sent him back to where we were. This

negro explained that he with about a thousand slaves had been at

work a month or more on these very lines, which, as he explained,

extended from the river about a mile above the railroad-bridge to

Turner's Ferry below,--being in extent from five to six miles.

Therefore, on the 5th of July we had driven our enemy to cover in

the valley of the Chattahoochee, and we held possession of the

river above for eighteen miles, as far as Roswell, and below ten

miles to the mouth of the Sweetwater. Moreover, we held the high

ground and could overlook his movements, instead of his looking

down on us, as was the case at Kenesaw.

From a hill just back of Mining's Station I could see the houses in

Atlanta, nine miles distant, and the whole intervening valley of

the Chattahoochee; could observe the preparations for our reception

on the other side, the camps of men and large trains of covered

wagons; and supposed, as a matter of course, that Johnston had

passed the river with the bulk of his army, and that he had only

left on our side a corps to cover his bridges; but in fact he had

only sent across his cavalry and trains. Between Howard's corps at

Paice's Ferry and the rest of Thomas's army pressing up against

this tete-du-pont, was a space concealed by dense woods, in

crossing which I came near riding into a detachment of the enemy's

cavalry; and later in the same day Colonel Frank Sherman, of

Chicago, then on General Howard's staff, did actually ride straight

into the enemy's camp, supposing that our lines were continuous.

He was carried to Atlanta, and for some time the enemy supposed

they were in possession of the commander-in-chief of the opposing

army.

I knew that Johnston would not remain long on the west bank of the

Chattahoochee, for I could easily practise on that ground to better

advantage our former tactics of intrenching a moiety in his front,

and with the rest of our army cross the river and threaten either

his rear or the city of Atlanta itself, which city was of vital

importance to the existence not only of his own army, but of the

Confederacy itself. In my dispatch of July 6th to General Halleck,

at Washington, I state that:

Johnston (in his retreat from Kenesaw) has left two breaks in the

railroad--one above Marietta and one near Mining's Station. The

former is already repaired, and Johnston's army has heard the sound

of our locomotives. The telegraph is finished to Mining's Station,

and the field-wire has just reached my bivouac, and will be ready

to convey this message as soon as it is written and translated into

cipher.

I propose to study the crossings of the Chattahoochee, and, when

all is ready, to move quickly. As a beginning, I will keep the

troops and wagons well back from the river, and only display to the

enemy our picket-line, with a few field-batteries along at random.

I have already shifted Schofield to a point in our left rear,

whence he can in a single move reach the Chattahoochee at a point

above the railroad-bridge, where there is a ford. At present the

waters are turbid and swollen from recent rains; but if the present

hot weather lasts, the water will run down very fast. We have

pontoons enough for four bridges, but, as our crossing will be

resisted, we must manoeuvre some. All the regular crossing-places

are covered by forts, apparently of long construction; but we shall

cross in due time, and, instead of attacking Atlanta direct, or any

of its forts, I propose to make a circuit, destroying all its

railroads. This is a delicate movement, and must be done with

caution. Our army is in good condition and full of confidence; but

the weather is intensely hot, and a good many men have fallen with

sunstroke. The country is high and healthy, and the sanitary

condition of the army is good.

At this time Stoneman was very active on our extreme right,

pretending to be searching the river below Turner's Ferry for a

crossing, and was watched closely by the enemy's cavalry on the

other side, McPherson, on the right, was equally demonstrative at

and near Turner's Ferry. Thomas faced substantially the intrenched

tete-du-pont, and had his left on the Chattahoochee River, at

Paice's Ferry. Garrard's cavalry was up at Roswell, and McCook's

small division of cavalry was intermediate, above Soap's Creek.

Meantime, also, the railroad-construction party was hard at work,

repairing the railroad up to our camp at Vining's Station.

Of course, I expected every possible resistance in crossing the

Chattahoochee River, and had made up my mind to feign on the right,

but actually to cross over by the left. We had already secured a

crossing place at Roswell, but one nearer was advisable; General

Schofield had examined the river well, found a place just below the

mouth of Soap's Creek which he deemed advantageous, and was

instructed to effect an early crossing there, and to intrench a

good position on the other side, viz., the east bank. But,

preliminary thereto, I had ordered General Rousseau, at Nashville,

to collect, out of the scattered detachments of cavalry in

Tennessee, a force of a couple of thousand men, to rendezvous at

Decatur, Alabama, thence to make a rapid march for Opelika, to

break up the railroad links between Georgia and Alabama, and then

to make junction with me about Atlanta; or, if forced, to go on to

Pensacola, or even to swing across to some of our posts in

Mississippi. General Rousseau asked leave to command this

expedition himself, to which I consented, and on the 6th of July he

reported that he was all ready at Decatur, and I gave him orders to

start. He moved promptly on the 9th, crossed the Coosa below the

"Ten Islands" and the Tallapoosa below "Horseshoe Bend," having

passed through Talladega. He struck the railroad west of Opelika,

tore it up for twenty miles, then turned north and came to Marietta

on the 22d of July, whence he reported to me. This expedition was

in the nature of a raid, and must have disturbed the enemy

somewhat; but, as usual, the cavalry did not work hard, and their

destruction of the railroad was soon repaired. Rousseau, when he

reported to me in person before Atlanta, on the 28d of July, stated

his entire loss to have been only twelve killed and thirty wounded.

He brought in four hundred captured mules and three hundred horses,

and also told me a good story. He said he was far down in Alabama,

below Talladega, one hot, dusty day, when the blue clothing of his

men was gray with dust; he had halted his column along a road, and

he in person, with his staff, had gone to the house of a planter,

who met him kindly on the front-porch. He asked for water, which

was brought, and as the party sat on the porch in conversation he

saw, in a stable-yard across the road, quite a number of good

mules. He remarked to the planter, "My good sir, I fear I must take

some of your mules." The planter remonstrated, saying he had

already contributed liberally to the good cause; that it was only

last week he had given to General Roddy ten mules. Rousseau

replied, "Well, in this war you should be at least neutral--that

is, you should be as liberal to us as to Roddy" (a rebel cavalry

general). "Well, ain't you on our side?" "No," said Rousseau; "I

am General Rousseau, and all these men you see are Yanks." "Great

God! is it possible! Are these Yanks! Who ever supposed they

would come away down here in Alabama?" Of course, Rousseau took

his ten mules.

Schofield effected his crossing at Soap's Creek very handsomely on

the 9th, capturing the small guard that was watching the crossing.

By night he was on the high ground beyond, strongly intrenched,

with two good pontoon-bridges finished, and was prepared, if

necessary, for an assault by the whole Confederate army. The same

day Garrard's cavalry also crossed over at Roswell, drove away the

cavalry-pickets, and held its ground till relieved by Newton's

division of Howard's corps, which was sent up temporarily, till it

in turn was relieved by Dodge's corps (Sixteenth) of the Army of

the Tennessee, which was the advance of the whole of that army.

That night Johnston evacuated his trenches, crossed over the

Chattahoochee, burned the railroad bridge and his pontoon and

trestle bridges, and left us in full possession of the north or

west bank-besides which, we had already secured possession of the

two good crossings at Roswell and Soap's Creek. I have always

thought Johnston neglected his opportunity there, for he had lain

comparatively idle while we got control of both banks of the river

above him.

On the 13th I ordered McPherson, with the Fifteenth Corps, to move

up to Roswell, to cross over, prepare good bridges, and to make a

strong tete-du-pont on the farther side. Stoneman had been sent

down to Campbellton, with orders to cross over and to threaten the

railroad below Atlanta, if he could do so without too much risk;

and General Blair, with the Seventeenth Corps, was to remain at

Turner's Ferry, demonstrating as much as possible, thus keeping up

the feint below while we were actually crossing above. Thomas was

also ordered to prepare his bridges at Powers's and Paice's

Ferries. By crossing the Chattahoochee above the railroad bridge,

we were better placed to cover our railroad and depots than below,

though a movement across the river below the railroad, to the south

of Atlanta, might have been more decisive. But we were already so

far from home, and would be compelled to accept battle whenever

offered, with the Chattahoochee to our rear, that it became

imperative for me to take all prudential measures the case admitted

of, and I therefore determined to pass the river above the

railroad-bridge-McPherson on the left, Schofield in the centre,

and Thomas on the right. On the 13th I reported to General Halleck

as follows:

All is well. I have now accumulated stores at Allatoona and

Marietta, both fortified and garrisoned points. Have also three

places at which to cross the Chattahoochee in our possession, and

only await General Stoneman's return from a trip down the river, to

cross the army in force and move on Atlanta.

Stoneman is now out two days, and had orders to be back on the

fourth or fifth day at furthest.

From the 10th to the 15th we were all busy in strengthening the

several points for the proposed passage of the Chattahoochee, in

increasing the number and capacity of the bridges, rearranging the

garrisons to our rear, and in bringing forward supplies. On the

15th General Stoneman got back to Powder Springs, and was ordered

to replace General Blair at Turner's Ferry, and Blair, with the

Seventeenth Corps, was ordered up to Roswell to join McPherson. On

the 17th we began the general movement against Atlanta, Thomas

crossing the Chattahoochee at Powers's and Paice's, by pontoon-

bridges; Schofield moving out toward Cross Keys, and McPherson

toward Stone Mountain. We encountered but little opposition except

by cavalry. On the 18th all the armies moved on a general right

wheel, Thomas to Buckhead, forming line of battle facing

Peach-Tree Creek; Schofield was on his left, and McPherson well

over toward the railroad between Stone Mountain and Decatur, which

he reached at 2 p.m. of that day, about four miles from Stone

Mountain, and seven miles east of Decatur, and there he turned

toward Atlanta, breaking up the railroad as he progressed, his

advance-guard reaching Ecatur about night, where he came into

communication with Schofield's troops, which had also reached

Decatur. About 10 A.M. of that day (July 18th), when the armies

were all in motion, one of General Thomas's staff-officers brought

me a citizen, one of our spies, who had just come out of Atlanta,

and had brought a newspaper of the same day, or of the day before,

containing Johnston's order relinquishing the command of the

Confederate forces in Atlanta, and Hood's order assuming the

command. I immediately inquired of General Schofield, who was his

classmate at West Point, about Hood, as to his general character,

etc., and learned that he was bold even to rashness, and courageous

in the extreme; I inferred that the change of commanders meant

"fight." Notice of this important change was at once sent to all

parts of the army, and every division commander was cautioned to be

always prepared for battle in any shape. This was just what we

wanted, viz., to fight in open ground, on any thing like equal

terms, instead of being forced to run up against prepared

intrenchments; but, at the same time, the enemy having Atlanta

behind him, could choose the time and place of attack, and could at

pleasure mass a superior force on our weakest points. Therefore,

we had to be constantly ready for sallies.

On the 19th the three armies were converging toward Atlanta,

meeting such feeble resistance that I really thought the enemy

intended to evacuate the place. McPherson was moving astride of

the railroad, near Decatur; Schofield along a road leading toward

Atlanta, by Colonel Howard's house and the distillery; and Thomas

was crossing "Peach-Tree" in line of battle, building bridges for

nearly every division as deployed. There was quite a gap between

Thomas and Schofield, which I endeavored to close by drawing two of

Howard's divisions nearer Schofield. On the 20th I was with

General Schofield near the centre, and soon after noon heard heavy

firing in front of Thomas's right, which lasted an hour or so, and

then ceased.

I soon learned that the enemy had made a furious sally, the blow

falling on Hooker's corps (the Twentieth), and partially on

Johnson's division of the Fourteenth, and Newton's of the Fourth.

The troops had crossed Peach-Tree Creek, were deployed, but at the

time were resting for noon, when, without notice, the enemy came

pouring out of their trenches down upon them, they became

commingled, and fought in many places hand to hand. General Thomas

happened to be near the rear of Newton's division, and got some

field-batteries in a good position, on the north side of Peach-Tree

Creek, from which he directed a furious fire on a mass of the

enemy, which was passing around Newton's left and exposed flank.

After a couple of hours of hard and close conflict, the enemy

retired slowly within his trenches, leaving his dead and many

wounded on the field. Johnson's and Newton's losses were light, for

they had partially covered their fronts with light parapet; but

Hooker's whole corps fought in open ground, and lost about fifteen

hundred men. He reported four hundred rebel dead left on the

ground, and that the rebel wounded would number four thousand; but

this was conjectural, for most of them got back within their own

lines. We had, however, met successfully a bold sally, had

repelled it handsomely, and were also put on our guard; and the

event illustrated the future tactics of our enemy. This sally came

from the Peach-Tree line, which General Johnston had carefully

prepared in advance, from which to fight us outside of Atlanta. We

then advanced our lines in compact order, close up to these

finished intrenchments, overlapping them on our left. From various

parts of our lines the houses inside of Atlanta were plainly

visible, though between us were the strong parapets, with ditch,

fraise, chevaux-de-frise, and abatis, prepared long in advance by

Colonel Jeremy F. Gilmer, formerly of the United States Engineers.

McPherson had the Fifteenth Corps astride the Augusta Railroad, and

the Seventeenth deployed on its left. Schofield was next on his

right, then came Howard's, Hooker's, and Palmer's corps, on the

extreme right. Each corps was deployed with strong reserves, and

their trains were parked to their rear. McPherson's trains were in

Decatur, guarded by a brigade commanded by Colonel Sprague of the

Sixty-third Ohio. The Sixteenth Corps (Dodge's) was crowded out of

position on the right of McPherson's line, by the contraction of

the circle of investment; and, during the previous afternoon, the

Seventeenth Corps (Blair's) had pushed its operations on the

farther side of the Augusta Railroad, so as to secure possession of

a hill, known as Leggett's Hill, which Leggett's and Force's

divisions had carried by assault. Giles A. Smith's division was on

Leggett's left, deployed with a weak left flank "in air," in

military phraseology. The evening before General Gresham, a great

favorite, was badly wounded; and there also Colonel Tom Reynolds,

now of Madison, Wisconsin, was shot through the leg. When the

surgeons were debating the propriety of amputating it in his

hearing, he begged them to spare the leg, as it was very valuable,

being an "imported leg." He was of Irish birth, and this

well-timed piece of wit saved his leg, for the surgeons thought, if

he could perpetrate a joke at such a time, they would trust to his

vitality to save his limb.

During the night, I had full reports from all parts of our line,

most of which was partially intrenched as against a sally, and

finding that McPherson was stretching out too much on his left

flank, I wrote him a note early in the morning not to extend so

much by his left; for we had not troops enough to completely invest

the place, and I intended to destroy utterly all parts of the

Augusta Railroad to the east of Atlanta, then to withdraw from the

left flank and add to the right. In that letter I ordered

McPherson not to extend any farther to the left, but to employ

General Dodge's corps (Sixteenth), then forced out of position, to

destroy every rail and tie of the railroad, from Decatur up to his

skirmish-line, and I wanted him (McPherson) to be ready, as soon as

General Garrard returned from Covington (whither I had sent him),

to move to the extreme right of Thomas, so as to reach if possible

the railroad below Atlanta, viz., the Macon road. In the morning

we found the strong line of parapet, "Peach-Tree line," to the

front of Schofield and Thomas, abandoned, and our lines were

advanced rapidly close up to Atlanta. For some moments I supposed

the enemy intended to evacuate, and in person was on horseback at

the head of Schofield's troops, who had advanced in front of the

Howard House to some open ground, from which we could plainly see

the whole rebel line of parapets, and I saw their men dragging up

from the intervening valley, by the distillery, trees and saplings

for abatis. Our skirmishers found the enemy down in this valley,

and we could see the rebel main line strongly manned, with guns in

position at intervals. Schofield was dressing forward his lines,

and I could hear Thomas farther to the right engaged, when General

McPherson and his staff rode up. We went back to the Howard House,

a double frame-building with a porch, and sat on the steps,

discussing the chances of battle, and of Hood's general character.

McPherson had also been of the same class at West Point with Hood,

Schofield, and Sheridan. We agreed that we ought to be unusually

cautious and prepared at all times for sallies and for hard

fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of

great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, and

rash man; and the change of commanders at that particular crisis

argued the displeasure of the Confederate Government with the

cautious but prudent conduct of General Jos. Johnston.

McPherson was in excellent spirits, well pleased at the progress of

events so far, and had come over purposely to see me about the

order I had given him to use Dodge's corps to break up the

railroad, saying that the night before he had gained a position on

Leggett's Hill from which he could look over the rebel parapet, and

see the high smoke-stack of a large foundery in Atlanta; that

before receiving my order he had diverted Dodge's two divisions

(then in motion) from the main road, along a diagonal one that led

to his extreme left flank, then held by Giles A. Smith's division

(Seventeenth Corps), for the purpose of strengthening that flank;

and that he had sent some intrenching-tools there, to erect some

batteries from which he intended to knock down that foundery, and

otherwise to damage the buildings inside of Atlanta. He said he

could put all his pioneers to work, and do with them in the time

indicated all I had proposed to do with General Dodge's two

divisions. Of course I assented at once, and we walked down the

road a short distance, sat down by the foot of a tree where I had

my map, and on it pointed out to him Thomas's position and his own.

I then explained minutely that, after we had sufficiently broken up

the Augusta road, I wanted to shift his whole army around by the

rear to Thomas's extreme right, and hoped thus to reach the other

railroad at East Point. While we sat there we could hear lively

skirmishing going on near us (down about the distillery), and

occasionally round-shot from twelve or twenty-four pound guns came

through the trees in reply to those of Schofield, and we could hear

similar sounds all along down the lines of Thomas to our right, and

his own to the left; but presently the firing appeared a little

more brisk (especially over about Giles G. Smith's division), and

then we heard an occasional gun back toward Decatur. I asked him

what it meant. We took my pocket-compass (which I always carried),

and by noting the direction of the sound, we became satisfied that

the firing was too far to our left rear to be explained by known

facts, and he hastily called for his horse, his staff, and his

orderlies.